St. Remy v. Greene

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 filed by Julien Michel St. Remy (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable Keli M. Neary on 3/12/25. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULIEN MICHEL ST. REMY,
Petitioner
v.
WARDEN F. GREENE,
Respondent

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-1423
(Judge Neary)

MEMORANDUM
This is a habeas corpus case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, Julien
Michel St. Remy, argues that the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has
improperly denied him time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”) that must be
applied towards time in a halfway house. The petition will be dismissed for St.
Remy’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
I.

Factual Background & Procedural History
St. Remy is serving a 360-month sentence of imprisonment imposed by the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for conspiracy to
import cocaine and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. (Doc. 7-3
at 3). He is housed in Allenwood Federal Correctional Center (“FCC-Allenwood”).
St. Remy’s petition arises from the FSA, which allows eligible inmates who
successfully complete “evidence-based recidivism reduction programs” (“EBRRs”)
or productive activities (“PAs”) to receive earned time credits to be applied toward
time in pre-release custody or supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). An
inmate may earn ten days of credit for every thirty days of successful participation.

Id. Inmates who have been assessed at a minimum or low risk of recidivism who do
not increase their risk of recidivism over two consecutive assessments may earn an
additional five days of credit for every thirty days of successful participation. Id.
As of September 4, 2024, St. Remy had earned 625 days of credit under the
FSA, 365 of which have been applied to his early release. (Doc. 7-6 at 2). On
February 28, 2024, the warden of FCC-Allenwood recommended St. Remy for
placement in a Residential Re-Entry Center (“RRC”) to commence on March 1,
2024, but noted that United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement had
lodged an immigration detainer to assume custody of St. Remy after his release
from prison. (Doc. 7-5). Because a BOP policy stated that inmates with immigration
detainers were ineligible for placement in an RRC, St. Remy was not transferred to
an RRC. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 7 at 13).
St. Remy filed an administrative remedy request under the BOP’s
administrative remedy program requesting transfer to an RRC on July 24, 2024.
(Doc. 1-1 at 5). The warden denied the request on August 5, 2024. (Id. at 4). St. Remy
filed an appeal to the BOP’s regional office on August 13, 2024. (Doc. 1-1 at 6). He
filed the habeas corpus petition that initiated this case the next day, on August 14,
2024, before he received a response from the regional office. (Doc. 1). The petition
was received and docketed on August 21, 2024. (Id.)
St. Remy asserts that the BOP has improperly refused to apply time credits
he has earned under the FSA to his sentence and that such credits entitle him to be
transferred to an RRC. (Id.) The case was initially assigned to United States District
Judge Christopher C. Conner. Respondent responded to the petition on September
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16, 2024, arguing that St. Remy failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
filing the petition, that the decision to deny St. Remy’s requested transfer to an
RRC is not subject to judicial review, that the BOP nonetheless properly considered
St. Remy’s request for transfer to an RRC, and that St. Remy has no legal
entitlement to the relief he requests. (Doc. 7). St. Remy filed a reply brief in support
of his petition on October 1, 2024, making the petition ripe for review. (Doc. 8). The
case was reassigned to the undersigned on January 21, 2025, following Judge
Conner’s retirement.
II.

Discussion
Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for Section

2241 habeas petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
consistently held that exhaustion applies to such claims. See Callwood v. Enos, 230
F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53
(3d Cir. 1986)); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).
Exhaustion allows the agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise,
conserves judicial resources, and provides agencies the opportunity to “correct
their own errors” thereby fostering “administrative autonomy.” Id. at 761-62. The
BOP has a specific internal system through which federal prisoners can request
review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19. That
process begins with an informal request to staff and progresses to formal review by
the warden, appeal with the regional director, and—ultimately—final appeal to the
general counsel. Id. §§ 542.13-.15. No administrative remedy is considered fully
exhausted until reviewed by the general counsel. Id. § 542.15(a).
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Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will generally
preclude habeas review. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761. Only in rare circumstances is
exhaustion of administrative remedies not required. For example, exhaustion is
unnecessary if the issue presented is one that consists purely of statutory
construction. See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Exhaustion is likewise not
required when it would be futile. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982).
Respondent argues that St. Remy’s petition should be dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies because he filed his petition before completing the
BOP’s administrative remedy process. (Doc. 7 at 6-8).
St. Remy concedes that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies but
offers two arguments as to why exhaustion should be excused. (See Doc. 8 at 2).
First, he argues that exhaustion is futile because (a) completing the administrative
remedy process would take a significant amount of time and he allegedly would be
entitled to release before he could complete the program; and (b) the BOP likely
would not give him any relief. (Id.) Second, he argues that his claim is purely one of
statutory construction because both the FSA and relevant BOP policies state that
immigration detainers have no effect on whether an inmate should be transferred to
an RRC and that BOP employees are disregarding these rules. (Id. at 5).
St. Remy’s arguments are unavailing. First, courts in this district have
consistently rejected the argument that exhaustion of a Section 2241 habeas claim
should be excused as futile because completing the administrative remedy process
would take too long and the inmate may be released while the process is pending.
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See, e.g., Williams v. Warden, Allenwood-Low, No. 3:24-CV-1321, 2024 WL 4204277,
at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2024); Hammond v. Spaulding, No. 1:22-CV-1780 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 28, 2023). Similarly, the administrative remedy process is not rendered futile
“simply because a prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in his administrative
appeals.” Williams, 2024 WL 4204277, at *2 (quoting Ross v. Martinez, No. 4:09-CV1770, 2009 WL 4573686, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009))). Finally, St. Remy’s petition
does not present a question of purely statutory interpretation that would excuse
exhaustion: he argues not only that the FSA requires him to be given time credits,
but also that BOP staff are violating BOP policies indicating that immigration
detainers have no bearing on whether inmates should be transferred to RRCs. (Doc.
8 at 5); see also, Williams, 2024 WL 4204277, at *2 (rejecting argument that claim
presented pure question of statutory interpretation where it also raised “a dispute
as to whether the BOP properly applied its agency calculations”). St. Remy’s
petition will accordingly be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Respondent’s alternative arguments will not be addressed.
III.

Conclusion
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. An appropriate order shall issue.
/S/ KELI M. NEARY
Keli M. Neary
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated:

March 12, 2025

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