Joseph v. Kelly et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 14 Amended Complaint filed by Carrington K. Joseph. Signed by Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson on 1/27/2025. (ve)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARRINGTON K. JOSEPH,
Plaintiff,
v.
TERRI KELLY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 1:24-CV-01532
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the amended complaint filed by Carrington K. Joseph
(“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff is raising claims
under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on his
receipt of legal mail via fax from the State Correctional Institution Mahanoy
(“SCI-Mahanoy”) while he was temporary housed at Lancaster County Prison.
(Id.) Following a screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his
complaint one final time.
BACKGROUND
On September 10, 2024, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s
complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docs. 1, 2.) Plaintiff is an
inmate currently housed at SCI-Mahanoy in Frackville, Pennsylvania. On October
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11, 2024, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff later paid the filing fee in full, and the court deemed
the complaint filed. (Doc. 12.)
The original complaint named the following five defendants: (1) Terri Kelly
(“Kelly”), Mail Inspector Supervisor at SCI-Mahanoy; (2) Faith Walter (“Walter”),
Mail Inspector Supervisor at SCI-Mahanoy; (3) Major Michael Dunkle
(“Dunkle”), Security (Facility Management) Major of the Guard at SCI-Mahanoy;
(4) Kirsa Tobias (“Tobias”), Unite Manager – Housing Unit J at SCI-Mahanoy;
and (5) Bernadette Mason (“Mason”), Superintendent/Facility Manager for SCIMahanoy. (Doc. 1, pp. 2–3.)1 Plaintiff alleged that while he was on an Authorized
Temporary Absence at Lancaster County Prison on August 24, 2023, nondefendant Mail Clerk Supervisor Mrs. Kennedy shoved mail beneath the door of
his cell. (Id., p. 4.) After reviewing the mail, Plaintiff realized it was not regular
mail, but legal mail. (Id.) Plaintiff spoke with non-defendant Correctional Officer
T. Kyle (“C.O. Kyle”) and asked why he had a copy of his legal mail and not the
original court documents. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleged that C.O. Kyle explained
that SCI-Mahanoy, or someone from SCI-Mahanoy, faxed his legal mail from SCIMahanoy to Lancaster County Prison. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that he then asked
C.O. Kyle “why would they violate my Constitutional Rights like that?”, and C.O.
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For ease of reference the court uses the page numbers form the CM/ECF header.
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Kyle told him it was because it was much faster to fax the legal mail rather than
forward it through the mail. (Id.)
On November 26, 2024, the court screened the complaint and dismissed it
because Plaintiff did not allege facts demonstrating the personal involvement of the
named defendants. (Doc. 13.) The court granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend
his petition. (Id.)
On December 19, 2024, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s amended
complaint. (Doc. 14.) This amended complaint realleges the facts of the original
complaint, but identifies the named defendants as “speculative” defendants stating
that “anyone of the Five Named above will be held accountable/culpable for faxing
the Plaintiff’s legal mail down to Lancaster County Prison.” (Id., p. 3.) Plaintiff
also asks the court to order the Superintendent of SCI-Mahanoy to surrender
Plaintiff’s documents, that a forensic computer tech be hired to retrieve data, that
the mailroom policy be provided, and that a private investigator be hired so that
Plaintiff can identify the correct defendant in this action. (Id., pp. 3–4.)
The court will now screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
dismiss the amended complaint.
DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal district courts “shall review . . . a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
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entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” The grounds for dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A include a complaint that is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The legal standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss. Simonton v. Ryland-Tanner, 836 Fed. App’x. 81, 83 (3rd Cir. 2020).
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as
true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe
v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The pleadings of selfrepresented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Selfrepresented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint
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even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
245 (3d Cir. 2008).
A. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged Personal Involvement of the Defendants.
Here, Plaintiff has again not set forth any personal involvement on the part
of any of the named defendants in the alleged facts. See Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor
approved.”) Instead, Plaintiff attempts to overcome this pleading flaw by
identifying the named defendants as speculative defendants and seeking the
assistance of the court in gathering the necessary evidence to identify who is the
proper defendant in the action. (Doc. 14.)
Under similar circumstances where the individual actor cannot be identified,
but a supervisor of that actor is identified, several courts have held that a court
should not dismiss an otherwise colorable claim against supervisory personnel,
who are not alleged to otherwise have personal involvement, until a pro se plaintiff
has been afforded an opportunity, at least through limited discovery, to identify the
subordinate officials who have personal liability. Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917,
920–21 (2d Cir. 1998). To this end, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
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implicitly sanctioned the use of an employer or supervisor as a placeholder for an
unknown defendant for the limited purpose of assisting a pro se plaintiff in
obtaining sufficient information to identify the defendant and effectuate proper
service. See Wyatt v. Municipality of Commonwealth of Philadelphia, 718 Fed.
Appx. 102, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2017) (recognizing the difficulties presented where a
pro se plaintiff could only provide limited information for the United States
Marshals Service for purpose of serving the defendants). Other district courts in
this Circuit have adopted the same approach. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Piazza, 2022
WL 16540671, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2022) (retaining the State Parole Office as
a “placeholder” defendant so that the pro se plaintiff could “obtain sufficient
information to identify the defendants to effect proper service”); Robinson v.
Responding Nurse, 2022 WL 93678, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2022) (maintaining the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections as a defendant “for the limited, and
sole purpose, of allowing the Marshals Service to serve a copy of the Summonses
and the Complaint, along with a copy of this Memorandum and its accompanying
Order, so that the Department may assist [plaintiff] in identifying the unnamed
Defendants.”).
Here, Plaintiff is not naming a supervisor as a placeholder, but is identifying
five individuals who could be liable. Therefore, in the spirit of liberally construing
a pro se complaint and the above caselaw, the court will not dismiss this action for
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failing to allege the personal involvement of the named defendants. However, the
court will dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
B. Plaintiff Has Not Adequately Pleaded a First Amendment Claim.
Plaintiff does not specifically plead a First Amendment claim. However, in
an effort to liberally construe the pro se party’s complaint, the court will address
any potential First Amendment claim.
Prisoners have a well-established constitutional right of access to the courts.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). A claim for denial of access to courts
requires a showing of actual injury, meaning that a prisoner's “nonfrivolous legal
claim” challenging his sentence or conditions of confinement was frustrated or
impeded. Id. at 353–55; Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). A
prisoner alleging interference with his legal mail must demonstrate that the
interference hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim to give rise to a claim for
denial of access to the courts. Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff does not allege that the opening of his mail outside of his presence
hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. Therefore, he cannot succeed in a First
Amendment claim based on the alleged interference with his mail.
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C. Plaintiff Has Not Adequately Pleaded A Claim Under the Fourth,
Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments.
Any due process claim arising from the opening of Plaintiff’s mail outside
his presence cannot succeed. Procedural due process rights are only triggered by
deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest. For a prisoner, such a
deprivation occurs when the prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Confiscation and/or interference with his mail does not
constitute a significant or atypical hardship, and, as such, does not qualify for any
procedural protections. See Caldwell v. Folino, Civil No. 09-217, 2009 WL
3082524, at *15 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2009), report and recommendation adopted,
Civil No. 09-217, 2009 WL 3055298 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2009) citing Donovan v.
Magnusson, Civil No. 04-102, 2005 WL 757585, at *2 (D. Me. March 11, 2005)
(“Any claims that the opening of his mail out of his presence offended the Fourth
or Fourteenth Amendment due process clause must fail, see Sandin, 515 U.S. at
483–84 (1995); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Barstow v. Kennebec
County Jail, 115 F. Supp.2d 3, 8 (D. Me. 2000).
The Fifth Amendment due process protections applies to federal inmates.
Shoemaker v. City of Lock Haven, 906 F. Supp. 230, 237 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
Plaintiff is not a federal inmate, but an inmate in a state facility. Therefore, any
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due process claim under the Fifth Amendment is not applicable in this action, and
any claim under the Fifth Amendment will be dismissed.
D. Plaintiff Has Not Adequately Pleaded an Eighth Amendment Claim.
The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive bail, excessive fines, and
cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII. Nothing in the alleged
facts concerning the opening of Plaintiff’s mail outside of his presence runs afoul
of the Eighth Amendment as it does not concern Plaintiff’s bail, fines, or
punishment. Therefore, all Eighth Amendment claims will be dismissed.
E. Plaintiff Has Not Adequately Pleaded a Ninth Amendment Claim.
The Ninth Amendment states that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.” U.S. CONST. Amend. IX. “The Ninth Amendment refers only to
unenumerated rights, while claims under § 1983 must be premised on specific
constitutional guarantees.” Gibson v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utilities Comm'n, No.
1:15-CV-00855, 2015 WL 3952777, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2015) (quoting
Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F. Supp.2d 569, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)); see also Clayworth
v. Luzerne Cnty., 513 F. App'x 134, 137 (3d Cir. 2013) (observing that “[t]he Ninth
Amendment does not independently provide a source of individual constitutional
rights”). Thus, the amended complaint does not state a Ninth Amendment claim
upon which relief can be granted.
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CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the amended complaint in this action will be
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff will be given
a final opportunity to amend his complaint. An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: January 27, 2025
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