Arlington Industries v. Bridgeport Fittings

Filing 210

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 196 MOTION to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal filed by Bridgeport Fittings Inc Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 11/4/13. (jam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ARLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-0134

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

BRIDGEPORT FITTINGS, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal (Doc. 196) filed
by Defendant Bridgeport Fittings, Inc. (“Bridgeport”). On March 19, 2013, the Court granted
Plaintiff Arlington Industries, Inc. (“Arlington”)’s Motion for Contempt (Doc. 51). Bridgeport
appealed the Court’s Order granting Arlington’s Motion for Contempt and subsequently filed
the present motion. Because Bridgeport has failed to show that it will be irreparably injured
absent a stay or that the public interest favors a stay, this motion will be denied.
Furthermore, Bridgeport’s motion to stay will be denied because Bridgeport has not
sufficiently demonstrated that it is likely to succeed on the merits or that a stay will not
substantially injure Arlington.

LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding whether to grant a motion to stay, courts consider four factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely
to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the
public interest lies.
Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 1999).
The party requesting the stay “‘bears the burden of showing that the circumstances

justify an exercise of that discretion.’” Supinski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 06-CV00793, 2012 WL 1622385, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 9, 2012) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 433-34, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 173 L. Ed. 2d 550 (2009)). In addition, courts must
balance the factors “in light of the individualized considerations” relevant in each case.
Republic of Philippines, 949 F.2d. at 658. However, stays are “an extraordinary remedy”
and are “rarely granted.” Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., No. 13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013).
Moreover, failure to establish any one of the four elements above may render the stay
inappropriate. Id. See also Supinski, 2012 WL 1622385, at *1.

DISCUSSION

I.

Bridgeport Will Not Be Irreparably Injured Absent a Stay
Bridgeport contends that absent a stay, it will be irreparably and substantially

harmed since “the appeal is moving forward and Bridgeport must be allowed to focus its
efforts on the appeal rather than be forced to defend a ‘two front war.’” (Doc. 197, 22.)
Absent a stay, Bridgeport contends that it “would be forced to either pay a substantial
sum, or post a substantial bond pending the outcome of the appeal.” Id. at 19. As
Arlington indicates, pecuniary injury alone does not constitute irreparable injury.
Supinski, 2012 WL 1622385, at *1 (“[Defendant’s] only injury would be pecuniary, and
this does not constitute an irreparable injury.”) (citing Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp.,
204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2000)) . Since Bridgeport only alleges potential pecuniary
injury, Bridgeport has failed to demonstrate that it will be irreparably injured absent a
stay. Therefore, Bridgeport’s motion to stay will be denied.

II.

The Public Interest Does Not Favor A Stay
Bridgeport argues that the public interest “in judicial economy overwhelmingly
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supports the issuance of a stay.” (Doc. 197, 20.) On the other hand, Arlington argues
that Bridgeport’s request for a stay “violates the public interest in judicial economy and
against piecemeal litigation” as a “blatant attempt to delay the determination of the
appropriate amount of sanctions for its contempt.” (Doc. 203, 19.) In addition, Arlington
argues that the request for a stay is offensive to the public interest in enforcing valid
patents” as well as “the public interest in enforcing judgments.” (Doc. 203, 19.) See, e.g.
Abbott Labs v. Andrx Pharms, Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Tennenbaum
Capital Partners, LLC v. Kennedy, No. 08-mc-00194, 2012 WL 748256, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 10, 2012). Arlington’s arguments on this issue are more persuasive, and the Court
is satisfied the public interest does not favor a stay.

III.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Although Bridgeport’s motion can be denied based on its failure to satisfy either of

the two factors above, it also fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
As an initial matter, the parties disagree over whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over Bridgeport’s appeal. Arlington suggests, based on a recent decision from the
Federal Circuit dismissing an appeal of a contempt order for lack of jurisdiction, that the
Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction in this case. See Aevoe v. AE Tech, No. 2012-1422,
2013 WL 456301, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2013). Thus, as an initial matter, it is unclear
that the merits panel assigned to this case will in fact reach the merits of the appeal.
(Doc. 203, 10.)
With respect to the substance of the Contempt Order itself, Bridgeport contends
that the Court erred in determining that the New Connectors were no more than
colorably different from the Old Connectors, ignoring “substantial unrebutted evidence of
significant changes to the New Connectors that Bridgeport presented.” (Doc. 197, 10.)
Bridgeport also contends that the Court erred “when it constructed the term ‘cylindrical’
to mean ‘having the approximate form of a cylinder.’” (Doc. 197, 13.) However, as
Arlington points out, Bridgeport has failed to provide a sufficient basis for the Court to
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find that there is a strong likelihood that the Court’s determinations on these issues will
be overturned on appeal.
Finally, Bridgeport asserts that the “Federal Circuit is likely to vacate this Court’s
injunction because it is overly broad.” (Doc. 197, 17.) As Arlington asserts, Bridgeport
has not sufficiently demonstrated that it can challenge the underlying scope of the
injunction at this phase of litigation. (Doc. 203, 15-16.) However, even if it can, it is not
clear that Bridgeport is likely to succeed on the merits of this argument. Therefore,
Bridgeport has failed to make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits
of the case.

III.

A Stay Would Substantially Injure Arlington
Although Bridgeport contends that Arlington will not be substantially injured by a

stay pending appeal to the Third Circuit since Bridgeport is enjoined from selling the
New Connectors, Arlington maintains that it would be substantially injured if deprived of
entry of judgment that the Court found it is entitled to after lengthy litigation. (Doc. 203,
17.) Furthermore, Arlington contends that it would be harmed if a stay is granted
because this would allow Bridgeport “to pursue an entire appeal without posting a bond
to secure Arlington’s interest in the lost profits and attorney’s fees that even Bridgeport
acknowledges Arlington was awarded.” Id. at 18. The Court agrees that granting the
request to stay the proceedings would result in “a substantial delay of justice,” (Doc. 203,
18.) Therefore, Bridgeport has failed to demonstrate that a stay would not cause
substantial injury to Arlington.

CONCLUSION
The Court will deny Bridgeport’s motion to stay the proceedings pending appeal
because Bridgeport has failed to demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm absent a
stay and that the public interest favors a stay. Bridgeport also fails to demonstrate that it
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is likely to succeed on the merits, or that Arlington will not be substantially injured if a stay
is granted, further supporting denial of the motion to stay.
An appropriate order follows.

November 4, 2013
Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

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