Lyons v. Beard et al

Filing 96

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - IT IS RECOMMENDED, that the defendants motion for summary judgment (Doc. 71 ) be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows: 1. The motion for summary judgment should be DENIED as to Defendants Ayers, Simpson, Yohn , Darhower and Kreider. 2. The motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED as to Defendants Beard, Vaughn, Kelcher, Brannigan, Sunday, Cole, Southers, Orwig, Reading, Brown, Tobias, and Martz. Objections to R&R due by 1/27/2011. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on January 10, 2011. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIC LYONS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 3:07-CV-444
(Judge Conner)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.

Introduction
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a party is entitled to

summary judgment in its favor when “there is no genuine issue as to any material
facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2). This case aptly illustrates this basic tenet of federal civil practice, a tenet
that defines how federal courts are to apply the law to the factual circumstances
presented in an individual case.
The Plaintiff in this civil action is Eric Lyons, a state inmate currently housed
at the State Correctional Institution (SCI), Camp Hill. Lyons brings this complaint
against 17 different correctional officers, ranging from the Commissioner of
Corrections, Jeffrey Beard, to various institutional staff who directly oversaw Lyons’
2006 incarceration at the Special Management Unit at SCI Camp Hill.

The gravamen of Lyons’ complaint is the allegation that correctional staff
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
by soliciting other inmates to assault Lyons while he was housed in this prison unit
dedicated to the treatment of recalcitrant inmates, by using excessive force against
him when quelling this brawl between Lyons and a fellow inmate, and by failing to
adequately investigate his complaints concerning this incident.
All 17 of the correctional Defendants have now moved for summary judgment
asserting that as to each Defendant “there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2). However, our review of the Plaintiff’s claims as to these 17 different
Defendants reveals that, while there are no genuine issues as to any material facts
regarding a number of Defendants, with respect to five Defendants the factual record
is marked by conflicts and controversy. Therefore, mindful of the fact that summary
judgment may be granted only where “there is no genuine issue as to any material
facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2), we recommend that this motion be granted, in part, and denied, in part, as
discussed more fully below.

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II.

Statement of Facts and of the Case
A.

Lyons Arrives at the Special Management Unit

This case arises out of events at the Special Management Unit of the State
Correctional Institution, Camp Hill, in the Spring and Summer of 2006. With respect
to some of these events, and some of the Defendants, the pleadings present two stark,
and starkly different, factual narratives.
For his part, the Plaintiff, inmate Eric Lyons alleges that on April 5, 2006, he
was transferred to the Special Management Unit at SCI Camp Hill from SCI Fayette.
(Doc. 1, Section IV.) The Special Management Unit at SCI Camp Hill was intended
for housing and care of prisoners who “exhibit behavior that is continually disruptive,
violent, dangerous or a threat to the orderly operation of their assigned facility.”
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (U.S. 2006)(internal citations omitted). At the time
of his transfer to this institution, Lyons was serving a state sentence arising out of his
conviction for an array of sexual assault, rape and involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse charges in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. (Doc. 81, Ex. C.)
According to Lyons, these charges related to the alleged sexual assault and rape of
an 8-year old girl, offenses which Lyons claims inspired widespread enmity against
the Plaintiff in the prison system.

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B.

Lyons Allegedly Learns of Threats to His Safety Involving
Inmates and Several Prison Staff

Lyons alleges that shortly after his arrival at the Special Management Unit,
several correctional officers in the unit, including Defendants Ayers, Yohn, Brown,
Tobias, Simpson and Darhower “harbored a personal dislike of me due to my crime”
and resolved to ensure that Lyons did not successfully complete the Special
Management Unit program, which enables an inmate to return to the prison general
population. (Doc. 1, Section IV.) As part of this effort, Lyons alleges that some of
these correctional staff began soliciting other inmates to assault Lyons, in order to
create an affray which would support disciplinary charges against the Plaintiff.
Lyons has now provided specific proof in support of this claim with respect to
four of the named Defendants. According to Lyons, in May of 2006 a fellow inmate,
James Paluch, warned him that some correctional officers disliked him, and that he
was being set up by correctional staff. Lyons has supported these allegations through
an affidavit which he has executed and through declarations and affidavits from four
fellow inmates: Sean Pressley, Steve Cage, Anthony Sides, and James Paluch. These
declarations and affidavits allege that, shortly after Lyons’ arrival in the Special
Management Unit, four of the named Defendants, Correctional officers Ayers, Lyons.
Simpson and Darhower, solicited two other inmates, Sides and Paluch, to assault
Lyons because of their personal antipathy for him, offering these other prisoners
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favorable treatment in return for their participation in this assault. (Doc. 95, Exs. C
and D, Paluch and Sides declarations.) Paluch and Sides both allege that they refused
these solicitations, and Paluch further asserts that he warned Lyons that staff were
trying to set him up to be assaulted. (Id.)
C.

Lyons Claims to Have Warned Prison Staff of This Reported Threat

Lyons then claims to have communicated this threat to his safety to prison
officials in May and June of 2006. However, Lyons’ own sworn account of how he
conveyed this information to prison officials reveals that his communications were
vague, sporadic and fragmentary, providing prison staff little upon which to act.
For example, Lyons contends that he sent a note to Superintendent Kelcher on
May 5, 2006, alerting the superintendent to his safety concerns. (Doc. 80, Ex. B.
P.27.) However, Lyons’ own description of this communication reflects that it
provided Superintendent Kelcher with virtually no meaningful details regarding his
concerns. Rather, Lyons asserts that he simply: “sent [a] request slip to the
superintendent and I let him know that I was experiencing problems with the staff.”
(Doc. 80, Ex. B, p.27.)
In addition, on or about June 1, 2006, Lyons claims that he had a progress
review meeting with three correctional staff, Unit Manager Southers, Lieutenant
Robert Kreider, and Deputy Superintendent Eugene Brannigan. (Id., pp.24-26.)
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During this meeting, Lyons contends that he advised these correctional supervisors
of his concerns, but Lyons’ sworn account of this conversation is, once again, notably
lacking in detail. Thus, Lyons simply insists that: “I took it before them and I let them
know that, hey, you know, guards have it in for me. They’ve, you know, been going
to inmates, setting up a contract,” (Id., p.25), and stated that, “I mentioned that
basically it was–that a conspiracy was being gauged against me, and that–you know,
I mentioned Boyking’s [sic] name.” (Id., p. 26.) Lyons concedes, however, that at the
time of this conversation: “I didn’t have no evidence to substantiate, so therefore
there was nothing [they] could do about it”, (Id., p. 25) and concedes that given his
lack of supporting evidence he was informed by prison staff that they could not fully
credit his claims. (Id.)
Finally, Lyons asserts that he reported these threats to Sergeant Darhower, (Id.,
p. 28-9), but acknowledges that Darhower never disclosed this report to any other
corrections official. (Id.) Indeed, given Lyons’ current assertion that Darhower was
one of the staff who was soliciting inmates to assault him, the Plaintiff readily
concedes that Darhower would not have acted upon, or communicated his complaints
to others. (Id.)
While Lyons has listed all of these corrections officials to whom he claims to
have made complaints as Defendants, with respect to many of these named
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Defendants their only reported involvement in this entire episode consists of
receiving these vague, and unsubstantiated complaint from Lyons. Thus, with respect
to Defendants Kelcher, Southers, and Brannigan, Lyons’ claims are premised solely
upon their alleged failure to act upon his vague claims that he “was experiencing
problems with the staff,” or that “ hey, you know, guards have it in for me.”1 Thus,
Lyons makes no assertions that Southers, Kelcher or Brannigan took any active role
in the events leading up to his June 19, 2006 brawl with a fellow inmate or otherwise
endangered him; rather, he simply faults them for failing to prevent that fight based
upon his isolated and vague complaints.
D.

Lyons Is Involved in a Fight With a Fellow Inmate on June 19, 2006

According to Lyons in June of 2006, a handful of disgruntled correctional staff
reached out to another SMU inmate, Anthony Boykins, soliciting Boykins to assault
Lyons in return for favorable treatment. Two inmates, Sean Pressley and James
Paluch, have submitted affidavits in support of these allegations. (Doc. 95, Exs. A and

Lyons’ complaint also lists another Defendant, Wayne Cole, in connection
with these allegations. However, Lyons’ proof with respect to Defendant Cole is
wholly lacking, and consists solely of a claim by Lyons that Cole was present at
one of these discussions, a claim which Lyons later recanted, testifying that “Cole
wasn’t there.” (Doc. 80, Ex. B, p.26.) Finally, Lyons lists Stephen Sunday, whom
he describes as a deputy at the prison as a Defendant, but when asked what Sunday
did wrong in this case, Lyons simply asserted enigmatically that Sunday “did
nothing.” (Doc. 80, Ex. B, p.59.)
1

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C.) In these affidavits, Paluch and Pressley recount statements allegedly made by
Boykins, confirming that he had been solicited by guards to attack Lyons. (Id.) In
addition, inmate Paluch described Boykins’ receipt and retention of contraband food
items immediately following his assault on Lyons, violations of prison policy that
Paluch alleges were observed and condoned by Correctional Officers Yohn and
Ayers, who had solicited the assault. (Id., Ex. C.)
In addition, Lyons has submitted declarations from inmates which purport to
describe conversations between inmate Boykins and SMU unit staff planning the
timing of an assault on Lyons, (Id., Ex. C) as well as affidavits which provide from
the Plaintiff’s perspective an account of the events leading up to Boykin’s June 19,
2006 attack on Lyons in the SMU unit exercise yard. These declarations describe the
affray between Lyons and Boykins as an assault instigated by Boykins, and further
indicate that several correctional officers, including Defendants Ayers, Lyons.
Simpson and Darhower, made statements immediately preceding the assault which
indicated that they were aware of a plan by Boykins to attack Lyons. (Id., Exs. A-D.)
According to Lyons, the fight instigated by staff occurred on June 19, 2006,
when Lyons and Boykins were placed in the same exercise yard at the prison and
Boykins attacked Lyons. Lyons supports this claim with inmate declarations which
recite that Boykins instigated this fight, and further allege that, when this fight
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erupted in the SMU exercise yard between inmates Boykins and Lyons, correctional
staff did not immediately respond to the assault. (Id.) According to Lyons, the
correctional staff who were on-duty on June 19, 2006, and refrained from
immediately intervening to aid him included three correctional officers who have
been identified by the Plaintiff’s witnesses as staff who were actively soliciting other
prisoners to assault Lyons– Defendants Simpson, Yohn and Ayers.
In addition, Lyons alleges that several of these prison officials used excessive
force against him when they did intervene in this fight. In particular, Lyons claims
that Correctional Officers Ayers and Simpson assaulted him, (Doc. 80, Ex. B, pp.3840) and that Lieutenant Kreider struck him with a baton in the course of quelling this
brawl. (Id.) Lyons provides no other specific, articulable details concerning the
involvement of any other correctional staff in this alleged use of excessive force.2

The other staff identified as present and on duty on June 19, 2006, who are
alleged to have delayed in intervening in this prison fight are Defendants Brown,
Tobias, and Martz. (Doc. 1.) While these correctional officers are also identified as
Defendants in this case, Lyons does not present evidence that any of these
correctional staff had prior knowledge of any planned assault. Nor does he present
proof that these staff assaulted him, and in fact it appears that several of these staff
actually intervened and restrained his assailant inmate Boykins, thus protecting
Lyons from further injury at the hands of this fellow prisoner. Nonetheless, Lyons
names these correctional officers as additional Defendant, apparently because he
faults them for their alleged, brief delay in intervening in this prison brawl.
2

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For their part, the corrections Defendants employed in the Special Management
Unit at SCI Camp Hill in June 2006 present a starkly different account of this
episode, one which they also independently document. Without exception, these
corrections staff emphatically deny Lyons’ claims that they participated in a
conspiracy to assault this inmate. These corrections Defendants also insist that the
evidence, which consists, in part of reports which they have authored, conclusively
shows that the June 19, 2006 brawl was actually instigated by Lyons, and not by
inmate Boykins. (Docs. 80-84, Exs. D-M.)
E.

Events Following The June 19, 2006 Confrontation at The Special
Management Unit

In the aftermath of this brawl, several events occurred which have relevance
to the instant litigation. First, Lyons was disciplined for his alleged involvement in
this fight. Second, Lyons lodged grievances with various prison officials,
complaining that he had been the victim of a conspiracy by a handful of corrections
staff and inmate Boykins. Third, a prison investigation discounted Lyons’ complaints,
resolving credibility issues between Lyons and corrections officials in favor of
corrections staff.
These three events set the stage for the final series of allegations made by
Lyons in his complaint, which described a cascading series of alleged failures by
prison managers to appropriately respond to his grievances following this June 19,
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2006, affray. Lyons contends that these failures are so grave that they, too, rise to the
level of constitutional infractions by Defendants Reading, Orwig, Beard and Vaughn.
With respect to these four Defendants, Lyons’ position is both simply stated
and sparsely supported: First, Lyons insists that Lieutenant Reading, who conducted
an investigation into his complaints following this June 19 episode violated his rights
when he credited the denials of misconduct by corrections staff over Lyons’
accusations leveled against those staff. (Doc. 80, Ex. B, pp.64-68.) Captain David
Orwig, in turn, was the security captain at the prison, and Reading’s supervisor.
Lyons faults Orwig for failing to adequately supervise the investigation of this
incident, and in very general terms alleges that Orwig as a security supervisor in some
fashion failed to protect him, while acknowledging that Captain Orwig “didn’t do
anything as far as physical damage to me, but he failed to intervene.” (Id. p.64.) Thus,
the apparent premise of Lyons’ claims against Orwig is that this Defendant’s
supervisory station makes him personally liable for any security shortcomings, and
makes him personally culpable for the outcome of inquiries into inmate grievances
conducted by his subordinates. (Id.)
As for Defendants Beard and Vaughn, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for
the Department of Corrections, the basis upon which Lyons seeks to hold them
personally responsible for his alleged injuries can be succinctly stated: Lyons believes
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they are personally liable to him for these Eighth Amendment violations because they
as supervisors did not directly reply to letters he wrote to them after-the-fact
complaining about the manner in which this incident was handled by prison staff.
(Doc. 80, Ex. B, pp.52-3.) Lyons makes no other factual claims against either of
these two senior corrections officials. (Id.)
F.

This Litigation and the Pending Summary Judgment Motion

On March 8, 2007, Lyons commenced this action by filing a pro se complaint
against 17 corrections Defendants and inmate Boykins. (Doc. 1.) These corrections
Defendants included: Corrections Secretary Beard, Deputy Secretary Vaughn, Prison
Superintendent Kelcher, Deputy Superintendent Brannigan, Deputy Stephen Sunday,
Unit Managers Cole and Southers, Captain Orwig, Lieutenants Kreider and Reading,
Sergeant Darhower, and the following six correctional officers–Officers Ayers,
Simpson, Yohn, Brown, Tobias, and Martz.
In this complaint, Lyons alleged that these Defendants plotted to have him
assaulted, failed to protect him from assault, used excessive force in curtailing an
assault when it occurred, and failed to appropriately investigate his complaints about
this alleged assault after it took place. (Doc. 1.) Inmate Boykins was dismissed from
the case, (Doc. 7), and Lyons’ action has proceeded against the remaining 17
corrections Defendants. Discovery has now closed, (Doc. 66), and the 17 corrections
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Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Lyons’ claims. (Doc. 71.)
This motion has been fully briefed by the parties, (Docs. 78-84, and 93-95), and is
now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, we recommend that the motion be granted, in
part, and denied, in part, as follows: Disputed material factual issues preclude
summary judgment on behalf of Defendants Ayers, Simpson, Yohn, Darhower and
Kreider, and the summary judgment motion should be denied as to these Defendants.
As to the remaining Defendants, “there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2). Therefore, with respect to these remaining Defendants, it is recommended
that the motion for summary judgment be granted.
III.

Discussion
A.

Summary Judgment-Standard of Review

The Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the Defendants’ motion advances a host
of individualized claims pertaining to the 17 individual Defendants named in this
civil rights action, a consistent theme in the Defendants’ pleadings is the assertion
that “no reasonable jury” could find theme liable for any constitutional violations.
(Doc. 78.)
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To the extent that this articulation of the standard of review on summary
judgment implies that the court may assess what evidence a jury might reasonably
believe, we find that this standard of review misstates the scope of this Court’s task
under Rule 56. Rule 56, which governs summary judgment motions, provides that
“[t]he judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, through summary adjudication a court is empowered to
dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine issue as to any material fact,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary
formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. 07-0493, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31615, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010). The substantive law identifies which
facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a
material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow
a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes
shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec.
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& Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims, “the
non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest
solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.”
Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006); accord
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the nonmoving party “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment
is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if
the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence
supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. Id. at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider
all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v.
Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Thus, our task is not to determine what facts reasonable jurors might find.
Rather, we must assess whether the material facts are undisputed, determine what the

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undisputed facts show, and then ascertain whether the Defendants are entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, based upon those undisputed facts.

B.

Constitutional Standards Governing Eighth Amendment Claims.

In conducting this legal analysis we must also be mindful of the constitutional
standards which govern both Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure-toprotect claims, since the gravamen of Lyons’ complaint is that prison officials have
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
displaying “deliberate indifference” to this inmate’s safety. Lyons faces an exacting
burden in advancing either of these Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials
in their individual capacities since these claims require a specific showing of intent
in order to demonstrate deliberate indifference.
1.

Excessive Force Claims

Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure-to-protect claims both entail a
showing of some subjective intent to injure. In an excessive force case, that showing
is made where “prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is
that set out in Whitley[v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)]: whether force was applied in
a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
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to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The issue of whether
excessive force was used is one which, in proper circumstances, can be determined
as a matter of law. In such cases, summary judgment may only be appropriate when
“it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will
support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Brooks v. Kyler,
204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). There are
several factors that a court examines in determining whether a correctional officer has
used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, including: “(1) ‘the need
for the application of force’; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount
of force that was used’; (3) ‘the extent of injury inflicted’; (4) ‘the extent of the threat
to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on
the basis of the facts known to them’; and (5) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity
of a forceful response.’” Id. at 106.
2.

Failure-To-Protect Claims

Similarly, proof of a culpable subjective intent is a critical component of an
Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. The leading case in the Third Circuit
addressing deliberate indifference in this prison context is found in Beers-Capitol v.
Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2001). In Beers-Capitol, the Third Circuit explained

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the basic requirements of a claim brought against a prison official under the Eighth
Amendment as follows:
An Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official must meet two
requirements: (1) “the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official must have a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.”

Id. at 125 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Furthermore, in
cases involving prison safety or prison conditions, the relevant state of mind “is one
of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id.
This deliberate indifference standard “is a subjective standard under Farmer –
the prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the
excessive risk to inmate safety.” Id. Thus, “ ‘[d]eliberate indifference can be shown
when a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety’ Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks
omitted)(emphasis added). Accordingly, “to survive summary judgment on an Eighth
Amendment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is required to produce
sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants'
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Davis v. Williams, 354 F.
App’x 603, 605-606 (3d Cir. 2009).

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As explained in Beers-Capitol, in Eighth Amendment cases based on
allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials or other
supervisory defendants, the Supreme Court has “rejected an objective test for
deliberate indifference; instead it looked to what the prison official actually knew
rather than what a reasonable official in his position would have known.” Id. at 131.
Specifically, the Supreme Court “held that ‘a prison official cannot be found liable
under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). This requirement of actual
knowledge on the part of supervisory officials “means that ‘the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837).
At the same time, this subjective standard does not insulate officials from
liability where such officials choose to remain deliberately indifferent to an excessive
or substantial or serious risk of harm to inmates. The Supreme Court explained:
We are no more persuaded by petitioner’s argument that, without an
objective test for deliberate indifference, prison officials will be free to
ignore obvious dangers to inmates. Under the test we adopt today, an
Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted
or failed to act believing that harm would actually befall an inmate; it is
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enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of
a substantial risk of serious harm.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. The Supreme Court also noted that a supervisory
defendant’s knowledge of a risk may be proved through circumstantial evidence, so
that “a fact finder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from
the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id.
The appellate courts recognize that a mere generalized knowledge that prisons
are dangerous places does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g,
Jones v. Beard, 145 F. App’x 743 (3d Cir. 2005). Instead, the Court of Appeals has
interpreted Farmer to signal that “a plaintiff could make out a deliberate indifference
case by showing that prison officials simply were aware of a general risk to inmates
in the plaintiff’s situation[.]” However, in order to show deliberate indifference in this
fashion, a plaintiff would need to come forward with evidence showing a substantial
basis for demonstrating that a prison official was deliberately indifferent in the face
of information that presented a substantial risk to inmate safety. As the Supreme
Court has observed in this context: “If an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents
evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding,
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the
circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to
information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it, then such
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evidence would permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual
knowledge of the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43(emphasis added).
Applying this standard, which looks to whether the alleged threat was
longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in
the past, court have rejected Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims on facts
similar to those presented here, with respect to individual prison officials, where the
evidence was insufficient to put those prison officials subjectively on notice of a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Thus, an inmate’s report to a staff
member that other prisoners harbored antipathy for him based upon his history as a
child molester, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that prison officials were
on notice of, and deliberately indifferent to, a substantial risk of harm. Davis v.
Williams, 354 F.App’x 603, 605-606 (3d Cir. 2009). Similarly, an inmate cannot
establish sufficient subjective awareness of a serious risk of harm to satisfy an Eighth
Amendment claim by simply asserting that staff were informed that the inmate was
not getting along with others, O’Connell v. Williams, 241 F.App’x 55, 58 (3d Cir.
2007), or that staff were present when a fellow inmate bragged about harassing the
plaintiff-prisoner. Counterman v. Warren County Correctional Facility, 176 F. App’x
234 (3d Cir. 2006). This proof simply does not meet the exacting standard of
subjective knowledge called for under the Eighth Amendment. Instead, in such cases:
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“[a]ctual knowledge can be proven circumstantially [only] where the general danger
was obvious; that is, where ‘a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding,
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past.’ ”
Counterman, 176 F. App’x at 238 quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43.
Even where a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder
to reach the inference that a prison official had knowledge of the risk on the basis that
risk was obvious, it is clear that an inference may not be compelled, and that the
prison official must be permitted to show that he was actually unaware of the risk in
question. Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 132. Lastly, a prison official who is shown to
have been actually aware of a risk to a prisoner-plaintiff can avoid liability if he
shows that he responded reasonably to the risk, even if the response did not avoid the
ultimate harm. Id.
3.

Limits of Supervisory Liability

In addition to the foregoing analysis applicable to claims brought against
supervisors under the Eighth Amendment alleging deliberate indifference to a known
excessive risk, the courts also recognize that supervisors may be exposed to liability
on the basis that they maintained deficient policies that resulted in the plaintiff
sustaining an Eighth Amendment injury. In these kinds of cases based upon
allegations of deficient policies, the Third Circuit has fashioned a four-part test based
22

upon the reasoning of City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), for supervisory
liability on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to supervise. Under this test, “the
plaintiff must identify a specific policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ
and show that: (1) the existing policy or practice created an unreasonable risk of the
Eighth Amendment injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the unreasonable risk
was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk; and (3) the injury resulted
from the policy or practice.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 134 (citing Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). Accordingly, these approaches are
summarized as follows:
In sum, to make out a claim of deliberate indifference based on direct
liability (i.e., insofar as the defendants are alleged to have known of and
ignored the particular risk that Whetzel posed, the plaintiffs must meet
the test from Farmer v. Brennan: They must show that the defendants
knew or were aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiffs’
health or safety, and they can show this by establishing that the risk was
obvious. For the plaintiffs’ claims seeking to hold supervisors liable for
their deficient policies, Sample’s four-part test provides the analytical
structure for determining whether the policymakers exhibited deliberate
indifference to the plaintiffs’ risk of injury, it being simply the deliberate
indifference test applied to the specific situation of a policymaker.
Id.
In this setting the Third Circuit has noted that, in order to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference on the part of prison
officials “must present enough evidence to support the inference that the defendants
23

knowingly and unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Id.
at 132. However, a claim of a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely
on the fact that the named defendant was the prison warden, or a prison supervisor,
when the incidents set forth in the complaint occurred. Quite the contrary, to state a
claim under §1983, the plaintiff must show that the supervisory defendants, acting
under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. 42 U.S.C. §1983; Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d
902 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Maine v.Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Liability under §
1983 is personal in nature and can only follow personal involvement in the alleged
wrongful conduct shown through specific allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence in the challenged practice. Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
In particular, with respect to prison supervisors it is well-established that:
“A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal
involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or
of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988).
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).
Thus, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging
deliberate indifference on the part of supervisory prison officials “must present
24

enough evidence to support the inference that the defendants knowingly and
unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Id. at 132.
Applying these benchmarks, courts have frequently held that, in the absence of
evidence of supervisory knowledge and approval of subordinates’ actions, a plaintiff
may not maintain an action against supervisors based upon the misdeeds of their
subordinate. For example, in O’Connell v. Sobina, No. 06-238, 2008 WL 144199, *
21 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2008), the court rejected an effort to hold supervisors liable for
the acts of staff holding that:
Personal involvement by a defendant can be shown by alleging either
personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence in a
subordinate’s actions. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. “Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be
made with appropriate particularity.” Id. See also Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Moreover, in order to maintain a claim
for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show: 1) that the supervising
official personally participated in the activity; 2) that the supervising
official directed others to violate a person’s rights; or 3) that the
supervising official had knowledge of and acquiesced in a subordinate’s
violations. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh,120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d
Cir. 1997); Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir.
1995).

Similarly, in Neuburger v. Thompson, 305 F. Supp. 2d 521, 535 (W. D. Pa. 2004), the
Court rejected an effort to extend civil rights liability to supervisory officials without
proof of personal involvement or acquiescence in wrongdoing, stating:

25

Third Circuit case law recognizes that “(a) defendant in a civil rights
action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” in order
to be liable. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir.2003) (citing
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988)).
Consequently, a supervisor may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his
or her subordinate's unlawful conduct if he or she directed, encouraged,
tolerated, or acquiesced in that conduct. See Blanche Road Corp. v.
Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir.1995); Baker v. Monroe Twp.,
50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir.1995). However, the mere assertion “that
the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have occurred if the
superior had done more than he or she did” is insufficient to establish
liability. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir.1989). Likewise,
a supervisor's mere failure to train, supervise or discipline subordinate
officers does not state a basis for a § 1983 claim against the supervisor
absent proof of direct participation by the superior in some unlawful
conduct. Mobley v. City of Atlantic City Police Dept., No. Civ. A. 972086JBS, 2000 WL 363692 at *3 (D.N.J. March 30, 2000) (citing Brown
v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1119-20 (3d Cir.1990)).

Nor can inmates sustain Eighth Amendment claims against prison officials
based solely upon claims that those officials failed to adequately investigate their past
grievances. Inmates do not have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system.
See Jones, 433 U.S. at 137-138; Speight v. Sims, No. 08-2038, 283 F. App’x 880,
2008 WL 2600723 at *1 (3d. Cir. June 30, 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d
641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no
liberty interest on a prisoner.”). Consequently, dissatisfaction with response to an
inmate’s grievances does not support a constitutional claim. See also Alexander v.
Gennarini, 144 F. App’x. 924 (3d Cir. 2005) (involvement in post-incident grievance
26

process not a basis for § 1983 liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D.
D.C. 1995) (because prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive
constitutional rights upon prison inmates, the prison officials’ failure to comply with
grievance procedure is not actionable). See also Cole v. Sobina, No. 04-99J, 2007 WL
4460617, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[M]ere concurrence in a prison
administrative appeal process does not implicate a constitutional concern.”).

C.

Disputed Material Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment in
Favor of Defendants Ayers, Simpson, Yohn, Darhower and Kreider

These legal tenets guide our resolution of the summary judgment motion made
on behalf of the 17 corrections Defendants named in Lyons’ complaint, and compel
a series of differing results for these disparate Defendants. At the outset, we find that
with respect to five of these Defendants–Defendants Ayers, Simpson, Yohn, Darhower
and Kreider–there presently exist disputed material issues of fact which preclude
summary judgment.
As to Defendants Simpson, Yohn, Ayers and Darhower, those disputed factual
issues could not be more profoundly contrasting and starkly presented. Simply put,
Lyons accuses these Defendants of actively soliciting inmates to assault him, a charge
which the Defendants flatly deny. Despite the Defendants’ denials, Lyons has

27

proffered affidavits from fellow inmates who are prepared to testify that they
witnessed such solicitations by the Defendants.
Lyons’ evidence, if believed, would plainly make out an Eighth Amendment
violation since to make out such a claim and, “survive summary judgment on an
Eighth Amendment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is required to
produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the
defendants' deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Davis v. Williams,
354 F.App’x 603, 605-606 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, if his witnesses are believed, Lyons
can show actual harm caused by inmate Boykins’ assault, and his evidence, if credited
by a jury, would plainly show a culpable state of mind on the part of the corrections
officials who are alleged to have actively encouraged this assault. While the
Defendants argue with great vigor that “no reasonable jury” could credit this proof,
we cannot at this juncture engage in a speculative assessment of which evidence and
which witnessers are more credible. That task must await another time, and another
proceeding. Instead where, as here, we are presented with irreconcilable factual
accounts, suffice it to say that we cannot find that “there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Therefore, the summary judgment motion must be denied as to these
Defendants.
28

We also find that disputed factual issues make summary judgment inappropriate
as to Defendant Kreider. With respect to this Defendant, Lyons’ evidence, if believed,
would show that Lyons warned Kreider that the correctional officers he directly
supervised were plotting to have an inmate attack him. When that attack occurred,
precisely as Lyons had warned that it would, Lyons’ evidence viewed “in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486
F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007), would show that Kreider assaulted Lyons, striking him
with a baton, and that Kreider permitted Correctional Officers Ayers and Simpson to
assault Lyons as well. (Doc. 80, Ex. B, pp.38-40.) While this proof is hotly contested
by the Defendants, that contest does not provide a basis for summary judgment; rather,
it defines a factual dispute which may not be resolved through a summary judgment
determination.
D.

The Remaining Defendants named in Lyons’ Complaint Are Entitled
to Summary Judgment

While we find that disputed factual issues prevent the entry of summary
judgment as to five of the Defendants named in Lyons’ complaint, as to the remaining
12 Defendants we conclude that summary judgment is appropriate because for each
of these Defendants “there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). These

29

twelve Defendants, all of whom are in our view entitled to summary judgment, are
discussed separately below:
1.

Lyons Presents No Articulable Basis for Holding Defendants
Cole and Sunday Personally Liable in this Case

At the outset we find that Lyons has not presented any grounds for holding
either Defendant Cole or Defendant Sunday personally liable to him for any
constitutional tort. First, as to these Defendants Lyons’ complaint violates the
pleadings rules prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
__U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) in that it only contains “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. at 1949. In fact, as to these Defendants the complaint does not even
contain “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action”. Rather, these two
Defendants are not specifically mentioned anywhere in the body of the complaint
beyond being listed in the caption of this case, and warrant only passing, general,
conclusory references in the body of the complaint. (Doc. 1.) This complete failure to
articulate in the complaint a basis for holding these correctional staff accountable for
some violation of the constitution now compels dismissal of these Defendants from
this lawsuit. See Thomas v. Conway, No. 04-1137, 2005 WL 2030304 (M.D. Pa. July
21, 2005)(failure to name defendant in body of complaint compels dismissal).

30

Furthermore, Lyons’ sworn deposition testimony actually underscores that these
two corrections officials should be dismissed from this action. While Lyons names
Cole and Sunday as Defendants, when asked what they did to harm him, Lyons’ proof
with respect to Defendant Cole was wholly lacking, and consisted solely of a claim by
Lyons that Cole was present one time when Lyons voiced a vague concern about
threats. However, even this threadbare claim was later abandoned by Lyons, who
recanted this assertion, testifying that “Cole wasn’t there” when he lodged this
complaint. (Doc. 80, Ex. B, p.26.) Finally, Lyons listed Stephen Sunday, who he
described as a deputy at the prison, as a Defendant, but when asked what Sunday did
wrong in this case, Lyons simply asserted enigmatically that Sunday “did nothing.”
(Doc. 80, Ex. B, p.59.)
To be held personally liable for a constitutional tort, these Defendants must be
alleged to have done something to harm Lyons. Therefore, in this case, where Lyons’
pleadings and proof reflect that Sunday and Cole did nothing to harm him, these
Defendants are clearly entitled to be dismissed from this lawsuit.
2.

Lyons May Not Maintain an Eighth Amendment Claim
Against Defendants Kelcher, Brannigan, and Southers based
Solely Upon The Fact That They Did Not Respond to His
Vague and Isolated Complaints

Similarly, Lyons may not maintain Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendants Kelcher, Brannigan and Southers based solely upon the fact that he made
31

isolated and vague complaints to them in the days prior to this exercise yard brawl. In
this regard, Lyons must make a precise and exacting showing to sustain an Eighth
Amendment claim. As we have noted: “[T]o survive summary judgment on an Eighth
Amendment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is required to produce
sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants'
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Davis v. Williams, 354 F.App’x
603, 605-606 (3d Cir. 2009).
With respect to these elements of a deliberate indifference claim, “ ‘a prison
official cannot be found liable . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’ Thus, the mere presence of circumstances
from which a reasonable person could infer ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety’ is insufficient; rather, the official must actually make the inference and
disregard it.” Counterman v. Warren County Correctional Facility, 176 F..App’x 234,
238 (3d Cir. 2006)(citations omitted).
Therefore, in order to show deliberate indifference by these Defendants Lyons
must come forward with evidence showing that these prison officials were actually
aware of a substantial risk of harm and deliberately disregarded that risk. As the
Supreme Court has observed in this context: Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43(“If an Eighth
Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate
32

attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison
officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being
sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known
about it, then such evidence would permit a trier of fact to find that the defendantofficial had actual knowledge of the risk.”)
Applying this standard, which looks to whether the alleged threat was
longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in
the past, court have rejected Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims on facts
similar to those presented here, with respect to individual prison officials where the
evidence was insufficient to put the prison official subjectively on notice of a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Thus, an inmate’s report to a staff
member that other prisoners harbored antipathy for him based upon his history as a
child molester, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm. Davis v. Williams, 354 F. App’x
603, 605-606 (3d Cir. 2009). Nor can an inmate establish sufficient subjective
awareness of a serious risk fo harm to satisfy an Eighth Amendment claim by simply
asserting that staff were informed that the inmate was not getting along with others,
O’Connell v. Williams, 241 F. App’x 55, 58 (3d Cir. 2007); or that staff were present
when an inmate bragged about harassing fellow prisoners. Counterman v. Warren
33

County Correctional Facility, 176 F. App’x 234 (3d Cir. 2006). This proof simply does
not meet the exacting standard of subjective knowledge called for under the Eighth
Amendment, where: “[a]ctual knowledge can be proven circumstantially [only] where
the general danger was obvious; that is, where ‘a substantial risk of inmate attacks was
longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in
the past.’ ” Counterman, 176 F. App’x at 238 quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43.
This exacting legal standard is not met here with respect to Defendants Kelcher,
Brannigan and Southers. As the outset, with respect to Defendant Kelcher, Lyons
merely contends that he sent a note to Superintendent Kelcher on May 5, 2006
regarding safety concerns, but Lyons’ own description of this communication reflects
that it provided Superintendent Kelcher with virtually no meaningful details regarding
his concerns. Rather, Lyons asserts that he simply: “sent [a] request slip to the
superintendent and I let him know that I was experiencing problems with the staff.”
(Doc. 80, Ex. B, p.27.) Thus, Lyons’ note to this Defendant was nothing more than
an assertion by this inmate was not getting along with others, which as a matter of law
is insufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment claim. See O’Connell v. Williams,
241 F. App’x 55, 58 (3d Cir. 2007).
As for Defendants Brannigan and Southers, Lyons simply asserts that on or
about June 1, 2006, he had a progress review meeting with these correctional staff and,
34

during this meeting, contends that he advised these correctional supervisors of his
concerns. However, Lyons’ sworn account of this conversation is, once again, notably
lacking in detail. Thus, Lyons simply insists that: “I took it before them and I let them
know that, hey, you know, guards have it in for me. They’ve, you know, been going
to inmates, setting up a contract,’ (Id., p.25), and stated that, “I mentioned that
basically it was–that a conspiracy was being gauged against me, and that–you know,
I mentioned Boyking’s [sic] name.” (Id., p. 26.) Lyons concedes, however, that at the
time of this conversation: “I didn’t have no evidence to substantiate, so therefore there
was nothing [they] could do about it”, (Id., p. 25) and concedes that given his lack of
supporting evidence he was informed by prison staff that they could not credit his
claims. (Id.) Since an inmate’s isolated report to a staff member that other prisoners
harbored antipathy for him based upon his history as a child molester, standing alone,
is insufficient to establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of harm, Davis v. Williams, 354 F.App’x 603, 605-606 (3d Cir. 2009),
this general claim–which Lyons concedes was wholly unsubstantiated–does not
provide grounds for a finding of deliberate indifference to a serious security concern
by Brannigan or Southers.
Since Lyons’ proof simply fails to show any deliberate indifference by these
officials when they were presented with vague claims which Lyons acknowledges he
35

had “no evidence to substantiate,” Defendants Kelcher, Brannigan and Southers
should also be dismissed from this action.
3.

In the Absence of Proof of Any Culpable Actions on Their
Part, Lyons May Not Hold Other Prison Staff Who Were On
Duty at SCI Camp Hill on the Date He was Allegedly
Assaulted Personally Liable for Damages

In his complaint, Lyons named other staff who were on-duty and present at the
SMU on June 19, 2006 as defendants. Specifically, Lyons named three correctional
officers who were allegedly on duty that day–Correctional Officers Brown, Tobias,
and Martz–as Defendants.(Doc.1.) Yet, while these correctional officers are identified
as Defendants in this case, Lyons’ claims against these Defendants are completely
lacking in content.
Indeed, what is most remarkable as to these Defendants is what Lyons does not
claim with respect to them. First, Lyons does not present any evidence or allegations
that any of these correctional staff had prior knowledge of any planned assault on him.
Nor does he present proof that these staff assaulted him. Quite the contrary, it appears
that several of these staff actually intervened and restrained his assailant inmate
Boykins, thus protecting Lyons from further injury at the hands of this fellow prisoner.
Indeed, in the course of his deposition, Lyons cannot even state whether these three
officers ever touched him, sometimes stating that he was not touched by these
Defendants, and on other occasions repeating hearsay accounts that these staff touched
36

him. (Doc. 80, Ex. B, pp. 62-64.) Thus, Lyons states at various times that Defendant
Martz “did not actually do any physical harm to me”, (Id., p.64), and when asked about
the roles of Martz and Tobias conceded “they did not actually touch me.”(Id.)
Similarly, when asked if Defendant Brown ever laid hands on him, Lyons replied “No,
Brown did not.” (Id., p.62.) Nonetheless, Lyons still names these correctional officers
as additional Defendant, apparently because he faults them for their alleged, brief
delay in intervening in this prison brawl.
In this setting, where a constitutional violation must be premised on conduct
displaying deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety, Lyons’s pleading and proof
as to these three correctional staff, who never harmed him and appear to have
intervened to prevent further injuries to Lyons at the hands of another inmate, are
plainly inadequate. Therefore, these Defendants should be dismissed from this action.
4.

Lyons May Not Hold Prison Supervisors and Officials
Personally Liable to Him Simply By Virtue of Their
Supervisory Posts or Because He Was Dissatisfied With Their
Responses to His Grievances.

Finally, in his complaint Lyons seeks to hold four supervisory officials–
Secretary Beard, Deputy Secretary Vaughn, Captain Orwig and Lieutenant reading–
personally liable to him. We find that Lyons’ complaints as to these supervisory
Defendants are an odd admixture of respondeat superior liability, coupled with
complaints concerning the processing and resolution of grievances which he lodged
37

following this June 19, 2006 brawl. Specifically, Lyons complains that Lieutenant
Reading, who conducted an investigation into his complaints following this June 19
episode violated his rights when he credited the denials of misconduct by corrections
staff over Lyons’ accusations leveled against those staff. (Doc. 80, Ex. B, pp.64-68.)
Captain David Orwig, in turn, is simply identified as the security captain at the prison,
and Reading’s supervisor. In allegations which plainly sound in repsondeat superior
liability Lyons faults Orwig for failing to adequately supervise the investigation of this
incident, and in very general terms alleges that Orwig failed to adequately supervise
prison security, while acknowledging that Captain Orwig “didn’t do anything as far
as physical damage to me, but he failed to intervene.” (Id. p.64.) As for Defendants
Beard and Vaughn, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for the Department of
Corrections, the basis upon which Lyons seeks to hold them personally responsible for
his alleged injuries can be succinctly stated: Lyons believes these Defendants are
personally liable to him because they as prison supervisors did not directly reply to
letters he wrote to them after-the-fact complaining about the manner in which this
incident was handled by prison staff. (Doc. 80, Ex. B, pp.52-3.) Lyons makes no other
factual claims against either of these two senior corrections officials. (Id.)
These allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Indeed, these claims fail for at least two reasons. First, to the extent that
38

Lyons attempts to hold these officials personally culpable based simply upon their
supervisory status, his complaint runs afoul of he settled rule that civil rights liability
may not be based solely upon notions of respondeat superior. It is well-settled that a
claim of a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the
named defendant was the prison warden, or a prison supervisor, when the incidents set
forth in the complaint occurred. Quite the contrary, to state a claim under §1983, the
plaintiff must show that the supervisory defendants, acting under color of state law,
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42
U.S.C. §1983; Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997); see
also Maine v.Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Liability under § 1983 is personal in
nature and can only follow personal involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct
shown through specific allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence in the challenged practice. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d
1286 (3d Cir. 1997). In particular, with respect to prison supervisors it is wellestablished that:
“A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal
involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or
of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988).
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).
39

Nor can Lyons convert his displeasure with these officials’ responses to his
grievances following this June 19, 2006, episode into an infraction of constitutional
dimension. Inmates do not have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system. See
Jones, 433 U.S. at 137-138; Speight v. Sims, No. 08-2038, 283 Fed. Appx. 880, 2008
WL 2600723 at *1 (3d. Cir. June 30, 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641,
647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no
liberty interest on a prisoner.”). Consequently, dissatisfaction with response to an
inmate’s grievances does not support a constitutional claim. See also Alexander v.
Gennarini, 144 F. App’x. 924 (3d Cir. 2005) (involvement in post-incident grievance
process not a basis for § 1983 liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D.
D.C. 1995) (because prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive
constitutional rights upon prison inmates, the prison officials’ failure to comply with
grievance procedure is not actionable). See also Cole v. Sobina, No. 04-99J, 2007 WL
4460617, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[M]ere concurrence in a prison
administrative appeal process does not implicate a constitutional concern.”). As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently observed when disposing
of a similar claim by another inmate:
Several named defendants, such as the Secretaries of the Department of
Corrections or Superintendents, were named only for their supervisory
roles in the prison system. The District Court properly dismissed these
defendants and any additional defendants who were sued based on their
40

failure to take corrective action when grievances or investigations were
referred to them. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir.1988) (defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely
on the operation of respondeat superior ); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan,
81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.1996) (state's inmate grievance procedures
do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause)
Pressley v. Beard, 266 F.App’x 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).
These basic principles apply here, and compel the dismissal of Lyons’ claims
against Defendants Beard, Vaughn, Orwig and Reading, who may not be held liable
simply because they were prison supervisors when these events occurred or were
alleged to have failed “to take corrective action when grievances or investigations
were referred to them.” Id.
IV.

Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED, that the
defendants motion for summary judgment (Doc. 71) be GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, in part, as follows:
1.

The motion for summary judgment should be DENIED as to Defendants
Ayers, Simpson, Yohn, Darhower and Kreider.

2.

The motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED as to
Defendants Beard, Vaughn, Kelcher, Brannigan, Sunday, Cole,
Southers, Orwig, Reading, Brown, Tobias, and Martz .
41

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28
U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition
of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written
objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed
findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the
basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local
Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only
in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own
determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 10th day of January, 2011.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

42