Rines v. Beard et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM and ORDER denying 35 Motion to Reopen Case; DENYING as moot 42 Motion to proceed 45 Motion for Judgment and 46 Motion for an evidentiary Hearing Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 6/1/11 (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD E. RINES,
Plaintiff

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No. 3:07cv636
(Judge Munley)

SECRETARY JEFFREY A. BEARD,
SUPT. MR. MYERS, and
RECORDS OFFICER JOHN DOE,:
Defendants
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MEMORANDUM
Before the court is plaintiff’s motion to reopen the case based on newly
discovered evidence. Having been briefed, the matter is ripe for disposition.
Background
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this court on April 4, 2007. The complaint sought
damages and other relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false imprisonment and
violation of his due process rights. (Complaint (hereinafter “Complt.”) (Doc. 1) at 1).
Plaintiff’s complaint recited that he had been sentenced on April 18, 1975 in the
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania to a term of seven
and one-half to fifteen years. (Id.). The sentence was originally to expire on October
5, 1989. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that defendants filed criminal charges for escape
against him in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Pennsylvania on May
1, 1979. (Id. at 3). In 1981, plaintiff was transferred from New Jersey to
Pennsylvania to face those charges, and eventually was acquitted and returned to

New Jersey. (Id.). Later, in 1993, defendants sought and obtained the extradition of
the plaintiff from Indiana, alleging that he had escaped from custody. (Id.). The
governor of Indiana signed an extradition order, and plaintiff returned to
Pennsylvania prison on December 28, 1993. (Id.). Prison officials placed him in
solitary confinement, where he remained for ninety days. (Id.). Plaintiff insisted that
he should not be in prison, since his maximum sentence had expired in 1989. (Id.).
Plaintiff was granted parole in March 1999. The next year, after the federal
government arrested plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Department of Parole placed a
detainer on him. (Id.). When the government calculated plaintiff’s criminal history in
determining his sentence, his imprisonment from 1993 to 1999 in Pennsylvania
became a factor in elevating him to career criminal status. (Id.). This calculation led
to a longer federal sentence. (Id.). Plaintiff’s lawsuit argued that these calculations
of plaintiff’s status were improper, that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
improperly added years to his prison term after the maximum term set by the court
had expired, and that these actions deprived him of his liberty without due process of
law. (Id. at 4-5). These actions led to plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim. (Id. at 5).
On September 28, 2007, Magistrate Judge Smyser filed his report and
recommendation on defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 29). The magistrate judge
concluded that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed under the standard established
in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under that doctrine, a plaintiff cannot
recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional conviction or

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imprisonment unless he can show that some other court action has invalidated his
sentence. The magistrate judge found that plaintiff had made no such showing, and
concluded that his Section 1983 claim should be dismissed. The court adopted
Magistrate Judge Smyser’s report and recommendation and closed the case on
December 3, 2007. (Doc. 32). The court then denied plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration on December 12, 2007. (Doc. 34). Plaintiff did not appeal this
decision.
On February 18, 2011 plaintiff filed the instant motion to reopen the case
based on newly discovered evidence. (Doc. 35). He argues that he recently
discovered letters directed to him in 2006 from Deputy Counsel for the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections. (See Exhs. 1-2 to Motion (Doc. 35)). In one of those
letters, the Deputy Counsel addressed the length of plaintiff’s sentence. Though
plaintiff had not been convicted of the crime of escape, counsel informed him he was
still required to serve the time remaining on his sentence once he returned to state
custody. (See Exh. 2). Plaintiff contends that these statements are an
acknowledgment that he was improperly held, and therefore state officials should be
subject to damages for this confinement.
Jurisdiction
As this case is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

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Discussion
In his earlier objections to Magistrate Judge Smyser’s report and
recommendation, plaintiff argued that Heck v. Humphrey is not applicable to his case
because, unlike the plaintiff in that case, his conviction and sentence have been
invalidated. Plaintiff claimed that he may therefore bring a Section 1983 suit for
damages related to that conviction.
In Heck, a prisoner filed a pro se Section 1983 suit in Federal Court, alleging
that defendants had undertaken an “‘unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary’”
investigation that led to plaintiff’s arrest, destroyed exculpatory evidence and used
improper evidence at his trial. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court found
that plaintiff could not bring an action under Section 1983 that sought damages for
an allegedly unconstitutional conviction if that conviction had not been ruled
improper by a court. The court concluded that “the hoary principle that civil tort
actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has
always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.” Id. at 486. Accordingly,“in
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

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state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 487. A Section 1983
action where judgment for the plaintiff “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence” must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can show that a court
has already invalidated that sentence. Id.
In the instant matter, the court concluded that plaintiff could not prevail in his
lawsuit because he could not provide evidence that any court had invalidated his
previous conviction. Plaintiff now claims he has uncovered new evidence that
demonstrates that his earlier conviction was invalid and he is thus entitled to sue for
damages. The evidence produced by the plaintiff, even if the court were to consider
that evidence newly discovered, does not demonstrate that the earlier conviction
“has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 487. The evidence
produced by the plaintiff merely demonstrates that a state official agreed with the
plaintiff that he was not convicted of an escape charge related to his absence from
prison. Such evidence does not prove that a court or other appropriate official
invalidated the sentence under which plaintiff was serving at the time. The letters are
not court documents, and their text indicates that the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections continued to argue that plaintiff’s detention was lawful and of the
appropriate length. As such, no damage claim may be brought pursuant to Section

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1983 for plaintiff’s allegedly illegal confinement. No new evidence indicates a formal
finding that plaintiff’s detention was invalid. The court will deny the motion to
reopen.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court will deny the plaintiff’s motion to
reopen. An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD E. RINES,
Plaintiff

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v.

No. 3:07cv636
(Judge Munley)

SECRETARY JEFFREY A. BEARD,
SUPT. MR. MYERS, and
RECORDS OFFICER JOHN DOE,:
Defendants
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ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 1st day of June 2011, the plaintiff’s motion to reopen
based on newly discovered evidence (Doc. 35) is hereby DENIED. The plaintiff’s
motion to proceed (Doc. 42), motion for judgment (Doc. 45) and motion for an
evidentiary hearing (Doc. 46) are hereby DENIED as moot.

BY THE COURT:

s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court

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