Young et al v. Pleasant Valley School District et al

Filing 664

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Each party may, at its own election, submit a brief not exceeding twenty (20) pages in length that addresses the sanctions issue presently under consideration no later than 7/27/2017; In addition, because counsel for Plaintiff failed to submit an Exhibit List along with her exhibits for today's hearing, as directed by this Court's 6/20/2017 Order, ECF No. 652 at Paragraph 3, she must file one on the record via ECF no later than 7/14/2017. Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 7/13/2017. (See Order for further details.) (jn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MEAGAN YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRUCE H. SMITH, JR.,
Defendant.

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No. 3:07-CV-00854
(Judge Brann)

ORDER
JULY 13, 2017
FINDINGS:
1.

On June 20, 2017, this Court scheduled a July 13, 2017
evidentiary hearing and oral argument on counsel for Plaintiff’s
Motion for Fees, and this Court’s related sua sponte
determination that sanctions might result following the Court’s
further review of this matter and after considering counsel for
Plaintiff’s argument. ECF No. 652.

2.

The Order provided Plaintiff’s counsel with “particularized
notice,” because it stated “the particular factors that [s]he must
address if [s]he is to avoid sanctions.” Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat.
Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990).

3.

In particular, that Order stated as follows at Paragraph 4:
In addition, at the time of the hearing, both parties should
be prepared to address whether counsel for Plaintiff’s fee
request in excess of $727,000.00, which seeks fees and
costs for portions of the litigation that were necessitated
by her own vexatious conduct, as against defendants that
she ultimately did not prevail, for certain expenses
previously held unrecoverable by judges of this Court,
and relative to a total settlement of $25,000.00, violates
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

4.

In addition to citing Rule 11, that Order made clear sanctions
may be imposed for Plaintiff counsel’s “vexatious conduct,”
which conduct is the cornerstone of any sanctions
determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

5.

Earlier today, the Court held its oral argument and evidentiary
hearing, at which time counsel for Plaintiff reiterated on
numerous occasions that she was prepared to contest (and did
so contest) the extent to which her conduct was “vexatious.”

6.

Contrary to her misrepresentations during this morning’s oral
argument, my June 20, 2017 Order was not the first occasion
upon which the issue of sanctions for Plaintiff counsel’s
meritless and vexatious fee petition was raised.

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7.

Indeed, despite not filing a separate Rule 11 motion, defense
counsel highlighted the propriety of sanctions in its responsive
papers to Plaintiff counsel’s fee petition, devoting a full section
of its argument to the following contention: “Plaintiff’s
demand for fees for the second trial, where Defendant Smith
was not a party, should be the basis for sanctions, a denial of
fees, or an overall reduction in fees.” ECF No. 642 at 21–22.

8.

That section specifically states that “Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b), by presenting a paper to this Honorable Court, Plaintiff’s
counsel certifies that, to the best of her knowledge, the legal
contentions are warranted under existing law.” Id. at 21.

9.

In fact, counsel for the Defendant in its opposition brief to
Plaintiff counsel’s fee petition quoted directly from my 2016
decision imposing Rule 11 sanctions, in which I stated that such
sanctions may be appropriate to deter “vexatious conduct” on
the part of an attorney who “is simply not getting the message.”
ECF No. 642 at 20 (citing Keister v. PPL Corp., — F. Supp. 3d.
—, No. 4:13-CV-00118, 2016 WL 688031, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 2016), aff’d, 677 F. App’x 63 (3d Cir. 2017)).

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10.

Moreover, in a July 10, 2017 Order granting a motion to quash
one of Plaintiff counsel’s subpoenas, I again reiterated that the
issues to be considered at the July 13 hearing included the
propriety of sanctions as to counsel for Plaintiff’s fee petition.
ECF No. 660 ¶ 4.

11.

At today’s hearing, I ensured, for what is now at least the third
time, that Plaintiff’s counsel was aware that the sanctionable
conduct at issue was her submitting a fee petition that sought
costs and fees for portions of the litigation that were
necessitated by her own vexatious conduct, as against
defendants from whom she ultimately did not prevail, for
certain expenses previously held unrecoverable by judges of
this Court, and relative to a total settlement of $25,000.00.

12.

At the hearing, I confirmed that Rule 11 applies if an attorney
submits papers “for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation” or if an attorney’s “claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions” are not “warranted by existing law or by a

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nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.”
13.

At the hearing, I confirmed that Section 1927 “requires a court
to find an attorney has (1) multiplied proceedings; (2) in an
unreasonable and vexatious manner; (3) thereby increasing the
cost of the proceedings; and (4) doing so in bad faith or by
intentional misconduct.” In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542
F.3d 90, 101 (3d Cir. 2008).

14.

At the hearing, I confirmed that Plaintiff’s counsel understands
that penalties imposed pursuant to Rule 11 or § 1927 could take
the form of monetary sanctions.

15.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
previously upheld a district court’s imposition of monetary
sanctions under § 1927 where a scheduling order noted that
sanctions were sought “for unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplying the proceedings in this matter, and seeking payment
. . . of the excess costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig.
Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 191 (3d Cir. 2002).

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16.

In fact, the Third Circuit in Prudential reasoned that “all parties
were given ample notice of what behavior was in dispute,”
because “the questions posed at oral argument afforded to the
parties an inkling of the Court’s concerns about
what behavior might be objectionable,” and “each party was
able to listen at oral argument to the concerns voiced by the
other.” Id. “Surely,” the court concluded, “each side was on
particularized notice of what behavior and actions were at
issue.” Id.

17.

I also point to Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat. Corp., 899 F.2d 1350,
1357 (3d Cir. 1990) (contrasting a scenario where the offending
party was not put on notice “until he received the court’s order
. . . actually imposing sanctions” with that in which the
offending party “prior to sanctioning” is provided “notice and
some occasion to respond”).

18.

Having recounted all of the foregoing procedures, I will
nevertheless recite again for the record that the sanctions issue
presently under consideration is whether counsel for Plaintiff
should be sanctioned for submission of a fee request in excess

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of $727,000.00, which seeks fees and costs for portions of the
litigation that were necessitated by her own vexatious conduct,
as against defendants from whom she ultimately did not prevail,
for certain expenses previously held unrecoverable by judges of
this Court, and relative to a total settlement of $25,000.00.
19.

The Court may sanction Plaintiff’s counsel under either (or
both) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.

20.

The penalties imposed may include monetary sanctions.

21.

Moreover, counsel for Plaintiff is afforded an additional
opportunity to respond and be heard on the sanctions issue
presently under consideration, consistent with the below
directives.

AND NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Each party may, at its own election, submit a brief not
exceeding twenty (20) pages in length that addresses the
sanctions issue presently under consideration no later than
July 27, 2017.

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2.

In addition, because counsel for Plaintiff failed to submit an
Exhibit List along with her exhibits for today’s hearing, as
directed by this Court’s June 20, 2017 Order, ECF No. 652 at
Paragraph 3, she must file one on the record via ECF no later
than July 14, 2017.

3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this Order as a
“written opinion,” pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

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