Grosek et al v. Panther II Transportation, Inc. et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 50 dfts' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ; GRANTED re pltfs' claim re punitive damages against dfts Panther Transport and Panther Expedited; DENIED re pltf's claim for punitive damages against dft Sanders; and Pltfs may obtain punitive damages against dfts Panther Transport and Panterh Expeditied Services through vicarious liability.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/20/09 (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA HELEN GROSEK, and ANTHONY GROSEK, Plaintiffs : No. 3:07cv1592 : : (Judge Munley) : v. : : PANTHER TRANSPORTATION, INC., : PANTHER EXPEDITED SERVICES, : INC., and : ANTHONY L. SANDERS, a/k/a TONY : SANDERS, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
M E M O R AN D U M B e fo re the court is defendants' motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 50). Having been fully briefed, the matter is ripe for disposition. B a c k g ro u n d T h is case arises out of an accident between an automobile driven by Plaintiff Helen Grosek and a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Anthony Sanders. (Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 50) at ¶ 1).1 On the date o f the accident, May 14, 2007, Defendant Sanders was operating a tractor-trailer tra ve lin g southbound on Route 309 in Dallas Township, Pennsylvania. (Id. at ¶ 13).

The defendants did not submit the separate statement of material facts required by the local rules. The defendants did, however, cite to the relevant portions of the record in their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs responded to these statements paragraphby-paragraph in a response to the motion for summary judgment. The court will therefore use these statements to address the facts of the case in this opinion. The court urges the defendant to observe the rules of court in briefing future motions.

1

H is truck collided with plaintiff's vehicle at the intersection of Route 309 with East C e n te r Hill Road. (Id. at ¶ 16). The parties dispute whether Sanders drove through a red light before his truck struck the plaintiff's car or whether the light had merely tu rn e d yellow when the truck entered the intersection. (Id. at ¶ 14). (Plaintiff's R e s p o n s e to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) at ¶ 14). Sanders pled guilty to failing to stop at a red traffic signal, however. (Sanders D e p o s itio n (Exh. 1 to Plaintiff's Response) (Doc. 55-6) at 189). Sanders had received training from Caldwell Community College to meet the re q u ire m e n ts for obtaining a Commercial Driver's License (CDL). (Defendants' M o tio n at ¶ 17). During his previous employment with United Parcel Service (UPS), S a n d e r s received training as well. (Id. at ¶ 18). As part of his UPS training, Sanders h a d instruction from an on-the-road trainer, as well as receiving written materials and vid e o ta p e s . (Id. at ¶ 19). On the date of the accident, Sanders was employed as an in d e p e n d e n t contractor. (Id. at ¶ 20). The parties dispute the amount of training D e fe n d a n t Sanders received from the Defendant Company as part of this in d e p e n d e n t contractor status. Defendants contend that Sanders received seven d a y s of classroom training. (Id. at ¶ 21). Plaintiffs insist that the evidence d e m o n s tra te s he received only three days of such training. (Plaintiff's Response at ¶ 2 1 ). The parties also dispute whether plaintiff received both written materials and vid e o ta p e s , or just written materials, as part of his training. (Motion at ¶ 22; P la in tiff's Response at ¶ 22). They also disagree about whether Sanders received

2

tra in in g in the Smith System of driving techniques or any defensive driving training. (Motion at ¶ 23; Plaintiff's Response at ¶ 23). Sanders did receive and read D e fe n d a n t Panther's driver handbook and safety manual. (Motion at ¶ 24). The p a rtie s also disagree about whether additional mandatory training existed. (Motion a t ¶ 25; Plaintiff's Response at ¶ 25). The parties disagree about the experience and training that Defendant S a n d e r s had at the time Panther hired him, and about whether this training and e xp e rie n c e was adequate. Defendant Panther contends that its drivers are required to have six months of verifiable tractor-trailer driving experience before they are h ire d . (Motion at ¶ 26). Sanders did not have six months experience as a driver w h e n he was hired, but had that experience when Defendant Panther included S a n d e rs ' time in driving school in its calculations. (Motion at ¶¶ 26-27; Plaintiff's R e s p o n s e at ¶¶ 26-27). Defendant Panther insists that Sanders met all of its driver e lig ib ility requirements. (Motion at ¶ 30). Panther did not require Sanders to c o m p le te a written or road test before his hiring. (Id. at ¶ 29). Panther contends that S a n d e rs 's possession of a CDL obviated the need for such testing, but plaintiffs in s is t that even with his CDL Sanders did not meet the company's driver q u a lific a tio n s . (Plaintiff's Response at ¶ 29). Jurisdiction T h is court has jurisdiction pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U .S .C . § 1332. The plaintiffs are Pennsylvania citizens, and the defendant

3

c o rp o ra tio n s incorporated and with their principle places of business in states other th a n Pennsylvania. Defendant Sanders is a citizen of North Carolina. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Because the court is sitting in diversity, the s u b s ta n tiv e law of Pennsylvania shall apply to the instant case. Chamberlain v. G ia m p a p a , 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 6 4 , 78 (1938)). Legal Standard T h e case is before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to in te rro g a to rie s , and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that th e re is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1 9 9 7 ) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence o f some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise p ro p e rly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be n o genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 2 4 7 -4 8 (1986) (emphasis in original). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the fa c ts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. International Raw M a te ria ls , Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The b u rd e n is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a

4

re a s o n a b le jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U .S . at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit u n d e r the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of p ro o f at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by s h o w in g that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, w o u ld be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. C a tre tt, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the b u rd e n shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond its pleadings, and d e s ig n a te specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. Discussion D e fe n d a n ts argue that the court should grant them summary judgment on p la in tiff's punitive damages claim on several grounds. The court will address each in tu rn . i. Punitive Damages Claim Against Defendant Sanders D e fe n d a n t Sanders contends that there is insufficient evidence of outrageous conduct for a jury to conclude that he is liable for punitive damages. T h e court must first establish the standard for awarding punitive damages in a case like this one. As a general matter, because the court is sitting in diversity, the s u b s ta n tiv e law of Pennsylvania shall apply to the instant case. Chamberlain v. G ia m p a p a , 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 5

6 4 , 78 (1938)). In Pennsylvania, "`[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct th a t is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless in d iffe re n c e to the rights of others.'" Hutchinson ex rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 870 A. 2 d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984)). Since "punitive damages are penal in nature," they are available "only in cases w h e re the defendant's actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton o r reckless conduct." Id. In determining whether to award punitive damages, "one m u s t look to `the act itself together with all the circumstances including the motive of th e wrongdoers and the relations between the parties.'" Feld, 485 A.2d at 748. A p a rty may be liable for punitive damages by acting with "reckless indifference." Medvecz v. Choi, 569 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1977). As such, "a punitive damages claim m u s t be supported by evidence sufficient to establish that (1) a defendant had a s u b je c tive appreciation of the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2 ) he acted, or failed to act, as the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk." Hutchinson, 870 A.2d at 772. The court concludes that in this case a jury could find that plaintiff consciously a p p re c ia te d and ignored the risk of causing an accident that his behavior caused. If a jury concludes that Sanders ignored a red light and drove at full speed through an in te rs e c tio n , the jury could reasonably conclude that Sanders was aware of and ig n o re d the risk that he would strike another vehicle legally crossing the intersection fro m another direction. Plaintiff points to evidence by which a jury could come to this

6

c o n c lu s io n . Defendant Sanders testified that he never slowed down as he a p p ro a c h e d the intersection, even though he had observed the stoplight change to ye llo w . (Sanders Deposition (Exh. 1) to Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 55-4) at 1001 0 1 ). Sanders admitted that his foot was still on the accelerator when the accident o c c u rre d . (Id. at 101). Eyewitness testimony indicates that Sanders drove through a lig h t that had been red "four or five seconds" before he entered the intersection and struck plaintiff's car. (Deposition of Ryan Kenney, Exh. 2 to Plaintiff's Response (D o c . 55-8) at 10-11). Another witness also reported that the weather was clear, and th a t Sanders ran through a red light before striking plaintiff's car. (Deposition of P a tric k Touhey, Exh. 3 to Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 55-9) at 11-12). Plaintiff also e m p lo ye d an expert witness who concluded that the traffic light had been red for four to six seconds before Sanders's truck struck the plaintiff's car, and that Sanders had a d e q u a te time to stop his truck before entering the intersection but failed to do so. (Report of Lance E. Robson, Exh. 4 to Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 55-10) at 5-6). In Focht v. Rabada, the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that "driving w h ile under the influence of intoxicating liquor with its very great potential for harm a n d serious injury may under certain circumstances be deemed `outrageous c o n d u c t' and `a reckless indifference to the interests of others' sufficient to allow the im p o s itio n of punitive damages." 268 A.2d 157, 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970). The c o u rt noted that "[a]utomobiles represent the most lethal and deadly weapons today e n tru s te d to our citizenry. W h e n automobiles are driven by intoxicated drivers, the

7

p o s s ib ility of death and serious injury increases substantially. Every licensed driver is aware that driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor presents a s ig n ific a n t and very real danger to others in the area." Id. at 161. While the case of ru n n in g a red light is not as extreme as driving an automobile intoxicated, the c o n c e rn s expressed by the Pennsylvania court about the danger posed by motor ve h ic le s are magnified when the vehicle in question is a tractor-trailer weighing s e ve ra l tons. If a jury concludes that Defendant Sanders entered the intersection w ith o u t even braking for an obvious red light, it could reasonably decide that the d e fe n d a n t was recklessly indifferent to a very real danger to others in the area. As a tru c k driver with experience and training in safety, the jury could conclude that S a n d e r s knew or should have known of the consequences of such behavior. The c irc u m s ta n c e s of the accident therefore make punitive damages available. S in c e the court has found that Sanders could be liable for punitive damages, the court also finds that Defendant Panther could be vicariously liable for punitive d a m a g e s attributed to Sanders. In Pennsylvania, "[p]unitive damages may be a w a rd e d on the basis of vicarious liability." Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1240 (P a . Super. Ct. 1998). Defendants do not appear to deny that Sanders served as an a g e n t "subject to the principal's control over the details of his performance of the ta s k for which he was appointed." Id. As such, Panther could be vicariously liable if a jury found Sanders liable, and the court will deny the motion for summary judgment o n these grounds.

8

ii. Claims for Punitive Damages Against Panther Defendants also contend that no evidence establishes that punitive damages c a n be imposed against Panther in its own right. Plaintiff's claim for punitive d a m a g e s , which is based on Panther's alleged failure to provide adequate training to S a n d e rs , sounds in the torts of negligent supervision and failure-to-train. Pennsylvania courts have found that punitive damages are available in that context. S e e , e.g., Hutchinson, 870 A.2d at 773 (finding that "there is no general proscription in law against pursuing punitive damages in the [master-servant] context, where the fa c ts so warrant."). At the same time, however, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages in the negligence context must demonstrate the availability of such damages by "e xa m in [in g ] the actor's conduct." Feld 485 A.2d 748. As with a claim for punitive d a m a g e s against the servant, the plaintiff must show that the master's "conduct not o n ly was negligent but that the conduct was outrageous, and warrants response in th e form of punitive damages." Hutchinson, 870 A.2d at 772. A s evidence that the defendant company engaged in outrageous conduct worthy of punitive damages, plaintiffs point out that the defendant company did not fo llo w its own safety standards in hiring Sanders. Sanders lacked the minimum re q u is ite training required by the company's own guidelines. As such, the defendant c o m p a n y was surely aware that it had put a driver on the road who lacked the tra in in g appropriate to preventing the sort of injuries that occurred in this case. Moreover, plaintiffs argue that the training that the company provided was

9

s u b s ta n d a rd : the company never road tested Sanders and offered little in the way of c o n tin u in g training. Plaintiffs also claim that an issue of fact exists as to whether the d e fe n d a n t company actually provided plaintiff with training as to when and how to s lo w down in the face of a light that had "long" been green. Finally, plaintiffs argue th a t the Defendant Company failed adequately to supervise plaintiff. The company n e ve r discussed the accident in question here with Sanders, never reprimanded him a b o u t substandard log book and poor time management, and never reprimanded h im for speeding. Indeed, plaintiffs argue that company policies actually encouraged s p e e d in g as a cost-saving measure. The court will grant the defendants' motion on this point. Even if the jury were to believe all of the evidence cited by the plaintiffs, the jury could not find that d e fe n d a n ts ' conduct in training Sanders was reckless or outrageous. The evidence in d ica te s that plaintiffs' injuries were caused by Sanders' failure to stop at a red light. None of the evidence advanced by the plaintiffs indicates that defendants' training e n c o u ra g e d drivers to ignore traffic laws or to take the risk of entering an intersection w h e n a traffic light was red or yellow. While the training may not have offered clear a d vic e about when and how to slow down when approaching an intersection, a jury c o u ld not find that these failing were so outrageous as to justify a finding a re c k le s s n e s s . Similarly, employing a driver who did not meet all of the training re q u ire m e n ts does not amount to reckless indifference to the clear possibility that s u c h a driver would ignore basic traffic laws, run a red light and injure another driver.

10

A s such, the court will grant summary judgment to the defendants on this aspect of p la in tiffs ' punitive damages claim. C o n c l u s io n F o r the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion for partial summary ju d g m e n t will be granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order follows.

11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA HELEN GROSEK, and ANTHONY GROSEK, Plaintiffs : No. 3:07cv1592 : : (Judge Munley) : v. : : PANTHER TRANSPORTATION, INC., : PANTHER EXPEDITED SERVICES, : INC., and : ANTHONY L. SANDERS, a/k/a TONY : SANDERS, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER AN D NOW, to wit, this 20th day of February 2009, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as fo llo w s : 1 ) The motion is GRANTED with respect to plaintiffs' claim for punitive d a m a g e s against Defendants Panther Transportation and Panther Expedited S e r v ic e s ; 2 ) The motion is DENIED with respect to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages a g a in s t Defendant Anthony Sanders; and 3 ) Plaintiffs may obtain punitive damages against Defendants Panther T ra n s p o rta tio n and Panther Expedited Services through vicarious liability.

12

B Y THE COURT:

s / James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT

13