Robinson v. Tennis et al

Filing 88

MEMORANDUM and ORDER adopting 85 Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Mannion; GRANTING dfts' motion for summary judgment; DENYING as moot pltf's motion to stay court proceedings; Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE case. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 3/4/10 (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MARK A. ROBINSON, Plaintiff : No. 3:08cv924 : : (Judge Munley) : : : v. : : FRANKLIN J. TENNIS, : JOEL S. DICKSON, : LYNN EATON, : JEFFREY RACKOVAN, and : SHARON M. BURKS, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
M E M O R AN D U M B e fo re the court is plaintiff's appeal of Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion's decision denying his motion to supplement his complaint, as well as plaintiff's o b je c tio n s to the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mannion, which re c o m m e n d s that summary judgment be granted the defendants. Having been fully b rie fe d , the matters are ripe for disposition. B a c k g ro u n d T h is case arises out of plaintiff's employment at the prison kitchen in the P e n n s ylva n ia State Correctional Institution at Rockview ("SCI-Rockview"). (Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. 42) (hereinafter "D e fe n d a n ts ' Statement") at ¶ 1). On May 23, 2006, while working in the kitchen,

plaintiff stopped Ms. Johnson, a female staff person, and spoke inappropriately to h e r. (Id. at ¶ 2). Johnson reported these comments to her supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 3). Johnson wrote a misconduct report about plaintiff as ordered by her supervisor. (Id. a t ¶ 4). According to the report, plaintiff told Johnson that he found her "beautiful" a n d offered to "get something going" with her. (Id. at ¶ 5). A romantic relationship b e tw e e n an inmate and a prison employee violates prison rules. (Id. at ¶ 6). That same day, the prison issued Misconduct #A902830, charging plaintiff w ith sexual harassment. (Id. at ¶ 7). Johnson's complaint led to placement of R o b in s o n in Administrative Custody pending an investigation and hearing on his a lle g e d misconduct. (Id. at ¶ 8). The prison held a misconduct hearing on May 26, 2 0 0 6 . (Id. at ¶ 9). Plaintiff pled guilty to the charge and received sixty days in d is c ip lin a ry custody for this offense. (Id. at ¶ 10). Plaintiff also lost his job in the p ris o n kitchen. (Id. ¶ 11). The prison thereafter also considered plaintiff a threat to fe m a le staff and to the institution. (Id. at ¶ 12). P la in tiff filed a complaint on May 13, 2008. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that he w a s classified a "threat and risk" in 2008 without due process of law. (Id. at ¶ 1). T h is classification, he claims, has "severely limited" his ability to have his sentenced c o m m u te d . (Id. ¶ 4). That classification has also prevented him from obtaining an in s titu tio n a l job. (Id. at ¶ 5). As relief, plaintiff seeks expungement of the May 23, 2 0 0 6 incident from his record so that he can seek commutation. He also requests re in s ta te m e n t to his previous employment and back pay for time missed while in the

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SCI-Rockview's restricted housing union. Finally, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. A t the close of discovery the defendants filed the instant motion for summary ju d g m e n t. After the parties briefed the issue, Magistrate Judge Mannion issued a re p o rt and recommendation, advising the court that defendants' motion should be g ra n te d . Plaintiff filed the instant objections and a brief in support of them, bringing th e case to its present posture. J u r is d ic tio n B e c a u s e plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this court h a s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original ju ris d ic tio n of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the U n ite d States."). Discussion A. Plaintiff's Appeal P la in tiff first appeals the magistrate judge's decision to deny his motion to s u p p le m e n t his complaint. Here, the plaintiff appeals the magistrate judge's nond is p o s itiv e order. The standard of review for a non-dispositive order by a magistrate ju d g e is to determine if the magistrate judge's ruling was clearly erroneous or c o n tra ry to law. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A). On July 16, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion (Doc. 57) to supplement his c o m p la in t. Defendant sought to add to the complaint several officials at SCIR o c k vie w . He alleged that these individuals had violated the ADA and discriminated 3

against him, attempted to apply cruel and unusual punishment and attempted to d e n y him access to the court. In his brief in support of that motion, plaintiff relates th a t he suffers from an anxiety disorder and needs to be housed in a cell with w in d o w s . Plaintiff relates that prison officials were aware of that condition. In June 2 0 0 9 , plaintiff told prison psychologists that he intended to kill himself if not placed in a cell with windows. Despite these threats, administrators placed him in a w in d o w le s s cell. Plaintiff contends that this failure to provide a safe cell came in re ta lia tio n for his filing a federal law suit. Plaintiff also complains that he was placed in restricted forms of custody without justification and without due process. The magistrate judge concluded that plaintiff should not be allowed to s u p p le m e n t his complaint. He found that the actions about which plaintiff c o m p la in e d in his motion and brief had occurred long after the events that led to the in itia l complaint and were unrelated to them. As such, the court denied the motion to s u p p le m e n t. Plaintiff then filed the instant appeal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides that "[o]n motion and re a s o n a b le notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a s u p p le m e n ta l pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that h a p p e n e d after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). "Because it refers to events that occurred after the original pleading was filed, a s u p p le m e n ta l pleading differs from an amendment, which covers matters that o c c u rre d before the filing of the original pleading but were overlooked at the time."

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Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1888 (3d Cir. 1979). The determination of whether to allow a supplemental pleading is left to the d is c re tio n of the court. Id. "Leave to file a supplemental complaint should be freely p e rm itte d in the absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory tactics, undue prejudice to defendants, or futility, and when the supplemental facts are connected to the o rig in a l pleading." Hassoun v. Cimmino, 126 F.2d 353, 361 (D. N.J.. 2000) (citing Q u a ra tin o v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 1995)). T h e court will deny the appeal. The magistrate judge's opinion is neither c le a rly erroneous nor contrary to law. The magistrate judge determined that the e ve n ts about which plaintiff complained in his supplemental pleading were not re la te d to the events that led to the original complaint. They had to do with how he w a s housed, not his contact with prison staff and his access to a particular job in the p ris o n . Thus, allowing plaintiff to supplement the complaint would add a whole new s e t of allegations and defendants which were unrelated to the original complaint. See Nottingham v. Peoria, 709 F. Supp. 542, 544 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that "a c o u rt may deny leave to file a supplemental pleading where that pleading relates o n ly indirectly, if at all, to the original complaint and the alleged cause of action arose o u t of an entirely unrelated set of facts and related to a defendant not implicated in th e original complaint."). Such a supplementation would neither promote efficient or a llo w a fuller and fairer examination of plaintiff's complaints against the original d e fe n d a n ts . This finding did not amount to an abuse of discretion or a clear error of

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law. As such, the court will deny the appeal. B . Plaintiff's Objections P la in tiff has filed objections to the report and recommendation that proposes th e court grant summary judgment to the defendants. His objections, however, do n o t address the substance of the report, but instead complain about the court's d e c is io n to allow defendants to file a motion for summary judgment after the courte s ta b lis h e d deadline for filing such motions and the magistrate judge's decision not to allow him to supplement the complaint. The court will address those issues, but w ill also address the propriety of the court's recommendation on the motion for s u m m a ry judgment. That recommendation, after all, proposes the court enter ju d g m e n t in the defendants' favor. In disposing of objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, th e district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C); see also Henderson v. C a rls o n , 812 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1987). This court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The district court judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to th e magistrate judge with instructions. Id. The case comes before this court on a motion for summary judgment. Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to in te rro g a to rie s , and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

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there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1 9 9 7 ) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence o f some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise p ro p e rly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be n o genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 2 4 7 -4 8 (1986) (emphasis in original). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the fa c ts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. International Raw M a te ria ls , Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The b u rd e n is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a re a s o n a b le jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U .S . at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit u n d e r the governing law. Id. W h e re the non-moving party will bear the burden of p ro o f at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by s h o w in g that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, w o u ld be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. C a tre tt, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the b u rd e n shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond its pleadings, and d e s ig n a te specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. 7

i. Timeliness of Defendants' Motion P la in tiff first complains that the court allowed the defendants to file the instant m o tio n for summary judgment after the deadline for filing such motions had passed. W h e n defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed a motion to s trik e . Rather than entertaining this motion, the magistrate judge ruled on the motion fo r summary judgment. P la in tiff filed his initial complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis o n May 13, 2008. (See Docs. 1, 2). Magistrate Judge Mannion granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 9) and authorized service of the complaint on d e fe n d a n ts on May 16, 2008. After defendants answered the complaint, the court e s ta b lis h e d a discovery schedule that made dispositive motions due on March 6, 2 0 0 9 . (See Doc. 19). W h e n defendants did not file any dispositive motions by that d e a d lin e , the court scheduled a pre-trial conference. (See Doc. 37). On the day of th e pre-trial conference, defense counsel filed a motion for an extension of time to file a motion for summary judgment. (See Doc. 40). The court granted this motion. (Doc. 43). Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, which is presently b e fo re the court. P la in tiff's complaint is that the court should not consider the summary ju d g m e n t motion because it was not filed until after the date originally established by th e magistrate judge. The motion was timely filed, however, according to the new s c h e d u le established by the court after the defendants filed their motion for an

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extension of time. The court granted defendants' motion after considering both the p o te n tia l merits of the proposed motion and lateness of filing, which came on the day o f the pre-trial conference. The court concluded that consideration of the potentially m e rito rio u s motion was required in order to do substantial justice to the defendants. T h e court will not revisit that decision at this point. Plaintiff's objections are overruled o n this point. ii. The Recommendation that Summary Judgment be Granted T h e substance of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation is that s u m m a ry judgment should be granted the defendants on all of plaintiff's claims. The c o u rt will address each portion of that recommendation. a . Classification Claims The magistrate judge recommended that the court dismiss all of plaintiff's c la im s related to his classification as a "threat and risk," finding that plaintiff has no c o n s titu tio n a l due process right to a particular classification. Courts have found that a prisoner's "procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a legally c o g n iz a b le liberty interest. For a prisoner, such a deprivation occurs when the p ris o n `imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the o rd in a ry incidents of prison life.'" Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 531 (3d Cir. 2003) (q u o tin g Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). If "restraints on a prisoner's fre e d o m are deemed to fall `within the expected perimeters of the sentenced im p o s e d by a court of law,'" then the prisoner does not have a "protected liberty 9

interest" and the "state owed him no process before placing him in disciplinary c o n fin e m e n t." Id. Moreover, "the baseline for determining what is `atypical and s ig n ific a n t' . . . is ascertained by what a sentenced inmate may reasonably expect to e n c o u n te r as a result of his or her conviction in accordance with due process of law" a n d that "`discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct fa lls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.'" G riffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir 1997) (quoting Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2 3 0 1 ). T h e magistrate judge properly concluded that plaintiff did not have a p ro te c ta b le liberty interest in a particular custody classification and thus could not p re va il on his claim. The court will adopt this recommendation. Courts have found th a t a prisoner "does not have a right under the U.S. Constitution or Pennsylvania s ta te laws or regulations to any specific custody status," and thus cannot prevail on h is due process claim based on his placement in a particular status. Oden v. C a is o n , 892 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1995); see also, Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 2 3 6 , 242 (1976); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding that "a d m in is tra tiv e segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should re a s o n a b ly anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration."). Thus, a p a rtic u la r classification is not the type of atypical and significant hardship that would im p lic a te a due process right. The magistrate judge also concluded that, to the e xte n t that plaintiff attempts to raise a claim because he did not receive a hearing

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before being classified a threat or risk, he could not prevail. Since plaintiff had no c o n s titu tio n a l right to avoid such classification, he had no right to process s u rro u n d in g it. Because, as explained above, the court agrees that plaintiff has no lib e rty interest in a particular classification, the court will adopt this aspect of the re p o rt and recommendation. b. Employment P la in tiff also claims that his rights were violated because the prison's decision th a t he represented a danger deprived him of the opportunity to obtain prison e m p lo ym e n t. The magistrate judge concluded that plaintiff could not prevail on this c la im because he had no constitutional right to prison employment and thus could n o t bring a claim pursuant to Section 1983 for being denied work. Courts have held th a t "[w]e do not believe that "an inmate's expectation of keeping a particular prison jo b amounts either to a `property' or `liberty' interest entitled to protection under the d u e process clause." Bryan v. W e rn e r, 516 F.2d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 1975); see also, K a n ta m a n to v. King, 651 F. Supp. 2d 313, 330 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that prisoner "d o e s not have a protected liberty or property interest in his law library job arising d ire c tly from the Due Process Clause" or from state prison regulations.). Since the p la in tiff's complaint here is that he was denied the ability to work in a particular job b y virtue of the prison's classification, the court finds that plaintiff had no protected p ro p e rty interest in his job. The court will adopt the magistrate judge's re c o m m e n d a tio n that summary judgment be granted the defendants on this claim.

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c. False Incident Report P la in tiff also claims that he was subjected to punishment based on a false in c id e n t report, and that this violated his due process rights. The magistrate judge re c o m m e n d e d that the court grant defendants' summary judgment motion on these c la im s as well. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found that "due process is s a tis fie d where an inmate is afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend a g a in s t the allegedly falsified evidence and groundless misconduct. Thus, so long a s certain procedural requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified e vid e n c e or misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due p ro c e s s claim." Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the p la in tiff alleges that misconduct reports were falsified, but not that he suffered any e xtra o rd in a ry or exceptional harm as a result. As such, he has not been subject to a n atypical and significant hardship and cannot make out a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Rhoades v. Adams, 194 Fed. Appx. 93, 94-95 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that 1 5 days in segregation and classification as an increased security risk based on a lle g e d ly false reports of misconduct do not constitute a due process violation b e c a u s e "they do not rise to the level of an `atypical and signficant hardship on the in m a te in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life'") (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. a t 484). The court will adopt the report and recommendation and grant summary ju d g m e n t on this claim. d . Grievance Process

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Plaintiff also complains about the fairness of the grievance procedures at SCIR o c k vie w . The magistrate judge recommends that those claims be dismissed, as c o u rts have found no constitutional right to grievance procedures. The court agrees th a t failure to follow grievances procedures cannot create a due process claim. Courts have concluded that "inmate grievance procedures, in themselves, do not c o n fe r a liberty interest protected by the due process clause in the inmate grievance p ro c e d u re s ." Rhoades, 194 Fed. Appx. at 95; see also, Burnside v. Moser, 138 Fed. A p p x. 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that "[i]nmates do not have a constitutionally p ro te c te d right to the prison grievance process."); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8 th Cir. 1991) ("W h e n the claim underlying the administrative grievance involves a c o n s titu tio n a l right, the prisoner's right to petition the government for redress is the rig h t of access to the courts, which is not compromised by the prison's refusal to e n te rta in his grievance."); Hoover v. W a ts o n , 886 F.Supp. 410, 418-19 (D. Del. 1 9 9 5 ). The court will therefore adopt the report and recommendation on this point a n d grant summary judgment to the defendants on all of plaintiff's claims related to th e grievance process. iii. Recommendation that the Case be Marked Closed P la in tiff next objects to the magistrate judge's recommendation that the case b e marked closed. He contends that he filed a motion to supplement the complaint, b u t Magistrate Judge Mannion did not issue a report and recommendation on the is s u e . As such, the magistrate judge should not have recommended that the case

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be closed. He should instead have ruled on that motion. The court will overrule this objection. The magistrate judge ruled on this m o tio n to supplement the complaint. (See Doc. 73). The plaintiff appealed this nond is p o s itiv e decision, and the court has now ruled on that appeal. Moreover, the m a g is tra te judge recommended that the defendants be granted summary judgment o n all of plaintiff's claims. Since the court will adopt that recommendation, the case w o u ld be properly closed. C o n c lu s io n F o r the reasons stated above, the court will deny plaintiff's appeal and o ve rru le his objections to the report and recommendation. The court will adopt that re p o rt and recommendation and grant the defendants' motion for summary ju d g m e n t. An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MARK A. ROBINSON, Plaintiff : No. 3:08cv924 : : (Judge Munley) : : : v. : : FRANKLIN J. TENNIS, : JOEL S. DICKSON, : LYNN EATON, : JEFFREY RACKOVAN, and : SHARON M. BURKS, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER AN D NOW, to wit, this 4th day of March 2010, the plaintiff's appeal (Doc. 80) o f the magistrate judge's opinion denying plaintiff's motion to supplement the c o m p la in t (Doc. 71) is hereby DENIED. The plaintiff's objections (Doc. 86) to the re p o rt and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion (Doc. 85) are h e re b y OVERRULED. The report and recommendation is hereby ADOPTED. The d e fe n d a n ts motion for summary judgment (Doc. 41) is hereby GRANTED. The p la in tiff's motion to stay court proceedings (Doc. 82) is hereby DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the case. BY THE COURT: 15

s/ James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT

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