Binsack v. Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM and ORDER DENYING 38 Letter Request for a temporary restraining order; Pltf's motion for 37 extension of time to serve the complaint is GRANTED; Pltf shall serve the complaint w/i 60 days of this order; The Court will not direct the USM to develop a payment plan for service, or the Clerk of Court to provide pltf w/copies of his complaint.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/19/09. (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SCOTT J. BINSACK, SR. Plaintiff : No. 3:08cv1166 : : (Judge Munley) : v. : : LACKAWANNA COUNTY DISTRICT : ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, et al., : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
M E M O R AN D U M B e fo re the court is plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining the certain state officials from instituting a state order of indefinite inpatient c o n fin e m e n t. (Doc. 37). Background T h is case arises out of plaintiff's arrest and criminal indictment by Defendant L a c k a w a n n a County District Attorney's Office. Plaintiff, who moved to Monroe C o u n ty , Pennsylvania in 1998, has operated several home-building businesses in th e succeeding years. (Complaint (Doc. 1) (hereinafter "Complt.") at ¶ 42).1 He also p le d guilty to a number of theft charges related to his business in 2001, and served th re e years in prison. (Id. at ¶ 44). After release on parole, plaintiff took up re s id e n c e in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania and resumed his business career. (Id. at

These facts are presented merely as background to the case. They are taken from the plaintiff's complaint. The court makes no ruling on the veracity of these averments.

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¶ 45). The company he eventually formed, Mansions and Estates, International, e n jo ye d success, and eventually accumulated over $1 million in assets. (Id. at ¶¶ 4 7 -4 8 ). Plaintiff also created a radio show about homebuilding and became p ro m in e n t in several professional organizations. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-51). Plaintiff made s u b s ta n tia l investments in his business, buying and remodeling property to house his e n te rp ris e s . (Id. at ¶ 53). This success, however, was not greeted with universal a c c la im by other area builders. (Id. at ¶¶ 54). The conflict that resulted could at tim e s turn violent, and plaintiff alleges that he suffered severe injuries to his knee as th e result of an attack. (Id. at ¶ 56). Even those who worked for plaintiff­including the a tto rn e ys handling his business affairs­became involved in this scheme to u n d e rm in e his business and take over his property. (Id. at ¶ 69, 78). Plaintiff also alleges that certain business associates and law enforcement o ffic ia ls conspired to achieve "the alleged and wrongful arrest and incarceration of P la in tiff, the public and financial debilitation of Plaintiff, the illegal takeover of P la in tiff's corporations and the assets thereof, and the illegal seizure and closure of P la in tiff's office, and thus, the complete and utter financial destruction thereof [sic] s a id corporate entities." (Id. at ¶ 63). Plaintiff filed the instant complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma p a u p e ris on June 19, 2008. Count I of the complaint raises due process and equal p ro te c tio n claims against Lackawanna County prosecutors, detectives and borough o ffic ia ls . Plaintiff alleges unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as

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im p r o p e r search and seizure of his personal and business property. He also c o n te n d s that the defendants conspired to commit these constitutional violations. Count II raises claims against the non-governmental defendants for conspiring with th e prosecutors and borough officials to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Count III raises alleges that the Lackawanna County District Attorney's office and A s s ista n t District Attorneys Jarbola and Talerico failed to provide proper training to e m p lo ye e s , and that these failings led to a violation of plaintiff's rights. Count IV, ra is e d against Lackawanna County, the Clarks Summit Police Department, the B o ro u g h of Clarks Summit and Police Chief Vitale, alleges a similar failure-to-train a g a in s t those entities. Count V alleges that Lackawanna County, the Lackawanna C o u n ty Prison, and the W a rd e n and Deputy W a rd e n of that prison have failed to p ro vid e adequate training to officers and employees. This lack of training, plaintiff c o n te n d s , led defendants to fail to provide proper public access to hearings and a rra ig n m e n ts . Count VI brings a malicious prosecution/wrongful use of proceedings c la im against the prosecutors and borough officials. Count VII is an intentional or n e g lig e n t infliction of emotional distress claim against all of the defendants. Count V III is a state-law false arrest and false imprisonment claim. In Count VIII, plaintiff a lle g e s that all of the defendants defamed him by publicizing his arrest. Count IX b rin g s a tort claim for false light based on public statements about the plaintiff. Plaintiff raises a common law conspiracy claim against all the defendants in Count X. The complaint seeks $42 million in actual damages, in addition to punitive damages,

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in te re s t, costs and attorney's fees. Plaintiff eventually decided to pay the filing fee, making his motion to proceed in forma pauperis moot. (See Docs. 25-26). The court did, however, grant plaintiff's m o tio n to have the United States Marshal's Service serve his complaint. (Doc. 28). Plaintiff found the $856 that the Marshal's Service sought as a fee for serving his c o m p la in t too costly. (See Doc. 29). Because the plaintiff had paid the filing fee and w a s not proceeding in forma pauperis, the court then ordered the plaintiff to serve th e complaint by his own means or pay the Marshal's Service for its assistance. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff has yet to serve his complaint on the defendants. On February 3, 2009, plaintiff filed the instant motion titled "D e c la r a tio n /M e m o ra n d u m in Support of W h y Plaintiff has Failed Timely to Serve C o m p la in t and for an Emergency T.R.O. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief." (Doc. 3 7 ). Petition alleges in his motion that he is the defendant in a criminal case in the C o u rt of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. He filed the instant c o m p la in t while out on bail in that case, and has since been incarcerated. Plaintiff c o n te n d s that his incarceration and efforts by the County Court Judge to have a s ta te agency assess plaintiff's competency to represent himself in his criminal p ro c e e d in g s amounts to retaliation for filing his action in this court, as well as other c o m p la in ts to disciplinary boards, the United States Department of Justice and the P e n n s ylv a n ia State Police. Plaintiff contends the he has information that Judge M ic h a e l Barrasse intends to keep him incarcerated in a state mental hospital until he

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a b a n d o n s his case in this court, and that efforts to have him committed are efforts to d e n y him access to the courts. Moreover, plaintiff insists that he does not suffer fro m any mental illness and is capable of representing himself. His behavior is m e re ly "idiosyncratic," and attempts to confine him to an institution without proper p ro c e d u ra l safeguards violate his rights. (Doc. 37 at 11). Judge Barrasse, plaintiff c o n te n d s , is a close friend of one of the defendant judges in this case, and is thus a tte m p tin g to assist his friend in the litigation by having plaintiff institutionalized. Because of these alleged dangers to plaintiff's rights he requests that the court e n jo in the defendants and the court in Lackawanna County from undertaking the p e n d in g examination of the plaintiff or to take any step or proceeding to enforce that o rd e r. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff includes as exhibits to his motion a number of documents related to h is criminal case in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. On December 17, 2008, J u d g e Michael Barrasse ordered that plaintiff be transferred to the Norristown (Pa.) S ta te Hospital for a competency and mental health evaluation designed to determine w h e th e r he could represent himself pro se. (Order, Doc. 37-3). Plaintiff also in c lu d e s his petition for a writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus, filed in the P e n n s ylva n ia Supreme Court. (Doc. 37-4). In that document, plaintiff sought a writ o f prohibition and/or mandamus compelling Judge Barrasse to revoke the order re g a rd in g mental health treatment. (Id. at ¶ 21). Plaintiff also sought a writ of m a n d a m u s compelling Judge Barrase to recuse himself from the case. (Id. at ¶ 30).

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D i s c u s s io n P la in tiff seeks to have the court issue a temporary restraining order staying a c tio n on any procedures in state court related to his mental competency. The Third C ircu it Court of Appeals has outlined four factors that a court ruling on a motion for a p re lim in a ry injunction must consider: (1) whether the movant will be irreparably in ju re d by denial of the relief; (2) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even g re a te r harm to the nonmoving party; (3) whether granting the preliminary relief will b e in the public interest; and (4) whether the movant has shown a reasonable p ro b a b ility of success on the merits. Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment Inc., 2 3 9 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir.2001). These same factors are used to determine a m o tio n for a temporary restraining order. Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E .D .P a .1 9 9 4 ). These factors merely "structure the inquiry" and no one element will n e c e s s a rily determine the outcome. The court must engage in a delicate balancing o f all the elements, and attempt to minimize the probable harm to legally protected in te re s ts between the time of the preliminary injunction to the final hearing on the m e rits . Constructors Association of W e s te rn Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d C ir.1 9 7 8 ). The movant bears the burden of establishing these elements. Adams v. F re e d o rm Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 486 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff seeks to have the court stay action on a civil matter related to his c rim in a l case in state court, alleging that defendants in this action seek to prevent h im from proceeding in this court by institutionalizing him in Pennsylvania. As a

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g e n e ra l matter, Federal law establishes that a federal court "may not grant an in ju n c tio n to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act o f Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Supreme Court has found that 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3 , the statute under which plaintiff brought the instant action, expressly a u th o riz e s such federal action. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (fin d in g that "under the criteria established in our previous decisions construing the a n ti-in ju n c tio n statute, § 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the `expressly a u th o riz e d ' exception to that law."). Although a court may issue an injunction in s u c h circumstances, "the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must re s tra in a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding" apply. Id. at 243. The court notes that this situation requires the court to consider not only the n o rm a l equitable principles related to the issuance of a temporary restraining order, b u t also to consider equitable principles that apply when a party seeks to enjoin p ro c e e d in g s in a state criminal case. The United States Supreme Court has re m in d e d courts that "Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy, with c e rta in well-defined statutory exceptions, of leaving generally to the state courts the tria l of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject to review by this Court of any fe d e ra l questions involved." Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). Accordingly, a court sitting in equity "should conform to this policy by refusing to

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in te r fe r e with or embarrass threatened proceedings in state courts save in those e xc e p tio n a l cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irre p a ra b le injury which is clear and imminent." Id. In respect to this promised d e fe re n c e , "equitable remedies infringing this independence of the states­though th e y might otherwise be given­should be withheld if sought on slight or in c o n s e q u e n tia l grounds." Id. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971); see also, Y o u n g e r v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (noting that "it has been perfectly natural for o u r cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal c o u r ts are asked to enjoin proceedings in state courts is not to issue such i n j u n c t io n s . " ) . T h e court finds that the principles of equity and federalism salient to this case c o u n s e l against issuance of a temporary restraining order. The injunction that p la in tiff seeks the court to issue is related to a criminal proceeding, and the court is re lu c ta n t to interfere with such a proceeding. The purpose of assessing plaintiff's a b ility to defend himself in the criminal proceeding is to ensure that he can protect h is rights without the assistance of a lawyer. To prevent such a proceeding could be to endanger the adequate protection of plaintiff's rights in a proceeding involving his lib e rty.2 Moreover, enjoining the competency proceeding in state court would disrupt

The court recognizes the plaintiff's contention that he is being incarcerated in a mental hospital indefinitely while his competency is adjudicated. Nothing indicates that such a situation has or will come to pass, and the court will not enjoin proceedings on speculative grounds. 8

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th e process in plaintiff's criminal case, interposing a barrier to the state's efforts to e n fo rc e criminal laws that no court has declared invalid. Enjoining that proceeding w o u ld also prevent swift resolution of the state-court matter, meaning that plaintiff w o u ld face the prospect of indefinite incarceration as the state waits for the litigation to move forward in this jurisdiction. As such, the facts of this case counsel strongly a g a in s t interfering with the state proceedings. In addition, the court does not find that the threatened competency hearing th re a te n s to impose an irreparable injury which is either clear or imminent. First, p la in tiff contends that he will not be able to prosecute his action in this court if he is fo rc e d to defend his competency in state court. He may, plaintiff insists, face default in this action. The court notes that default is not imminent in this case, and that the c o u r t will certainly entertain a motion for extension of time based on the interference to this matter caused by state-court proceedings. Moreover, plaintiff faces a hearing in state court, and­based on his representations to this court­could very well prove h e is sufficiently lucid and self-aware to defend himself in state court. The injury p la in tiff faces, therefore, is not imminent and may never even come to pass. In addition, the general principles governing applications for temporary re s tra in in g orders lead the court to conclude that an injunction is inappropriate here. F irs t, the court finds that plaintiff will not be irreparably harmed by failure to enjoin th e proceeding here in question. Plaintiff could well be judged competent to re p re s e n t himself, and, in any case, the plaintiff is free to continue the litigation in

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th is court as he sees fit, regardless of the outcome of proceedings in state court. Second, enjoining the competency hearing could well prevent the state from p r o c e e d in g with its prosecution until the court lifts the injunction, and may prejudice th e state's case. Third, because the requested relief would prevent the orderly p ro g re s s io n of a criminal matter, the public interest would best be served by allowing th e proceeding to go forward. Fourth, as explained by this court in connection with p la in tiff's request for an appointed attorney in these proceedings (See Doc. 26), p la in tiff's likelihood of success on the merits of this case are slim. The court will th e re fo re decline to enjoin the state-court proceeding at question in this case. M o tio n for Extra Time to Serve the Complaint P la in tiff asserts that the stress of dealing with his state criminal matter and the tre a tm e n t he has been subjected to therein have contributed to his failure to serve th e complaint within the period allotted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff also avers that his incarceration and lack of friends or associates in the area h a ve also made service difficult. Further, the cost of serving a complaint several h u n d re d s of pages long on 32 defendants has been onerous. Plaintiff promises that if "given more time or permitted photocopies by this court via the Clerk of Courts; or a payment plan to the U.S. Marshals, he could achieve service within 60-90 days." (Doc. 37 at 8). The court accepts the plaintiff's promise that he can serve the c o m p la in t if given additional time. As such, the court will grant plaintiff an additional 6 0 days from the date of this order to serve the complaint. The court finds, however,

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th a t ordering the Clerk of Court to provide plaintiff with copies of his complaint to s e rve on all 35 plaintiffs would not be an efficient use of court resources. The court w ill therefore deny that portion of plaintiff's request. In addition, the court will not o rd e r the Marshal's Service to develop a payment plan for serving the complaint. The court has been informed that the Marshals do not offer such plans. C o n c l u s io n F o r the reasons stated above, the court will deny the plaintiff's motion for a te m p o ra ry restraining order. The court will grant plaintiff's motion for an additional s ixty (60) days to serve the complaint. An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SCOTT J. BINSACK, SR. Plaintiff : No. 3:08cv1166 : : (Judge Munley) : v. : : LACKAWANNA COUNTY DISTRICT : ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, et al., : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER AN D NOW, to wit, this 19th day of February 2009, the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 37) is hereby DENIED. The plaintiff's motion for a n extension of time to serve the complaint (Doc. 37) is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff s h a ll serve the complaint within sixty (60) days of the date of this order. The court w ill not order, however, that the United States Marshal's service develop a payment p la n for service of the complaint, or that the clerk of court provide plaintiff with copies o f his complaint.

BY THE COURT: s/ James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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