Binsack v. Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office et al

Filing 98

MEMORANDUM and ORDER DENYING 58 MOTION for Recusal filed by Scott J. Binsack, Sr. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 11/6/09. (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SCOTT J. BINSACK, SR., Plaintiff : No. 3:08cv1166 : : (Judge Munley) : v. : : LACKAWANNA COUNTY DISTRICT : ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, et al., : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER AN D NOW, to wit, this 6th day of November 2009, the plaintiff's motion for this ju d g e 's recusal (Doc. 58) is hereby DENIED. Federal law requires that a judge "shall d is q u a lify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be q u e s tio n e d ." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). "Beliefs or opinions that merit recusal must involve a n extrajudicial factor; `for example, if a judge has acquired a dislike of a litigant b e c a u s e of events occurring outside of the courtroom, a duty to recuse might e n s u e .'" United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 208 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting U n ite d States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 1995)). "`A party seeking recusal n e e d not show actual bias on the part of the court, only the possibility of bias . . . U n d e r § 455(a), if a reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would h a rb o r doubts about the judge's impartiality under the applicable standard, then the ju d g e must recuse.'" Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3 d Cir. 2004) (quoting Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co.

Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions), 148 F.3d 283, 343 (3d Cir. 1998)). Moreover, a judge is required to disqualify himself when "he has a personal bias or p re ju d ic e concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts c o n c e rn in g the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Bias and prejudice "connote a fa vo ra b le or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or in a p p ro p ria te , either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge th a t the subject ought not to possess . . . or because it is excessive in degree." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994). As grounds for recusal, plaintiff contends that the undersigned judge has a c o n flic t of interest, has had prior ex parte contacts with key defendants, and a "gross b ia s e d attitude to Plaintiffs [sic] serious case." (Doc. 58 at 1). Plaintiff also a n tic ip a te s that the court will become vindictive towards him, as he intends to file a c o m p la in t of judicial misconduct against the undersigned judge with the Third Circuit C o u rt of Appeals. Plaintiff contends that the court's bias can be seen in earlier ru lin g s in this case, which he alleges are biased against him. Moreover, since the p la in tiff sues many officials in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, plaintiff argues th a t the case should be transferred from Scranton, Pennsylvania to a judge who sits in another county. The court will deny the recusal motion. First, the fact that the court has denied m a n y of plaintiff's motions is not evidence of a bias that would require recusal. The p la in tiff does not point to any comments in the court's opinions or in public forums

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concerning those opinions that would indicate an improper bias towards the plaintiff. Instead, the plaintiff merely contends that the court erred in ruling the way it did. A re a s o n a b le person would not question the court's impartiality based on these rulings. T h e Supreme Court has noted that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a va lid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . In and of themselves (i.e., apart from s u rro u n d in g comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show re lia n c e upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances e vid e n c e the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial s o u rc e is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not re c u s a l." Litecky, 510 U.S. at 555. S e c o n d , while the plaintiff argues that the undersigned judge has personal re la tio n s h ip s with some of the defendants in the case, and has provided the court w ith numerous newspaper clippings which he contends documents a culture of c o rru p tio n in the local bar and judiciary, he has not pointed to any sort of business or fa m ily relationship between the judge and parties to the case that would warrant re c u s a l. Mere acquaintance with a litigant is not­absent more­grounds for recusal. The court finds that a reasonable person would not question this judge's impartiality b a s e d on these alleged relationships. F in a lly, plaintiff's threatened filing of misconduct charges against the u n d e rs ig n e d judge does not require recusal. The court emphasizes that its rulings a re based on a reasoned assessment of the applicable law, and no other factors.

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Moreover, the court recognizes that to submit to recusal because a party threatens b a s e le s s misconduct charges would be to allow litigants to choose their judge based o n a mere threat. See Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 209 (finding that the trial judge d id not err in failing to recuse himself, though the defendant had filed a judicial m is c o n d u c t complaint against the judge, since defendant "had already deluged the D is tric t Court with numerous and frivolous pro se motions throughout the p ro c e e d in g s , and we are unwilling to conclude that Judge Hardiman erred by not sua s p o n te recusing himself from sentencing simply because Banks, a convicted d e fe n d a n t who had already clogged the proceedings with pro se motions, also filed a ju d ic ia l misconduct complaint in addition to other pro se motions.").

BY THE COURT: s / James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT

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