Victor v. SCI Smithfield et al
Filing
385
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 317 Pltf's MOTION for relief as moot. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on August 18, 2011. (kjn )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM VICTOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
R.M. LAWLER, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 3:08-CV-01374
(Judge Nealon)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case.
This is a civil rights action brought by William Victor, an inmate who was
formerly confined in the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (“SCIHuntingdon”). In his complaint, Victor, who is proceeding pro se, has named an
array of defendants, including the prison superintendent and other employees of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at SCI-Huntingdon. Victor alleges that on
June 28, 2008, he was assaulted by Corrections Officers while being moved between
cells in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Huntingdon. Attachment to
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 6. Victor’s jaw was allegedly broken in this
assault, requiring medical treatment outside the prison.
As to some of the defendants named in this action, it has been alleged–without
dispute–that the Office of Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
has conducted a criminal investigation to determine whether criminal charges are
warranted as to any of these correctional officials. Furthermore, it is apparent that the
Commonwealth itself has found that there are substantial, unresolved factual
questions relating to the conduct of some correctional officials in connection with this
cell extraction since some staff were disciplined for their roles in this matter, and the
Commonwealth has withdrawn from representing certain defendants in this civil
lawsuit, citing its finding of bad faith deliberate misconduct on their part. (Doc. 113
and 114)
Acknowledging the fact of this criminal investigation, an investigation whose
outcome is presently unknown, Victor has filed a motion, styled “Motion for Relief”
(Doc. 317), which requested production of investigative records from this criminal
investigation for use by Victor in preparing and litigating his civil case arising out of
this alleged assault. (Id.) Victor later explained that his request is narrowly tailored
and only seeks reports of interview or statements of defendants made outside the
grand jury during this criminal probe that may be relevant and probative on the issue
of whether any correctional staff defendants assaulted Victor. (Doc. 340)
With Victor’s request defined by the plaintiff in this fashion, on April 5, 2011,
we entered an order directing the Office of Attorney General to respond to this
request, and identify reports of statements by the named defendants in this case,
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obtained by investigators outside the grand jury, which may relate to the matters in
this litigation, the circumstances surrounding the June 28, 2008, cell extraction of
Victor, the way in which Victor’s injuries occurred, and the extent to which the scene
of the cell extraction was staged, or evidence documenting that cell extraction was
altered. (Doc. 345) Thus, we instructed the Attorney General’s office to respond to
Victor’s specific request and report regarding whether they possessed any documents
responsive to that request.
The Office of Attorney General has complied with this order, filing a response
which states in pertinent part as follows:
After exercising due diligence, the OAG must advise the Court that it
does not have any documents fitting this description in its care, custody
or control other than the statements that were compiled as part of the
DOC's investigation of the incident that gives rise to this matter.
Counsel for the DOC has advised that those documents have all been
previously supplied to Victor in the course of discovery in this matter.
Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for the same would therefore appear
to be duplicative and unnecessary.
(Doc. 360, pp.2-3)
Having considered this response, we will deny Victor’s motion for relief as moot,
since it is represented that all responsive materials sought by that motion have already
been produced for the plaintiff.
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II.
Discussion
Victor’s motion for relief is, in essence, a motion seeking further discovery in
this matter. Construed in this fashion, several basic guiding principles inform our
resolution of the instant discovery dispute. At the outset, the scope of what type of
discovery may be compelled in a case is defined, in part, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
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Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
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discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.” One other immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when
ruling on motions to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the
production of things that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of
evidence by parties who attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an
adversary in litigation. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare
Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL
5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL
975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Victor’s
motion for relief. In this case, we have carefully considered Victor’s motion, and we
have compelled the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General to
certify whether they possess any responsive materials which would be relevant to the
issues in this litigation. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Office of Attorney
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General now represents that it possesses no responsive materials beyond those
previously released to the plaintiff. Given this representation, and recognizing that
the court cannot compel the production of things that do not exist, or compel the
creation of evidence by parties who attest that they do not possess the materials
sought by an adversary in litigation, see, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health
and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010
WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL
975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009), we will accept the Attorney General’s response.
Since that response reveals that Victor possesses all of the responsive materials in the
care custody and possession of the Attorney General’s office, this motion will be
denied as moot.
III.
Conclusion and Order
AND Now this 18th day of August 2011, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for relief (Doc. 317), is DENIED as moot in
light of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of Attorney General’s
certification that:
After exercising due diligence, the OAG must advise the Court that it
does not have any documents fitting this description in its care, custody
or control other than the statements that were compiled as part of the
DOC's investigation of the incident that gives rise to this matter.
Counsel for the DOC has advised that those documents have all been
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previously supplied to Victor in the course of discovery in this matter.
Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for the same would therefore appear
to be duplicative and unnecessary.
(Doc. 360, pp.2-3)
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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