Victor v. SCI Smithfield et al

Filing 386

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion 374 for relief is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on 8/19/11. (rc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM VICTOR
Plaintiff
v.
R.M. LAWLER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 3:08-CV-1374
(Judge Nealon)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

Statement of the Case

This case is a prisoner civil rights lawsuit lodged by the plaintiff, William
Victor, against correctional staff at SCI Huntingdon. In this lawsuit, Victor alleges,
inter alia, that he was the victim of staff assaults in June 2008.
Victor has now filed a motion, styled as a motion for emergency relief, (Doc.
374) which invites us to reconsider prior discovery rulings in this litigation.
Specifically, Victor urges us to reconsider our prior May 18, 2011 rulings, (Doc.
367), on Victor’s earlier motion for sanctions, for other relief related to alleged
spoliation of evidence, and to compel production of materials. (Doc. 169.) This
motion was filed by Victor in January of 2010 and has now been the subject of three
prior rulings by this Court. (Docs. 188, 213 and 367). In these prior orders we first
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directed an in camera review of certain records, and then ordered redacted copies of
those records released to Victor. We also received, and reviewed, supplemental
submissions from the defendants relating to Victor’s requests for access to prison
policy manuals pertaining to videotaping of cell extractions. (Docs. 217 and 218.) In
these submissions, the defendants objected to the release of these policy manuals and
identified a single section of one policy manual which related to videotaping cell
extractions, stating:
The Corrections Defendants object to the release of the 6.3.1 Procedures
Manual. Most of the Procedures Manual has nothing to do with the issue
of when use of force is to videotaped or videotape retention. The only
pertinent section is Section 32. The release of the other sections will
compromise safety and security within the institution. The same applies
to the 6.5.1 (“Administration of Security Level 5 Housing Units”)
Procedures Manual.
(Doc. 217, pp.4 and 5.)
With respect to Victor’s request for copies of the Department of Corrections
Policy Manuals 6.5.1 and 6.3.1, which dealt with facility safety and security matters,
Victor’s initial request (Doc. 169) was unaccompanied by any detailed explanation
of the relevance of this information to his lawsuit or any limitations in terms of the
scope of the request, factors which led the defendants to object to this request, (Doc.
177) citing the justifiable security concerns that the institution would have releasing
these sensitive operations manuals to an inmate. In response to these well-grounded
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concerns of the defendants, Victor narrowed and refined his request, (Doc. 183),
explaining that he was seeking limited information which was directly relevant to his
spoliation argument involving what are alleged to been missing prison tapes relating
to Victor’s June 28, 2008 cell extraction, an incident in which it is alleged that
Victor’s jaw was broken, and the subsequent medical treatment provided to Victor
immediately after this cell extraction. Focusing on this incident, and the medical
treatment which followed, Victor asserted that he was only seeking those portions of
the procedure manuals which provide instruction and guidance on documenting cell
extractions and preserving video evidence of those cell extractions.
This much narrower request sought evidence that may be relevant to a fullyinformed assessment of Victor’s spoliation claims relating to what are conceded to
be missing videos from the time period of the cell extraction episode.(Doc. 183.)With
its scope narrowed in this fashion, we found on May 18, 2011, that Victor’s request
was more reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence under Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes “discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense” and further
defines relevant evidence in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Having conducted this
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in camera review we granted Victor’s request, in part, and instructed the Corrections
Defendants to provide Victor with a declaration which fully and accurately
summarized the cell extraction videotaping policies set forth in Section 32 of the
6.3.1 Procedures Manual, a disclosure which protected valid institutional security
concerns while addressing Victor’s proffer of relevance in this case.
Additionally, Victor sought spoliation sanctions, including a spoliation
inference instruction at trial, as a penalty for what he alleged was the deliberate
destruction of prison videotapes which he claims would have documented some of
the allegations which he has made in this lawsuit. (Docs. 169, 183, 361.) In response,
the defendants conceded that some tapes could not be found, and apparently were
destroyed, but argued that spoliation sanctions were inappropriate because there was
insufficient evidence to justify a finding of deliberate or negligent spoliation of
evidence. (Doc. 177.)
In our May 18, 2011 ruling, (Doc. 367), we denied this request without
prejudice to Victor renewing this argument for spoliation sanctions at trial, noting
that many of the considerations which determine whether a spoliation sanction is
appropriate are factual matters. Therefore, to the extent that Victor sought a spoliation
inference instruction at trial, his entitlement to this instruction would turn on the
precise nature of the proof at trial, and the credibility of various witnesses.
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Recognizing this fact, we stated that this issue should be deferred to trial, observing
that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has cautioned us that
“pretrial [rulings regarding evidentiary questions] should rarely be granted. . . .” In
re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the Third Circuit’s “cautious
approach to Rule 403 exclusions at the pretrial stage . . . .”). Since Victor had not
consented to proceed before this Court, and appellate case law cautioned against pretrial resolution of evidentiary matters like the spoliation inference Victor sought at
trial, we concluded that the appropriate course here was to deny Victor’s request for
such a spoliation inference finding at this time, without prejudice to him renewing
this request at trial before the trial judge.
Victor now invites us to reconsider, and reverse, these prior discovery rulings.
(Doc. 374.) Because Victor’s pleadings do not demonstrate that reconsideration of
these rulings is warranted here, the motion will be denied.
II.

Discussion

The legal standards that govern motions to reconsider are both clear, and
clearly compelling. “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp.
v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Typically such a motion should only
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be granted in three, narrowly defined circumstances, where there is either : "(1) [an]
intervening change in controlling law, (2) availability of new evidence not previously
available, or (3) need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice".
Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F. Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992 ). As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed:
“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration ... is to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Max's
Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677 (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779
F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985)). “Accordingly, a judgment may be altered
or amended if the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the
following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251
(3d Cir. 2010).
Thus, it is well-settled that a mere disagreement with the court does not
translate into the type of clear error of law which justifies reconsideration of a ruling.
Dodge, 796 F.Supp. at 830. Furthermore, "[b]ecause federal courts have a strong
interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted
sparingly." Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937, 943
(E.D. Pa. 1995). Moreover, it is evident that a motion for reconsideration is not a tool
to re-litigate and reargue issues which have already been considered and disposed of
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by the court. Dodge, 796 F.Supp. at 830. Rather, such a motion is appropriate only
where the court has misunderstood a party or where there has been a significant
change in law or facts since the court originally ruled on that issue. See Above the
Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983).
These legal restrictions on motions to re-consider apply with particular force
to motions addressing orders in discovery matters, since discovery orders are
governed by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the scope of
discovery permitted under the Rules rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Similarly,
rulings regarding the extent to which discovery may be compelled are matters
consigned to the court’s discretion and judgment, and it has long been held that
decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are “committed to the sound discretion of the
district court.” DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir.
1974). Thus, a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed
only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699
F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). Further, this discretion is guided by certain basic
principles. Thus, at the outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which
can be obtained through discovery reaches “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense”. Therefore, valid claims of privilege still cabin and
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restrict the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. However, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 otherwise embraces all “relevant information,” a
concept which is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”
Evidentiary rulings regarding whether a spoliation inference is appropriate also
rest in the sound discretion of the court. Ward v. Lamanna, 334 F. App’x 487, 492 (3d
Cir. 2009). That discretion is guided, however, by settled legal tenets, tenets which
define both the fundamental nature of spoliation and the appropriate sanctions for acts
of spoliation. “Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or
the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably
foreseeable litigation. Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 348
F.Supp.2d 332, 335 (D.N.J.2004).” Fortune v. Bitner. No. 01-111, 2006 WL 839346,
*1 (M.D.Pa. March 29, 2006); see Ogin v. Ahmed, 563 F.Supp.2d. 539, 542 (M.D.
Pa. 2008). In assessing a spoliation claim:
[R]elevant authority requires that four (4) factors be satisfied for the rule
permitting an adverse inference instruction to apply: 1) the evidence in
question must be within the party's control; 2) it must appear that there
has been actual suppression or withholding of the evidence; 3) the
evidence destroyed or withheld was relevant to claims or defenses; and
4) it was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would later be
discoverable. Mosaid, 348 F.Supp.2d at 336 citing Brewer, 72 F.3d at
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334; Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 248-50 (D.N.J.2000); Veloso
v. Western Bedding Supply Co., 281 F.Supp.2d 743, 746 (D.N.J.2003).
Additionally, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey recognized: “While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain
every document in its possession, even in advance of litigation, it is
under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, will
likely be requested in reasonably foreseeable litigation.” Mosaid, 348
F.Supp.2d at 336 (quoting Scott, 196 F.R.D. at 249).
Ogin,563 F.Supp.2d at 543.
Thus, “[a] party which reasonably anticipates litigation has an affirmative duty to
preserve relevant evidence. Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F.Supp. 1285, 1290
(M.D.Pa.1994). Where evidence is destroyed, sanctions may be appropriate, including
the outright dismissal of claims, the exclusion of countervailing evidence, or a jury
instruction on the ‘spoliation inference.’ This inference permits the jury to assume
that ‘the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of the
offending party.’ Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d
Cir.1994).” Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 505 (M.D.Pa. 1996)
If the court finds that there is a culpable destruction or spoliation of evidence,
the question then becomes determining the appropriate sanction for this act of
spoliation. In this respect:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has applied
three (3) key considerations to determine whether a sanction for
spoliation of evidence is appropriate. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79. The
considerations are: 1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or
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destroyed the evidence; 2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the
opposing party; and 3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid
substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending
party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in
the future. Id. When appropriate, a court may impose any potential
sanction including: 1) dismissal of a claim or granting judgment in favor
of a prejudiced party; 2) suppression of evidence; 3) an adverse
inference, referred to as the spoliation inference; 4) fines; and 5)
attorneys' fees and costs. Mosaid, 348 F.Supp.2d at 335.
Ogin, 563 F.Supp.2d at 545.
Many of the considerations which determine whether a spoliation sanction is
appropriate, however, are factual matters which are best decided by a trial judge in
the context of a trial, where the court can consider the precise nature of the proof at
trial, and the credibility of various witnesses.
With these guiding principles in mind we turn to the plaintiffs’ request that we
re-consider these prior discovery rulings. Noting that the plaintiff has not shown that
re-consideration is necessary because of: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence . . . ; or (3) the need to correct a clear error
of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice,” Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v.
Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010), this motion will be denied.
Indeed, Victor cannot meet this exacting standard justifying reconsideration of these
discovery rulings for at least two reasons.

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First, Victor’s motion does not address the legal benchmarks which must be
met to justify this relief. For example, Victor cites to no new evidence in this case.
Nor does he explain how the court’s prior rulings constituted a clear error of law or
fact which created a manifest injustice. Further, Victor points to no intervening
change in the law which would warrant granting a motion to reconsider. More
fundamentally, Victor’s motion ignores the simple truth that the court’s rulings were
both fair and actually quite favorable to the plaintiff, in that we granted Victor’s
request for information regarding prison videotaping policies, and simply deferred a
ruling on a spoliation sanction since that issue is more properly reserved and
presented to the district court. In short, Victor’s motion for relief, (Doc. 374), which
invites reconsideration of various discovery rulings fails both legally and factually
since it does not present the court with legal or factual grounds that would justify
reconsideration of these prior decisions. Therefore, the motion will be denied.
III.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for relief, (Doc.
374), is DENIED. So ordered this 19th day of August, 2011.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge.

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