Victor v. SCI Smithfield et al

Filing 588

MEMORANDUM ORDER - IT IS ORDERED as follows: Victors Motion for Emergency Relief, Monetary Sanctions, Hearing and to Compel, in Victor v. Lawler, No. 3:08-CV-1374, is DENIED without prejudice since Victor has already previously filed a motion in th is lawsuit seeking this precise relief. (Doc. 548.) However, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department of Corrections shall file aresponse to the motion docketed at No. 548, which alleges a breach of thesettlement agreement, in accordance with Local Rule 7.6 on or before July15, 2012. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the plaintiff may then file a replybrief fourteen days after the filing of the defendants brief, on or before July 29, 2012. Victors Motion for Emergency Relief, Monetary Sanctions, Hear ing and to Compel in Victor v. Varano, No. 3:11-CV-891, Victor v.Varano, No. 3:11-CV-2000, and Victor v. Huber, No. 3:12-CV-282,ARE DENIED without prejudice to Victor filing a new complaintrelating to the alleged loss of property, once Victor has completed thepursuit of his post-deprivation remedies as he is required to do by law.Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on July 2, 2012. (kjn )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM VICTOR,
Plaintiff
v.
R.M. LAWLER, et al.,
Defendants
WILLIAM VICTOR,
Plaintiff
v.
DAVID VARANO, et al.,
Defendants
WILLIAM VICTOR,
Plaintiff
v.
DAVID VARANO, et al.,
Defendants

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Civil No. 3:08-CV-1374

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

Civil No. 3:11-CV-891
(Judge Nealon)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

Civil No. 3:11-CV-2000
(Judge Nealon)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

WILLIAM VICTOR,
Plaintiff
v.
C.O.HUBER, et al.,
Defendants

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Civil No. 3:12-CV-282
(Judge Nealon)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
The plaintiff, William Victor, is a state inmate who currently has four civil
actions pending with this court. These civil actions relate to incidents and episodes
occurring at different times at various state correctional institutions throughout
Pennsylvania. Recently, the plaintiff filed a motion, styled “Motion for Emergency
Relief, Monetary Sanctions, Hearing and to Compel,” in each of these four civil
actions. Liberally construed, the motion makes two claims, one new and one old.
First, the motion contains a claim relating to the oldest of Victor’s cases, and
alleges that the Department of Corrections has violated the terms of a settlement
agreement with Victor in Victor v. Lawler, No. 3:08-CV-1374. Victor has already
previously filed a motion in this lawsuit seeking this precise relief. (Doc. 548.) The
Department of Corrections was ordered to respond to this motion, (Doc. 572), but has
not yet filed a response.

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Second, the motion presents new allegations by the plaintiff, specifically
asserting that some of Victor’s property was damaged during a recent transfer of
Victor to SCI Forest. With respect to these new allegations, Victor’s motion indicates
that he has begun, but not completed, administrative grievances which could provide
him with a post-deprivation remedy for this lost and damaged property. To the extent
that Victor attempts to bring these new claims regarding damaged property in his
current lawsuits, the claims run afoul of two separate legal obstacles. First, these
motions involve new matters which bear no temporal, topical, legal or logical
relationship to the allegations set forth in these prior complaints. Victor’s efforts to
join these wholly unrelated matters in this lawsuit violate the rules governing joinder
of claims in civil litigation. Those rules provide, in part, that:
Person[s] . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in
the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(emphasis added). In this case, it cannot be said that these
new allegations arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions
set forth in his prior complaints. Quite the contrary, Victor’s motions recite disparate
acts, allegedly committed by different actors at divergent times and places. “[G]iven
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the hodgepodge of claims raised in the [motion],” Boretsky v. Governor of New
Jersey, 433 F. App’x 73, 77(3d Cir. May 25, 2011), this court may properly, in the
exercise of its discretion, decline to join these new allegations in Victor’s prior
lawsuits. Id.
Moreover, the gist of Victor’s complaint as recited in these various motions
seems to be that prison officials recently have lost, or damaged, property in the course
of a recent prison transfer. Inmate claims arising out of the loss or damage of
personal property are judged against settled legal standards, standards which
recognize that:
Like other constitutional rights, the Due Process rights of prisoners may
be accommodated to a prison's legitimate security needs. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
[Therefore] “[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property” by
prison officials does not violate the Due Process Clause “if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)(citing Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981)). Predeprivation notice is not constitutionally required. See id.
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2008).
Thus, a crucial component to any inmate due process claim in this setting is an
allegation that property was taken and the prisoner was afforded no post-deprivation
administrative remedy. Therefore, where an inmate is afforded a meaningful post4

deprivation due process remedy, an inmate’s constitutional complaints regarding loss
or taking of property typically fail. See, e.g., Watson v. Secretary, Dep’t of
Corrections, 436 F. App’x 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2011); Bowens v. United States Dep’t
of Justice, 415 F. App’x 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, it is apparent from Victor’s
motions that he has a due process remedy which he is actively pursuing by filing a
grievance relating to the loss or damage of this property. Given the availability of
this remedy, we should not act upon this request until the plaintiff has completed this
post-deprivation review process. Id.
Accordingly, presented with these motions, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

Victor’s “Motion for Emergency Relief, Monetary Sanctions, Hearing
and to Compel,” in Victor v. Lawler, No. 3:08-CV-1374, is DENIED
without prejudice since Victor has already previously filed a motion in
this lawsuit seeking this precise relief. (Doc. 548.) However, IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that the Department of Corrections shall file a
response to the motion docketed at No. 548, which alleges a breach of the
settlement agreement, in accordance with Local Rule 7.6 on or before July
15, 2012. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the plaintiff may then file a reply
brief fourteen days after the filing of the defendants’ brief, on or before

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July 29, 2012. All briefs must conform to the requirements prescribed by
Local Rule 7.8.
2.

Victor’s “Motion for Emergency Relief, Monetary Sanctions, Hearing
and to Compel” in Victor v. Varano, No. 3:11-CV-891, Victor v.
Varano, No. 3:11-CV-2000, and Victor v. Huber, No. 3:12-CV-282,
ARE DENIED without prejudice to Victor filing a new complaint
relating to the alleged loss of property, once Victor has completed the
pursuit of his post-deprivation remedies as he is required to do by law.

So ordered this 2nd day of July 2012.

/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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