Victor v. SCI Smithfield et al
Filing
600
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Accordingly, upon consideration of the Defendants motions for attorneys fees, (Docs. 582 and 589 .), for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motions are DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on August 22, 2012. (kjn )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM VICTOR,
Plaintiff
v.
R.M. LAWLER, et al.,
Defendants
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Civil No. 3:08-CV-1374
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The above-captioned action was commenced four years ago, on July 21, 2008,
by William Victor, an inmate who was formerly confined in the State Correctional
Institution at Huntingdon (“SCI-Huntingdon”). In his complaint, Victor, who
proceeded pro se, initially named 29 Defendants, including the prison superintendent
and other employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at SCIHuntingdon.
While some of Victor’s complaints in this litigation were far-reaching, at the
heart of this complaint rested a singular, significant incident: Victor alleged that on
June 28, 2008, he was assaulted by Corrections Officers while being moved between
cells in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Huntingdon. There is no dispute
that Victor’s jaw was broken at some point during this incident, and required medical
treatment outside the prison. Victor alleged that some of the correctional staff
endeavored to cover up and conceal the true facts surrounding this episode, and that
the incident was staged in retaliation for Victor having been a troublesome inmate
who had filed a number of grievances or civil actions against corrections officers or
employees.
Following amended pleadings, extensive litigation which included more than
550 separate court filings, the resolution of dispositive motions, and the settlement
of a number of claims on terms which were favorablel to the Plaintiff, the Court found
that four of Victor’s claims against nine Defendants should be permitted to proceed
to trial.1 In reaching this result the Court concluded that genuine disputed issues of
fact existed with respect to Victor’s claims against seven corrections officers, one
former lieutenant, and one prison nurse for violations of the First and Eighth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and for civil conspiracy in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, from May 21, 2012, through Tuesday, May 29,
2012, the Court presided over a jury trial held in Scranton, Pennsylvania in which
Victor presented his claims that corrections staff conspired to subject him to cruel and
unusual punishment, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in
The remaining nine Defendants were: Lieutenant William Diffin; Nurse
Hallie Ritchie; and Correctional Officers Adam Goodman, Nathan Lehman,
Anthony Eberling, Jason Pyle, Noah Grove, David Plummer, and Joseph Snyder.
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violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as claims that these Defendants subjected
him to this treatment in retaliation for Victor’s exercise of First Amendment protected
activity.
Following jury selection and five days of evidence, the jury was brought back
to the Court on Tuesday, May 29, 2012, following the Memorial Day holiday. On
that day the jury heard closing arguments, was instructed on the law, and was
thereafter released to deliberate. After several hours of deliberation, the jury returned
a unanimous verdict in favor of the Defendants on all claims. (Doc. 570.) Judgment
was accordingly entered in favor of Defendants Goodman, Pyle, Snyder, Eberling,
Plummer, Grove, Lehman, Diffin, and Ritchey on May 29, 2012. (Doc. 571.)
In the wake of this defense verdict, the Defendants have now filed two motions
seeking the award of attorneys’ fees against the Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
(Docs. 582 and 589.) These motions have been fully briefed by the parties, (Docs.
583, 590 and 598.), and are ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, these
motions for attorneys’ fees will be denied.
II.
DISCUSSION
Section 1988 of Title 42, United States Code provides that in federal civil
rights actions: “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” See Hensley v.
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Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 426 (1983). As the text of §1988 implies, decision
regarding the awarding of attorneys’ fees rest in the sound discretion of the court.
However, when the court is presented by fees petitions lodged by defendants in
federal civil rights actions, several basic principles guide the exercise of our
discretion. Thus, as to prevailing defendants in civil rights litigation, it is well
established that: “A prevailing defendant may recover an attorney's fee only where
the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.
See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (‘[A] district court may in
its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon
a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.’).”
Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, n. 2 (1983). As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has observed:
Section 1988 provides, in relevant part: “In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of sections ... 1983 [and] 1985 ... of this title, ... the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs....” 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). The “prevailing party” can be either the plaintiff or
the defendant but the standard for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing
defendants is more stringent than that for awarding fees to prevailing
plaintiffs. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421,
98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); L.B. Foster, 123 F.3d at 7504
51. As the Supreme Court held in Christiansburg, while prevailing
plaintiffs “should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust,” a prevailing
defendant is entitled to attorney's fees only “upon a finding that the
plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation....”
Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 416-17, 421, 98 S.Ct. at 698, 700.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the prevailing defendant establish
that the plaintiff had subjective bad faith in bringing the action in order
to recover attorney's fees. Rather, the relevant standard is objective. See
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178, 66 L.Ed.2d 163
(1980). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that “it is
important that a ... court resist the understandable temptation to engage
in post hoc reasoning by concluding that because a plaintiff did not
ultimately prevail his action must have been unreasonable or without
foundation.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. at 700. We
have relied on several factors in determining whether a plaintiff's
unsuccessful civil rights claim was frivolous including whether the
plaintiff established a prima facie case, the defendant offered to settle,
the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or the case continued until
a trial on the merits. See L.B. Foster, 123 F.3d at 751. Other factors that
courts have considered in determining if an action was frivolous include
whether the question in issue was one of first impression requiring
judicial resolution, the controversy is based sufficiently upon a real
threat of injury to the plaintiff, the trial court has made a finding that the
suit was frivolous under the Christiansburg guidelines, and the record
supports such a finding. See Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 894
F.2d 250, 253-54 (7th Cir.1995). These considerations, however, are
merely guidelines, not strict rules; thus “[d]eterminations regarding
frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Sullivan v. School Bd.,
773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir.1983).
Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2001)
Judged against these benchmarks, and mindful of the fact that “it is important
that a ... court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning
by concluding that because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail his action must have
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been unreasonable or without foundation,” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22, we
find that Victor’s claims–while ultimately unsuccessful as to these Defendants –
cannot be regarded as frivolous.
At the outset, we note that this litigation began with an immutable fact which
underscored and defined the gravity of this matter throughout the four year history
of this litigation: On June 28, 2008, William Victor’s jaw was broken in the course
of a cell extraction conducted by the Defendants. This simple, undeniable fact
defined much of the subsequent course of this litigation. Thus, this basic truth clearly
contributed to the decision of some Defendants to settle Victor’s claims, a factor
which strongly suggests that these claims were not frivolous. See Barnes Found. v.
Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing defendants’ offer
to settle as a factor which rebuts a claim of frivolousness). Moreover, the gravity of
Victor’s injuries, in large measure, defined a fundamental factual issue relating to the
degree of force used in this cell extraction a dispute which was a key component of
these Eighth Amendment claims; a dispute which could only be resolved by a jury at
trial; and a dispute which further demonstrated that Victor’s claims, while
unsuccessful, could not be discounted as frivolous. See Barnes Found. v. Twp. of
Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing plaintiff’s presentation of
a prima facie case as a factor which rebuts a claim of frivolousness).
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Since we cannot dismiss Victor’s claims as “frivolous, unreasonable or without
foundation...,” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 416-17, the Defendants have not met the
legal threshold which entitles them to recover attorneys’ fees in this action.
Therefore, their motions for attorneys’ fees (Docs. 582 and 589.), must be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
III.
ORDER
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Defendants’ motions for attorneys’
fees, (Docs. 582 and 589.), for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT the motions are DENIED.
So ordered this 22d day of August 2012.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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