Strickland v. Mahoning Township et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion to Dismiss ; GRANTED re dft Mahoning Township Police Department; GRANTED re punitive damages against the Township and against the inidividual dfts in their official capacities; GRANTED re pltf's claims against the individual dfts in their official capacities; and DENIED in all other respects.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 7/8/09 (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SAMUEL D. STRICKLAND, Plaintiff : No. 3:08cv1570 : : (Judge Munley) : v. : : MAHONING TOWNSHIP, : MAHONING TOWNSHIP POLICE : DEPARTMENT, : FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP, : CARBON COUNTY, : OFFICER AUDIE M. MERTZ, : POLICE CHIEF MARK ZENKO, : OFFICER FRANK BOUNAIUTO, : RALPH FAHRINGER, and : JESSICA FAHRINGER, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
M E M O R AN D U M B e fo re the court is Defendants Mahoning Township, Mahoning Township Police Department, Officer Audie M. Mertz and Police Chief Mark Zenko's motion to d is m is s the complaint. Having been fully briefed, the matter is ripe for disposition. B a c k g ro u n d 1 T h is case arises out of the November 18, 2006 arrest of plaintiff, his brother C ra ig Strickland, and James E. Rose, Jr. by police officers from the defendant m u n ic ip a litie s . (Complaint (Doc. 1) (hereinafter "Complt.") at ¶ 27). Defendant and

The facts in this section are drawn from the allegations in the complaint. The court takes no position on their veracity.

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C r a ig Strickland had spent that Saturday working to repair the floor of an Allentown n ig h tc lu b owned by their friend Rose. (Id.). Sometime in the afternoon, Rose asked th e Strickland brothers to help him return three dogs to the Carbon County home of d e fe n d a n t Ralph Fahringer. (Id.). Rose had purchased the dogs from Fahringer on th e previous day. (Id.). Plaintiff only reluctantly accompanied Rose. (Id. at ¶ 2). He w a s tired, had been drinking at the club and had not slept much the previous night. (Id.). The three men drove to Rose's house and picked up the three dogs, placing th e m in a cardboard box in the back of Rose's truck. (Id. at ¶ 29). Plaintiff fell a s le e p in the back of the truck on the way to Fahringer's home in Lehighton, P e n n s ylv a n ia . (Id. at ¶ 30). He remained asleep in the truck when the three men a rrive d at Fahringer's home. (Id. at ¶ 31). He learned of a confrontation between C ra ig Strickland and Rose and Fahringer only after he awoke. (Id.). According to th e story plaintiff heard, Craig Strickland first left the truck to return the dogs alone. (Id. at ¶ 31(a)). W h e n he got out of the truck, he noticed that the front door of the h o u s e had been opened six or seven inches. (Id.). He informed the person inside th e house that he was there to return puppies. (Id.). When Craig Strickland turned a ro u n d to get the dogs from the truck, a rifle barrel appeared sticking out of the d o o rw a y of the Fahringer's home. (Id. at ¶ 31(b)). Craig Strickland saw Ralph F a h rin g e r with a gun. (Id.). Fahringer told Strickland to leave the dogs in the d rive w a y and get off his property. (Id.). Hearing this commotion, Rose got out of the

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tru c k to tell Fahringer that he had arrived to return the dogs and get his money back. (Id. at ¶ 31(c)). Fahringer then opened the door more widely and aimed his rifle d ire c tly at Rose. (Id.). Craig Strickland, who had already returned to the truck, u rg e d Rose to get back in the truck lest he be shot. (Id. at ¶ 31(d)). Rose did so, a n d backed the truck out of the driveway. (Id.). R o s e dialed 911 as he backed out of the driveway. (Id. at ¶ 31(e)). As he d ro ve toward the main highway, Rose told the police dispatcher about the incident. (Id.). W h e n he was about three blocks from the Fahringer residence, the dispatcher to ld Rose to return to the area near the home and wait for police to arrive. (Id.). Rose parked his vehicle on Fritz Drive in front of the Fahringer home. (Id.). Plaintiff a lle g e s that he never left the truck at any time during the confrontation between his b ro th e r, Rose and the Farhingers. (Id. at ¶ 32). Fahringer never made allegations to th e police about the plaintiff. (Id.). Almost immediately after Rose finished his conversation with the 911 d is p a tc h e r, Defendant Mertz, a Mahoning Township Police Officer, arrived on the s c e n c e . (Id. at ¶ 31(f)). W ith Mertz were Roger A. Gehring, Matthew Arner and D e fe n d a n t Frank Buonaiuto, a Franklin Township Police Officer. (Id.). The D e fe n d a n t Police Officers questioned the plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 34). Plaintiff refused to c o o p e ra te with their questions, and plaintiff alleges that the officers manufactured c rim in a l charges against him because of this refusal. (Id. at ¶ 34). Plaintiff alleges th a t defendants never issued him his Miranda warnings before questioning him. (Id.

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a t ¶ 35). After stopping the plaintiff, his brother and Rose, officers searched the three m e n and their truck. (Id. at ¶ 37). This search found no weapons on the men or in th e car. (Id.). Once officers completed the search, they handcuffed the plaintiff and p la c e d him in a patrol car. (Id. ¶ 38). Plaintiff was not given his Miranda rights at th is point, nor was he told that he was under arrest. (Id.). Because he was not told h e was under arrest and had not committed a crime, plaintiff did not respond to O ffic e r Buonaiuto's request for his name and identification. (Id. at ¶ 39). Instead, "s till half-asleep [and] under the influence of alcohol," plaintiff gave Buonaiuto the n a m e of Michael Andrews. (Id. at ¶ 41). When officers discovered the plaintiff did n o t match the picture of Michael Andrews that came up on the computer screen in th e ir police car, they told plaintiff he would be charged with giving false information to a police officer. (Id. at ¶ 42). He later discovered he had been charged with "False R e p o rt, Falsely Incriminate Another and Defiant Trespass." (Id. at ¶ 42). Plaintiff a n d Rose were arrested. (Id. at ¶ 63). Police issued Craig Strickland a citation and re le a s e d him. (Id.). They held plaintiff on $1,000 bond and Rose on $3,500 bond. (Id.). Plaintiff and Rose appeared before a state-court magistrate judge. (Id. at ¶ 6 5 ). Rose had an anxiety attack while he and plaintiff appeared before the m a g is tra te judge. (Id. at ¶ 66). Neither the magistrate judge nor Defendant Officer M e rtz offered Rose any assistance, though they recognized his distress. (Id. at ¶

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6 6 ). After this appearance, plaintiff and Rose return to the Carbon County Prison. (Id. at ¶ 70). He found himself unable to contact his family and have them arrange fo r bail. (Id. at ¶ 69). Defendants placed plaintiff in a separate jail cell from Rose. (Id. at ¶ 70). This cell lacked adequate heating, an "inhumane condition" that plaintiff a lle g e s was "a form of torture." (Id. at ¶ 70). While incarcerated at the Carbon C o u n ty Prison, plaintiff was also "subjected to racial name-calling and other racial h a ra s s m e n t." (¶ 71). Plaintiff contacted his relatives and made bail the following M o n d a y morning. (Id. at ¶ 73). O n February 1, 2007, plaintiff entered a guilty plea to the charge of providing fa ls e identification to law enforcement officers. (Id. at ¶ 74). Plaintiff contends that h e did not willingly enter this plea. (Id.). He was instead forced to pay a fine of $ 3 0 0 , $136 in court costs, and $1,000 bail. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he was a victim of false arrest, false imprisonment, and racial profiling. (Id. at ¶ 35). He also contends that his arrest unlawfully restricted h is right to travel pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶ 36). In addition, p la in tiff alleges that his unlawful arrest was the result of a conspiracy between D e fe n d a n t Mertz, the other police officers on the scene, Chief Mark Zenko and A s s is ta n t District Attorney Jean Engler. (Id.). Moreover, plaintiff insists that the ra c ia l discrimination he experienced was a result of a policy or practice followed by th e defendant municipalities. (Id. at ¶ 47). The discriminatory treatment he endured

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fro m the officers on the scene was a result of the defendant townships' failure to p ro vid e training for their officers in how to deal with black people. (Id. at ¶ 50). On August 22, 2008, plaintiff filed the instant complaint (Doc. 1) and motion for le a ve to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) in this court. The complaint consists of th r e e counts. Count I, brought pursuant to 42 U.S. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983 against D e fe n d a n ts Strickland, Mertz, Buonaiuto, Mahoning Township and Franklin T o w n s h ip , alleges that the defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights in a n u m b e r of ways. The count contends that plaintiff was the victim of an unlawful a rre s t, suffered from an unreasonable search and seizure, suffered cruel and u n u s u a l punishment, faced excessive bail, had his free speech rights unlawfully re s tric te d , was denied his liberty without due process of law, suffered from the use of u n re a s o n a b le force, faced racial discrimination and racial profiling, and had his right to travel unlawfully restricted. Count II, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a lle g e s a conspiracy to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights between Defendants M e rtz , Buonaiuto, Carbon County, Franklin Township, Mahoning Township, and R a lp h & Jessica Fahringer. Count III alleges supervisory liability pursuant to 42 U .S .C . § 1986 against Defendants Mahoning Township, Carbon County, Franklin T o w n s h ip , Zenko, Keiper, Eidem, Blocker, Snyder, Stawnyczy, Green, Smith and K o c h e r. On October 9, 2008, though the court had not yet approved service of the c o m p la in t, Defendant Carbon County filed a motion to dismiss the instant complaint.

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(D o c . 7). The parties then briefed the issue. On November 7, 2008, the court issued a n opinion (Doc. 11) granting the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis but d is m is s in g plaintiff's claims for false arrest and excessive bail, as well as his claims a g a in s t certain defendants. The court granted Defendant Carbon County's motion to d is m is s with respect to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and denied it in all other re s p e c ts . After the court issued this decision, plaintiff served the complaint on the re m a in in g defendants. Defendants Mahoning Township, Mahoning Township Police D e p a rtm e n t, Audie Mertz and Mark Zenko then filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 15). The parties briefed the issues related to that motion, bringing the case to its present p o s tu re . Jurisdiction B e c a u s e plaintiff brings his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we have ju ris d ic tio n pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original ju ris d ic tio n of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the U n ite d States."). W e have jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U .S .C . § 1367(a) ("In any civil action of which the district courts have original ju ris d ic tio n , the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other c la im s that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that th e y form part of the same case or controversy under Article II of the United States C o n s t it u t io n . " ) . Legal Standard

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D e fe n d a n ts have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). W h e n a defendant files such a motion, all well-pleaded a lle g a tio n s of the complainant must be viewed as true and in the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the p le a d in g s , the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 8 3 8 F.2d 663, 665-666 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of Y o rk , 768 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1985), (quoting Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 5 6 4 , 565 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curium)). The court may also consider "matters of p u b lic record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the re c o rd of the case." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1 3 8 4 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court does not have to accept legal c o n c lu s io n s or unwarranted factual inferences. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. o f W ilm in g to n , Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Morse v. Lower M e rio n Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). The complaint is properly d is m is s e d "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in s u p p o rt of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 5 1 9 , 520-521 (1972) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The c o u rt will apply this standard when addressing Defendant Carbon County's motion. D i s c u s s io n D e fe n d a n ts argue that the claims against them should be dismissed on s e ve ra l grounds. The court will address each in turn. 8

A. Mahoning Township Police Department D e fe n d a n ts argue that any claims against the police department should be d is m is s e d . Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against the department, and even if he did the department and the township are the same legal entity for the purposes o f the instant action. Plaintiff agrees that his claims are more properly directed at the tow n s h ip . He does not oppose this aspect of the motion. The court will therefore g r a n t defendants' motion on this point and dismiss the claims against the police d e p a rtm e n t. B . Claims Against the Individual Defendants in their Official Capacities D e fe n d a n ts next contend that plaintiff's claims against the individual d e fe n d a n ts in their official capacities must be dismissed, as they are duplicative of p la in tiff's claims against the municipality itself. The court agrees. An officialc a p a c ity suit is generally merely another way of pleading an action against an entity o f which an officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Such a suit is properly treated as a suit against the entity. Id. at 166. The court will th e re fo re dismiss the claims against the Mahoning Township officials in their official c a p a c i ti e s . C. Claims for Punitive Damages Against the Municipal Defendants D e fe n d a n ts next seek dismissal of plaintiff's claims for punitive damages a g a in s t the municipal defendants. They argue that punitive damages cannot be o b ta in e d against a municipality, and as such cannot be obtained against individual 9

d e fe n d a n ts in their official capacities. Moreover, the conduct alleged against the in d ivid u a l municipal defendants is not reckless or in callous disregard of federally g u a ra n te e d rights. As such, defendants contend, punitive damages are not available a g a in s t those defendants. Plaintiff agrees that punitive damages are not available a g a in s t the municipality, but argues that punitive damages could be awarded against th e individual defendants in their individual and official capacities. T h e court finds that punitive damages are not available against the individual d e fe n d a n ts in their official capacities. As explained above, a suit against an in d ivid u a l in her official capacity is a suit against the municipality. Since a m u n ic ip a lity cannot be liable for punitive damages, neither can an individual sued in h e r official capacity. The court will deny the motion, however, as it applies to the in d ivid u a l defendants in their individual capacities. "[A] jury may be permitted to a s s e s s punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is s h o w n to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous in d iffe re n c e to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. W a d e , 461 U.S. 30, 5 6 (1983). The court finds that if plaintiff could prove his allegations that the in d ivid u a l defendants deprived him of federally protected rights after his arrest and w h ile holding him in custody, and that they were motivated by a racial animus, he c o u ld establish a reckless and callous indifference to his rights. The court will deny th e motion on this point. D . Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

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D e fe n d a n ts contend that plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman d o c trin e , which precludes lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction o ve r final state court judgments. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). Defendants argue that plaintiff pled guilty to providing false identification to law e n fo rc e m e n t officers, and cannot now recover damages based on that conviction. Plaintiff argues that his claims for damages are based on constitutional violations th a t occurred separate from his conviction, and are thus not barred by the doctrine. P la in tiff here brings his § 1983 and § 1985 claims for 1) unlawful arrest; 2) u n re a s o n a b le search and seizure; 3) cruel and unusual punishment; 4) excessive b a il; 5) limits on his freedom of speech; 6) deprivations of his liberty without due p ro c e s s of law; 7) excessive force; 8) summary punishment; 9) racial discrimination a n d racial profiling; and 10) unlawful restrictions on his right to travel. In an earlier d e c is io n , the court determined that some of these claims could be combined, finding th a t the following claims remained: 1) excessive bail; 2) unlawful arrest; 3) u n re a s o n a b le search and seizure; 4) cruel and unusual punishment; and 5) racial p ro filin g (equal protection). The court found that plaintiff's excessive bail and u n la w fu l arrest claims were frivolous and should be dismissed. As such, plaintiff has c la im s remaining for unreasonable search and seizure, cruel and unusual p u n is h m e n t , and equal protection. The court must determine whether any of these re m a in in g claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. T h e court concludes that the doctrine is inapplicable to plaintiff's three

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re m a in in g constitutional claims. Plaintiff's equal protection claim is not the e q u iva le n t of an appeal of a final state-court judgment. To prevail on an equal p r o te c tio n claim in the racial-profiling context, plaintiff must establish that he is a m e m b e r of a protected class and similarly situated to others not within the protected c la s s who were not prosecuted. See Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 834 (3d C ir. 2002). Plaintiff does not need to establish that he was innocent of the u n d e rly in g charge, or that the state court judgment was invalid to prevail. Instead, h e must show that others similarly situation and not within the protected class were n o t prosecuted. Plaintiff asserts that the Fahringers were similarly situated, not m e m b e rs of a protected class, and not prosecuted. The doctrine therefore does not a p p ly to bar this claim. In the same way, plaintiff's unreasonable search and seizure claim is not b a rre d by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as he does not need to challenge the a d e q u a c y of his conviction to prevail on that claim. A defendant's guilt on charges a g a in s t him is "simply irrelevant to the legality of the search under the fourth a m e n d m e n t or to [his] right to compensation from state officials under section 1983." Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316 (1983). Plaintiff's cruel and unusual p u n is h m e n t claim is likewise not affected by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. W h e th e r h e suffered cruel and unusual punishment does not depend on the adequacy of the g ro u n d s used to hold him. E. Supervisory Liability

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C o u n t III of plaintiff's claim alleges supervisory liability against Mahoning T o w n s h ip , Carbon County, Franklin Township and Police Chief Zenko. Defendants h e re claim that plaintiff has alleged only respondeat superior liability on this count a n d have failed to point to any policy or custom that would expose these supervisors to liability. Under the law, a municipality cannot be liable for civil rights violations on a re s p o n d e a t superior basis. Instead, a plaintiff must establish that the violation o c c u rre d pursuant to the municipality's policy or custom. Monell v. Department of S o c ia l Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In the instant case, the defendants argue th a t plaintiff has not alleged a township policy or custom that caused the harm at is s u e . The court is unconvinced. The complaint alleges that plaintiff faced d is c rim in a tio n pursuant to "the widespread and pervasive policy, custom, practice a n d usage" of racial discrimination. (Complt. at § 115). These allegations are s u ffic ie n t to survive a motion to dismiss. F . Section 1985 Claim D e fe n d a n ts argue that plaintiff's conspiracy claim, brought pursuant to 42 U .S .C . § 1985, should be dismissed. That section provides a cause of action for c o n s p ir a c y to violate civil rights. The elements of such a cause of action are: 1) a c o n s p ira c y; 2) motivated by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal p ro te c tio n of the laws; 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 4) an injury to

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p e rs o n or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the U n ited States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Griffin v. B re c k e n rid g e , 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired with each other to violate his civil rights. (Complt. at ¶ 101). Plaintiff avers that defendants c o n s p ire d to achieve his false arrest and deprive him of his due process rights b e c a u s e he was black. (Id.). These actions, the complaint contends, caused p la in tiff injury. (Id. at ¶ 106). Plaintiff points to specific acts and to specific rights w h ic h those acts violated. Read broadly, then, the complaint makes out a claim for c o n s p ira c y against the moving defendants. The court will deny the motion on this p o in t. G. Qualified Immunity F in a lly, the individual defendants, Officer Mertz and Chief Zenko, contend that th e y are entitled to qualified immunity for the actions about which plaintiff complains. Qualified immunity can serve as a defense for an individual defendant accused of a c ivil rights violation. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Qualified im m u n ity does not apply where state officials violate "clearly established statutory or c o n s titu tio n a l rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wright v. City o f Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 699-700 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 4 5 7 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). For a qualified immunity analysis, therefore, the court m u s t examine: 1) whether officials violated a constitutional right and 2) whether that

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rig h t was clearly established at the time. Id. H e re , the plaintiff has alleged facts which­if proved­could demonstrate that o ffic ia ls violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. If plaintiff proved such violations, q u a lifie d immunity would not be appropriate because the rights that plaintiff a d va n c e s ­ th e right to be free from racial discrimination, to be free from cruel and u n u s u a l punishment, and to be free from unreasonable search and seizure­are c le a rly established rights. Qualified immunity does not apply at this point. C o n c l u s io n F o r the reasons stated above, the court will deny the defendants' motion in p a r t and grant it in part. An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SAMUEL D. STRICKLAND, Plaintiff : No. 3:08cv1570 : : (Judge Munley) : v. : : MAHONING TOWNSHIP, : MAHONING TOWNSHIP POLICE : DEPARTMENT, : FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP, : CARBON COUNTY, : OFFICER AUDIE M. MERTZ, : POLICE CHIEF MARK ZENKO, : OFFICER FRANK BOUNAIUTO, : RALPH FAHRINGER, and : JESSICA FAHRINGER, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER AN D NOW, to wit, this 8 th day of July 2009, Defendant Mahoning Township, M a h o n in g Township Police Department, Audie M. Mertz and Mark Zenko's motion to d is m is s (Doc. 15) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows: 1 ) The motion is granted with respect to plaintiff's claims against the Mahoning T o w n s h ip Police Department; 2) The motion is granted with respect to plaintiff's claims for punitive damages a g a in s t the Township and against the individual defendants in their official c a p a c itie s ; 16

3 ) The motion is granted with respect to plaintiff's claims against the individual d e fe n d a n ts in their official capacities; and 4 ) The motion is denied in all other respects. BY THE COURT:

s / James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT

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