Wallace v. Powell et al

Filing 1137

MEMORANDUM re 1107 MOTION to Clarify Reconsider, For Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers ot to amend order to certify for appeal filed by Western PA Child Care, LLC, Mid Atlantic Youth Services Corp., PA Child Care, LLC Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 6/5/12. (jam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FLORENCE WALLACE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-286

v.
ROBERT J. POWELL, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.
******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CONWAY, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0291

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.
******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
H.T., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357

v.
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al.,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Defendants.
******************************************************************************************************

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SAMANTHA HUMANIK,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0630

Plaintiff,
v.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al.,
Defendants.

******************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAUL CLARK, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-0357

Plaintiffs,
v.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

MICHAEL T. CONAHAN, et al.,
Defendants.

*****************************************************************************************************
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WAYNE DAWN, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-2535

Plaintiffs,
v.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., et al.,
Defendants.

*****************************************************************************************************
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELA RIMMER BELANGER, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-1405

Plaintiffs,
v.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

MARK A. CIAVARELLA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is the Motion to Clarify Order, to Reconsider Order, for
Summary Judgment, to Amend Answers or to Amend Order to Certify Order Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed. R. App. P. 5(A)(3) and to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 1107)
brought by Defendants Mid-Atlantic Youth Services, Corp., PA Child Care, LLC, and
Western PA Child Care, LLC (together, the “Provider Defendants”). On April 10, 2012, the
Court, applying the test for relief from a protective order set forth by the Third Circuit in
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787-91 (3d Cir. 1994), denied Provider
Defendants’ Motion for Modification of or Relief from the Stipulated Protective Order. (Docs.
1101; 1102.) Now, Provider Defendants seek clarification, reconsideration, summary
judgment, leave to amend, and/or certification for interlocutory appeal of the Court’s Order.
(Doc. 1107.) Because relief from the April 10, 2012 Order is not warranted, Provider
Defendants’ Motion will be denied in its entirety.
I. Background
As discussed in the April 10, 2012 Memorandum, (Doc. 1101), this action arises out

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of an alleged conspiracy in which two former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas
judges, Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan, accepted payments from various individuals
and corporations for the purpose of facilitating the construction of juvenile detention
facilities. Thereafter, Ciavarella and Conahan are alleged to have taken steps to ensure
that a disproportionate number of juveniles were incarcerated in those facilities. Plaintiffs
in this action are all juveniles or the parents of juveniles who appeared before Ciavarella.
On July 27, 2011, Provider Defendants filed a motion for relief from the stipulated
Protective Order that had been agreed upon by the parties and signed by the Court on July
23, 2009. (Doc. 205.) Specifically, Provider Defendants sought to modify the Protective
Order so that they could show Attorneys’ Eyes Only material to persons who were not privy
to the material under paragraph 8 of the Order. (Doc. 957.) The Court denied the motion.
(Doc. 1102.) Provider Defendants subsequently filed the instant Motion requesting the
Court to clarify, or reconsider, the prior decision. (Doc. 1107.) The Motion has been fully
briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
In the instant Motion, Provider Defendants request the Court to: (A) clarify the April
10, 2012 Order; (B) reconsider the Order; (C) grant summary judgment due to Plaintiffs’
spoliation of evidence; (D) permit Provider Defendants to amend their answers to deny
previously admitted averments; and/or (E) certify the April 10, 2012 Order for appeal. (Doc.
1107.) These issues will be addressed in seratim.
A.

Clarification of the Order
According to Provider Defendants, “this Court should clarify its Order to state the

nature of the damages that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover and the discovery about those
damages to which Provider Defendants are entitled.” (Doc. 1108.) “‘The general purpose
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of a motion for clarification is to explain or clarify something ambiguous or vague, not to
alter or amend.” Montgomery Cnty. v. Microvote Corp., No. 97-6331, 2000 WL 341566, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2000) (quoting Resolution Trust Co. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, No.
92–1373, 1993 WL 211555, at *2 (E.D.Pa. June 8, 1993)).
Clarification of the April 10, 2012 Order is unwarranted. Contrary to Provider
Defendants’ assertion, the Court’s Order did not fundamentally alter the rules of these
actions. Likewise, the Order did not deny Provider Defendants due process. Rather, the
Court’s determination was narrow: Provider Defendants are not entitled to relief from the
parties’ stipulated Protective Order. And, this determination is clearly, and unambiguously,
stated in the Court’s Order: “NOW, this 10th day of April, 2012, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendants’ Motion for Modification of or Relief From Stipulated Protective Order (Doc.
957) is DENIED.” (Doc. 1102.) In that regard, the Order did not limit or alter the remedies
or theories of relief in this action that existed prior to the Court’s Order. Instead, the Court
simply upheld the status quo pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreed upon Protective
Order. Further clarification of the Court’s Order is therefore unnecessary.
B.

Reconsideration
Provider Defendants’ motion for reconsideration will be denied. Here, Provider

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration arises under Middle District Local Rule 7.10. The
procedure for such reconsideration is essentially the same as a motion to alter or amend
judgment brought under Rule 59(e), except that it allows for reconsideration of any court
order, and is not limited to the entry of judgment. Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings,
Inc., No. 3:06–CV–1105, 2011 WL 4916397, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct.17, 2011) (clarifying that
the “difference between a motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 7.10 and a motion
to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) is that a motion for reconsideration under
Local Rule may be filed in response to any order of the court, not solely after the entry of
judgment.”).
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence. See Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906,
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909 (3d Cir. 1985).

A judgment may be altered or amended if the party seeking

reconsideration establishes at least one of the following: “(1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or
fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Café, by Lou–Ann, Inc., v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). “A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a
means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a
point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone Residence,
226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002). “[R]econsideration motions may not be used to
raise new arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Hill v. Tammac Corp., Civ. A. No. 05–1148, 2006 WL 529044, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 3, 2006). Lastly, reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy, and should be granted
sparingly. D'Angio v. Borough of Nescopeck, 56 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
Provider Defendants argue that the Court committed clear error of law in its
application of the fairness and efficiency prong of the Pansy criteria. (Doc. 1108.)
Specifically, Provider Defendants assert that the Court’s determination was contrary to
controlling authority, incorrectly applied offensive collateral estoppel against them, and
unfairly prohibited them from examining Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records. (Id.) These arguments
are without merit.
First, reconsideration is unwarranted on the basis of the Court’s application of the
fairness and efficiency consideration of the Pansy criteria. Although Provider Defendants
argue that the Court’s evaluation of the fairness and efficiency factor is controlled by the
Supreme Court’s holding in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252
(1978), the Court disagrees.
In Carey, a school district suspended students without providing the students presuspension hearings. See id. at 249-50. The students filed suit against the school district
alleging that they had been suspended without due process of law. See id. at 250. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether “in an action for the deprivation of
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procedural due process, a plaintiff must prove that he was actually injured by the deprivation
before he may recover substantial ‘non-punitive’ damages.” Id. at 253. The Supreme Court
held that in the absence of proof of actual injury, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for the
deprivation of procedural due process may not recover compensatory damages and is
instead limited to recovery of nominal damages. Id. at 264. Thus, if the students would
have been suspended in Carey even if they had been given pre-suspension hearings- that
is the suspensions were “justified”- then, in the absence of proof of emotional distress
damages, the students could recover only nominal damages. Id. at 267.
Here, unlike in Carey, the Court did not determine what remedies are available to
Plaintiffs in this case.1 Instead, the Court, in applying the fairness and efficiency factor of
the Pansy criteria, concluded that, in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
determination that the proceedings conducted by former Judge Ciavarella violated the rights
of juveniles, the promotion of fairness did not require a modification of the stipulated
Protective Order. As such, Carey is not outcome-determinative of whether Provider
Defendants, as the moving party, satisfied their burden to obtain relief from the Protective
Order.2

1

This issue, in fact, was not briefed in Provider Defendants’ opening brief in
support of their motion to modify, nor was it addressed in Plaintiffs’ opposition to
the motion to modify.

2

Even if Carey supports the conclusion that the fairness and efficiency factor favor
Provider Defendants, this finding alone would be insufficient to convince the
Court that reconsideration is necessary. In particular, if the fairness inquiry
favored Provider Defendants, this would impact the resolution of only a single
Pansy factor and would not change the Court’s previous determination that “there
was good cause to issue the protective order because the compelling concerns
regarding privacy and embarrassment strongly outweighed the minor issues of
efficiency and public importance. . . . [And], the Juvenile Plaintiffs relied upon the
Protective Order.” (Doc. 1101.) Thus, a finding that the promotion of fairness
weighs in favor of Provider Defendants would not alter the Court’s ultimate
conclusion. That is, even assuming arguendo that the fifth Pansy consideration
favors Provider Defendants, the balancing of interests would still not weigh in
favor of granting relief from the Protective Order.
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Moreover, the Court is not convinced that Carey compels the resolution in this action
advanced by Provider Defendants. Provider Defendants, applying Carey, imply that if
Juvenile Plaintiffs would have been detained, or adjudicated guilty, even in the absence of
Ciavarella’s improper conduct, then, unless emotional distress is proven by Plaintiffs, they
have not suffered actual injuries. Unrecognized by Provider Defendants, however, is that
the factual scenario in this case- denial of procedural and substantive due process rights
related to an impartial tribunal, including, inter alia, the right to counsel, the right to an
unbiased fact finder, and the right to a fair trial- implicate issues far different from the school
district’s deprivation of pre-suspension hearings in Carey. Rephrased, unlike the students
in Carey, Juvenile Plaintiffs allege not only a deprivation of procedural due process, but also
a significant denial of substantive due process rights.3 In light of these considerations, the
Court, at this time, is not convinced that Carey conclusively resolves the issue of damages
in this case.4 See also Stachura, 477 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I do not
understand the Court, however, to hold that deprivations of constitutional rights can never

3

Although Carey did “not establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights,
with substantive rights afforded greater protection than ‘mere’ procedural
safeguards,” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309, 106 S. Ct.
2537, 91 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1986), Carey recognized that:
[T]he elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to
compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right
are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the
deprivation of another. . . . [T]hese issues must be considered with
reference to the nature of the interests protected by the particular
constitutional right in question.
Carey, 435 U.S. at 265-66 (emphasis added). Thus, while damages for a
constitutional deprivation must always be designed to compensate injuries,
“[w]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred
but difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may be appropriate.”
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 311.

4

However, as this issue is not currently before the Court, its resolution will be left
for another day.
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themselves constitute compensable injuries. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the
logic of Carey, and would defeat the purpose of § 1983 by denying compensation for
genuine injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.”).
Second, contrary to Provider Defendants’ assertion, the Court’s Order does not
implicitly prevent Provider Defendants from denying “that [they] were involved in Ciavarella’s
alleged due process violations.” (Doc. 1108.)

The relevant passage of the Court’s

Memorandum, as quoted by Provider Defendants, states that “a trial of each plaintiff on the
delinquency allegations would effectively nullify the determination that the proceedings
conducted by former Judge Ciavarella violated the rights of those juveniles.” (Doc. 1101.)
While this passage is consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination to
expunge Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records, it does not expressly state, nor implicitly indicate, that
Provider Defendants are barred from arguing against involvement in Ciavarella’s violation
of Plaintiffs’ rights.
Third, Provider Defendants are not entitled to reconsideration on the basis that the
Court unfairly prohibited them from examining Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records. Contrary to
Provider Defendants’ characterization of the Order, they are not prevented from discovering
Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records.

The Order did not alter Provider Defendants’ access to

documents produced in this case, including court and probation files for Juvenile Plaintiffs.
Likewise, the Order did not modify Provider Defendants’ access to their own documents and
their ability to question third parties about these documents in the context of a deposition.
Thus, because the Court simply maintained the status quo based upon an agreement of the
parties, reconsideration is not justified.
C.

Summary Judgment Based on Spoliation of Evidence
Provider Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiffs’

alleged spoliation of evidence. “‘Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of
evidence, or the failure to preserve properly for another’s use as evidence in pending or
reasonably foreseeable litigation.’” Fortune v. Bitner, No. 01-0111, 2006 WL 839346, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2006) (Vanaskie, C.J.) (quoting Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
9

Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 (D. N.J. 2004)). Here, as noted, Juvenile Plaintiffs’ records
have not been destroyed or altered, nor have Plaintiffs failed to preserve the records. In
fact, the records have been specifically maintained for use in this litigation. Thus, as
Provider Defendants fail to establish that evidence has been destroyed or not properly
preserved for use in this litigation, their request for summary judgment will be denied.
D.

Leave to Amend Admissions
Provider Defendants will be denied the opportunity to “amend their answers to deny

allegations previously admitted.” (Doc. 1115.) Initially, the Court recognizes that Provider
Defendants provide no legal support for the position that “[w]hat Provider Defendants know
as a matter of fact is different from what they are permitted to know as a matter of law.” (Id.)
More troubling to the Court, however, is that Provider Defendants’ request to deny known
facts seemingly contradicts the mandates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by this Court pursuant to Local
Rule 83.23.2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4) (“[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written
motion, or other paper . . . an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief . . . [that] the denials of factual contentions are warranted
on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information”); Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1 (2012) (“a lawyer shall not bring or defend
a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous”); Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 (2012) (“a lawyer shall
not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal . . . (3) offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false”). Because Provider Defendants have access
to the records and evidence that formed the basis of their previous admissions and they
specifically “know [this information] as a matter of fact,” (Doc. 1115), they will not be
permitted to amend their prior admissions.
E.

Certification for Interlocutory Appeal
Lastly, the Court will not amend the April 10, 2012 Order to certify it for immediate

appeal. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district judge may certify an interlocutory order
10

for appeal when the judge is “of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.” Id. As the Court has discussed at length, the prior decision was based on a
single issue: whether to modify or grant relief from the stipulated Protective Order. And,
because it is well-settled in this Circuit that “a district court has wide discretion in weighing
any relevant factors and deciding whether to grant a motion for a protective order,” Caldon,
Inc. v. Advanced Measurement & Analysis Grp., Inc., No. 04-1951, 2007 WL 4571165, at
*1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2007) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787; Glenmede Trust Co. v.
Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir.1995)), the Court will not amend the Order to certify
it for appeal.
III. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, Provider Defendants’ Motion will be denied in its
entirety.
An appropriate order follows.

June 5, 2012
Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

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