Goodwin v. Martinez

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 25 Motion for Reconsideration ; OVERRULING petitioner's objections; Clerk of Court is directed to REOPEN case soley for the purpose of considering the pltfs' objections and to CLOSE the without prejudice to the petitoner's filing a new habeas corpus action after exhausting his administrative remedies.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 5/27/10 (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEARLY REED GOODWIN, Petitioner : No. 3:09cv474 : : (Judge Munley) : : v. : : RICARDO MARTINEZ, WARDEN, : Respondent : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
M E M O R AN D U M B e fo re the court is petitioner's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 25) of the c o u rt's order adopting the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Thomas M . Blewitt, which proposed that the court dismiss the instant petition for a writ of h a b e a s corpus. B a c k g ro u n d O n March 13, 2009, Learly Reed Goodwin filed the instant petition for a writ of h a b e a s corpus in this court. Petitioner contends that the court that sentenced him fa ile d to establish a specific schedule for payments due under the Mandatory Victim R e s titu tio n Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, during his incarceration. Petitioner contends th a t the Bureau of Prisons set up this schedule, and that the Bureau lacked authority to do so. As such, he seeks an order from the court barring the Bureau from e n fo rc in g this schedule of payments or instituting any sanctions against the p e titio n e r for failing to comply with the payment schedule. Magistrate Judge Blewitt

granted petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3). Repondent filed a response with attached exhibits (Doc. 7), and petitioner filed a tra ve rs e (Doc. 8). The magistrate judge then issued a report and recommendation (D o c . 14), which concluded that petitioner could not obtain relief through habeas c o rp u s and recommended dismissal of the case. W h e n the magistrate judge issued his report and recommendation he in fo rm e d the petitioner of the deadline for filing objections. As a result, the court c o n s id e re d the report and recommendation on a deferential standard and adopted it. After the court closed the case, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in w h ic h he attacked the reasons for the magistrate judge's decision. Because p e titio n e r is proceeding pro se, the court concluded that justice would be served by g ra n tin g the motion for reconsideration and reexamining the report and re c o m m e n d a tio n in light of the petitioner's objections. See Max's Seafood Cafe ex re l. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that in a m o tio n for reconsideration "[t]he movant must demonstrate one of three grounds for s u c h a motion to be granted: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the a va ila b ility of new evidence not previously available; or (3) the need to correct a c le a r error of law or to prevent manifest injustice."). The court examined the report and recommendation and petitioner's o b je c tio n s . The court declined to adopt the report and recommendation, finding that p e titio n e r could raise a habeas claim based on the terms of restitution in his

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sentence. The court remanded the case to the magistrate judge with instructions to d e te rm in e whether plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, and to e xa m in e the terms under which his sentence was imposed. The magistrate judge undertook those inquiries and then issued another re p o rt and recommendation. (Doc. 22). Therein, the magistrate judge re c o m m e n d e d that the case be dismissed because plaintiff had not exhausted his a d m in is tra tiv e remedies. W h e n petitioner failed to respond to this case in a timely fa s h io n , the court adopted the report and recommendation and closed the case. (Doc. 23). Thereafter, citing problems receiving mail in prison, plaintiff filed o b je c tio n s to the report and recommendation and a motion for reconsideration of this c o u rt's opinion closing the case. (Docs. 23-24). For the reasons stated above, the c o u rt will again reopen the case and consider the petitioner's objections. Jurisdiction Because petitioner filed his action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the court has ju ris d ic tio n pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original ju ris d ic tio n of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the U n ite d States."). Legal Standard W h e n dealing with objections to a magistrate judge's report and re c o m m e n d a tio n , a district court must make a de novo determination of those p o rtio n s of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). This 3

court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or re c o m m e n d a tio n s made by the magistrate. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). The district c o u rt judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the m a g is tra te judge with instructions. Id. Discussion T h e magistrate judge concluded that petitioner's claim should be dismissed w ith o u t prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under federal law, "[f]e d e ra l prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies b e fo re petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241." Moscato v. F e d e ra l Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1993). The exhaustion re q u ire m e n t exists for three reasons: "(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting a g e n c ie s to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing a g e n c ie s the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative a u to n o m y ." Id. at 761-62. This rule applies unless a petitioner can demonstrate th a t exhaustion "is futile." Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (R o th , concurring). Futility can occur when administrative review will not meet any of th e goals of the exhaustion doctrine. Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d C ir. 1981) P e titio n e r does not deny that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, o r that the law requires him to do so. Instead, he insists that exhaustion would have

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been futile, and should thus be excused. As grounds for futility, petitioner argues th a t the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") wrote the policy about which he c o m p la in s , and his subordinates have no hope of altering it. Second, petitioner a rg u e s that he addresses "a core judicial function which is part of his sentence," and th u s should be addressed by the court, not the BOP. Third, since the BOP receives 2 5 % of all fines paid, petitioner predicts that the Bureau will fight all attempts to alter th e policy in hopes of maintaining its financial interest. The court will overrule the petitioner's objections. The court finds that e xh a u s tio n would not be futile in this instance. The court originally remanded the c a s e to the magistrate judge for a determination of the sentence provided the plaintiff a n d the directions given the BOP to carry out that sentence. Undertaking the a d m in is tra tiv e process offered by the prison will allow the development of a factual re c o rd that can establish how the prison has calculated and enforced plaintiff's re s titu tio n schedule. Petitioner may receive relief in that context, but he may also file a new cause of action in this court after exhausting his administrative remedies. Moreover, the court is surely capable of carrying out its review responsibilities for th a t decision after the administrative process occurs. The court likewise finds that p la in tiff's concern that the use of administrative remedies would be futile because he e xp e c ts to lose in those proceedings--the subject of his final two claims of futility--is u n a va ilin g . If plaintiff loses on the administrative level, he may challenge those c o n c lu s io n s in court. "[T]he exhaustion doctrine is not supposed to preclude judicial

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relief, but merely postpone a timing of the judicial determination." Lyons v. U.S. M a rs h a ls , 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). C o n c lu s io n F o r the reasons stated above, the court will grant the petitioner's motion for re c o n s id e ra tio n , but overrule the plaintiff's objections and adopt the report and re c o m m e n d a tio n . The court will order the case dismissed without prejudice to p la in tiff raising his claim after exhausting the available administrative remedies. An a p p ro p ria te order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEARLY REED GOODWIN, Petitioner : No. 3:09cv474 : : (Judge Munley) : : v. : : RICARDO MARTINEZ, WARDEN, : Respondent : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER AN D NOW, to wit, this 17th day of May 2010, the petitioner's motion for re c o n s id e ra tio n (Doc. 25) of the court's order closing the instant case (Doc. 23) is h e re b y GRANTED. The petitioner's objections (Doc. 24) to the report and re c o m m e n d a tio n are hereby OVERRULED. The Clerk of Court is directed to R E O P E N the case solely for the purpose of considering the plaintiff's objections, and to CLOSE the case without prejudice to the petitioner's filing a new habeas corpus a c tio n after exhausting his administrative remedies.

BY THE COURT: s / James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT 7