Johnson v. Beard et al

Filing 200

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) However, the Court will grant Manchas incorporated request to voluntarily dismiss his claims against two of the five Remaining Defendants, Garman and Glorioso, as well as his conditions of confine ment claims with the exception of two allegations, namely, that Manchas was exposed to unconstitutional powerhouse emissions (Doc. 46, p. 7.) and second, that there were leaks in the ceiling and floors of his cell which caused mold (Doc. 46, p. 5-6.) and went uncorrected. An appropriate Order will enter. (See Memorandum)Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 11/26/13. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON,

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Plaintiff
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, ET AL.,
Defendants

CIVIL NO. 3:CV-09-886
(Judge Conaboy)

_________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Procedural History
This pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
was initiated by Timothy R. Johnson during his prior confinement at
the State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (SCIHuntingdon).1

An Amended Complaint was filed by Johnson on

February 22, 2010.

See Doc. 46.

By Order dated July 22, 2010, Inmate Daniel Manchas, III was
granted leave to be joined as a Plaintiff in this matter.

Manchas’

request asserted that he had been subjected to the same alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement as Johnson.
75, p. 2.

See Doc.

Plaintiff Manchas is still confined at SCI-Huntingdon.

By Memorandum and Order dated March 15, 2011, this Court
partially granted a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed
by the Commonwealth Defendants.

See Doc. 93.

Defendant Shoaf’s

1. Johnson was later transferred to the Rockview State
Correctional Institution, Bellefonte, Pennsylvania (SCI-Rockview).
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motions to dismiss the claims of the respective Plaintiffs were
granted by Memorandums and Orders dated March 22, 2011 and August
23, 2011.

The August 23, 2011 Order specifically noted that

Manchas’ conditions of confinement claims against Defendants
Lawler, Garman, Ewell, Williams, and Glorioso would proceed.
By Order dated March 8, 2012, Plaintiff’s Johnson’s
surviving claims were dismissed for failure to prosecute.

The

Order noted that the surviving claims of Remaining Plaintiff
Manchas would proceed.
Presently pending is the Remaining Defendants’ motion
seeking entry of summary judgment as to the claims raised by
Manchas.

See Doc. 184.

Also pending are Manchas’s cross summary

judgment motion (Doc. 190) and his second motion requesting leave
to file a second amended complaint.

(Doc. 187).

Manchas’ Claims
Remaining Defendants are the following SCI-Huntingdon
employees:

Superintendent Lawler; Unit Manager Garman; Safety

Manager B. M. Ewell; Utilities Manager Curtis Williams; and Herve
Glorioso of the Food Services Department.
The Amended Complaint initially claims that the SCIHuntingdon cells are not large enough to accommodate two inmates
and the prison’s screening process which determines which inmates
should be celled together is flawed.

See Doc. 46, p. 5.

In

addition, the cells are described as having: poor plumbing, mold,
insufficient storage space, poor ventilation, and contaminated
drinking water.

It is further asserted that the cells are rodent

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and insect infested and lack window screens as well as radiator
covers.
Next, it is alleged that the SCI-Huntingdon chapel is
deficient because it lacks a rest room and running water.
Plaintiffs also generally contend that the prison’s kitchen: is
unsanitary due to insect and rodent infestation; has poor
conditions in its rest room; serves outdated, non-nutritious, and
freezer burned food; and kitchen workers engage in unsanitary
handling of food.

The Amended Complaint also claims that SCI-

Huntingdon has numerous fire and safety code violations, the
powerhouse gives off unhealthy emissions, and deficient medical and
psychiatric treatment is provided to its inmates.
Summary Judgment
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d
Cir. 2001).

A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the

outcome of the suit under the applicable law.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty

A factual dispute is

“genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that
would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict for the
non-moving party.

Id. at 248.

The court must resolve all doubts

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of
the non-moving party.

Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232; see also Reeder v.
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Sybron Transition Corp., 142 F.R.D. 607, 609 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
Unsubstantiated arguments made in briefs are not considered
evidence of asserted facts.

Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984

F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d Cir. 1993).
Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of
evidence to support the claims of the non-moving party, the nonmoving party may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in
its complaint.
(1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

Instead, it must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.”

Id. (internal quotations omitted); see

also Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted).

Summary

judgment should be granted where a party “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at
trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

“‘Such affirmative evidence

– regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial – must
amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the
evaluation of the court) than a preponderance.’”

Saldana, 260 F.3d

at 232 (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458,
460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Manchas’ Cross Summary Judgment
On May 2, 2013, Plaintiff Manchas filed a cross summary
judgment motion.

See Doc. 190.

Along with his motion the

Remaining Plaintiff filed a statement of disputed facts (Doc. 191)
and a supporting declaration (192).
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M.D. Pa. Local Rule 7.5. requires that a party who files a
pretrial motion must submit a brief in support of said motion
within fourteen (14) days of its being filed with the court.

If a

supporting brief is not timely filed, “such motion shall be deemed
to be withdrawn.”

A review of the docket establishes that the

Remaining Plaintiff has not filed a brief in support of his motion.
Moreover, Manchas’ pending motion does not set forth any
argument as to why summary judgment should be entered in his favor.
On the contrary, his motion asserts that “there are material facts
that are genuinely disputed” and “there exists genuine issues to be
tried,” assertions which if proven would preclude entry of summary
judgment.

Doc. 190, p. 1.

Since Plaintiff has failed to submit a supporting brief as
required by Local Rule 7.5, and his motion offers no basis
whatsoever as to why entry of summary judgment in his favor is
appropriate, his motion seeking entry of summary judgment (Doc.
190) will be deemed withdrawn.
Remaining Defendants
The five (5) Remaining Defendants raise two arguments
asserting that they are entitled to entry of summary judgment.
First, they contend that the claims against them in their official
capacities are precluded because they are entitled to sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Second, they contend that Manchas has not set forth
sufficient factual averments to allege personal involvement by the
Remaining Defendants in any violations of his constitutional
rights.
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Eleventh Amendment
Remaining Defendants contend that the claims for money
damages against them in their official capacities must be dismissed
because they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
See Doc. 189, p. 13.
The Eleventh Amendment bars all suits against a state and
its agencies in federal court that seek monetary damages.

Walker

v. Beard, 244 Fed. Appx. 439, 440 (3d Cir. 2007); see also A.W. v.
Jersey City Public Schools, 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003).
Likewise, suits brought against state officials acting in their
official capacities are to be treated as suits against the
employing government agency.

Will v. Michigan Department of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); Garden State Elec. Inspection
Serv. v. Levin, 144 Fed. Appx. 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2005).
As such, Manchas’ damage claims brought against Remaining
Defendants in their official capacities are considered to be
against the state itself and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.2
Personal Involvement
By Order dated July 22, 2010, this Court granted Manchas’
motion to be joined as a Plaintiff in this matter.

The Order noted

that Manchas and Original Plaintiff Johnson were housed in the same
units and as such Manchas’ conditions of confinement claims

2.
Freeman’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
against Corrections Defendants in their official capacities,
however, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297
F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).
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appeared to be based upon “a common set of facts as those asserted
by Johnson.”

Doc. 75, p. 3.

This Court’s March 15, 2011 Memorandum and Order stated as
follows:
Based upon an application of the standards developed in
Farmer and a liberal reading of the pro se Amended
Complaint, adequate factual averments are set forth which
could arguably establish that Remaining Corrections
Defendants Lawler, Garman, Ewell, Williams, and Glorioso had
personal knowledge of unconstitutional conditions of
confinement which existed at SCI-Huntingdon and failed to
take appropriate corrective measures to protect the safety
of Plaintiffs Johnson and Manchas. The request for
dismissal on behalf of Defendants Lawler, Garman, Ewell,
Williams, and Glorioso on the basis of factual insufficiency
will be denied.
Doc. 93, p. 11.
A condition of confinement, in order to implicate the Eighth
Amendment, must be so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under
contemporary standards or one that deprives an inmate of minimal
civilized measure of the necessities of life.

See Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991).

An Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official

must meet two requirements:

(1) “the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official
must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”3
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Farmer v.

In prison conditions cases,

3.
Under Farmer, deliberate indifference is a subjective
standard in that the prison official must actually have known or
been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety. Beers-Capitol
v. Whetzel, 256 F. 3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). This requirement of
actual knowledge means that “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
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“that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate
health or safety.”

Id.

In reviewing this type of claim the courts

have stressed that the totality of the circumstances are crtical to
a finding of cruel and unusual punishment.
The pending summary judgment motion generally reasserts the
same argument that was previously considered and rejected by this
Court’s March 15, 2011 Memorandum and Order.
This Court agrees that Manchas can only pursue claims
relating to his own personal situation.

However, this Court has

already determined that given the totality of those conditions of
confinement, if proven, could rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.

Since the pending summary judgment does address the

merits of those claims, there is no basis for entry of summary
judgment.
Motion to Amend
Plaintiff Manchas has also filed a motion requesting leave
to file a second amended complaint.

His motion asserts that the

amended complaint filed by former Plaintiff Johnson was defective.
Manchas also asserts that he wishes to drop Garmen and Glorioso as
Defendants and provide clarification to the conditions of
confinement claims previously raised.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides:
(a)

Amendments Before Trial.
(1) Amending as a matter of course.
A party may amend
its pleading once as a matter of course:
(A) 21 days after serving it; or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading is required, 21 days after service
of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
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service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or
(f), whichever is earlier.
As previously noted an Amended Complaint was filed in this
matter on February 22, 2010 therefore based upon an application of
Rule 15(a), Plaintiff cannot file an Amended Complaint as a matter
of course.
However, Rule 15(a)(2) additionally provides that in other
cases, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave.”

The Rule adds that

“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
There is no indication that any of the Remaining Defendants have
provided written consent to Manchas’ proposed submission of a
second amended complaint.

In fact, as previously discussed those

Remaining Defendants have filed a summary judgment motion.
By Order dated February 21, 2013, this Court denied a prior
request by Manchas for leave to submit a second amended Complaint.
See Doc. 180.

In that request, Manchas sought to add new

defendants, reassert claims against defendants who had already been
granted dismissal and add entirely new claims.

See id. at p. 3.

As previously noted by this Court, Inmate Manchas has been a
party to this action since July 22, 2010.

The pending second

motion to amend was not filed until April 30, 2013, almost three
years after he joined this action.

Accordingly, this Court agrees

that there are clearly timeliness issues given the advanced stage
of these proceedings.

Due to the age of these proceedings, Manchas

will not be permitted to submit a second amended complaint.

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However, the Court will grant Manchas’ incorporated request
to voluntarily dismiss his claims against two of the five Remaining
Defendants, Garman and Glorioso, as well as his conditions of
confinement claims with the exception of two allegations, namely,
that Manchas was exposed to unconstitutional powerhouse emissions
(Doc. 46, p. 7.) and second, that there were leaks in the ceiling
and floors of his cell which caused mold (Doc. 46, p. 5-6.) and
went uncorrected.

An appropriate Order will enter.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: NOVEMBER 26, 2013

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