Sanders et al v. Beard et al

Filing 536

MEMORANDUM Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/1/13. (jam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALPHONSO SANDERS, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-1384
Plaintiffs,
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are a Motion for Reconsideration brought by Plaintiff
Steve Stewart (Doc. 535) and a Motion to Vacate brought by Plaintiff John Diaz (Doc. 531).
Plaintiff Stewart seeks reconsideration of the Court’s April 19, 2013 Memorandum and
Order (Docs. 511–512), which, inter alia, dismissed Defendant James Fouse from this
action. Plaintiff Diaz asks the Court to vacate its June 13, 2013 Memorandum and Order
(Docs. 527–528), which denied his Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s April 19, 2013
Memorandum and Order.1 As the moving Plaintiffs have not presented an intervening
change in controlling law, presented any previously unavailable evidence, or demonstrated
a clear error of fact or law in the Court’s April 19, 2013 Memorandum and Order or June 13,
2013 Memorandum and Order, their motions will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Diaz, Stewart, Dwight Bowen, Anthony Williams, and Alphonso Sanders
were, at all relevant times, incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield in
Smithfield, Pennsylvania (“SCI–Smithfield”). Between April 2007 and June 2009, Plaintiffs
1

The Court will construe Plaintiff Diaz’s motion as a Motion for Reconsideration
rather than a Motion to Vacate, as the Court’s June 13, 2013 Memorandum and
Order is not a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b).

filed several inmate grievances regarding the prison’s ventilation system, air quality, and
water quality.

On July 16, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint bringing Eighth

Amendment conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care claims against various
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees who work or have worked at
SCI–Smithfield, including Art Varner, the prison’s former Facility Maintenance Manager;
James Fouse, the prison’s Safety Manager; and William Felton, the prison’s Facility
Maintenance Manager.
In a pre-trial memorandum filed on January 18, 2012 (Doc. 393) and a Motion in
Limine filed the following day (Doc. 394), Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to properly
exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Plaintiffs did not file a response to
the motion. A hearing was held on April 15, 2013 to determine whether Plaintiffs exhausted
their administrative remedies. On April 19, 2013, the Court issued a Memorandum and
Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion in Limine. (Docs. 511–512.)
Specifically, the Court dismissed: all claims raised by Plaintiff Williams; all claims brought
against Defendant Fouse; Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claims;
Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Defendants Felton
and Varner that were not based on the air quality, water quality, or ventilation system at
SCI–Smithfield; and Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages against Defendants Felton and
Varner, except for those raised by Plaintiff Sanders. These rulings were based on Plaintiffs’
failure to exhaust their administrative remedies due to deficiencies in their grievances.
On April 29, 2013, Plaintiff Diaz filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Memorandum and Order (Doc. 515); Plaintiffs Bowen and Williams did likewise on May 7,
2013 (Doc. 521).2 On June 13, 2013, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order denying
2

On April 29, 2013, Plaintiff Stewart filed a Motion for An Extension of Time to file
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s April 19, 2013 Memorandum and
Order. (Doc. 517.) The Court granted the motion on May 1, 2013 and allowed

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the reconsideration motions. (Docs. 527–528.)
On June 25, 2013, Plaintiff Diaz filed a Motion to Vacate the Court’s June 13, 2013
Order. (Doc. 531.) On June 26, 2013, Plaintiff Stewart filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Court’s April 19, 2013 Memorandum and Order (Doc. 535) that is identical to his June
10, 2013 reconsideration motion (Doc. 525).
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration is governed by Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which allows a party to move to alter or amend a judgment within
twenty-eight days of entry. Alternatively, when the reconsideration motion is not to
amend or alter the judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Middle District of Pennsylvania Local
Rule 7.10 allows a party to seek reconsideration within fourteen (14) days of entry of an
order. “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law
or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d
906, 909 (3d Cir.1985) (citation omitted). A judgment may be altered or amended if the
party seeking reconsideration establishes at least one of the following: “(1) an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not
available when the court granted the motion; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of
law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Café, by Lou Ann, Inc., v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999). “A motion for reconsideration is not to be
used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to
relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Ogden v.
Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002). “[R]econsideration
motions may not be used to raise new arguments or present evidence that could have

Plaintiff Stewart to file a reconsideration motion within twenty days. (Doc. 519.)
However, he did not do so until June 10, 2013 (Doc. 525), and the Court struck
the motion from the record as untimely (Doc. 526).

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been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Hill v. Tammac Corp., No. 05 1148, 2006
WL 529044, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2006). Lastly, the reconsideration of a judgment is
an extraordinary remedy, and such motions should be granted sparingly. D'Angio v.
Borough of Nescopeck, 56 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (M.D. Pa.1999).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff Diaz’s Motion to Vacate (Doc. 531)
In its April 19, 2013 Memorandum and Order, the Court dismissed: Plaintiff Diaz’s
claims against Defendant Fouse, his Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claims, his
claims for monetary damages from Defendants Felton and Varner, and his Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Defendants Felton and Varner that
were based on issues not raised in his grievance. These rulings were based on deficiencies
in Grievance No. 195311, which Plaintiff Diaz filed on July 27, 2007 and appealed to final
review in accordance with the DOC’s inmate grievance procedure laid out in DC–ADM 804.
In his Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s April 19, 2013 Memorandum and
Order, Plaintiff Diaz asked the Court to compel Defendants’ counsel to provide him with a
copy of his “Pennsylvania grievance file.” (Doc. 515 at 1–2.) He asserted that the file,
which purportedly contains numerous legal documents and grievances that were never
returned to him following his transfer to a Massachusetts prison, shows that he exhausted
his administrative remedies and may sue Defendants Felton and Varner for monetary
damages. (Id. at 2.) This argument was nearly identical to those advanced in two motions
to compel discovery filed by Plaintiff Diaz in early 2012 (Docs. 425, 431), which the Court
denied in June 2012 for being overbroad and untimely, as the discovery period had long
been closed. (Docs. 443–444.) In light of its prior ruling, the Court denied Plaintiff Diaz’s
reconsideration motion in its June 13, 2013 Memorandum and Order. (Docs. 527–528.)
In his Motion to Vacate the Court’s June 13, 2013 Memorandum and Order, Plaintiff

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Diaz asks the Court to reconsider its dismissal of his claims for monetary damages from
Defendants Felton and Varner. (Doc. 531.) In support, he supplies Grievance No. 259534,
filed at SCI–Smithfield on January 27, 2009, in which he requests that the air filters in the
prison’s ventilation system be changed and seeks “all available court relief.” (Doc. 534.)
However, this grievance does not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to vacate
its prior rulings and allow Plaintiff Diaz to sue Defendants Felton and Varner for monetary
damages. Plaintiff Diaz has not asserted that he fully and properly appealed Grievance No.
259534 to final review, nor has he provided any evidence that would support such an
assertion. Additionally, a search by Tracy Williams, a Grievance Review Officer for the
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”),3 indicates that Grievance
No. 195311 was the only grievance that Plaintiff Diaz appealed to final review prior to
instituting this action. (Doc. 395, Ex. A.) Thus, Grievance No. 259534 or any possible
claims arising from it, including claims for monetary damages, are not within the scope of
this action due to his failure to exhaust that grievance. Therefore, because Plaintiff Diaz
has not presented an intervening change in controlling law, presented any previously
unavailable evidence, or demonstrated a clear error of fact or law in the Court’s dismissal
of his claim for damages, his Motion to Vacate (Doc. 531) will be denied.
II. Plaintiff Stewart’s Motion for Reconsideration4 (Doc. 535)
In its April 19, 2013 Memorandum and Order, the Court dismissed: Plaintiff Stewart’s
claims against Defendant Fouse, his Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claims, his

3

SOIGA serves as the third and final level of review for an inmate’s grievance in
the DOC’s DC–ADM 804 procedure.

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Local Rule 7.10 provides that any motion for reconsideration “must be
accompanied by a supporting brief and filed within fourteen (14) days after the
entry of the order concerned. . . .” Plainitiff Stewart’s motion filed on June 26,
2013 (Doc. 535) seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Memorandum and Order of
April 19, 2013 (Docs. 527–528). Although his motion is untimely, the Court will
address it on its merits.

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claims for monetary damages from Defendants Felton and Varner, and his Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Defendants Felton and Varner that
were based on issues not raised in his grievance. These rulings were based on deficiencies
in Grievance No. 184834, which Plaintiff Stewart filed on April 16, 2007 and appealed to
final review in accordance with the DC–ADM 804 inmate grievance procedures.
In his untimely Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff Stewart argues that Defendant
Fouse should remain in this case, as he was the lone prison official who investigated
Grievance No. 270740, filed by Plaintiff Bowen on April 28,2009, and therefore acted under
color of state law.5 (Doc. 535.) Although prison officials at SCI–Smithfield identified
Defendant Fouse as “within the compass” of Grievance No. 270740, that grievance and all
claims based on it are no longer within the scope of this action due to Plaintiff Bowen’s
failure to properly and fully appeal it to final review. Defendant Fouse has not been named
in any inmate grievances relevant to this action, including Plaintiff Stewart’s Grievance No.
184834, nor has he been identified by prison officials in the internal reviews of those
grievances; thus, he is not within the ambit of this action. Therefore, because Plaintiff
Stewart has not presented an intervening change in controlling law, presented any
previously unavailable evidence, or demonstrated a clear error of fact or law in the Court’s
dismissal of Defendant Fouse, his Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 535) will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Because the moving Plaintiffs have not presented an intervening change in
controlling law, presented any previously unavailable evidence, or demonstrated a clear
error of fact or law in the Court’s April 19, 2013 Memorandum and Order or June 13, 2013

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This case was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides, “[e]very
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.”

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Memorandum and Order, Plaintiff Diaz’s Motion to Vacate (Doc. 531) and Plaintiff Stewart’s
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 535) will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.

July 1, 2013
Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

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