DeShields v. International Resort Properties, LTD. et al
Filing
75
MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 42 45 Motions for Summary Judgment; Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE case.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 5/20/11 (sm, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LINDA DeSHIELDS,
Plaintiff
:
No. 3:09cv2125
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
MOUNTAIN LAUREL
:
RESORT & SPA; VACATION
:
CHARTER, LTD. and
:
BAR-U FARM, INC.,
:
Defendants
:
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MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition are two motions for summary
judgment. Defendant Bar-U Farm, Inc. filed one of the motions and
Defendants Mountain Laurel Resort & Spa (hereinafter “Mountain Laurel”)
and Vacation Charters, Ltd. filed the other.1 The motions have been fully
briefed and are ripe for disposition.
Background
Plaintiff sustained injuries in a horseback riding incident on
November 2, 2007. (Doc. 74, Statement of Facts, Mountain Laurel, ¶ 1).
At the time of the accident the plaintiff was vacationing at a “time share”
she owned in the Mountain Laurel Resort & Spa located in Lake Harmony,
1
This motion was also filed by International Resort Properties, Ltd.
and Willowbrook at Lake Harmony. Those two entities have since been
dismissed from the case. (See Doc. 63, Order of Oct. 28, 2010 granting
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss these parties).
The complaint lists as a defendant “Vacation Charter, Ltd.”, which
indicates that its actual name is “Vacation Charters, Ltd.” (Doc. 1, Ans.)
1
Pennsylvania.2 (Id.) On November 2, plaintiff and her husband took a trail
ride at Defendant Bar-U Farm, Inc.’s (hereinafter “Bar-U”) stables located
at Mountain Laurel. (Id. ¶ 2). Plaintiff rode a horse named “Jack-In-TheBox.” (Id.) During the trail ride, the horse galloped and plaintiff was thrown
from the horse. (Doc. 68, Pl.’s Ans. to Mountain Laurel’s SOF ¶ 4).
Specifically, plaintiff asserts that initially Jack-In-The-Box walked very
slowly, and she fell behind the others on the ride - her husband and the
trail ride leader, Doreen Wehr. Eventually, plaintiff’s horse overtook her
husband and Wehr. A short time later, the horse speeded up to a trot or
gallop, and plaintiff was thrown off the horse, striking the ground. (Doc. 67
- 6; 67 - 7; Pl.’s Ex. 6, 7, excerpts from plaintiff’s deposition). Plaintiff
brought suit against the defendants for the injuries she sustained. (Doc. 1,
Compl.) She alleges that she was thrown from the horse due to the
defendants’ negligence. (Id.) Defendants move for summary judgment
bringing the case to its present posture.
Jurisdiction
Plaintiff is a citizen of Delaware, and the defendants are citizens of
Pennsylvania., (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 1 - 2). Thus, this court has jurisdiction
pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Because
we sit in diversity, the substantive law of Pennsylvania shall apply to the
instant case. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
Standard of review
Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
2
Defendant Mountain Laurel was a division of Defendant Vacation
Charters, Ltd. (Doc. 74, Def. Mountain Laurel’s Statement of Facts ¶ 6).
2
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c)). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must
examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 898
F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to
demonstrate that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not
return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
(1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet
its burden by showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to
admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's
burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party, who must go beyond its pleadings, and designate
specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers
to interrogatories showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
3
Discussion
The motions for summary judgment each raise the same three
issues. Those issues are: 1) Is recovery by the plaintiff barred because she
assumed the risk of her injury? 2) Did the defendants owe any duty to the
plaintiff as she knowingly and voluntarily encountered the risk? and 3) Is
there any evidence from which a reasonable person could infer
negligence?
I. Assumption of the risk
The first issue raised by both motions is whether plaintiff’s recovery is
barred by the doctrine of assumption of the risk. Generally for a
negligence action, the defendant must owe the plaintiff a duty of care, and
breach that duty leading to harm to the plaintiff. “The basic premise of the
doctrine of assumption of the risk is that a party who voluntarily and
knowingly assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless
conduct of the defendant cannot recover damages for such harm.”
Malinder v. Jenkins Elevator & Mach. Co., 538 A.2d 509, 418 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988). Under Pennsylvania law, assumption of the risk may be used
as an affirmative defense in the following three situations: 1) in cases
involving express assumption of risk; 2) cases of strict liability; and 3)
cases where a statute specifically preserves it as an affirmative defense.
Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1113 n.10 (Pa. 1993) (plurality opinion).
In the instant case, the defendants assert that the assumption of risk
defense has been preserved by a statute, the “Equine Activity” law. This
law provides that “[a]s to those within the scope of this act, liability for
negligence shall only be barred where the doctrine of knowing voluntary
assumption of risk is proven with respect to damages due to injuries or
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death to an adult participant resulting from equine activities.” 4 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 602(a). The term “equine activities” includes, inter alia,
“[r]ecreational rides or drives which involve riding or other activity involving
the use of an equine.” 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 602(b)(6).
The Equine Activity law only provides immunity to the defendant,
however, “where signing is conspicuously posted on the premises on a
sign at least three feet by two feet, in two or more locations, which states
the following: You assume the risk of equine activities pursuant to
Pennsylvania law.” 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 603. This immunity is narrowly
construed. 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 606.
Thus, if defendants had the proper signs, then they are not liable for
plaintiff’s injuries. The Defendants allege that their evidence provides that
the appropriate signage was used in this case, and that they are therefore,
immune from suit.
Defendants present the deposition testimony of Harold Hauschild,
the owner and operator of Defendant Bar-U Farms to support their
position. Bar-U Farm rented and operated a riding stable on the Mountain
Laurel premises, the stable from which plaintiff procured the horse on the
day in question. (Doc. 46-2, Def. Mountain Laurel Ex. A, Lease).
Hauschild testified that at the time of the incident, two signs were in place
that read “WARNING You assume the risk of equine activities pursuant to
Pennsylvania Law.” (Doc. 46-6, Def. Mtn. Laurel Ex. E, Hauschild Dep. 95;
Doc. 46-5, Def. Mtn. Laurel Ex. D, photograph of sign). The signs
measured “3-by-4". (Doc. 46-6, Def. Mtn. Laurel’s Ex. B, 95). One was
located inside the barn, and the other was located where prospective horse
riders signed the release. (Id.)
5
At plaintiff’s deposition, she testified that she had noticed only one
sign at the stables on the day in question. The sign read: “Mountain Laurel
Stable.” (Doc. 46-3, Def. Mountain Laurel’s Ex. B, Pl. Dep. 67). Plaintiff’s
husband, Kevin DeShields, was present on the day of the incident. He
indicated that signs were posted in the stable. He did not know how many
there were or what was printed on them. (Doc. 46-4, Def. Mountain
Laurel’s Ex. C, Kevin DeShields Dep. 15).
Based upon this evidence, it appears that a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to the existence of the signs and the language on the signs.
The factfinder may agree with Hauschild that the appropriate signs under
the Equine Activity law were indeed present.3 On the other hand, the
factfinder may credit plaintiff’s testimony that only one sign was present
and it did not provide the language required under the law to immunize the
defendants from liability.
Accordingly, we will deny the motions for summary judgment that are
based upon assumption of risk and the Equine Activity statute.
II. Defendants’ duty of care
Next, the defendants argue that if the Equine Activity statute does not
allow assumption of risk as a defense, then assumption of risk is still
appropriate under Howell. We disagree. Pennsylvania provides a specific
statute with regard to horseback riding and the defense of assumption of
the risk. Here, a question of facts exists as to whether the statute provides
a defense. Because a specific law is applicable, it would be inappropriate
3
Hauschild’s testimony is somewhat incomplete to provide immunity
to the defendants. He indicates that the signs were 3 x 4. He does not
indaicate the unit of measurement. As set forth above, the statute provides
that the signs must be 3 feet by 2 feet.
6
to find assumption of the risk is defense under the common law.
III. Evidence of negligence
The last argument raised by the defendants is that even if
assumption of risk is not a proper defense, the plaintiff cannot recover
because she has presented no evidence of negligence.
Plaintiff has provided evidence that at or about the time of the signing
of the lease with Bar-U Farm, Inc., Vacation Charters, Ltd. did not inspect
the trail at issue. (Doc. 69-3, Pl. Ex. C, Dep. Louis DelRosso 45). The
General Manager of Mountain Laurel Resort and Spa also indicated that
he never inspected the trail. (Doc. 69-4, Pl. Ex. D., Edward Peterson Dep.
15). No evidence is presented, however, that the state of the trail led to
the incident.
Plaintiff’s analysis of the defendants’ negligence is as follows:
Did the Defendants provide reasonable and safe
trails to be traveled by the horse and the Plaintiff in
this matter? Obviously the answer to that is no.
The horse began to gallop in an area it was not
allowed to or not supposed to. The horse began to
gallop before any notice was given to the riders of
what was about to occur. As a result of the horse
galloping the Plaintiff was thrown off the horse. She
bounced a number of times on the horse and then
was thrown off. The duty owed the Plaintiff was
clearly breached.
(Doc. 69, Pl. Oppo. Br. 11).4 Plaintiff, however, has no evidence to support
4
Plaintiff indicates that the trail leader provided by the defendants
was charged with having “full and complete knowledge of what was to
occur, when it was to occur and how it was to occur.” (Doc. 69, Pl. Oppo.
Br. 11). Plaintiff, however, does not tie any alleged lack of knowledge on
the part of the trail leader to the happening of the accident. It is as if
plaintiff argues that the trail leader should have know that the horse should
not have galloped and thrown off the plaintiff. Such an argument does not
convince this court that any sort of negligence took place.
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her argument. Plaintiff presents no evidence whatsoever that the trail was
kept in a dangerous condition or that this particular horse should not have
been provided to the plaintiff. With no citation to the record, plaintiff states:
“There is testimony, although very conflicting, as to whether there were bee
stings on this horse and whether there were bees on this trail guide and
whether the bees were in the ground or not.” (Id. at 11). It appears that
the plaintiff argues that the trail was negligently maintained, allowing a
bees’ nest to form in an area reserved for horse trail rides. Besides the
lack of evidence to support this proposition, the plaintiff provides no
evidence, expert or otherwise, to indicate that allowing a bees’ nest to form
in the ground near the trail would be negligence on the part of the
defendants.
Generally, plaintiff’s argument can be summarized as follows:
because the accident happened, defendants must have been negligent.
The law does allow for such an inference. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
provides that the circumstances surrounding an injury may give rise to an
inference of negligence. Quinby v. Plumsteadville Fam. Prac., 907 A.2d
1061, 1071 (Pa. 2006). “It is a rule that provides that a plaintiff may satisfy
his burden of producing evidence of a defendant’s negligence by proving
that he has been injured by a casualty that normally would not have
occurred in the absence of the defendant’s negligence.” Id. It cannot be
said that a person would not be thrown from a horse in the absence of
someone’s negligence. It is an inherent danger of riding a horse that such
an incident may occur no matter how many precautions are taken.5
5
Defendants Mountain Laurel and Vacation Charter Ltd., also argue
that they owed no duty to the plaintiff at all because they leased the
8
Because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, plaintiff
needs evidence of negligence to proceed. If plaintiff presented evidence of
a breach of duty, then summary judgment would be inappropriate. For
example in Bulkin v. Camp Nockamixon, Inc., a child was injured when she
fell off of a horse at summer camp. 79 A.2d 234, 235 (Pa. 1951). The
child was on a horse and led by a groom to a corral. At the corral the
groom released the horse. Id. It walked for a short time and then broke
into a run and kicked up its heels. Id. The child fell from the horse and
was injured. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the following to
be sufficient evidence of negligence: the camp allowed a ten-year-old child,
who had never been on a horse before, to ride unattended despite her
mother’s request that she not be allowed to ride horses at the camp. Id.
In the instant case, the evidence presented merely consists of the
following: Plaintiff rode the horse, it started to gallop and she fell off. No
evidence suggests that the defendants engaged in any conduct that
caused the horse to begin galloping or that the horse was generally an
unsafe horse for a novice rider or that the trail was maintained in a
negligent manner. Without such evidence, plaintiff’s negligence claim
cannot proceed.6 Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to the
premises and the horse stable to Bar-U Farm. Accordingly, they argue that
Bar-U is solely responsible for ensuring the safety of those partaking in the
business. While this argument may appear to have merit, we will not
address it as we find that the plaintiff cannot establish negligence,
regardless.
6
Plaintiff’s complaint contains many assertions of negligence. But no
evidence has been presented to support the allegations. (See Doc. 1,
9
defendants. An appropriate order follows.
Compl. ¶¶ 48, 56, 64, 70 and 76).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LINDA DeSHIELDS,
Plaintiff
:
No. 3:09cv2125
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
MOUNTAIN LAUREL
:
RESORT & SPA; VACATION
:
CHARTER, LTD.; and
:
BAR-U FARM, INC.,
:
Defendants
:
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ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 20th day of May 2011, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1) Defendant Bar-U Farm, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
42) is hereby GRANTED;
2) Defendant Mountain Laurel Resort & Spa and Vacation Charter,
Ltd.’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45) is hereby GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
BY THE COURT:
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court
11
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