Spiess et al v. Pocono Mountain Reginal Police Department et al

Filing 151

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re parties' 135 136 137 138 139 and 140 MOTIONS in Limine.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/14/15. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM SPIESS; KASHEEN
THOMAS; GENE THOMAS, II;
JALEEL HOLDEN and JOSE
LACEN,
Plaintiffs
v.

:
No. 3:10cv287
:
:
(Judge Munley)
:
:
:
:
MICHAEL RAKACZEWSKI, Esquire :
and WENDY BENTZONI
:
Defendants
:
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition are the parties’ motions in limine filed
in advance of the pretrial conference. The motions have been fully briefed
and are ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motions will
be granted in part and denied in part.
Background1
On the morning of February 11, 2008, a sixteen-year-old girl, AJ,
and a fifteen-year-old girl, TM, reported to the Pocono Mountain Regional
Police Department that they had been sexually assaulted on February 9,
2008, by multiple men at a house party. Police officials interviewed the
girls separately and, in describing the assaults they said were committed

1

Because the following facts are undisputed, the court will forego
citations to the record.

by the plaintiffs–William Spiess, Kasheen Thomas, Gene Thomas, II,
Jaleel Holden, and Jose Lacen–they provided different accounts of what
happened. Although their accounts varied, it is undisputed that the girls
attended a party, that the plaintiffs attended the party, and that sexual
activity occurred.
After the girls’ interviews, Detective Richard Luthcke of the Pocono
Mountain Regional Police Department and Defendant Wendy Bentzoni, a
detective for the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office, took AJ to the
Pegasus Child Advocacy Center in Carbondale, Pennsylvania. Dr. Andrea
Taroli examined AJ and opined that AJ had been sexually assaulted.
Luthcke then called his supervisor, Detective Chris Wagner, regarding the
alleged assault and brought Wagner into the on-going investigation.
Luthcke and Wagner spoke with AJ together, but failed to record the
interview.
That evening, a group of detectives went to Spiess’s residence,
where Spiess’s mother told the detectives that TM’s family had spoken to
her and her husband about the party. Spiess’s mother provided the
detectives a note in TM’s handwriting stating that Spiess did not
participate in the alleged assaults. Approximately two hours later, Spiess

2

voluntarily arrived at police headquarters, and Luthcke and another
detective interviewed him. Luthcke then prepared search and arrest
warrants for Lacen, at whose home the alleged assaults took place.
Wagner reviewed the warrants and affidavits of probable cause and spoke
with Defendant Rakaczewski, a Monroe County Assistant District Attorney,
who approved the warrants.2 The warrants were then presented to a
judge.
The judge granted the search and arrest warrants, and authorities
executed a search at Lacen’s home. They arrested him shortly before
midnight on February 11, 2008. The remaining plaintiffs were variously
arrested on February 25, 2008, and March 24, 2008. Authorities charged
each plaintiff with multiple counts of rape. Three of the five plaintiffs were
minors, but the police officials and Defendant Rakaczewski charged them
as adults because AJ claimed plaintiffs used a knife during the assault.
A preliminary hearing was held on March 28, 2008, at which AJ and
TM testified, and the plaintiffs were subsequently incarcerated for nearly a
2

Rakaczewski served as the sexual assault prosecutor in the
District Attorney’s Office. Relevant here, in the spring of 2006 and
October of 2007, AJ made allegations of sexual abuse against a family
member, which the police determined to be unfounded but forwarded the
case to Rakaczewski. Rakaczewski declined to prosecute based on the
police’s determination that the allegations were unfounded.
3

year awaiting trial. In January 2009, however, the District Attorney’s
Office received a letter from AJ’s school stating that she had confessed to
giving false statements and testimony. The school’s letter indicated that
AJ said that the sexual activity had been consensual and that no knife was
involved. When Rakaczewski and Luthcke interviewed AJ, she denied the
school’s allegation. During a second interview, however, AJ confessed to
lying about three things: that Spiess assaulted her, the presence of
alcohol at the party, and that a knife was involved in the assault. In
February 2009, Rakaczewski filed a nolle prosequi petition with regard to
the charges against all the plaintiffs and consented to the plaintiffs’
subsequent expungement petitions.
Based upon Rakaczewski’s decision to dismiss the underlying
criminal charges, plaintiffs filed the instant civil rights action against
Defendants Rakaczewski and Bentzoni (hereinafter “defendants”).3 At the
conclusion of discovery, Defendant Rakaczewski filed a motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs’ section 1983 false arrest claim, which the
court denied on March 26, 2013. (Doc. 124). Defendant Bentzoni also
3

Plaintiffs also named several Pocono Mountain Regional Police
Officers as defendants. The Police Defendants, however, settled with
plaintiffs on December 19, 2013 and have been dismissed from the instant
action. (Doc. 132).
4

filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ section 1983 false arrest
and false imprisonment claim and plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim.
The court granted Defendant Bentzoni’s motion for summary judgment on
plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim, but denied Bentzoni’s motion for
summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ false arrest and false
imprisonment claim. (Doc. 124). Therefore, the only remaining claim
against Defendant Rakaczewski is false arrest and the remaining claims
against Defendant Bentzoni are false arrest and false imprisonment.
Discussion
A pretrial conference has been scheduled, and in accordance with
the court’s rule, the parties filed various motions in limine seeking to
preclude evidence from trial. The court will first address plaintiffs’
motions.
I. Plaintiffs’ motions in limine
Plaintiffs have filed five (5) motions in limine. The court will discuss
each motion in seriatim.
A. Plaintiffs’ settlement with police defendants
Plaintiffs first seek to preclude from trial evidence that they settled
their claims with the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department

5

(hereinafter “police defendants”). Plaintiffs contend the settlement is not
relevant. Defendants assert the settlement amount is relevant to a setoff
calculation–the verdict amount must be reduced by plaintiffs’ settlement
with the police defendants. After careful consideration, the court agrees
with plaintiffs.
Federal law provides that relevant evidence is generally admissible.
FED. R. EVID. 402. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401.
Plaintiffs’ settlement with the police defendants, however, is not
relevant. The settlement agreement does not make the existence of any
fact of consequence in the instant civil rights false arrest and false
imprisonment action more or less probable. Moreover, section 1983
litigation serves a dual purpose: (1) protect the constitutional rights of
individual citizens and (2) punish those who violate an individual’s
constitutional rights. Allowing the defendants a setoff would further
neither of these purposes. As such, the court will preclude from trial
evidence that plaintiffs settled their claims against the police defendants.

6

B. Plaintiff Jose Lacen’s juvenile conviction
Plaintiffs’ next motion in limine seeks to preclude from trial evidence
regarding a different juvenile sexual assault prosecution against Plaintiff
Lacen. Defendants agree that evidence of Lacen’s juvenile adjudication is
inadmissable pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d), stating that
evidence of a juvenile adjudication is not admissible in a civil proceeding
for impeachment purposes. FED. R. EVID. 609(d). Defendants assert,
however, that Lacen’s juvenile adjudication should be admitted for other
purposes including damages. Specifically, Lacen’s subsequent juvenile
adjudication speaks directly to his claims that he was stigmatized as a
rapist, by the underlying criminal charges in this case, which diminished
his reputation and employment opportunities.
The court agrees that evidence of Lacen’s subsequent juvenile
sexual assault adjudication is relevant evidence regarding damages.
Relevant evidence, however, may be excluded “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R.
EVID. 403.

7

In the instant matter, the probative value of Lacen’s juvenile
adjudication is substantially outweighed by confusing the issues and
misleading the jury. The central issue the jury must determine is whether
the defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs in February 2008.
The fact that authorities subsequently charged Lacen with rape in another
case has no bearing on what the defendants did or did not do prior to
arresting plaintiffs and is misleading and confusing. Therefore, evidence
of Lacen’s juvenile sexual assault prosecution, while he was incarcerated
in this case, will be precluded from trial.
C. Dr. Andrea Taroli’s testimony4
Plaintiffs also seek to limit Dr. Taroli’s testimony regarding her
actions and statements on February 11, 2008–the day Detective Luthcke
and Defendant Bentzoni took AJ to her for a forensic interview and
examination. Plaintiffs argue that opinions Dr. Taroli expressed in her
deposition regarding AJ’s credibility and whether or not plaintiffs anally
raped AJ were not conveyed to Detectives Luthcke and Bentzoni on
February 11, 2008, and therefore must be excluded.

4

Dr. Andrea Taroli, Medical Director of the Pegasus
Comprehensive Assessment Center, performed a forensic interview and
examination of AJ on February 11, 2008.
8

Defendants assert that Dr. Taroli should be permitted to testify
regarding her interview and exam of AJ on February 11, 2008.
Additionally, defendants contend Dr. Taroli should be permitted to testify
about any and all written reports she generated after February 11, 2008.
After careful consideration, the court will limit Dr. Taroli’s testimony to her
forensic interview and examination of AJ and what she conveyed to
Detectives Luthcke and Bentzoni on February 11, 2008.
As previously stated, the central issue in the instant matter is
whether or not probable cause to arrest plaintiffs existed on February 11,
2008. Therefore, any statement Dr. Taroli made or opinion she offered
after this date is irrelevant because it does not have the tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 401. Moreover, the probative value of Dr. Taroli’s
subsequent opinions is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and
confusion of the issues and would therefore be excluded under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. Accordingly, Dr. Taroli’s testimony will be limited to
her forensic interview and examination of AJ on February 11, 2008, and
the information she conveyed to Detectives Luthcke and Bentzoni on that

9

same day.
D. Statements from plaintiffs’ criminal defense attorneys
Plaintiffs next move to preclude from trial evidence regarding
statements from plaintiffs’ criminal defense attorneys. Specifically, one or
more of plaintiffs’ criminal defense attorneys made statements
commending the police and the district attorney’s office for their handling
of the investigations, following the dismissal of the criminal charges
against plaintiffs. Defendants do not object to this motion in limine. Ergo,
the court will grant plaintiffs’ motion in limine on this issue as unopposed.
E. Testimony regarding police detectives’ or defendants’ belief that
plaintiffs raped AJ and TM
Plaintiffs’ final motion in limine seeks to preclude from trial any
evidence regarding defendants’ and police detectives’ beliefs that plaintiffs
raped AJ and TM. The parties agree that this evidence is relevant
evidence but dispute whether Federal Rule of Evidence 403 requires its
exclusion.5

5

Defendants also assert that plaintiffs’ motion must be denied
because defendants knowledge and belief that plaintiffs raped AJ and TM
speaks directly to plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim against
Defendants Rakaczewski and Bentzoni. A review of the docket in this
matter, however, establishes that plaintiffs’ amended complaint only
asserts a malicious prosecution claim against Bentzoni, not Rakaczewski.
10

The law provides that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
FED. R. EVID. 403. Plaintiffs contend that this evidence creates unfair
prejudice because plaintiffs’ criminal charges were dropped and their
records expunged. Any mention of the defendants’ and police detectives’
beliefs that plaintiffs raped AJ and TM is therefore highly prejudicial. The
court disagrees.
The probative value of defendants’ actions, and the reasons for
them, is high because they address the fundamental issue in this
case–whether probable cause existed in February 2008 to arrest
plaintiffs.6 Additionally, the defendants’ and police detectives’ beliefs that
plaintiffs raped AJ and TM is not unfairly prejudicial because the plaintiffs

(Doc. 63, Am. Compl. at 10, 50-52). Furthermore, the court granted
Bentzoni’s motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ malicious
prosecution claim. (Doc. 124 at 59). Accordingly, a malicious prosecution
claim no longer exists against any defendant in this case.
6

Moreover, what actions the defendants took, and whether those
actions were reasonable, is material to their qualified immunity claims.

11

will be able to fully explore this issue through cross examination and
argument. Thus, the court will deny plaintiffs’ motion in limine regarding
defendants’ and police detectives’ beliefs that plaintiffs raped AJ and TM.
II. Defendants’ motions in limine
Defendants have likewise filed several motions in limine. The court
will address each in turn.
A. Kadeem Allison claims and testimony
Defendants seek to exclude from trial evidence regarding charges
defendants initially filed against Kadeem Allison, which they subsequently
withdrew. Defendants assert this evidence is irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial. Plaintiffs contend that this evidence is relevant because it
demonstrates that AJ and TM lied to defendants on February 11, 2008,
which addresses the central issue of this case–whether defendants had
probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for rape. After careful consideration, the
court agrees with plaintiffs.
On February 11, 2008, AJ and TM stated to the police and
defendants that plaintiffs and a number of other individuals, including
Kadeem Allison, raped them. Based on these statements, defendants
arrested Kadeem Allison for rape on March 18, 2008. The charges

12

against Kadeem Allison, however, were dropped the very next day
because defendants quickly determined, after they arrested Kadeem
Allison, that he had an alibi for the night in question.
This evidence is clearly relevant because it may demonstrate that AJ
and TM lied on a material issue when they provided their one and only
statement to police on February 11, 2008. Further, defendants’
conclusory assertion that this evidence is prejudicial is without merit.
Defendant cites no authority, and our research has uncovered none, to
support their assertion that evidence pertaining to the charges against
Kadeem Allision is unfairly prejudicial. Indeed, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals requires the opposite conclusion. See Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d
961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that Rule 403 does not offer protection
against evidence that is merely prejudicial, in the sense of being
detrimental to a party’s case. Rather, the rule only protects against
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial.)
As previously discussed, the probative value of Kadeem Allison’s
arrest is high because it speaks directly to whether or not defendants had
probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for rape. Additionally, while the initiation
of charges against Kadeem Allison and their subsequent dismissal the

13

very next day may be prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to
defendants’ case, the court finds nothing unfairly prejudicial regarding
this evidence. In short, this evidence is relevant and its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. As such, defendants’
motion to preclude this evidence will be denied.
B. Alleged racial comments made by police
Defendants next seek to exclude from trial evidence regarding
alleged racial comments made by the police during plaintiffs’
interrogations. Plaintiffs agree that they will not introduce evidence that
any of the police officers made racially inappropriate comments to
plaintiffs during their interrogations. Therefore, defendants’ motion will be
granted as unopposed.
C. Refusal to prosecute TM and AJ for perjury
Defendants also seek to preclude from trial any evidence pertaining
to Defendant Rakaczewski’s failure to prosecute AJ and TM for perjury
after the preliminary hearing on plaintiffs’ rape charges. Plaintiffs argue
that AJ and TM’s testimony from the preliminary hearing is admissible
because it is relevant and addresses issues of credibility. After careful
consideration, the court agrees with defendants in part.

14

The court will exclude from trial any reference to the filing of perjury
charges against AJ and TM after the preliminary hearing. The filing of
perjury charges is not relevant. What is relevant, however, is that the
police defendants recognized discrepancies in AJ and TM’s stories, that
the police defendants discussed these issues with Defendant
Rakaczewski and that, apparently, the police defendants and
Rakaczewski failed to investigate the discrepancies while plaintiffs
remained incarcerated for almost a year. Moreover, this evidence is
relevant because it addresses issues of AJ and TM’s credibility–a central
theme to the core issue of whether or not defendants had probable cause
to arrest plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court will exclude from trial any
evidence pertaining to the police defendants statements or opinions
regarding the filing of perjury charges against AJ and TM.
D. Victims’ subsequent criminal history
Defendants’ next motion in limine seeks to preclude from trial
evidence of AJ’s and TM’s subsequent criminal history. Defendants
assert this evidence is not relevant. Plaintiffs argue that AJ’s and TM’s
subsequent criminal history is relevant with respect to impeaching the
girls’ credibility.

15

The Federal Rules of Evidence allow impeachment of a witness by
evidence of her conviction for a crime if “it can readily be determined that
establishing the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an
act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness.” FED. R. EVID.
609(a)(2). Such crimes are referred to as crimen falsi.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that petit larceny
and theft are not crimen falsi crimes. See Government of Virgin Islands v.
Testamark, 528 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1976) (petit larceny); United States v.
Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 100-02 (3rd Cir. 2004) (theft). The Third Circuit,
however, has not yet determined whether retail theft under 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN § 3929(a)(1) (hereinafter “section 3929(a)(1)”) is a crimen falsi
crime.
Section 3929(a)(1) provides that a person is guilty of retail theft if
she “takes possession of, carries away, transfers or causes to be carried
away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered
for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the
intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of
such merchandise without paying the full retail value thereof.” 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. 3929(a)(1). No element of this crime requires a

16

dishonest or false statement. Rather, the elements describe actions akin
to pickpocketing, which involves no crimen falsi. As such, the alleged
victims’ theft and shoplifting convictions have little, if any, impeachment
value and do not bear on their propensity to testify truthfully in the instant
matter. Furthermore, admitting evidence of these convictions would serve
no proper purpose and would only unfairly prejudice defendants. Ergo,
the court will exclude from trial evidence of the alleged victims’
subsequent criminal history.
E. Expert opinions regarding Rakaczewski’s fitness as a prosecutor
Defendants final motion in limine seeks to exclude from trial any
testimony from plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Ron Martinelli, regarding his opinion
that Rakaczewski lacked the necessary experience and/or training to
prosecute sexual assault cases. Plaintiffs do not intend to elicit any expert
testimony from Dr. Martinelli regarding Rakaczewski’s fitness or actions as
a prosecutor. Instead, plaintiffs will limit Dr. Martinelli’s testimony to
Rakaczewski’s fitness and performance of his duties in an investigative
capacity, which is relevant in the instant matter. Thus, defendants’ motion
to preclude from trial any evidence from Dr. Martinelli regarding
Rakaczewski’s fitness as a prosecutor will be granted as unopposed.

17

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the parties’ motions in limine will be
granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs’ motions will be granted to the
extent that the court will preclude from trial any evidence regarding
plaintiffs’ settlement with the police defendants. The court will also
exclude evidence of Plaintiff Jose Lacen’s juvenile sexual assault
prosecution. Furthermore, the court will limit Dr. Taroli’s testimony to her
forensic interview and examination of AJ on February 11, 2008, and any
and all information she conveyed to Detectives Luthcke and Bentzoni on
that day. The court grants, as unopposed, plaintiffs’ motion to preclude
statements plaintiffs’ criminal defense attorneys made following the
dismissal of the criminal charges against plaintiffs. Finally, the court will
deny plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude from trial any evidence
pertaining the defendants’ and police detectives’ beliefs that plaintiffs
raped AJ and TM.
The court will deny defendants’ motion in limine regarding charges
against Kadeem Allison. The court grants, as unopposed, defendants’
motion to exclude from trial evidence regarding the police detectives’
alleged racial comments made during plaintiffs’ interrogations.

18

Defendants’ motion to preclude from trial any evidence pertaining to
Defendant Rakaczewski’s failure to prosecute AJ and TM for perjury after
the preliminary hearing is granted. The court will also exclude from trial
any evidence of the alleged victims’ subsequent criminal histories. Finally,
the court grants as unopposed defendants’ motion to preclude from trial
any evidence from Dr. Martinelli regarding Defendant Rakaczewski’s
fitness as a prosecutor.
The court further notes that the central issue the jury must determine
is whether the defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs in
February 2008. To reach this conclusion, the jury must determine what
actions defendants took and whether their actions were objectively
reasonable. If the jury determines defendants’ actions were unreasonable
in arresting plaintiffs without probable cause, the jury will then address
whether plaintiffs suffered any damages as a result of the violation of their
constitutional rights. An appropriate order follows.

Date:

01/14/15

s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court

19