Spiess et al v. Pocono Mountain Reginal Police Department et al

Filing 62

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 55 Motion to Amend/Correct the Complaint ; Pltfs are directed to file amended complaint with corrections consistent w/this opinion w/i 14 days of this order; Case management deadlines extended- Discovery due 7/30/12; Pltf expert reports due 7/30/12; dft expert reports due 8/29/12; Dispositive motions due 8/19/12. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 5/31/12 (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM SPIESS; KASHEEN
THOMAS; GENE THOMAS, II;
JALEEL HOLDEN; and JOSE
LACEN,
Plaintiffs
v.

:
No. 3:10cv287
:
:
(Judge Munley)
:
:
:
:
POCONO MOUNTAIN REGIONAL
:
POLICE DEPT.; TOBYHANNA TWP.; :
MOUNT POCONO BOROUGH;
:
TUNKHANNOCK TWP.;
:
COOLBAUGH TWP.; CHIEF
:
HARRY W. LEWIS; RICHARD
:
W. LUTHCKE; JOHN P. BOHRMAN; :
LUCAS BRAY; CHRIS WAGNER;
:
KENNETH LENNING; MONROE
:
COUNTY; A.D.A. MICHAEL
:
RAKACZEWSKI; and DET. WENDY
:
BENTZONI,
:
Defendants
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint (Doc.
55). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Background
We will briefly recite the facts that are relevant to the instant motion.
Plaintiffs William Spiess, Kasheen Thomas, Gene Thomas, II, Jaleel
Holden and Jose Lacen (collectively “plaintiffs”) bring this Section 1983
action alleging that the defendants violated their civil rights. The plaintiffs
were arrested and charged with raping two girls–sixteen year old AJ and
fifteen year old TM– on the night of February 9, 2008. (Doc. 1, Original
Compl. ¶ 1). Plaintiff Spiess alleges that he did not engage in any sexual
acts with either girl. (Id. ¶ 38). The remaining plaintiffs allege that they

engaged only in consensual sex acts with the two girls. (Id.)
On the morning of February 11, 2008, the two girls went to the
Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department (hereafter the
“Department”). (Id. ¶¶ 12, 46). The plaintiffs allege that the two girls were
interviewed separately and gave substantially conflicting stories regarding
the occurrences of February 9, 2008. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 48).
The plaintiffs also allege that AJ had made two previous complaints
of sexual molestation against a family member to the Department. (Id. ¶
57). The plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant Detectives Lutchke,
Borhman, Bray, Lenning, Wagner and Bentzoni (collectively “Defendant
Detectives”) as well as Assistant District Attorney Michael Rakaczewski
(hereafter “ADA Rakaczewski”) were involved in these prior rape
allegations and “were fully aware of AJ’s mental health issues and that she
had a history of reporting unfounded rape allegations . . . [and that] she
was a pathological liar.” (Id. ¶ 63). Ultimately, these prior complaints were
allegedly either recanted or closed as unfounded after detectives
interviewed the girl’s family and investigated her treatment at mental health
facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 58-62).
Despite the apparent inconsistencies and with knowledge of AJ’s
history of unfounded sexual assault allegations, the Defendant Detectives,
Chief Lewis and ADA Rakaczewski took the girls’ statements as an
opportunity to appear responsive to violent crime and gangs. (Id. ¶¶ 52,
55, 63, 81, 82, 83, 84, 94, 95). The plaintiffs also allege that their
treatment by the defendants was racially motivated–with the exception of
Plaintiff Spiess, the plaintiffs are either African American or Hispanic. (Id.
¶¶ 5, 55).

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The plaintiffs allege that the Defendant Detectives, Chief Lewis and
ADA Rakaczewski “crafted affidavits of probable cause wherein they
knowingly[,] deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, concealed
material facts and exculpatory evidence while, at the same time, including
statements that they knew or should have known were false.” (Id. ¶ 96).
Specifically, these defendants allegedly designed the affidavit to hide
inconsistencies in the girls’ statements. (Id. ¶ 97). The plaintiffs allege
that the Defendant Detectives, Chief Lewis and ADA Rakaczewski withheld
facts contradicting or undermining their affidavit. (Id. ¶ 98). The plaintiffs
allege that, at the time of the initial interviews, the Defendant Detectives,
Chief Lewis and the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office had a
statement signed by TM and her parents indicating that Plaintiff Spiess
was not involved in the rape. (Id. ¶ 85).
Detectives arrested the plaintiffs and they “were charged with, inter
alia, multiple felony counts of forcible rape, conspiracy to commit forcible
rape, conspiracy to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and
sexual assault.” (Id. ¶ 77). The plaintiffs allege that their arrest and
charges received widespread and harmful media coverage. (Id.)
The plaintiffs also allege that the Defendant Detectives and ADA
Rakaczewski encouraged the girls to confer to iron out their stories before
testifying at the preliminary hearing before a magistrate to bind the
plaintiffs over for trial. (Id. ¶ 101). The plaintiffs allege that the defendants
did not drop their charges even after the two girls gave testimony in the
preliminary hearing that contradicted their earlier statements or other
evidence. (Id. ¶ 102). The plaintiffs could not afford bail, which was set at
$250,000.00, and were held at the Monroe County Correctional Facility.

3

(Id. ¶¶ 77, 78). Ultimately, the charges against the plaintiffs were dropped
on the eve of trial. (Id. ¶ 108). AJ and TM allegedly admitted that their
rape accusations were false. (Id. ¶ 5).
The plaintiffs filed the original complaint on February 8, 2010. (Doc.
1, Original Compl.). On March 8, 2010, Defendants Monroe County, the
Monroe County District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney E. David
Christine Jr. (hereafter “DA Christine”), ADA Rakaczewski and Detective
Wendy Bentzoni (hereafter “Detective Bentzoni”) filed a motion to dismiss.
(Doc. 10). On July 26, 2010, this court granted, in part, and denied, in
part, the motion and pursuant to our rulings, the Monroe County District
Attorney’s Office and DA Christine were dismissed from the case. (Doc.
23).
The plaintiff filed the instant motion to amend the complaint on April
17, 2012, seeking to add another defendant and two failure to
train/supervise claims. (Doc. 55). The plaintiffs filed a copy of the
proposed amended complaint for the court’s consideration. (Doc. 57,
Attachs. 3, 4, 5). On April 23, 2012, Defendants Monroe County, ADA
Rakaczewski and Detective Bentzoni filed a brief in opposition to the
motion. (Doc. 58). On April 27, 2012, the Department, Chief Lewis and
Detectives Lutchcke, Bohrman, Bray, Wagner and Lenning also filed a
separate brief in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 60).1 The parties have

The attorney for the Department, Chief Lewis and Detectives
Lutchcke, Bohrman, Bray, Wagner and Lenning filed a brief titled “Brief of
the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department in Opposition to the
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint,” however, the brief does not
indicate whether the brief was filed on behalf of all the defendants or only
the Department. (Doc. 60). We will refer to “Defendant Department” when
1

4

fully briefed the motion, bringing the case to its present posture.
Jurisdiction
The court has federal question jurisdiction over this civil rights action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); 28 U.S.C. §§
1343(a)(3), (4) (granting district courts jurisdiction over civil actions brought
to redress deprivations of constitutional or statutory rights by way of
damages or equitable relief).
Discussion
The plaintiffs move to amend the complaint to add an additional
defendant and two failure to train/supervise claims to the complaint.2
Defendant Department addresses the new defendant, while Defendants
Monroe County, ADA Rakaczewski and Detective Bentzoni primarily
address the proposed failure to train/supervise claims. We will address the
defendants’ arguments as they relate to each proposed amendment.
1. Adding the Commission as a defendant
The plaintiffs seek to name the Pocono Mountain Regional Police
Commission (hereafter the “Commission”), an administrative body that
governs the Department, as a defendant in the instant case. (Doc. 57, Pl.
Br. in Supp. at 3). At the time that they initiated this action, the plaintiffs
addressing the arguments raised in that brief.
The plaintiffs are also voluntarily dismissing Kenneth Lenning as a
defendant and withdrawing Counts III, V, VI & VII of the original complaint.
(Doc. 57, Pl. Br. in Supp. at 11). Accordingly, the motion to amend will be
granted as unopposed with respect to the voluntary dismissal and
withdrawal of those claims.
2

5

believed that Chief Lewis was the sole decision-maker and policymaker of
the Department. However, the plaintiffs recently learned that the
Commission also serves in a policymaking capacity. (Id. at 10). The
plaintiffs claim that they did not have access to an organizational document
explaining the role of the Commission until discovery. The document
states:
Generally, all orders, directives, inquiries, reports,
hearings and policy information, will be transacted
through the Chief of Police. However, the
Commission members have the authority to assume
control and direct the official action of the members
of the Department when acting in their official
capacity. In addition, the Commission members,
when acting, may require manual accountability
from individual members of the Department.
(Doc. 57, Attach. 1).
Defendant contends that this proposed amendment is barred by the
statute of limitations, thus, the motion should be denied. While a plaintiff
may add a new defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c)(1)(C), which allows for amendments to relate back to the filing date
of the original pleading, defendant claims that the plaintiffs cannot satisfy
all of the requirements under that Rule, particularly that the Commission
knew or should have known that it would have been brought in as a party
to this suit. See FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). We disagree with defendant
and find that the amendment relates back to the original pleading and is
not barred by the statute of limitations.
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party may amend its pleading outside of the applicable time line provided
by the Rule only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave. FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2). District courts are obligated to grant leave

6

freely “when justice so requires.” Id. Decisions on motions to amend are
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Gay v. Petsock, 917
F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1990).
The Supreme Court discussed the liberal standard to amend a
complaint under Rule 15(a), when it found in Forman v. Davis that “[i]n the
absence of any apparent or declared reason–such as undue delay, bad
faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of the amendment . . . , the leave sought should,
as the rules require, be freely given.” Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics,
et al., 22 F. Supp. 2d 406, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The party opposing an amendment has be
burden of demonstrating prejudice. Kiser v. General Elec. Corp., 831 F.2d
423, 427-28 (3d Cir. 1987).
In applying Rule 15(a), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals regards the
possibility of prejudice to the non-moving party as the “touchstone for the
denial of the amendment.” Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d
Cir. 1989) (quoting Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Rev. Comm’n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)). Absent undue prejudice,
“denial must be grounded in bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or
unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure deficiency by amendments
previously allowed or futility of amendment.” Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v.
F.D. Rich Hous. of the V.I., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing
Cornell, 573 F.2d at 823).
When a plaintiff wishes to name a new party to a lawsuit after the
statute of limitations has expired on her claims, plaintiff must comply with

7

the conditions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). “If the amendment
relates back to the date of the filing of the original complaint, the amended
complaint is treated, for statute of limitations purposes, as if it had been
filed at that time.” Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citing Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2001).
Three requirements must be satisfied under Rule 15(c): (1) the
amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading; (2) within the
period provided by Rule 4(m),3 the party to be brought in by amendment
received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending
on the merits; and (3) within the period provided by Rule 4(m), the party to
be brought in by amendment knew or should have known that the action
would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the
proper party’s identity. FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)(ii). Plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating each of the three requirements. See Garvin, 354
F.3d at 222.
The Supreme Court has held that “relation back under Rule
15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to be added knew or should have
known, not on the amending party’s knowledge or its timeliness in seeking
to amend the pleading.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct.
2485, 2490 (2010). In Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, the Court
explained that the appropriate focus under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is on “what
the prospective defendant reasonably should have understood about the
plaintiff’s intent in filing the original complaint against the first defendant.”

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides a defendant must be
served within 120 days after the complaint is filed. FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m).
3

8

Id. at 2496. The “[i]nformation in the plaintiff’s possession is relevant only
if it bears on the defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff made a
mistake regarding the proper party’s identity.” Id. 2493-94.
In Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit held that “an
amended complaint will not relate back if the plaintiff had been aware of
the identity of the newly named parties when she filed her original
complaint and simply chose not to sue them at that time.” Garvin, 354
F.3d at 221-22. However, the Supreme Court clarified in Krupski that the
plaintiff’s knowledge of a party’s existence should not be conflated with
mistake. Rather:
A plaintiff might know that the prospective
defendant exists but nonetheless harbor a
misunderstanding about his status or role in the
events giving rise to the claim at issue, and she
may mistakenly choose to sue a different defendant
based on that misimpression. That kind of
deliberate but mistaken choice does not foreclose a
finding that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) has been satisfied.
Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494.
In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that the statute of
limitations on the plaintiffs’ claims expired, therefore, the amendment must
relate back to the original complaint. Defendant Department concedes the
first and second requirements under Rule 15(c), as the claims the plaintiffs
seek to assert against the Commission arose out of the same occurrence
alleged in the original complaint and the Commission had notice of the
lawsuit within the required time period. However, defendant argues the
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the Commission knew or should have
known that the action would have been brought against it but for a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity. FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
Defendant asserts that the plaintiffs alleged in the original complaint
9

that Department officers and ADA Rakaczewski brought charges against
the plaintiffs based upon “shameful lies on which Defendants were fully
aware.” (Doc. 60, Def. Dep’t Br. in Opp. at 12, quoting Original Compl. ¶
1). Defendant claims that the plaintiffs need to demonstrate that the
Commission members were complicit in a bogus prosecution fueled by
racial bias. It argues that, “[u]nless plaintiffs’ counsel are prepared to
represent to this Court that the Commission members acted out of racial
bias, the statute of limitations has run and these claims do not relate back
to the original Complaint under Rule 15.” (Id. at 13).
We find the pleadings in the original complaint are not so limited as
to only allege racial bias of individual officers. Rather, the plaintiffs also
alleged unlawful administration of criminal proceedings, including the
assignment, control, oversight and supervision of Department officers
involving the interviews, investigations and/or arrests of the plaintiffs.
(Original Compl. ¶ 167). Based on the original allegations, we find that the
Commission, while claiming that it did not know, should have known that
this action would have been brought against it.
The Commission is essentially comprised of or associated with Chief
Lewis, the Department and the four municipalities, all of which have been
defendants in this suit since its inception. The original complaint asserted
claims against Chief Lewis as a decision-maker and policymaker for the
Department. (Id. ¶ 165). The Commission is also a policymaker for the
Department and has “the authority to assume control and direct the official
action of the members of the Department when acting in their official
capacity.” (Doc. 57-5, Org. Doc. at 1). The original complaint asserted
claims against the Department, a police force which the Commission had

10

“authority to assume control and direct the official actions of the members .
. . .” (Id.) The Commission itself is comprised of members from
Tobyhanna Township, Mount Pocono Borough, Tunkhannock Township
and Coolbaugh Township, all of which were named as defendants in the
original complaint. (Doc. 60-1, Ex. B., Declaration of Harry J. Coleman at ¶
5).
It is clear that the Commission, due to its role and formation, should
have been a defendant in the instant case which involves the plaintiffs’
criminal proceeding. We find that the Commission should have known that
it would be a defendant, satisfying the only contested requirement under
Rule 15(c). Accordingly, we find that the amendment relates back to the
original pleading and is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendant Department also argues that plaintiffs’ counsel was aware
of the existence of the Commission as far back as March 2010, therefore,
the choice to not sue the Commission was deliberate and not a mistake.
(Doc. 60, Def. Dep’t Br. in Opp. at 13-14). The plaintiffs explained that
while they knew of the Commission’s existence, they did not learn that the
Commission was a policymaker until recent discovery and depositions.
(Doc. 57, Pl. Br. in Supp. at 3-4). We find that this important distinction
was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Krupski. See Krupski, 130 S.
Ct. at 2494. Plaintiffs did not make a deliberate choice not sue the
Commission, but instead they only recently realized the Commission’s
status or role as a policymaker and its connection to the underlying claims.
Such a mistake is allowable under Rule 15(c).
Defendant Department also suggests that the plaintiffs’ delay in
moving for the amendment is grounds for this court to deny the motion

11

under Rule 15(a). However, “[d]elay alone is not sufficient to justify denial
of leave to amend.” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir.1984)). A
district court may deny a motion to amend if the plaintiff’s delay is undue,
motivated by bad faith or prejudicial to the opposing party. Bjorgung v.
Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Adams, 739
F.2d at 864). Delay is “undue” when it places unwarranted burden on the
court, is prejudicial in placing an unfair burden on the opposing party, or
when the moving party had a previous opportunity to amend and failed to
do so. Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “[T]he question of undue delay requires that
we focus on the movant’s reasons for not amending sooner.” Id.
In the instant case, while defendant indicates that the amendment
was delayed, defendant fails to indicate how, if at all, defendant was
prejudiced by the delay. Delay alone is not sufficient to deny the motion.
The plaintiffs explained their reason for now moving to amend the
complaint. We do not find that there will be an unfair burden on
defendants in allowing for the amendment to add the Commission.
Accordingly, we will allow plaintiffs to amend the complaint to add the
Commission as a defendant.
2. Failure to train/supervise claims
The plaintiffs also seek to amend the complaint to add two counts for
failure to train/supervise. Count VIII of the proposed amended complaint
names the municipalities, the Commission, the Department and Chief
Lewis for failure to train/supervise. (Doc. 57-5, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 184-205).
Count IX of the proposed amended complaint names Monroe County and

12

DA Christine for failure to train/supervise. (Id. ¶¶ 206-33).4
Defendant Department does not raise any specific argument as to
the proposed failure to train claim asserted against them, as they devoted
the majority of their brief to opposing the amendment to add the
Commission as a defendant. The defendant has the burden of
demonstrating prejudice of an amendment and they have failed to do so.
See Kiser, 831 F.2d at 427-28. Accordingly, we will allow for the
amendment for the failure to train/supervise claim as it relates to the
Department, Municipalities, Chief Lewis or the Commission.
Defendants Monroe County, ADA Rakaczewski and Wendy Bentzoni
oppose the proposed amendment to add a failure to train/supervise claim
asserted against Monroe County and DA Christine.5 Defendants
essentially assert three arguments: they will be prejudiced by the
amendment, the statute of limitations expired and the amendment will
require additional discovery.
As stated above, the possibility of prejudice to the non-moving party
is the “touchstone for the denial of the amendment.” Bechtel, 886 F.2d at

The court notes that in the plaintiffs’ brief in support of their motion
to amend the complaint, they state that they wish to bring a failure to train
claim against the Department, the Department Municipalities, the
Commission and Chief Lewis. (Doc. 57, Pl. Br. in Supp. at 10). However,
in their proposed amended complaint, they also added the claim against
Monroe County and DA Christine. (Doc. 57-5, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 206-33).
4

While Defendants Monroe County, ADA Rakaczewski and
Detective Bentzoni argue that they oppose the motion to add a new
defendant and the failure to train/supervise claims, they only direct their
argument to the latter. As such, we will only address their argument as to
the failure to train/supervise claim.
5

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652 (quoting Cornell, 573 F.2d at 823). Defendants argue that they would
be prejudiced by plaintiffs’ proposed amendment, particularly because the
Monroe County District Attorney’s Office and DA Christine were dismissed
from this case pursuant to this court’s ruling on Defendants Monroe
County, ADA Rakaczewski and Detective Bentzoni’s motion to dismiss.
(Doc. 23, Memo. & Order). They argue that “[t]he parties took all of the
depositions based on the premise that District Attorney Christine and the
Monroe County DA’s office were not parties and that the plaintiffs had no
claim against DA Christine for his failure to properly train Assistant D.A.
Michael Rakaczewski and Monroe County Detective Wendy Bentzoni.”
(Doc. 58, Def. Monroe Cnty. Br. in Opp. in to Mot. to Am. at 3-4).
The plaintiffs argue that defendants will not be prejudiced. They
explain that at the time they initiated this action, plaintiffs believed that the
individually named detectives were properly trained and/or supervised.
(Doc. 57, Pl. Br. in Supp. at 10). Discovery revealed that the defendant
detectives did not have the level of training, experience and/or supervision
necessary and/or required for the highly specialize sexual abuse and rape
charges at issue in this action. (Id. at 11). Specifically, the plaintiffs allege
that Defendant Monroe County, through its policymaker DA Christine, did
not provide adequate training and/or supervision and Detective Bentzoni
did not possess the minimum qualifications for the County Detective
position. (Id. at 7-9).
First, we must reiterate our rulings in our Memorandum dated July
26, 2010. (Doc. 23, Memo & Order). We denied Monroe County’s motion
to dismiss, finding that based on state law the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
that DA Christine was a final policymaker for Monroe County in the area of

14

training and supervising assistant district attorneys and detectives with
regard to sexual assault investigations and abuse of power. (Id. at 17-18).
Therefore, the plaintiffs properly pleaded a claim of municipal liability
against Monroe County and it could be liable for DA Christine’s actions.
(Id. at 18).
We dismissed the Section 1983 claim against DA Christine, as the
claim was brought against him solely in his official capacity and was
duplicative of the surviving claim against Monroe County. (Id. at 19). The
Monroe County District Attorney’s Office was voluntarily dismissed by the
plaintiffs. (Id. at 13 n.4; Doc. 23,Order).
Under the instant motion to amend, we agree with defendants that it
appears that the plaintiffs are attempting to reassert claims against DA
Christine despite the fact he was dismissed from this lawsuit. While the
plaintiffs claim that they do not propose to add DA Christine as a
defendant, they did not remove his name from the caption, they named him
as a defendant in the heading before the proposed failure to
train/supervise claim and they refer to him as “Defendant Christine”
throughout Count IX for failure to train/supervise. (Doc. 57-5, Am. Compl.
¶¶ 206-33).
As we previously explained, a claim against DA Christine as a
policymaker for Monroe County is the same as a claim against the
municipality itself. (Doc. 23, Mem. & Order at 19, citing Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 n.14 (1985)). Therefore, to the extent that the
plaintiffs wish to pursue claims against DA Christine in his official capacity,
the proposed amendment will be denied as futile. See Riley v. Taylor, 62
F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways,

15

Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir.1988) (“An ‘[a]mendment of the complaint is
futile . . . if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to
dismiss.’”). We will, therefore, direct plaintiffs to remove DA Christine’s
name from the caption, the heading of Count IX and any reference to him
as a defendant.
Defendants also argue that they participated in substantial discovery
in the case under the impression that the plaintiffs did not claim that DA
Christine and Monroe County failed to properly train ADA Rakaczewski and
Detective Bentzoni. Therefore, they claim that defendants would be
prejudiced by the new claim against Monroe County.
Again, we refer to our motion to dismiss decision. We denied
Defendant Monroe County’s motion to dismiss because we found that “the
plaintiffs have alleged that DA Christine was a final policymaker for Monroe
County in the area of training and supervising assistant district attorneys
and detectives with regard to sexual assault investigations and abuse of
power.” (Doc. 23, Mem. & Order at 17-18) (emphasis added). We also
found that “[t]he plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims of failure to train
and supervise.” (Id. at 18). Furthermore, “the plaintiffs have taken care
only to allege acts or omissions of DA Christine for which the County may
be liable.” (Id.) Based on our findings, it was incorrect for the defendants
to assume that Monroe County could not be liable for the acts or omissions
of DA Christine in his official capacity as a policymaker, in particular for his
training and supervision of the assistant district attorneys and detectives.
DA Christine was dismissed as a defendant because the claim against him
was duplicative of the existing and surviving claim against Monroe County.
Our rulings on the defendant’s motion to dismiss did not affect Count VII of

16

the original complaint, “Administrative / Supervisory Liability,” against
Defendant Monroe County, as it could be held responsible for the purposes
of municipal liability.
Furthermore, the proposed amendments submitted by the plaintiffs
are similar to those in the original complaint. In the original complaint,
plaintiffs allege that DA Christine was a policymaker and administrator
“responsible for the formulation and / or implementation of all practices,
policies and procedures of the office; the discipline, assignment, training
and supervision of staff, including assistant district attorneys and
detectives; and all other day-to-day operations, oversight, command and
control of the office.” (Doc. 1, Original Compl. ¶ 26). The plaintiffs further
alleged that DA Christine was responsible for the “assignment, control,
command, oversight and supervision of assistant district attorneys and
detectives involved in rape and assault investigations.” (Id. ¶ 176).
Defendants should have been conducting discovery pursuant to the
allegations in the original complaint that are similar to the new claim of
failure to train/supervise. Therefore, we find that defendants will not be
prejudiced by the amendment.
Defendants also argue that the proposed failure to train/supervise
claim is barred by the statute of limitation. We disagree. The proposed
claim against Monroe County arose out of the occurrence set forth in the
original pleading alleging the unlawful investigation and/or arrest the
plaintiffs in the underlying criminal case. FED.R .CIV.P. 15(c). Therefore,
the amendment relates back to the original pleading and is not barred by
the statute of limitations.
Finally, defendants argue that the court should consider the plaintiffs’

17

undue delay in its motion to amend, because adding a new claim at this
stage of litigation would require a significant extension of the case
management deadlines to avoid prejudice.6 See Heyl & Patterson Int’l,
Inc., 663 F.2d at 425 (citing Cornell, 573 F.2d at 823).
During a recent discovery conference call, we indicated that we
would extend all case management deadlines. (See Doc. 52). While the
most recent order omitted the discovery deadline, such an extension was
permitted. Additionally, in light of our ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion to
amend, we find that it may be necessary to allow the parties to conduct
additional discovery. Therefore, we will grant the parties a sixty-day
discovery extension from the date of this order.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the
complaint will be granted, in part, and denied, in part. The motion will be
granted, as unopposed, with respect to dismissing Kenneth Lenning as a
defendant. The motion will also be granted as unopposed as to the
voluntary withdrawal of Counts III, V, VI and VII.
The motion to amend the complaint to add the Commission as a
defendant will be granted. The motion to add two failure to train/supervise
counts will be granted with respect to all defendants except for DA
Christine. The plaintiffs will be ordered to remove any reference to DA
Christine as a defendant in this case. The plaintiffs will also be directed to

Defendants also contend that plaintiffs offer no proper explanation
as to why they suddenly discovered new claims. We do not find any merit
in this argument as the plaintiffs clearly indicated that they discovered the
new claim during recent deposition and clearly set forth the reasons for the
amendment.
6

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file the amended complaint with corrections and amendments within
fourteen (14) days from the date of this order.
All case management deadlines will be extended sixty (60) days from
the date of this order. An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM SPIESS; KASHEEN
THOMAS; GENE THOMAS, II;
JALEEL HOLDEN; and JOSE
LACEN,
Plaintiffs
v.

:
No. 3:10cv287
:
:
(Judge Munley)
:
:
:
:
POCONO MOUNTAIN REGIONAL
:
POLICE DEPT.; TOBYHANNA TWP.; :
MOUNT POCONO BOROUGH;
:
TUNKHANNOCK TWP.;
:
COOLBAUGH TWP.; CHIEF
:
HARRY W. LEWIS; RICHARD
:
W. LUTHCKE; JOHN P. BOHRMAN; :
LUCAS BRAY; CHRIS WAGNER;
:
KENNETH LENNING; MONROE
:
COUNTY; A.D.A. MICHAEL
:
RAKACZEWSKI; and DET. WENDY
:
BENTZONI,
:
Defendants
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 31st day of May 2012, upon consideration of
the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint (Doc. 55), it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART
as follows:
1.

The motion is GRANTED as unopposed with respect to Defendant
Kenneth Lenning and he is hereby DISMISSED from the case;

2.

The motion is GRANTED as unopposed with respect to the
withdrawal of Counts III, V, VI and VII from the complaint;

3.

The motion is GRANTED with respect to adding Defendant Pocono
Mountain Regional Police Commission as a defendant in the case;

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4.

The motion is GRANTED with respect to the addition of two failure to
train/supervise counts, except to the extent those claims are against
DA Christine. The plaintiffs are hereby ORDERED to remove District
Attorney E. David Christine from the amended complaint;

5.

The plaintiffs are DIRECTED to file their amended complaint with
corrections within fourteen (14) days of this order; and

6.

The case management deadlines are extended as follows:
Discovery shall be completed by July 30, 2012;
Plaintiff’s Expert Reports shall be filed by July 30, 2012;
Defendant’s Expert Reports shall be filed by August 29, 2012;
Dispositive Motions shall be filed by August 19, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court

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