Byram v. Renehan et al
Filing
156
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 112 Defendant Joseph Connors' Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 12/8/11 (jam, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DANIEL ALLEN BYRAM, Administrator of
the Estate and Natural Father of
JOHNATHON BYRAM, deceased,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-593
Plaintiff
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
v.
MARK T. RENEHAN, et al.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
Defendant Joseph Connors moves for summary judgment on the negligence claims
against him stemming from a RUV accident in which Johnathon Byram was killed. Mr.
Connors argues that under Pennsylvania law, a passenger of a vehicle has no duty to a
third person killed by the vehicle’s driver. Plaintiff Daniel Allen Byram, decedent’s father,
argues for liability under three theories: (1) “concert of action”; (2)” substantial assistance”;
or (3) the “Good Samaritan” doctrine. The Court does not agree with plaintiff and will grant
Mr. Connors’ motion.
BACKGROUND
The underlying suit arises out of a tragic RUV accident which took place on Minkler
Mountain Rd in Wayne County, Pennsylvania in the early morning of July 5, 2009.
Johnathon Byram and Mr. Connors were staying at defendant Mark Renehan’s parents’
home over the Fourth of July weekend. Both Mr. Byram and Mr. Connors were nineteen
at the time and minors under Pennsylvania law. After a night of drinking at the nearby home
of Mr. Renehan’s aunt and uncle, defendants Patricia and James Renehan, Mr. Renehan
told Mr. Byram and Mr. Connors he was ready to go back to his parents’ house. The RUV
they were taking belonged to Mr. Renehan’s parents. Mr. Connors testified at his deposition
that, as the three approached the RUV, he and Mr. Renehan helped guide Mr. Byram to the
vehicle after he had slipped on the wet grass. Mr. Connors climbed into the back after
losing a game of ‘rock, paper, scissors’ for the front seat. Mr. Connors testified that he then
held out his hand to help Mr. Byram into the vehicle. Mr. Renehan drove. Along the way,
the RUV flipped over. Mr. Byram, who was not wearing a seatbelt, was thrown from the
vehicle and killed.
Daniel Allen Byram then filed a complaint on behalf of Johnathon on March 17, 2010
(Doc. 1), and an amended complaint, adding additional defendants, on October 14, 2011
(Doc. 109). The allegations against Mr. Connors are outlined in paragraph 94. Mr. Byram
primarily alleges that Mr. Connors was negligent in placing Johnathon Byram into the RUV
knowing Mr. Renehan was intoxicated and knowing that Johnathon was unable to take
precautions, such as buckling his seatbelt, to protect himself.
Mr. Connors now brings a motion for summary judgment. The motion has been fully
briefed and is ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). A fact is material if proof of its
existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable
substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Where, however, there is a disputed issue of
material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine
one. Id. An issue of material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id.
Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of
proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER ,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2727 (2d ed. 1983). The moving party may
present its own evidence or, where the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, simply
point out to the Court that “the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing of
an essential element of her case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
against the moving party, and the entire record must be examined in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d
Cir. 1988). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to either present affirmative evidence supporting its version of the material
facts or to refute the moving party’s contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a
matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57.
The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in
the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the
3
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
DISCUSSION
The Court will grant Mr. Connors’ motion for summary judgment on the negligence
claims against him because he did not owe a duty to Johnathon Byram.
“In order to hold a defendant liable for injuries sustained by a plaintiff, it must be
shown that the defendant breached a duty or obligation recognized by the law, which
required him to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of persons such
as the plaintiff.” Clayton v. McCullough, 448 Pa.Super. 126, 129 (1996) (internal citation
omitted). “Anglo-American common law has for centuries accepted the fundamental
premise that mere knowledge of a dangerous situation, even by one who has the ability to
intervene, is not sufficient to create a duty to act.” Clayton, 449 Pa.Super. at 129 (citing
Elbasher v. Simco Sales Serv. of Pa., 441 Pa.Super. 397, 398-99 (1995)).
Absent a special relationship, joint venture, or right to control the vehicle, “[a]
passenger does not owe a duty to a third-person where the driver of the vehicle is
intoxicated, particularly when passengers and the driver merely participate in the joint
procurement and ingestion of alcohol.” Brandjord v. Hopper, 455 Pa.Super. 426, 431
(1997) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).1
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The Brandjord court justified this rule by finding that:
To impose a duty on a passenger making him liable to others for what the driver chooses to
do is inappropriate; such a rule assumes, incorrectly, that a passenger somehow shares in the
management of the vehicle and the driver is amenable to the passenger's influence. Even
more troubling, however, is that such a duty would open a veritable Pandora's box of
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Under well-established Pennsylvania law then, Mr. Connors, as a passenger in the
RUV, had no duty to Johnathon Byram. In attempting to avoid this rule, Mr. Byram argues
that Mr. Connors could be held liable under theories of: (1) “concert of action,” (2)
“substantial assistance,” or (3) the “Good Samaritan” doctrine.
A.
“Concert of Action”
The “concert of action” theory is set forth in § 876(a) of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which provides that: “[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct
of another, one is subject to liability if he . . .does a tortious act in concert with the other or
pursuant to a common design with him.” While this provision of the Restatement has not
been formally adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it is the framework usually
employed by the lower courts in dealing with liability claims against motor vehicle
passengers. See, e.g., Brandjord, 455 Pa.Super at 432. In Welc v. Porter, decedent’s
parents sued driver and passenger for negligence after driver struck decedent’s vehicle,
killing her. 450 Pa. Super. 112 (1996). Driver and passenger had both been drinking and
were in a truck owned by driver’s mother. Plaintiffs argued that passenger was liable under
the “concert of action” theory. Since the only allegations were that driver and passenger
had been drinking together and that the driver had driven negligently, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that: the “facts do not present the type of situation where it can be said
that the driver and passenger acted in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a
particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result.” Welc, 450 Pa.Super. at 123.
potential liability and responsibility problems.
Brandjord, 455 Pa.Super. at 431.
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Similarly here, Mr. Connors testified that Mr. Renehan, after a night of drinking with Mr.
Connors and Johnathon Byram, told them he was ready to go back to his parents’ home.
They then got into an RUV owned by Mr. Renehan’s parents and proceeded back to the
parents’ home when the accident occurred. The Court therefore finds there was no
agreement between Mr. Renehan and Mr. Connors as to a line of conduct or a particular
result. Mr. Renehan simply announced his intentions and Mr. Connors and Mr. Byram
acquiesced.
B.
“Substantial Assistance”
Likewise, there are no facts that Mr. Connors “substantially assisted” in Mr. Byram’s
negligent conduct.
Under § 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a person can be liable for
harm to a third party resulting from the tortious conduct of another if the individual, “knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself” (emphasis added). Again, in Welc the
passenger was only alleged to have drank beer with the driver and rode with driver in a
truck owned by the driver’s mother. The Court concluded that plaintiffs could not recover
under § 876(b) because there were no allegations the passenger substantially assisted or
encouraged either driver’s alcohol consumption or his negligent driving. Likewise here, Mr.
Connors simply drank with Mr. Byram and rode in the RUV. He thus cannot be held liable
under a “substantial assistance” theory.
C.
“Good Samaritan” Theory
Additionally, Mr. Connors is not liable under the “Good Samaritan” theory because
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his “assistance” was of a minimal nature.
Under § 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from
his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Additionally, under § 324 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless
adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily
harm caused to him by
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the
other while within the actor's charge, or
(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the
other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him.
These sections, collectively, are known as the “Good Samaritan” doctrine. Filter v.
McCabe, 733 Pa.Super. 1274 (1999). In Filter, plaintiff was at a party at defendant’s home
and had been drinking. After everyone else had left, plaintiff fell, struck his head on the
concrete floor of defendant’s basement, and was rendered unconscious. Defendant revived
plaintiff, but plaintiff could not respond to defendant’s questions. Rather than call an
ambulance or plaintiff’s family, defendant put plaintiff on a couch and went to bed. The next
morning plaintiff woke up and went home. Defendant called plaintiff’s home to see that he
was safe, spoke to plaintiff’s wife but did not tell her about the fall. An hour later, defendant
called again, this time telling the wife about the accident. Plaintiff’s wife then went to wake
him up. When she could not, she called the paramedics. Plaintiff ultimately underwent
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emergency brain surgery and suffered permanent brain damage from the fall. Based on
the facts of the case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the homeowner could
be liable under §§ 323 and 324 of the Restatement.
However, the facts here are
distinguishable from Filter. The only help Mr. Connors testified to giving Johnathon Byram
was guidance to the RUV after Mr. Byram had slipped on the grass and a hand to help Mr.
Byram into the vehicle. His “assistance” was minimal. Additionally, while Mr. Byram had
been drinking, he was able to walk to the RUV and play a game of “rock, paper, scissors”
for the front seat. There is no evidence that Mr. Byram was in Mr. Connors care or that Mr.
Connors ever assisted him other than in the most cursory fashion. Finding liability here
would make the “Good Samaritan” exception to the principal of nonfeasance, a central pillar
of the law of negligence, consume the rule.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Connors’ motion for summary judgment will be granted because a passenger in
a vehicle cannot be held liable for the injuries or death of a third-person based on the
negligence of the vehicle’s driver. Additionally, there was no concerted action between Mr.
Connors and Mr. Renehan; Mr. Connors did not substantially encourage Mr. Renehan’s
negligent conduct; and Mr. Connors did not undertake to assist or aid Mr. Byram.
An appropriate order follows.
12/8/11
Date
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DANIEL ALLEN BYRAM, Administrator of
the Estate and Natural Father of
JOHNATHON BYRAM, deceased,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-593
Plaintiff
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
v.
MARK T. RENEHAN; THOMAS (a/k/a
TODD) S. RENEHAN; BETH L.
RENEHAN; JAMES RENEHAN;
PATRICIA RENEHAN and JOSEPH
CONNORS, Jr.,
Defendants
ORDER
NOW, this
8th
day of December, 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendant Joseph Connors’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 112) is GRANTED
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge
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