Patterson v. Scism
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 13 Motion for Reconsideration Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 7/5/11 (jam, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VICTOR PATTERSON,
Petitioner
v.
WILLIAM SCISM,
Respondent
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CIVIL NO. 3:CV-10-0965
(Judge Caputo)
MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
On May 5, 2010, Petitioner Victor Patterson filed a Petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking relief from his 1994 Pennsylvania
state drug conviction. On May 7, 2010, the Court issued an Order placing the
parties on notice that the Petition appeared to be time barred. See Doc. 5. After
the parties were given the opportunity to address the timeliness issue, the Court
dismissed the Petition as untimely. See Doc. 12.
Pending before the Court is Victor Patterson’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner presents a new claim of equitable tolling of the federal habeas corpus
filing period from June 1994 until 2008 based on his assertion that his legal counsel
lied to him about filing a Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition on
his behalf. Doc. 13, Mot. for Recon. For the reasons discussed, the motion will be
denied.
II.
Standard of Review
A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend is a device of limited utility. “The
purpose of a motion for reconsideration ... is to correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence.” Max's Seafood Café, 176 F.3d 669, 677
(3d Cir. 1999)(citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A judgment may be amended if the party seeking
reconsideration demonstrates an intervening change in the controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice. Id.
III.
Background
After entering a guilty plea, Victor Patterson was sentenced on April 11, 1994,
to term of three and half to seven years imprisonment. Doc. 12 at CM/ECF p. 2.1
He did not file a direct appeal. Id. On October 29, 2008, he filed a pro se petition
for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §
9541 et seq. On December 24, 2008, the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas
dismissed the petition. On September 15, 2009, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v.
Patterson, 986 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. September 15, 2009)(Table, No. 321 MDA
2009). The Superior Court determined Mr. Patterson was not “eligible for PCRA
1
Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the record reflect the docket number and
page number assigned by the electronic case filing system (CM/ECF) rather than the page
numbers of the original documents.
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relief” because “he completed his sentence on or before April 11, 2001 [and]
[b]ecause he is not currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation of
parole.” Id. On March 29, 2010, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his
petition for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 992 A.2d 124
(Pa. 2010)(Table, No. 876 MAL 2009). He filed his habeas corpus petition on May
5, 2010.
In support of his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Patterson affirms that in June
1994 he hired legal counsel to file a PCRA petition on his behalf to challenge his
Dauphin county conviction. Doc. 13 at p. 8. Petitioner called his attorney
periodically to ascertain the status of his petition. His counsel “always” advised him
that they were “awaiting an adjudication of the petition.” Id. In 2008, Petitioner
learned counsel has not filed the PCRA on his behalf. He then immediately filed his
2008 PCRA petition. Id.
IV.
Discussion
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the federal habeas statute of
limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 75 - 76
(3d Cir. 2004). Equitable tolling is allowed where (1) the petitioner was actively
misled; (2) the petitioner has been in some extraordinary way been prevented from
asserting his rights; and (3) the petitioner timely asserted his rights, but mistakenly in
the wrong forum. See Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).
Additionally, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly held that, in
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non-capital cases, attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other
mistakes are not the extraordinary circumstances necessary to establish equitable
tolling. Johnson v. Hendricks, 314 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Fahy v.
Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, even where attorney
malfeasance is found, standing alone, it does not warrant equitable tolling.
Schlueter, 384 F.3d at 77. Rather, the court also must “examine the petitioner's due
diligence in pursuing the matter under the specific circumstances he faced.” Id.
Even where extraordinary circumstances exist, “[i]f the person seeking equitable
tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file after the
extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary
circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary circumstances
therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 773 (3d
Cir.) (quoting Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 948 (2003)).
In this case, Mr. Patterson has not demonstrated any applicable grounds for
reconsideration. Absent any tolling, Victor Patterson had until April 24, 1997, to file
a timely habeas petition. See Doc. 12. Petitioner now urges the Court to adopt his
May 2010 petition as timely filed as a result of equitable tolling between June 1994
and 2008 when he learned of his PCRA counsel’s active misrepresentation that he
had filed a timely PCRA petition had been filed on his behalf. First, aside from his
own declaration, there is no evidence to support Mr. Patterson’s self-serving
statement that he was actively misled by his PCRA counsel from 1994 until 2008
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that a timely PCRA petition had been filed. Next, even if true, the Court cannot
agree that Victor Patterson demonstrated due diligence in pursuing, or protecting his
right to file, a timely habeas petition because he did not inquire with any source,
other than his PCRA counsel, between 1994 and 2008 as to the status of his PCRA
petition. This finding is underscored by the fact that even though his Dauphin
county sentence expired in April 2001 (see Doc. 12), he waited seven (7) more
years to inquire with an alternate source as to the status of his PCRA petition.
Moreover, Mr. Patterson does not explain why, despite learning in 2008 that no
PCRA petition had been filed on his behalf, which would have statutorily tolled the
federal habeas filing period, why he waited until May 2010 to file his habeas petition.
In light of the above facts, the Court concludes that Mr. Patterson did not
exercise due diligence in complying with the federal habeas filing deadlines and that
in this instance his PCRA counsel’s failure to file an appeal does not justify an
“extraordinary” circumstance meriting equitable tolling.
The Court will issue an appropriate order.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. RICHARD CAPUTO
United States District Judge
Date: July 5th , 2011
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VICTOR PATTERSON,
Petitioner
v.
WILLIAM SCISM,
Respondent
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:
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-10-0965
(Judge Caputo)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of JULY, 2011, it is ordered that Mr. Patterson’s
Motion for Reconsideration (doc. 13) is denied.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. RICHARD CAPUTO
United States District Judge
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