Robbins et al v. Dominion Transmission
Filing
46
MEMORANDUM and ORDER GRANTING dft's 32 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and REMANDING cse to TIOGA COUNTY Court of Common Pleas. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 5/13/13. (sm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANK J. ROBBINS, SR. and
MARY ROBBINS,
Plaintiffs
:
No. 3:10cv1381
:
:
(Judge Munley)
:
v.
:
:
DOMINION TRANSMISSION, INC.,
:
Defendant
:
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition is Defendant Dominion Transmission
Inc.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and request for judicial notice.
The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Background
According to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the background facts
are as follows: Plaintiffs own real property located at 1432 Tower Hill
Road, Tioga, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 14, First Am. Compl. at ¶ 4). Defendant
is the owner and operator of several underground gas storage fields in
Tioga County, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶¶ 7-10). Included in their operations are
fields known as the Meeker Field and the Tioga Field. (Id.) Defendant has
stored, and continues to store, natural gas in or under plaintiffs’ real estate
and on the Meeker and Tioga fields which are adjacent to the plaintiffs’ real
estate. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-14).
Pennsylvania law contemplates the existence of “buffer zones”
around underground storage fields. See 58 PENN. STAT. § 602.101 et seq.
Natural gas cannot be practically extracted from land within the buffer zone
of an underground gas storage field. (Id. ¶ 18). All or part of plaintiff’s real
property is located within buffer zones of defendant’s underground storage
facilities. (Id. ¶ 19). Thus, plaintiffs are prevented from entering into a
commercially reasonable lease or other agreement for the exploration,
extraction and collection of natural gas deposits located on their property.
(Id. ¶ 20). Additionally, the defendant’s gas storage operations have led to
the contamination of plaintiffs’ property and groundwater supply with heavy
metal contamination, including arsenic. (Id. ¶¶ 22 - 23).
Plaintiffs instituted this action by filing a complaint on June 10, 2010
in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1-2).
Defendant removed the case to this court on July 6, 2010. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 4, 2010. The amended
complaint contained various federal law and state law claims. Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss, and the court dismissed all causes of action
except for Count XIII a “taking” claim based upon the Pennsylvania
Eminent Domain Code. (Doc. 19).
Subsequently, defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings and
judicial notice. (Doc. 32). The parties requested that the court stay the
decision on this motion because plaintiffs had filed a related case against
UGI Storage and/or Utilities/Central Penn Gas (“UGI”). This case alleged
basically the same causes of action against UGI that plaintiffs had
asserted against defendant in the instant case. The resolution of the UGI
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case could affect the outcome of the pending motion as defendant alleged
that UGI actually owned one of the gas storage fields involved in this case
and is the co-owner, along with defendant, of the other field. (Doc. 39,
Stipulated Mot. To Continue Consideration ¶ 2). The court granted the
stay of the motion. (Doc. 40).
This court dismissed the action involving UGI on September 24,
2012. (See Robbins & Robbins v. UGI, No. 3:12cv626 (M.D. Pa. 2012),
Doc. 10). The parties then moved to lift the stay in this case, which the
court granted on November 15, 2012. (Doc. 42). The parties then
completed briefing the issues and the matter is now ripe for disposition.
Jurisdiction
The parties assert this court’s diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The plaintiffs are citizens of Pennsylvania, and the defendant is a
Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Clarksburg,
West Virginia. (Doc. 1, Not. of Removal ¶¶ 3, 4). Because we sit in
diversity, the substantive law of Pennsylvania shall apply to the instant
case. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
Standard of review
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the
circumstances when joinder of a party is compulsory. A defendant may
move to dismiss a complaint for plaintiff's failure to join a party in
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accordance with Rule 19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(7). Courts considering
a motion pertaining to Rule 19 follow a multi-step inquiry. See Gen.
Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 2007);
Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 404
(3d Cir. 1993) . The reviewing court must first determine whether the
absent party “should be joined as [a] ‘necessary’ part[y] under Rule 19(a).”
Gen. Refractories Co., 500 F.3d at 312. Rule 19(a) provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of
subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord
complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that disposing of the action in
the person's absence may: (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the
interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
If a “necessary” party should be joined, but “joinder is not feasible
inasmuch as it would defeat diversity of citizenship. . .” courts must next
“determine whether the absent parties are ‘indispensable’ under Rule
19(b).” Gen. Refractories Co., 500 F.3d at 312. There are four factors for
courts to consider in determining whether a party is “indispensable”:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might prejudice that person or the
existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice
could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective
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provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or
(C) other measures; (3) whether a judgment rendered
in the person's absence would be adequate; and (4)
whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if
the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b); General Refractories Co., 500 F.3d at 320-321.
In the Third Circuit, if a non-joined party is determined to be
“indispensable,” the action cannot go forward. Gen. Refractories Co., 500
F.3d at 312 (citing Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc., 11 F.3d at 404); Bank
of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 844 F.2d
1050, 1053-54 (3d Cir. 1988).
In a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts must “accept all
factual allegations in the complaints and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Lorenz v.
CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, the burden is on
the party filing the motion to prove that a non-joined party is indispensable
to the adjudication of the action. See F.D.I.C. v. Beall, 677 F. Supp 279,
283 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Am. Home Mortgage Corp. v. First Am. Title Ins.
Co., No. 07-1257, 2007 WL 3349320, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2007); Fed.
Home Loan Mort. Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., No.
92-5255, 1993 WL 95494, at *5 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1993).
Defendants move to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(7), arguing that UGI is a necessary and
indispensable party. UGI cannot be joined because that would destroy this
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court’s diversity jurisdiction, and thus, this case must be dismissed.
Discussion
First, defendant seeks to have the court take judicial notice of certain
documents to establish that UGI is the owner and/or co-owner of the
Meeker Field and the Tioga Field. In their brief in opposition to defendant’s
motion, the plaintiffs agree that UGI is in fact the owner of the Meeker Field
and the co-owner, with defendant, of the Tioga Field. Specifically, plaintiffs
state: “Plaintiffs hereby acknowledge that Defendant does not own the
Meeker field, and that Plaintiffs stand corrected on that initial claim.
Plaintiffs also hereby acknowledge that UGI is a co-owner of the Tioga
Storage Field (and Plaintiffs never claimed otherwise). Plaintiff’s [sic]
acknowledgements [sic] make Defendant’s request for judicial notice to
verify that information moot . . . .” (Doc. 43-1, Pls.’ Opp’n Br. at 7).
Accordingly, we will proceed on the basis that UGI owns the Meeker Field
and UGI jointly owns the Tioga Field with defendant.
As set forth above in the “Standard of review” section. We must
determine if UGI is a necessary party and if so, whether joinder of UGI is
feasible. If joinder is not feasible then we must determine whether UGI is
an “indispensable” party. We will discuss these issues separately.
A. Necessary
Rule 19(a)(1) provides the framework for us to determine whether
UGI is a necessary party. This rule provides that a party is necessary if:
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(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot
accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence
may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impeded the
person’s ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject o a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the
interest.
All of the clauses in this section are separated by the disjunctive “or”
and thus if any of these apply to UGI then it is a necessary party. Gen.
Refractories Co., 500 F.3d 306 at 312. In the instant case, we find that
UGI is a necessary party. Without UGI’s participation in this case, the
court will not be able to “accord complete relief” between the existing
parties. Plaintiffs seek damages for a taking. Two entities may be liable
for this taking. They are the defendant and UGI. UGI is not a party,
therefore, plaintiffs’ cannot be accorded complete relief should they prevail
in this action.
B. Feasibility of joinder
As we have found UGI to be a necessary party, we must next
determine if joinder is feasible. Gen. Refractories Co., 500 F.3d at 312. If
the court’s jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship, joinder of the
absent party is not feasible if it would defeat diversity of citizenship. Id.
Here, jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. (Doc. 1, Not. of
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Removal ¶ 2). The plaintiffs are citizens of Pennsylvania and the
defendant is a citizen of Delaware and West Virginia. UGI is a citizen of
Pennsylvania having its principal place of business in Reading,
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 33-1, Compl. from Civ. A. No. 1224 CV 2009 (Court
of Com. Pleas, Tioga Cnty. Pa.) at ¶ 2). Thus, joinder is not feasible
because joining UGI would defeat diversity of citizenship.
C. Indispensable
As we have found that UGI is a necessary party whose joinder is not
feasible, we must next determine whether UGI is an indispensable party.
Gen. Refractories Co., 500 F.3d at 312. Courts consider four factors to
determine whether a party is “indispensable”:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might prejudice that person or the
existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be
lessened or avoided by:
(A) protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or
(C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence would be adequate; and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate
remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
We must analyze these factors to determine whether “in equity and
good conscience, the action should proceed” between the plaintiff and
defendant. Id. With regard to the first factor, UGI will certainly be
prejudiced if the court determines that plaintiffs are entitled to damages for
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a taking with regard to the gas storage on the Meeker and Tioga fields
because of their ownership interest in the fields. Thus, this factor weighs in
favor of finding UGI indispensable.
The court could possibly limit the prejudice by attempting to shape
the relief, that is, mold it to reflect only the portion of the taking that
Defendant Dominion is liable for, if any. If the court proceeded in that
manner, however, the judgment rendered in UGI’s absence would not be
adequate for complete relief to the plaintiffs. Therefore, these factors also
weigh in favor of finding UGI indispensable.
The final factor is whether the plaintiffs would have an adequate
remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. This factor weighs in
favor of granting the motion. Defendant asks for dismissal, however, as
this is a removed case, we can remand it to state court instead of
dismissing it outright. Thomas Crompton & Margaret Crompton v.
Southland Corp., No. 86-5521, 1987 WL 8537 *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1987)
(remanding a case under Rule 19 instead of dismissing it); 28 U.S.C. §
1446 (indicating generally that the court may remand a removed action
where plaintiff seeks to join an additional defendant if such joinder would
destroy jurisdiction). Thus, as the case will not be dismissed, plaintiffs may
continue to pursue their claim.
A weighing of all the factors indicate that defendant’s motion should
be granted to the extent that this case should be remanded to state court.
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Moreover, plaintiff has already filed an action against UGI in state court for
a taking regarding these fields. (Doc. 33-1, Compl. from Civ. A. No. 1224
CV 2009 (Court of Com. Pleas, Tioga Cnty. Pa). Perhaps, the parties if
they desire, could consolidate this case with the UGI case in state court.
We lack jurisdiction, however, to do more than remand this case and
suggest to the parties that they may seek to consolidate the two cases at
the state court level.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we find that UGI is a necessary
party who it is not feasible to join. Further, UGI is an indispensable party.
We will not dismiss this action, however, but we will remand it to the Court
of Common Pleas of Tioga County. An appropriate order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANK J. ROBBINS, SR. and
MARY ROBBINS,
Plaintiffs
:
No. 3:10cv1381
:
:
(Judge Munley)
:
v.
:
:
DOMINION TRANSMISSION, INC.,
:
Defendant
:
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 13th day of May 2013, it is hereby ORDERED
that defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 32) is hereby
GRANTED to the extent that this case will be remanded to state court.
Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is directed to remand this case to the Court
of Common Pleas of Tioga County, Pennsylvania, and to close the case in
this court.
BY THE COURT:
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court
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