BALLARD v. WILLIAMS et al

Filing 83

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 80 MOTION For Subpoenas. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on March 2, 2012. (kjn )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD DARRELL BALLARD,
Plaintiff
v.
CO 1 WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants

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Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-1456
(Judge Caputo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.

Background

Todd Darrell Ballard, an inmate formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution at Camp Hill who is proceeding pro se, commenced the above-captioned
action on June 28, 2010, asserting that prison staff and officials violated his
constitutional rights following an altercation between Ballard and his cellmate on
March 30, 2008. Ballard claims that corrections officers at SCI-Camp Hill entered
his cell following the altercation, and that the officers assaulted him and burned him
on a radiator during this process. (Doc. 19, Am. Compl, ¶ 1)
Presently, there are two motions before the Court: A motion for stay filed by
Ballard and a motion for sanctions filed by the defendants. Both motions relate to the
scheduling of a deposition of the plaintiff in this case, and we have set a briefing
schedule on these motions to promptly and fairly resolve this aspect of the parties’

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dispute. In connection with these motions Ballard has now filed a motion for
subpoena, (Doc. 80), which seeks subpoenas compelling non-party witnesses to
provide affidavits to Ballard relating to the issues raised in these other motions. For
the reasons set forth below, we will deny this request.
II.

Discussion

Ballard seeks the issuance of subpoenas in support of the litigation of pretrial
motions. To the extent that Ballard seeks to use subpoenas directed to non-parties as
a discovery tool in connection with pretrial motions, we note that rulings regarding
the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which discovery may be compelled,
are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and judgment. Thus, it has long been
held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are “committed to the sound discretion
of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d
Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule
26 also rest in the sound discretion of the Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court’s decisions regarding the
conduct of discovery, and whether to compel disclosure of certain information, will
be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez
v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to
rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
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Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This broad discretion also extends to decisions regarding whether to issue
subpoenas to pro se litigants. Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1990). In
this case, in exercising our discretion, we will deny this request at the present time.
In our view the issues raised by the parties’ motion to stay and motion for sanctions
are subject to resolution without the compelled production of affidavits from third
party witnesses. Therefore, since we believe that these issues cannot be resolved with
such subpoenas and affidavits, we will deny this request, without prejudice to
reconsidering this issue should we determine that statements from these third parties
are essential to informed decision-making in this matter.

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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the plaintiff’s’s motion for subpoenas
(Doc. 80), is DENIED without prejudice.
So ordered this 2d day of March, 2011.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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