James et al v. The City of Wilkes-Barre et al

Filing 139

MEMORANDUM and ORDER providing the statements of the Court's reasoning for denying qualified immunity to dft Marshall. 138 USCA Order- Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/9/12. (sm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHERYL JAMES,
WARREN JAMES and
NICOLE JAMES,

:
No. 3:10cv1534
:
:
(Judge Munley)
Plaintiffs
:
:
v.
:
:
THE CITY OF WILKES-BARRE;
:
WRIGHT TOWNSHIP;
:
WILKES-BARRE HOSPITAL
:
COMPANY, LLC, d/ba Wilkes-Barre
:
General Hospital;
:
THE WYOMING VALLEY HEALTH
:
CARE SYSTEM;
:
THE WILKES-BARRE CITY POLICE
:
DEPARTMENT;
:
THE WRIGHT TOWNSHIP POLICE
:
DEPARTMENT;
:
DR. RUSSELL ELMER JAMES;
:
DR. NOEL PACLEB ESTIOKO;
:
AMY LYNN CRAIG;
:
BETH ANN NOBLE;
:
LORA DENISE PAULUKONIS;
:
BRIAN THOMAS MORAN;
:
TANYA LYNN OSTOPICK;
:
RYAN RUSSELL SELTZER;
:
CAROLE FLEMING PIROW;
:
DENNIS MONK;
:
BRIAN STOUT;
:
MICHAEL MARSHALL;
:
CHARLIE CASEY;
:
KATHY PICKARSKI VIDUMSKI;
:
JASON FRANK KILLIAN; and
:
DR. MAUREEN M. LICTCHMAN,
:
Defendants
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition is the issue of whether Defendant
Michael Marshall should be dismissed from this case on the basis of
qualified immunity. For the following reasons, we find that he should not
be so dismissed.
Background
The facts pertinent to Defendant Marshall’s qualified immunity claim

are as follows: On September 28, Plaintiff Nicole James, then fifteen years
old, sent text messages from her mobile telephone to a friend informing
that friend that James intended to commit suicide by taking an overdose of
seventeen ibuprofen pills. (Complaint, Exh. 1 to Notice of Removal (Doc.
1) (hereinafter “Compl.”) at ¶ 38). At 10:46 p.m., the Defendant Wright
Township Police received a phone call informing them of the threatened
suicide. (Id. at ¶ 39).
At the time of this phone call, Plaintiff Warren James, father of
Nicole, was sleeping. (Id. at ¶ 40). Shortly before, he had taken heart
medication, which made him extremely tired and sleepy. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 12).
Plaintiff Cheryl James, Nicole’s mother, had also taken prescription
medicine that evening. (Id. at ¶ 42). Like her husband, the prescription
medication made Cheryl James tired and sleepy, and she was “unable to
stay awake shortly after taking it.” (Id. at ¶ 11). She also drank some
alcohol on the night in question. (Id. at ¶ 43). All three members of the
James family were in the basement of their home, either sleeping or
watching television, at the time of the incident in question. (Id. at ¶ 41).
Wright Township Police officers Dennis Monk, Brian Stout and
Michael Marshall arrived at the James home accompanied by emergency
medical personnel at 10:49. (Id. at ¶¶ 44-45). They informed Cheryl
James of Nicole’s threats. (Id. at ¶ 44). The officers’ noisy arrival awoke
Warren James, and he and his wife spoke to the police. (Id. at ¶ 46).
Warren and Cheryl James confronted their daughter about the ibuprofen
and text message she had sent her friend. (Id. at ¶ 47). Nicole informed
them that she had sent a text and had planned to kill herself, but she
reconsidered and had not taken any of the pills. (Id.) Though Nicole

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James’s parents believed her denials, the Wright Township police officers
insisted that she be taken to the emergency room at Defendant WilkesBarre General Hospital (“the Hospital”). (Id. at ¶ 48). Warren and Cheryl
James disagreed, wanting to handle the matter in their own home. (Id. at ¶
49). The police officers then informed Warren and Cheryl James that they
would charge the couple with “assisted manslaughter” if Nicole suffered an
injury due to their actions. (Id. at ¶ 50). They felt compelled by the officers
to give permission to have Nicole taken to the hospital. (Id. at ¶ 51).
The police also informed the Warren and Cheryl James that they
would need to accompany Nicole to the hospital. (Id. at ¶ 52). Still feeling
disoriented from their medication, neither parent felt it safe for them to
travel. (Id. at ¶ 53). They informed the police officers of their fears. (Id.).
The officers nonetheless insisted that at least one parent travel with Nicole
James to the hospital. (Id. at ¶ 54). Cheryl James judging herself more
capable and feeling compelled by the law, agreed to accompany her to the
hospital. (Id. at ¶ 55).
Plaintiff’s complaint proceeds to assert many more facts, but these
are the facts pertinent to the claim against Defendant Marshall. The
plaintiffs assert that Defendant Marshall’s actions amounted to the false
arrest and false imprisonment of Plaintiff Cheryl James.
Defendant Marshall filed a motion to dismiss these claims. The
court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Mildred E. Methvin for the
issuance of a report and recommendation. Judge Methvin recommended
the dismissal of the claims against Defendant Marshall. (Doc. 109).
Plaintiffs filed objections to the report and recommendation. (Doc. 112).
Defendant Marshall opposed the objections asserting both that the

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plaintiffs had failed to allege any valid claim against him and that even if
they had, qualified immunity shielded him from liability. (Doc. 114, Br. in
Opp’n to Objections at 14-17). On August 15, 2011, the court issued a
memorandum and order which granted plaintiffs’ objections in part. The
court denied the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims for
false arrest and false imprisonment brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Doc. 129, Mem. & Order dated Aug. 15, 2011 at 33). Our memorandum,
however, did not address the issue of qualified immunity.
Defendant Michael Marshall appealed this court’s decision denying
him qualified immunity although our opinion did not explicitly address this
issue. (Doc. 130, Notice of Appeal). Noting this court’s silence on the
qualified immunity issue, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
case “for the limited purpose of providing a statement of [the court’s]
reasons for denying qualified immunity to [Defendant Marshall].” (Doc.
138, Order of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals dated Feb. 7, 2012). The
court further noted “that the disposition of a motion in which a party pleads
qualified immunity must include, at a minimum, an identification of relevant
factual issues and an analysis of the law that justifies the ruling with
respect to those issues.” (Id.) This memorandum and order follows.1
Discussion
Qualified immunity for police officers “absolves defendants if
reasonable officers could have believed their conduct was lawful ‘in light of
clearly established law and the information the searching officers

The Clerk of Court reassigned this case to District Court Judge
Robert Mariani on November 14, 2011. On February 7, 2012, Judge
Mariani transferred the case back for disposition of this issue.
1

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possessed.’” Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 491 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). Determining whether
qualified immunity applies is a two “step process:” “[f]irst, we must
determine whether the defendants violated ‘clearly established’ rights . . .
[s]econd, we determine whether a reasonable officer would have believed
that his or her conduct deprived plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights.”
Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dept., 421 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2005).
In other words:
Qualified immunity insulates from civil liability
government officials performing discretionary
functions insofar as their actions could reasonably
have been thought consistent with the rights they
are alleged to have violated. In assessing a claim of
qualified immunity, we must review the law relevant
to the official's behavior and ask whether the official
could have believed that his or her actions were
justified by law. The second part of this inquiry
contains two components. To overcome the
defense of qualified immunity, (1) the facts, taken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury, must show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right and (2) the contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.
Forbers v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, Plaintiff Cheryl James asserts that Defendant Marshall
violated her rights by insisting that Defendant Nicole James be taken to the
hospital against her parents’ wishes and requiring that a parent go with
her. Our memorandum of August 15, 2011, concluded that the complaint
alleged that the police officers
asserted their authority and compelled Cheryl
James to accompany her daughter to the hospital.
She alleges that she had no choice in the matter,
and her freedom of movement was thereby
intentionally terminated by the actions of the police.
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Likewise, James alleges that she was confined at
the direction of the police in an ambulance and no
means of exiting that confinement. If she can prove
these facts to a jury, [she] could prevail on her
claim.
(Doc. 129, Mem. & Order dated Aug. 15, 2011 at 15). These facts underlie
her false arrest and false imprisonment claims which in turn are based on
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The first step of the qualified
immunity test is met, that is the defendant is alleged to have violated
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.2
The next portion of the analysis is to determine whether a reasonable
police officer would have known that his actions violated plaintiff’s rights.
“Qualified immunity is defeated if an official ‘knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury.’” Forbes, 313 F.3d at 149 (quoting
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). The United States
Supreme Court has explained as follows: “A Government official's conduct
violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged
conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. We
do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, - - U.S. - - , 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Here a reasonable police officer would have known

A more thorough examination whether Plaintiff Cheryl James
asserted a valid constitutional claim is provided in our Memorandum and
Order of Aug. 15, 2011 at 13-15.
2

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that it violates the Constitution to use his authority as a police officer to
force someone to go somewhere they do not wish to go when that person
has no legal obligation to do so.3
Defendant argues that he acted as he did to ensure the well being of
a distraught teenager and that nothing indicates that it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that such conduct could violate the parent’s
constitutional rights. Regardless of his motives, however, a reasonable
police officer should have known that he cannot use his police authority to
force unwanted action upon someone. Moreover, perhaps recognizing that
it would be have been clear to a reasonable officer that it was a violation of
a constitutional right to force Plaintiff Cheryl James to go to the hospital,
defendant construes James’s actions as “voluntary” rather than forced.
(Doc. 114, Def. Br. in Supp. of Objections at 16-17) (“Mrs. James then
voluntarily agreed to go with her daughter.”)
At the motion to dismiss stage, however, we take the plaintiff’s
version of the facts as true. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d
902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that in deciding a motion to dismiss, the
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and give
the pleader the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can fairly be drawn
therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.) The
complaint alleges that the police insisted that one of the parents
accompany the daughter to the hospital. Plaintiff Cheryl James believed
herself “compelled by law” to accompany her daughter “in reliance upon
the statements of the Wright Township Police officers.” (Compl. at ¶ 55).

Defendant does not argue that the parents had a legal obligation to
accompany their fifteen year old daughter to the hospital.
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Ultimately, depending on what is revealed during discovery, it may well be
a jury question whether Defendant Marshall forced plaintiff to leave her
home or whether he merely convinced her to go voluntarily. At this stage
of the proceedings, however, taking plaintiff’s version of the facts as true
we find that the application of qualified immunity to shield Defendant
Marshall from liability is inappropriate.
For these reasons, Defendant James Marshall’s claim of qualified
immunity were denied.
Date: Feb. 9, 2012

BY THE COURT:
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court

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