Jobe et al v. Bank of America, National Association et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM re 38 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 29 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Bank of America, National Association, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP F/K/A Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 29 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Bank of America, National Association, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP F/K/A Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP - order to follow.Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 4/5/13. (bs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IAN JOBE and
CATHERINE JOBE,

:
:

Plaintiffs

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-1710
:

v.
:
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,
Defendants

(MANNION, D.J.)1
(CARLSON, M.J.)2

:
:

MEMORANDUM3
Presently before the court is a report and recommendation issued by
Judge Martin C. Carlson, (Doc. No. 38). Judge Carlson recommends that the
motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Bank of America, N.A. and BAC Home

1

This case was originally assigned to the Honorable A. Richard Caputo.
Pursuant to the verbal order dated January 4, 2013, the case has been
reassigned to the undersigned.
2

The plaintiffs misidentify Judge Carlson as “Magistrate.” The title
magistrate no longer exists in the U.S. Courts, having been changed from
“magistrate” to “magistrate judge” in 1990. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
104 Stat. 5089, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §321 (1990) (“After the enactment of this
Act, each United States magistrate . . . shall be known as a United States
magistrate judge."). The plaintiffs are reminded to use the correct title, in the
future, when referring to Judge Carlson.
3

For the convenience of the reader of this document in electronic
format, hyperlinks to the court’s record and to authority cited have been
inserted. No endorsement of any provider of electronic resources is intended
by the court’s practice of using hyperlinks.

Loan Servicing, L.P. (hereinafter the “BANA Defendants”),4 (Doc. No. 29), be
granted. Also before the court are the plaintiffs’ objections to the report and
recommendation, (Doc. No. 39), as well as defendants’ response to the
objections, (Doc. No. 41). After reviewing the report and recommendation and
the objections, the court will adopt Judge Carlson’s report and
recommendation to the extent that it recommends that the action to quiet title
be dismissed with respect to the BANA Defendants. In addition, the court will
adopt Judge Carlson’s recommendation that any claims arising under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§1692, et seq., and the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §2601, et seq.,
be dismissed in their entirety.

I.

BACKGROUND
The underlying action stems from a dispute over ownership interests in

a parcel of land. In particular, the parties dispute whether a particular
mortgage obligation has been satisfied and whether the defendants’ attempts
to collect amounts they believe are owed violated the FDCPA.5 On October

4

The parties do not dispute that Bank of America, N.A. is the successor
of BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. and are therefore properly considered
together in relation to the instant matter.
5

As Judge Carlson notes in his report and recommendation, the
plaintiffs have previously brought unsuccessful actions in federal court
2

6, 2011, District Judge A. Richard Caputo entered an order dismissing the
plaintiffs’ original complaint but granting the plaintiffs leave to file an amended
complaint. (Doc. No. 27). In their amended complaint, (Doc. No. 28), the
plaintiffs expressly raise two causes of action. The first is an action to quiet
title to the property against all named defendants. The second alleges various
violations under the FDCPA against the BANA Defendants. In addition, the
plaintiffs later argue that a third cause of action under RESPA is evident from
the facts presented in their amended complaint. (Doc. No. 32 at 2).
On November 21, 2011, the BANA Defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
(Doc. No. 29) and brief in support, (Doc. No. 30). The motion and brief argue
that the plaintiffs have failed to properly plead their claims. With respect to the
action to quiet title, the BANA defendants assert that the plaintiffs have
admitted that the BANA Defendants do not hold the promissory note nor have
any interest in the property and are therefore not proper parties to the action.
With respect to the FDCPA claims, the BANA Defendants argue that the
plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that the BANA
Defendants were acting as “debt collectors” under the statute.
On December 6, 2011, the plaintiffs’ filed a brief in opposition, (Doc. No.
32). The brief generally refutes the arguments that the pleadings are

regarding ownership of the parcel of land in question and encumbrances upon
it. See Jobe v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC, 373 F. Appx. 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
3

insufficient, but also alleges that the motion to dismiss failed to address the
plaintiff’s RESPA claim, purportedly asserted in paragraphs 25-27 and 30-31
of the amended complaint. On December 12, 2011, the BANA Defendants file
a reply brief, (Doc. No. 37), which argues in part that their motion to dismiss
did not address any RESPA claims because the plaintiffs failed to state a
RESPA claim.
On April 20, 2012, Judge Carlson issued his report and recommendation
that the motion to dismiss be granted, (Doc. No. 38). On May 7, 2012, the
plaintiffs filed their objections to the report and recommendation, (Doc. No.
39).6 On June 15, 2012, the BANA Defendants filed a response to the
plaintiffs’ objections, (Doc. No. 41). As noted above, this case was transferred
to the undersigned on January 4, 2013.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of the
report to which objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Brown v.

6

On May 7, 2012, the plaintiffs also filed an affidavit by a purported
expert on mortgage compliance and foreclosure. (Doc. No. 40). In reviewing
a motion to dismiss, however, the court will only consider the complaint,
attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v. McCormick, 502
F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007).
4

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo,
the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,
and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the
extent it deems proper. See Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.Pa.
2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).
For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no
objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also
Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D.Pa.
2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)
(explaining judges should give some review to every report and
recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or not,
the district court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to the provisions
of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has
been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F. 3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and
5

dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the
complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating “no set of facts” language
found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. This requirement “calls for enough fact[s]
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of”
necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. Furthermore, in order
to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff must “provide the
grounds
of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 ( 3d Cir. 2008) (brackets
and quotations marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at
1964-65).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the
complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider
“undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit
to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached]
6

documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged
in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the
court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to
dismiss. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d
Cir. 1994).
Finally, it is important to note that this court is required to liberally
construe a pro se plaintiff's pleadings; “however inartfully pleaded,” the
“allegations of [a] pro se complaint [are held] to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520(1972). In doing so, the court is to “apply the applicable law irrespective
of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293
F.3d 683, 687 (3d Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, a court need not credit a plaintiff's
“bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132
F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997).

III.

DISCUSSION
Judge Carlson’s report and recommendation addresses the three

distinct causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint: the
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action to quiet title and the FDCPA claims expressly asserted in the amended
complaint as well as the RESPA claim the plaintiffs allege is properly pled
within the complaint. The court will adopt Judge Carlson’s report and
recommendation dismissing each of the claims. The court will not, however,
adopt Judge Carlson’s ultimate recommendation that the case be closed,
finding that the action to quiet title has not yet been resolved as to the
remaining defendants to this action.
A. Action to Quiet Title
The plaintiffs have clearly asserted that the BANA Defendants do not
have any legal interest in their property and therefore cannot maintain an
action to quiet title against the BANA Defendants. As Judge Carlson indicated,
under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1061(b), an action to quiet title
may be brought:
(1) to compel an adverse party to commence an action of ejectment; (2)
where an action of ejectment will not lie, to determine any right, lien, title
or interest in the land or determine the validity or discharge of any
document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in
land; (3) to compel an adverse party to file, record, cancel, surrender or
satisfy of record, or admit the validity, invalidity or discharge of, any
document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in
land; or (4) to obtain possession of land sold at a judicial or tax sale.
Pa.R.C.P. 1061.
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs assert that “[d]efendants are
not the owner or holder of any Promissory Note or Mortgage encumbering the
Homestead.” (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 24). Though that assertion addresses all
8

defendant’s generally, the plaintiffs specifically reiterate that neither Bank of
America, National Association nor BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP are the
current owner of “any note encumbering the Homestead.” (Doc. No. 28 ¶¶ 3435).7 In their objections, the plaintiffs do not controvert their assertion that the
BANA Defendants hold no interest in land. Rather the plaintiffs claim that the
BANA Defendants are in possession of “document[s], obligation[s] or deed[s]
affecting any right, lien, title or interest in land,” under Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(3).
The plaintiffs, however, do not specify what documents they believe the
defendants may have or how those documents might related to the property.
In light of the fact that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint clearly asserts that
the BANA Defendants do not have any interest in the property, the bald
assertion that they may possess unspecified documents related to the
property is not sufficient to sustain their action to quiet title with respect to the

7

The plaintiffs also indicate that Defendant Wells Fargo, N.A.
(hereinafter “Wells Fargo”) is not the current holder of any note encumbering
the property. (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 33). The plaintiffs, however, cloud their assertion
regarding Wells Fargo by stating that in a letter dated October 20, 2010, Wells
Fargo claimed an interest over the property in the form of a loan which the
plaintiff dispute. (Doc. No. 49). Moreover, the plaintiffs acknowledge and
quote in their amended complaint a letter from Attorney Italiano, dated
January 15, 2010, informing them that Wells Fargo is the current owner of the
note on their property. (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 30).
Wells Fargo was not a party to the motion to dismiss on which Judge
Carlson issued his report and recommendation, therefore the court need not
resolve this conflicting account of Wells Fargo’s possible ownership at this
time.
9

BANA Defendants. Neither the plaintiffs’ amended complaint nor their
objections to the report and recommendation offer any legal support for the
maintenance of an action to quiet title against a third party whose only
purported connection to the a disputed property is possible possession of
unspecified documents. The court is similarly unable to find any legal support
for such a claim. As such, the court will adopt the report and recommendation
to the extent it recommends dismissal of the action to quiet title against the
BANA Defendants.
The court’s determination that the plaintiffs have failed to plead their
claim with respect to the BANA Defendants, however, does not necessarily
effect the action to quiet title with respect to the other named defendants. The
other defendants have not moved to dismiss the amended complaint and the
court will decline to adopt Judge Carlson’s recommendation that the action to
quiet title be dismissed in its entirety, at this time.
B. FDCPA Claims
Judge Carlson found that the plaintiffs failed to properly establish either
that the BANA Defendants were “debt collectors” under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§1692, et seq., or that any
debt existed. Therefore, Judge Carlson recommends that the FDCPA claims
be dismissed against the BANA Defendants, the only defendants against
whom FDCPA claims are alleged. The court agrees that the amended
10

complaint fails to establish a prima facie FDCPA claim.
As discussed above, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint clearly asserts
that the BANA Defendants are not creditors because they hold no interest in
the property. (Doc. No. 28 ¶¶ 34-35). As Judge Carlson discussed, the
FDCPA generally does not apply to mortgage servicers who merely perform
administrative duties. See Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, LP, 225 F.3d 379, 403
(3d Cir. 2000). The FDCPA does, however, impose obligations on those who
act as debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(6) defines a “debt collector” as:
[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection
of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another....
the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own
debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a
third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts....[S]uch
term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which
is the enforcement of security interests. 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(6).
The plaintiffs properly allege that the BANA Defendants used the mail
to correspond with the plaintiffs regarding their alleged mortgage. (Doc. No.
28 ¶ 59). The plaintiffs, however, fail to plead in any discernable manner that
the BANA Defendants’ principal business purpose is to collect debts or that
they regularly collect debts. As such, the plaintiffs fail to sufficiently establish
that the BANA Defendants are debt collectors which is a predicate to any of
their FDCPA claims.

11

The plaintiffs’ pleading failure is the result of the contradictory nature of
the amended complaint itself. At one point the plaintiffs plainly assert that the
defendants “were acting as debt collectors.” (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 53). In the
objections to the report and recommendation, the plaintiff allege that this
assertion is supported by the fact that the BANA Defendants’ communicated
with the plaintiffs on behalf of Wells Fargo. (Doc. No. 39 at 4-5). The plaintiffs
allege that the third party relationship between the BANA Defendants and
Wells Fargo demonstrates that the BANA Defendants were acting as debt
collectors on behalf of Wells Fargo. The plaintiffs’ internally inconsistent
amended complaint, however, suggests alternate relationships between the
defendants which critically undermines the veracity of any allegations that the
BANA Defendants were necessarily acting as debt collectors. Crippled by
contradiction regarding necessary facts, the amended complaint amounts to
a collection of bald assertions that cannot support the plaintiffs’ FDCPA
claims.
Throughout their amended complaint the plaintiffs offer conflicting
statements as to whether the BANA Defendants were servicing the alleged
mortgage or collecting an alleged debt. At one point the plaintiffs assert that
BAC did not start servicing the allege mortgage until June 22, 2010. (Doc. No.
28 ¶ 31). In their objections the plaintiffs argue that this was only included to
show that BAC believed it was servicing the mortgage. Nevertheless, the
12

statement indicates that the BANA Defendants may have been acting as a
mortgage servicer rather than as a debt collector. (Doc. No. 30 at 7). Similarly,
the plaintiffs’ amended complaint again references the possible servicer role
assumed by the BANA Defendants when recounting that “Bank of America
acquired Countrywide, the original servicer, in July 2008.”8 (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 57).
The plaintiffs then refute these statements by summarily stating that
“[n]either [d]efendant is the servicer of any obligation encumbering the
Homestead. BAC may be in the business of mortgage servicing, in general,
but it was not in fact the servicer of any obligation encumbering the
Homestead” (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 56). This lone conclusory assertion is entirely
inconsistent with the above mentioned facts that indicated that BAC was
servicing the mortgage rather than collecting a debt. However, even in
contradicting other parts of the pleading, the statement acknowledges that
“BAC may be in the business of mortgage servicing.” (Id.).
The court is required to liberally construe the plaintiffs’ pro se complaint
8

This statement appears to be offered to suggest a time line in which the
BANA Defendants acquired the alleged mortgage after it was in default. A
service may be liable under the FDCPA if it began servicing an obligation after
it has gone into default. See Conklin v. Purcell, Krug & Haller, 2007 WL
404047, *5 (M.D.Pa. Feb 1, 2007). The plaintiffs, however, repeatedly assert
that they never defaulted on their mortgage. (Doc. No. 28 ¶¶ 32-35, 55, 80).
Though it is yet another example of the plaintiffs inconsistent statements of
fact, the court need not reach the issue of whether there was a default
because it finds that the plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead that the
BANA Defendants were debt collectors under the FDCPA.
13

and take all facts asserted in the amended complaint as true in evaluating a
motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the court is simply unable to read the directly
conflicting facts offered by the plaintiffs as an affirmative allegation the BANA
Defendants were debt collectors. To be sure, it is not the plaintiffs’ burden to
establish whether the defendants were or were not mortgage servicers. The
plaintiffs, must however plead sufficient facts that the BANA Defendants were
persons who engaged in “business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debts, or who regularly collect[ed] or attempt[ed] to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another.” 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(6). The plaintiffs’ contradictory statements do
not allow for any conclusions to be drawn about the BANA Defendants’
business or any regular activities. This factual confusion about the nature of
the BANA Defendants role in the collection of payment completely undermines
the minimal support offered by the plaintiffs to support their conclusory
statement that the BANA Defendants must be considered debt collectors
because of their third party relationship to the mortgage. Under Twombly, the
bald assertion that remains cannot support a finding that the BANA
Defendants were debt collectors to which the FDCPA applies. See Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)
Therefore, the court will adopt the report and recommendation that the
plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims be dismissed.
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C. RESPA Claims
In their brief in opposition to the BANA Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
(Doc. No. 32), the plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to recognize and
respond to the claims properly raised under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. §2601, et seq., in paragraphs 25-27
and 30-31 of the amended complaint. Judge Carlson found that neither these
paragraphs nor the amended complaint as a whole adequately states a
RESPA claim. This court agrees and will dismiss the RESPA claims in their
entirety.
The paragraphs the plaintiffs indicated contain their RESPA claim relate
to a letter sent by Ms. Jobe to which the BANA Defendants did not respond.
(Doc. No. 28 ¶¶ 25-31). As Judge Carlson explained, 12 U.S.C. §2605(e)
imposes a duty on loan servicers to respond to borrower inquiries in a timely
fashion. To the extent the plaintiffs claim a violation of RESPA based on the
facts contained in the referenced paragraphs, such a claim would be properly
brought under 12 U.S.C. §2605(e). RESPA defines a servicer as “ the person
responsible for servicing of a loan” and the servicing of a loan as “receiving
any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of
any loan, including amounts for escrow accounts described in section 2609
of this title, and making the payments of principal and interest and such other
payments with respect to the amounts received from the borrower as may be
15

required pursuant to the terms of the loan.” 12 U.S.C. §§2605(i)(2)-(3). As
discussed above, the plaintiffs’ contradictory amended complaint fails to
clearly plead the relationship between the BANA Defendants, the mortgage
and the plaintiffs. The same internal confusion that prevented the court from
finding an adequate pleading that the BANA Defendants were debt collectors
under the FDCPA now prevents the court from finding that the BANA
Defendants are servicers under RESPA. In attempting to preserve claims
under each of the statutes the plaintiffs have pled themselves out of both.
In addition, as Judge Carlson further discussed, a breach of RESPA
duties alone is not sufficient to state a claim, a party must also allege
damages. See Hutchinson v. Delaware Sav. Bank FSB, 410 F. Supp. 2d 374,
383 (D.N.J. 2006); see also Cortez v. Keystone Bank, No. 98-2457, 2000 WL
536666, *12 (E.D.Pa. May 2, 2000). 12 U.S.C. §2605(f) addresses damages
and costs for breaches of RESPA and defines the available damages as: “(A)
any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and (B) any
additional damages, as the court may allow, in the case of a pattern or
practice of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an amount
not to exceed $1,000.” 12 U.S.C. §2605(f). In Cortez, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, explained that “actual
damages encompass compensation for any pecuniary loss including such
things as time spent away from employment while preparing correspondence
16

to the loan servicer, and expenses for preparing, photocopying and obtaining
certified copies of correspondence.” Cortez, 2000 WL 536666, *12.
The plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not allege any actual damages
attributable to the alleged breach of the defendants’ duty to respond under
RESPA. The plaintiffs lone assertion of damages under RESPA comes in their
prayer for relief which requests “all remedies set forth in 12 U.S.C. §2607.”
In their objections to the report and recommendation, the plaintiffs claim that
their amended complaint shows that they where “damaged by wrongful
collection efforts” and “by being unable to identify what, if anything, is owed
to whom, if anyone.” These broad allegations of damages, however, are not
adequate to establish the type of specific actual damages outlined in Cortez.
In addition, the plaintiffs have made no allegations of a pattern or practice of
noncompliance to warrant damages under §2605(f)(1)(B).
Therefore, even if the court construes the pro se complaint in a liberal
manner in an effort to draw out an implied RESPA claim, any such claim must
be dismissed because the complaint fails to plead that the BANA Defendants
are servicers to which the RESPA applies and contains no allegations of
actual damages resulting from the alleged RESPA violations. As such, the
court will adopt the report and recommendation to the extent it recommends
dismissal of the purported RESPA claims in their entirety.

17

IV.

CONCLUSION
Finding that the BANA Defendants have no ownership interest in the

property in dispute, the court will dismiss the action to quiet title with respect
to the BANA Defendants. This dismissal, however, does not affect the action
to quiet title with respect to the non-moving defendants. Finding that the
plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to properly plead necessary elements of the
respective causes of action, the court will dismiss the FDCPA and RESPA
claims in their entirety. An appropriate order will follow.

Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATED: April 5, 2013
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\2010 MEMORANDA\10-1710-01.wpd

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