Hill v. Lappin et al
Filing
145
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - For the foregoing reasons, Hills discovery motions, (Docs. 104, 110, 111, 112, 114), and motion for sanctions (Doc. 131) are DENIED. Hills Second Motion for Extension of Time in which to File a Reply Brief, (Doc. 143), which was previously granted by this Court, (Doc. 141), is DISMISSED as moot. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on June 6, 2012. (kjn )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERNEST JACK HILL, III
Plaintiff,
v.
HARLEY LAPPIN, et. al,
Defendants,
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CIVIL NO. 3:10-CV-1743
(Judge Kosik)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case is a civil rights action brought by a federal prisoner, Ernest Jack Hill,
against federal prison officials, alleging that these prison officials have been
deliberately indifferent to Hill’s serious medical needs. The plaintiff in this case,
Ernest Jack Hill, III, is an inmate who reportedly suffers from an array of emotional
and physical challenges. Over the past several years, medical personnel in at least
three federal prisons have examined Hill, treated him on dozens of occasions, and
diagnosed the complex combination of emotional maladies and physical symptoms
which he presents to his care-givers. The nature and extent of this treatment is
undisputed; indeed, Hill has meticulously documented and identified literally dozens
of medical encounters which he has had with prison staff, often on a weekly basis,
over the past two years.
Despite these undisputed efforts, Hill contends that prison officials have
nonetheless been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. This claim of
deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s medical needs appears, in part, to turn on a
broadly-framed dispute between Hill and his care-givers regarding one specific form
of treatment for the anxiety and panic disorders which plague the plaintiff, the use of
a particular class of anti-anxiety medications to treat this condition. In addition to
these broadly cast constitutional claims, Hill leveled one other, more specific and
narrowly tailored allegation in his second amended complaint. According to Hill,
on three specific instances between February and July of 2010, two correctional staff,
Lieutenant Novak and Correctional Officer Acevedo, ignored medical emergencies
experienced by Hill late at night or in the early morning hours, and deliberately
allowed the plaintiff to lay on the floor of his cell, suffering acute distress for hours
before summoning outside medical assistance. (Doc. 27, pp.29-30)
After making these allegations, Hill’s second amended complaint casts a broad
web of culpability, naming twenty-four individual defendants. These individual
defendants include the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Harley Lappin; five
medical personnel employed at the Federal Correctional Complex, Terre Haute;1 as
The Terre Haute defendants are defendants Klink, Ndife, Tabor, Drummy,
and Webster.
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well as prison medical personnel stationed in Springfield, Missouri, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and Waseca, Minnesota.2 Hill then levels a series of claims against
fifteen defendants employed at the United States Penitentiary, Canaan. These
defendants range from the warden at this facility, Ronnie Holt, to a corrections
lieutenant, correctional officers, along with prison medical and psychological staff.
After naming 24 defendants in his complaint, Hill seeks damages from only 11 of
these defendants. (Doc. 27, pp.29-31) Hill’s prayer for damages, like much of the
balance of his complaint, is sweeping in its reach, with Hill demanding $500,000 in
compensatory damages, and $1,500,000 in punitive damages from each of these
defendants. (Id.)
Hill has been provided an opportunity to complete discovery in aid of these
claims, and in order to permit the plaintiff to address a pending, and potentially
dispositive, defense motion.
Hill has taken full advantage of this discovery
opportunity, propounded numerous, multi-faceted discovery demands upon the
defendants, and is now embroiled in a discovery dispute with the defendants. This
dispute relates both to the adequacy of defense responses to multiple requests for
These defendants included, Lemuel Arriola, (Waseca, Minnesota), N.
Newland, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) and James Wolfson, M.D., (Springfield,
Missouri).
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admission served by Hill, as well as the timeliness of the delivery of other discovery
responses to Hill.
The defendants have responded to Hill’s various discovery motions,
acknowledging a brief delay in the delivery of some discovery, while asserting that
Hill has now received a response to all of his 35 discovery demands. Indeed, the
defendants note that they have provided Hill discovery beyond that required by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, Hill complained that the defendants
failed to make initial disclosures to him under Rule 26. The defendants, however,
have responded by noting both that they have made such disclosures, and by aptly
observing that Hill is not entitled to such disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B).
Beyond these arguments concerning the timing of discovery which has now
been tendered to Hill, the plaintiff’s principal complaint in these discovery motions
is that the defendants have not adequately responded to his multiple requests for
admission. With respect to this contention, the defendants have filed a carefully
documented response which details each of Hill’s requests for admission, and the
defendants’ responses to these requests for admission. (Doc. 136) The defendants
contend, with some substantial justification, that many of Hill’s requests for
admission were prolix, argumentative, confusing and embraced compound subjects,
actors, events and assertions. Notwithstanding these flaws in the requests for
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admission, the defendants note that they responded to each request, admitting what
they could, denying what was beyond their capacity to admit, and objecting to those
portions of these requests which were improper.
These various competing discovery motions have now been fully briefed by the
parties, and are ripe for resolution. Having reviewed these pleadings, for the reasons
set forth below, Hill’s discovery motions, (Docs. 104, 110, 111, 112, 114), and
motion for sanctions (Doc. 131) will be denied.
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions for sanctions, and provides that:
(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to
Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide
information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply
evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this
sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be
heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions . . . .
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37, and give
rise to sanctions, is defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
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a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
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defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”
A party moving under Rule 37 to compel discovery, or for sanctions, bears the
initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information. Morrison v.
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial
burden is met, “the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack
of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery: (1) does not come within
the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such
marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh
the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust
Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D.Kan. 2009).
In addition, when considering discovery disputes like the instant dispute
relating to requests for admissions, the court–and the litigants–must remain mindful
of the limited purpose served by this particular discovery tool.
The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to narrow the issues for trial to those which
are genuinely contested. See Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81
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F.R.D. 431, 436 (E.D.Pa.1978); United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197, 201
(S.D.N.Y.1959). Where, as here, issues in dispute are requested to be
admitted, a denial is a perfectly reasonable response. Furthermore, the
use of only the word “denied” is often sufficient under the rule. See, e.g.,
Continental Casualty Co. v. Brummel, 112 F.R.D. 77, 81-82 n. 2
(D.Colo.1986); Kleckner v. Glover Trucking Corp., 103 F.R.D. 553, 557
(M.D.Pa.1984). “Regardless of the subject matter of the Rule 36 request,
the statement of the fact itself should be in simple and concise terms in
order that it can be denied or admitted with an absolute minimum of
explanation or qualification.” Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67
F.R.D. 93, 96 (W.D.Mo.1973). “A request for an admission, except in a
most unusual circumstance, should be such that it could be answered yes,
no, the answerer does not know, or a very simple direct explanation
given as to why he cannot answer, such as in the case of privilege.”
Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 46 (E.D.Pa.1960). “Rule 36 should
not be used unless the statement of fact sought to be admitted is phrased
so that it can be admitted or denied without explanation.” Id. at 45
United Coal Companies v. Powell Const. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967-68 (3d Cir. 1988).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Hill’s various
discovery motions
At the outset, to the extent that Hill invites us to find that the defendants have
failed to adequately respond to his requests for admission, we will decline this
invitation. Our review of Hill’s requests for admission, and the defendants’ responses
to those requests for admission, reveal several basic truths.
First, many of Hill’s requests were confusing, unclear, prolix, and propounded
in an argumentative fashion. These requests for admission also frequently embraced
multiple, independent propositions, many of which assumed the ultimate issues at
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dispute in this lawsuit. Some of these propositions were framed in the nature of legal
assertions. Other requests for admission required parties to admit to the culpability
of co-defendants, or to acknowledge factual matters that were hotly disputed by the
parties. Thus, Hill’s requests for admission routinely violated the simple guidance
that: “Regardless of the subject matter of the Rule 36 request, the statement of the
fact itself should be in simple and concise terms in order that it can be denied or
admitted with an absolute minimum of explanation or qualification.” Havenfield
Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 96 (W.D.Mo.1973). Similarly, the complex
and confusing format of many of these requests defied any ready response, and did
not heed the court’s admonition that: “A request for an admission, except in a most
unusual circumstance, should be such that it could be answered yes, no, the answerer
does not know, or a very simple direct explanation given as to why he cannot answer,
such as in the case of privilege.” Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 46
(E.D.Pa.1960). “Rule 36 should not be used unless the statement of fact sought to be
admitted is phrased so that it can be admitted or denied without explanation.” Id. at
45. Furthermore, Hill’s efforts to secure admissions from the defendants of central,
and disputed, issues in this litigation ignored the basic truth that where, as here, issues
in dispute are requested to be admitted, a denial is a perfectly reasonable response.
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See e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Brummel,112 F.R.D. 77, 81-2 (D.Colo.1986);
Kleckner v. Glover Trucking Corp., 103 F.R.D. 553, 557 (M.D.Pa.1984).
Given the flaws in Hill’s requests for admission, we find the defendants’
responses to these requests to have been reasonable and appropriate. The defendants
admitted what they could. They denied what they disputed, and they objected to
those propositions which were not appropriates topics for requests for admission.
Accordingly, we will decline Hill’s invitation to compel further replies to these
requests.
We also find that Hill’s complaints regarding the timing of other discovery do
not require the Court’s intervention at this time. The defendants have acknowledged
an inadvertent delay in providing some discovery. They have corrected that delay,
providing material in some instances beyond that required under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the brief delay in producing this information has
not prejudiced Hill in any demonstrable way. On these facts, there is nothing further
for us to compel, and the imposition of sanctions is unwarranted.
An appropriate order follows.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Hill’s discovery motions, (Docs. 104, 110, 111, 112,
114), and motion for sanctions (Doc. 131) are DENIED. Hill’s Second Motion for
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Extension of Time in which to File a Reply Brief, (Doc. 143), which was previously
granted by this Court, (Doc. 141), is DISMISSED as moot.
So ordered this 6th day of June 2012.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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