Slavoski v. Pawlowski et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 15 Motion for Reconsideration. The Clerk of Courts is directed to mark the case as CLOSED. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 5/23/11 (jam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM SLAVOSKI,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-2139

(JUDGE CAPUTO)
FRANK PAWLOWSKI et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 15.) For
the reasons discussed below, the motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Slavoski filed his complaint on October 15, 2010 (Doc. 1) alleging First
Amendment retaliation (count I) and violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights (counts II and III), all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, a United States Secret
Service Officer, alleged that he had been unlawfully targeted by the Pennsylvania State
Police (“PSP”) after they accused him of using a law enforcement computer database for
unauthorized reasons. Plaintiff admits to having used the database to look up a car
registration after he was contacted by Daniel Griffin, a police officer in the city of the
Kingston, Pennsylvania, about Mr. Griffin’s concern over possibly being followed.
Plaintiff’s use of the database was investigated by the PSP, who claimed he used the
database improperly and suspended his use of it for one year. Plaintiff then made formal
complaints to the PSP regarding his suspension but the suspension remained in place.
After plaintiff’s complaint was filed, defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 6)
which the Court granted on March 16, 2011.

Plaintiff then filed a motion for

reconsideration on April 7, 2011. (Doc. 15.) The motion has been briefed by both sides
and is ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration is governed by Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows a party to move to alter or amend a judgment within ten days of
entry. FED . R. CIV. P. 59(e). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v.
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985). A judgment may be altered or amended if the
party seeking reconsideration establishes at least one of the following grounds: “(1) an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not
available when the court granted the motion . . . or (3) the need to correct a clear error of
law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Café, by Lou-Ann, Inc., v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999). “A motion for reconsideration is not to be
used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to
relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone
Residence, 226 F. Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002). “[R]econsideration motions may
not be used to raise new arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment.” Hill v. Tammac Corp., Civ. A. No. 05-1148, 2006 WL 529044,
at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2006). The reconsideration of a judgment is an extraordinary
remedy, and such motions are granted sparingly. D'Angio v. Borough of Nescopeck, 56
F. Supp.2d 502, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1999).

2

DISCUSSION
The Court will not grant plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because plaintiff has
not met the high standard for reconsideration. Plaintiff makes essentially four arguments,
all on the “clear error of law or fact” basis: (1) the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis was
incorrect; (2) the Court’s First Amendment retaliation analysis was incorrect; (3) the Court
states that plaintiff used the database in order to help Mr. Griffin, who was a personal
friend, whereas the complaint does not allege a personal relationship between them; and
(4) the Court ignores that some of the retaliatory incidents took place after plaintiff filed
his complaints against the PSP. The Court will discuss each point in turn.
First, the Court has already found that plaintiff did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a work computer. Therefore, defendants accessing of the
computer database in order to find plaintiff’s address was not an unlawful search under
the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff’s brief in this motion simply reiterates the arguments he
initially raised in his brief opposing the motion to dismiss.
Second, the Court agrees with plaintiff that it should have applied the general First
Amendment retaliation test, see, e.g., Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282
(3d Cir. 2004), rather than the test for First Amendment retaliation against a public
employee test found in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (U.S. 2006). However, using
the former test in no way impacted the Court’s finding that plaintiff failed to allege any
retaliatory action, the common requirement of both tests. Plaintiff was put on probation
for his allegedly unauthorized use of the database before he made the complaints against
the PSP, not after he made them, as would be necessary to support a retaliation claim.

3

Plaintiff does make some vague allegations in the complaint of being further investigated
by the PSP, but, as the Court stated in its prior memorandum opinion, these allegations
fail to state a claim for retaliation.
Third, while plaintiff is correct that the complaint does not allege a personal
relationship between plaintiff and Mr. Griffin nor that plaintiff had personal reasons for
using the database, the Court’s consideration of these matters did not in any way affect
the substantive analysis contained in the memorandum opinion.
Fourth, plaintiff’s vague references to being “investigated” or “harassed” are simply
too ill-defined to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation. Plaintiff also makes a brief
reference, en passant, to the merits of his Fourteenth Amendment “class-of-one” claim
at the end of his brief. However, as the Court noted in its prior memorandum opinion,
even if plaintiff had established that he had been treated differently from others similarly
situated, which he did not, treatment of violations surrounding the use of the database is
strictly within the discretion of the PSP. See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. Of Agric., 553 U.S.
591, 603 (2008).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration. (Doc. 15.) An appropriate order follows.

5/23/11
Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM SLAVOSKI,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-2139

Plaintiff,

(JUDGE CAPUTO)
FRANK PAWLOWSKI et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
NOW, this

23rd

day of May, 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 15) is DENIED. The Clerk of Courts is directed
to mark the case as CLOSED.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge