J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Kraynak et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting in part and denying pltf's 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment - GRANTING re Section 605(a) Liability against the corporation Nak's by the Tracks., and DENYING re enhanced damages and individual liability against dft Chirs Kraynak; and DENYING dfts' 35 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ; Clerk of Court is directed CLOSE this case. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/22/13. (sm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC., :
No. 3:10cv2486
Plaintiff
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
CHRIS KRAYNAK and NAK’S BY
:
THE TRACKS d/b/a KNACK AT THE :
TRACKS a/k/a NAK’S BY THE
:
TRACKS,
:
Defendants
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition are two motions. First, Plaintiff J & J
Sports Productions, Inc. moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 26).
Second, defense counsel moves to withdraw as attorney for defendants.
(Doc. 35). For the following reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment will be granted, in part, and denied, in part, and defense
counsel’s motion to withdraw will be denied.
Background
Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, Inc. (hereinafter “plaintiff”) is a
closed-circuit distributor of sports and entertainment programing. (Doc. 265, Aff. of Joseph M. Gagliardi (hereinafter “Gagliardi Aff.”) ¶ 3).
Defendants Chris Kraynak and Nak’s by the Tracks d/b/a Knack at the
Tracks a/k/a Nak’s by the Tracks (hereinafter “defendants”) are the owners
and operators of a commercial establishment (hereinafter “defendants’
bar”) located in Exeter, Pennsylvania 18643. (Doc. 26-2, Pl.’s Statement
of Material Facts (hereinafter “SOF”) ¶ 3; Doc. 17, Aff. in Supp. of Mot. to
Set Aside Default J. (hereinafter “Def. Aff.”) ¶¶ 1-2). Plaintiff purchased
and retains the commercial exhibition licensing rights to a boxing match,
Oscar De La Hoya v. Manny Pacquiao Welterweight Championship Fight
Program (hereinafter the “program”). (SOF ¶¶ 1-2). The program was
telecast nationwide on Saturday, December 6, 2008. (Id.)
On December 6, 2008, Janis Bianco, an investigator working for
plaintiff, entered defendants’ bar at 10:54 p.m. (Doc. 26-4, Aff. of Janis
Bianco (hereinafter “Bianco Aff”) at 2). Bianco did not pay a cover charge
to enter defendants’ bar and stayed until 11:56 p.m. (Id. at 2-3). Although
defendants’ bar has an occupancy for forty to fifty (40-50) people, Bianco
counted thirty (30) patrons in defendants’ bar.1 (Id.) Additionally, Bianco
observed three televisions. (Id. at 2). Two smaller televisions were
broadcasting a football game. (Id.) A larger fifty-two (52) inch television
was broadcasting the program. (Id.)
An establishment with a seating capacity of fifty (50) would have
paid a $2,200.00 license fee to broadcast the program. (Gagliardi Aff. ¶ 8).
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On December 3, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendants’
willfully broadcast the program without paying a licensing fee thereby
violating the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 et seq. and the
Cable and Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
47 U.S.C. § 553 et seq.2 (Doc. 1, Compl. (hereinafter “Compl.”)).
Plaintiff seeks $10,000 in statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §
605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II), $100,000 in enhanced damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §
650(e)(3)(C)(ii) and attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §
605(e)(3)(B)(iii). (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendant Chris Kraynak
individually liable.
On August 4, 2011, the Honorable Richard P. Conaboy granted
default judgment for the plaintiff. (Doc. 16). Defendants subsequently filed
a motion to set aside the default judgment (Doc. 17) and the case was
reassigned to the undersigned judge.
On August 24, 2011, the court set aside the default judgment and
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment only on 47 U.S.C. § 605, pursuant
to TKS Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir. 2001).
(Doc 26-1, Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3 n.1); see also J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Potions Bar & Lounge, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1825, 2009
WL 763624 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2009) (holding that a court is not
permitted to award damages under both 47 U.S.C. § 553 and 47 U.S.C. §
605 for a single transmission).
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3
ordered defendants to file an answer or other responsive pleading within
ten (10) days. (Doc. 19). Defendants filed an answer on September 2,
2011 (Doc. 21) and a case management conference was held on
November 3, 2011 (Doc. 25).
Subsequent to the case management conference, plaintiff filed a
motion for summary judgment and a brief in support thereof. (Doc. 26).
Defendants filed a motion for an extension of time to file a brief in
opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the parties
were engaged in settlement talks. (Doc. 27). The court granted
defendants’ request for an extension of time and ordered defendants to file
a brief in response to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment by August
10, 2012. (Doc. 29).
On August 10, 2012, plaintiff filed a notice of settlement. (Doc. 30).
The court dismissed the case and provided the parties sixty (60) days to
consummate the settlement. (Doc. 31).
Plaintiff filed a notice on September 28, 2012, to withdraw the
settlement and moved for the action to be reinstated. (Doc. 32). The court
ordered the case be re-opened and directed defendants to file a brief in
opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment within three (3)
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weeks. (Doc. 33). As a result of defendants’ failure to file a timely brief,
the court ordered defendants to file a response to plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment within ten (10) days. (Doc. 34). The court warned that
if a timely brief was not filed, the court would deem the motion unopposed
and all the factual averments made in the motion would be accepted as
true. (Id.)
No opposition brief was filed, and the deadline for its filing has
passed. Finally, defendants’ attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
on November 20, 2012 (Doc. 35) bringing this case to its present posture.
JURISDICTION
As this case is brought pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. § 605 et seq., and the Cable and Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 553 et seq., the court
has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c)). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must
examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Int’l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949
(3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the
non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is material if it might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where the
non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for
summary judgment may meet its burden by showing that the evidentiary
materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient
to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
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U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must go beyond its pleadings,
and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Id. at 324.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on four issues: (1) Liability; (2)
Damages–both statutory and enhanced; (3) Attorney’s Fees; and (4)
Liability of the Individual Defendant. We will address the issues in seriatim.
Prior to addressing plaintiff’s four issues, the court notes defendants
failed to submit a brief in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment. According to the local rules, the statement of material facts as
submitted by plaintiff is deemed admitted. L.R. 7.6, 56.1. Thus, to
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate, we must determine
whether “the facts specified in or in connection with the motion entitle the
moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I.
Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir.1990).
Furthermore, defendants failed to object or otherwise respond to
plaintiff’s request for admissions within thirty (30) days. Pursuant to the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a matter is admitted unless, within 30
days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves
on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the
matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3);
see also Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.
1976) (explaining that a request for admission was properly deemed
admitted under Rule 36(a) for purposes of a motion for summary judgment
because it was not denied), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). Plaintiff’s
request for admissions are thus admitted.
A. Liability
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under 47 U.S.C. § 605
(hereinafter “Section 605”). Section 605(a) prohibits the unauthorized
interception and exhibition of communications. Specifically, to establish a
violation of Section 605(a) plaintiff must show that defendants intercepted
a broadcast, were not authorized to intercept the broadcast, and showed
the broadcast to others.
In this regard, plaintiff has established undisputed facts to support all
the elements of Section 605(a). Plaintiff lawfully purchased the
commercial exhibition license rights to the program. (SOF ¶ 2; Gagliardi
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Aff. ¶ 3). Defendants never paid a licensing fee to broadcast the program.
(SOF ¶ 5). An investigator entered defendants’ bar on December 6, 2008
and observed a fifty-two (52) inch projection television broadcasting the
program. (SOF ¶ 4,8; Bianco Aff. at 1-3). Accordingly, the court finds no
genuine issue of material fact pertaining to liability under Section 605(a).
B. Damages
Because liability has been established under Section 605(a), we turn
our attention to damages. The law provides for statutory and enhanced
damages. In the present case, plaintiff seeks to be compensated for both.
As such, we will address each category of damages separately.
1. Statutory Damages
Section 605 allows any person aggrieved to collect statutory
damages. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). A single violation of Section
605 permits statutory damages of “not less than $1,000 or more than
$10,000.”3 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Walsh, 540 F.
Most cases applying this statute in a commercial context have
interpreted the showing of an event on a single night as one violation. See
e.g., Kingvision Pay-Per-View, LTD. v. Lardo, 2:10-CV-0059, 2010 WL
3463316 at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2010); Time Warner Cable v. Taco
Rapido Rest., 988 F. Supp 107, 110-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Accordingly, as
plaintiff’s evidence indicated that the event was illegally broadcast at
defendants’ bar on December 6, 2008, the court calculates damages
3
9
Supp. 2d 553, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2008). “The specific amount of statutory
damages assessed pursuant to Section 605 rests within the sound
discretion of the court.” Walsh, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 560; (citing DIRECTV
v. Haskell, 344 F. Supp. 2d 761, 763-64 (D. Me. 2004)). Here, plaintiff
seeks the maximum statutory damage award of $10,000.
Plaintiff advances two arguments for a maximum statutory damages
award: (1) plaintiff seeks to be made whole; and (2) plaintiff seeks to deter
future piracy. First, the program’s rate card indicates defendants would
have paid plaintiff $2,200 to lawfully broadcast the program. As a result, a
statutory award in the amount of $2,200 is warranted to make plaintiff
whole.
Second, plaintiff seeks the maximum statutory damage award to
deter piracy. United States District Courts within the Third Judicial Circuit
have approved the award of statutory damages in excess of actual
damages for the purpose of deterrence. Kingvision Pay-Per-View, LTD. v.
Lardo, 2:10-CV-0059, 2010 WL 3463316 at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2010); J
& J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Gallegos, No. 2:08-CV-0201, 2008 WL 3193157
at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2008); Comcast Cable Co. v. Bowers, No. 2:06-CV-
based on one violation of Section 605(a).
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1664, 2007 WL 1557510 at *4-5 (D.N.J. May 25, 2007).
However, district courts within the Third Judicial Circuit have also
acknowledged that when a large discrepancy exists between actual
damages ($2,200) and maximum statutory damages ($10,000), an award
of maximum statutory damages is not appropriate despite its deterrent
effect. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Gencarelli, 2:10-CV-4375, 2012 WL
4442514 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v.
Edrington, 2:10-CV-3789, 2012 WL 525970 at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2012); J
& J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Perdomo, 2:06-CV-1374, 2007 WL 923522 at *4
(D.N.J. March 26, 2007); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Munguti, 2:06-CV1282, 2007 WL 928479 at *3-4 (D.N.J. March 27, 2007).
Taking such factors into consideration, the court concludes a
statutory damage award of $6,600 is appropriate under the circumstances.
The court finds this sum sufficient to fully compensate plaintiff for lost
profits as well as to deter defendants and others like them from engaging
in future piracy. This amount is also “a recognition that the maximum
statutory damages should be reserved for cases where there is evidence of
more substantial injury to the plaintiff or profit by the defendants.”
Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Jasper Grocery, 152 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442
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(S.D.N.Y. 2001). As such, the court will award plaintiff $6,600 in statutory
damages.
2. Enhanced Damages
In addition to statutory damages, plaintiff seeks the maximum
amount of enhanced damages, $100,000. Section 605 allows for
enhanced damages, not to exceed $100,000, where “the court finds that
the violation was committed willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. §
650(e)(3)(C)(ii). Thus, plaintiff must prove: (1) defendants willfully violated
Section 605(a); and (2) defendants willful violation was for direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private financial gain. We address each element
in turn.
a. Willful Violation of Section 605(a)
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has defined “willful” conduct as
actions “marked by [the] careless disregard [for] whether or not one has
the right so to act.” United Airlines Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127
(1985) (citing United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933)); see
also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. It’s Amore Corp., No. 3:08-CV-0570, 2009
WL 1886038 at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 30, 2009) (defining willful conduct in a
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copyright infringement case).
Plaintiff argues defendants’ willfulness is found within plaintiff’s
request for admissions which contains a statement that defendants willfully
exhibited the program. (Req. for Admins. ¶ 31). Defendants failed to
object or otherwise respond to plaintiff’s request for admissions within thirty
(30) days. Thus, defendants’ statement is admitted, and plaintiff has
established defendants willfully violated Section 605(a).
b. Direct or Indirect Commercial Advantage or Private Financial Gain
The District Court of New Jersey has compiled factors illustrating
direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain. In
Munguti, the court explained that the number of televisions broadcasting
the event, existence of a cover charge, sale of food or drink, advertisement
of the event in the defendants’ bar, and a demonstration that defendants
made more money or conducted additional business by illegally
broadcasting the event are pertinent factors to be considered in
determining enhanced damages. 2007 WL 928479 at *3.
When the instant case is analyzed under the Munguti factors, it is
apparent plaintiff has not established direct or indirect commercial
advantage or private financial gain. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to
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provide evidence that defendants charged a premium on food and drinks.
Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that defendants advertised plaintiff’s
program prior to December 6, 2008. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to
provide evidence that defendants derived significant profit from
broadcasting the program. In fact, plaintiff’s own investigator stated
defendants were not charging a special cover charge on the night of
December 6, 2008. (Bianco Aff. at 2). Plaintiff’s failure to prove direct or
indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain is fatal to their
claim. As a result, the court declines to award enhanced damages.
C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Plaintiff has sought an award of litigation costs and attorney’s fees
pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii), in which a court “shall direct the
recovery of full costs, including awarding reasonable attorney’s fees to an
aggrieved party who prevails.” The plain wording of the statute allows
plaintiff to recover its full costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. Therefore,
plaintiff shall be given fourteen (14) days to submit evidence of its costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees.
D. Individual Liability
The final issue we must address is whether Defendant Chris Kraynak
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is liable in his individual capacity. In order to impose individual liability,
plaintiff must prove: (1) Defendant Kraynak had both the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity; and (2) Defendant Kraynak received a
direct financial benefit from such activity. DIRECTV v. Cibulka, No. 1:11CV-0231, 2011 WL 3273058 *1 (M.D. Pa. July 29, 2011) (citing Parker v.
Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 837 (3d Cir. 2007); Joe Hand Promotions,
Inc. v. Angry Ales, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-73, 2007 WL 3226451 at *4
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 2007).
1. Ability to Supervise
The first step assesses whether Defendant Kraynak had a “right and
ability to supervise” the infringing activity. Cibulka, 2011 WL 3273058 at
*1; J & J Sports Prods. v. Benson, No. 1:60-CV-1119, 2007 WL 951872 at
*7 (E.D.N.Y. March 27, 2007) (citations omitted). An individual defendant
has the right and ability to supervise if they possess dominion, control
and/or oversight of a commercial establishment’s activities. Cibulka, 2011
WL 3273058 at *4; Benson, 2007 WL 951872 at *7; Angry Ales, Inc., 2007
WL 3226451 at *4. Plaintiff states Defendant Kraynak is an officer, director
and/or principal with dominion, control and oversight over the airing of
plaintiff’s program. (SOF ¶¶ 6, 11). Defendants failed to submit a brief in
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opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. According to the
local rules, plaintiff’s statement of material facts are admitted. Thus, the
court will find Defendant Kraynak was a person with a right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity.
2. Direct Financial Benefit
Having found Defendant Kraynak had the ability to supervise the
infringing activity, we address whether Defendant Kraynak received a
direct financial benefit from such activity. Courts consider a direct financial
benefit to be present when the infringing materials act as a draw for
customers. Parker, 242 F. App’x at 837 (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357
F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004). “The draw for customers based upon the
infringing materials need not be substantial.” Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079.
Plaintiff makes three arguments to prove direct financial benefit: (1)
Defendant Kraynak required its patrons to pay a cover charge to enter
defendants’ bar on the night plaintiff’s program was broadcast; (2)
Defendant Kraynak advertised ahead of time that the program would be
telecast at defendants’ bar; and (3) Defendant Kraynak is sole shareholder
of Nak’s by the Tracks. However, a deeper inquiry into plaintiff’s three
arguments does not support a finding of direct financial benefit.
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First, plaintiff states Defendant Kraynak “required its patrons or
clientele to pay a cover charge or other fee to enter . . . .” (SOF ¶ 12(c);
Req. for Admins. ¶ 14). However, Investigator Bianco states she did not
pay a cover charge. (Bianco Aff. at 2). Additionally, Bianco did not witness
any other patron pay a cover charge. (Id. at 2-3). Thus, plaintiff has failed
to prove Defendant Kraynak required its patrons to pay a cover charge.
Second, plaintiff claims Defendant Kraynak “advertised ahead of time
that the program would be telecast within defendants’ bar.” (SOF ¶ 12(c);
Req. for Admins. ¶ 9). But, Bianco’s affidavit fails to mention any
billboards, fliers or posters inside or outside defendants’ bar advertising the
program. (Bianco Aff. at 2-3). On the contrary, Bianco observed the
following distinguishing items inside defendants’ bar: a dart board and a
beer sign in the window. (Id. at 2). As such, plaintiff has failed to prove
Defendant Kraynak advertised plaintiff’s program.
Finally, plaintiff argues Defendant Kraynak received a direct financial
benefit from airing plaintiff’s program because he is the sole shareholder of
Nak’s by the Tracks. Although proof Defendant Kraynak is the sole
shareholder satisfies the first step of the individual liability test (ability to
supervise) it is insufficient to satisfy the second step (direct financial
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benefit). Our standard imposing individual liability requires plaintiff to do
more than simply state Defendant Kraynak is the sole shareholder.
Plaintiff must prove a direct financial benefit by illustrating that the airing of
plaintiff’s program acted as a draw for customers. In this regard, plaintiff
has failed.
Thus, plaintiff’s inability to prove the infringing material acted as a
draw for customers is fatal to their claim that Defendant Kraynak received
a direct financial benefit from broadcasting plaintiff’s program.4
Accordingly, the court will not hold Defendant Chris Kraynak individually
liable for the Section 605(a) violation.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment will be granted, in part, and denied, in part, and defense
counsel’s motion to withdraw will be denied. Plaintiff’s summary judgment
motion will be granted with respect to Section 605(a) liability against the
corporation Nak’s by the Tracks. The motion will be denied with respect to
enhanced damages and individual liability against Defendant Chris
Contra Cibulka, 2011 WL 3273058 at *1 n.4 (finding advertisements
of infringing activities on a large billboard outside a bar with drink and food
specials is evidence of a draw for customers).
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Kraynak. An appropriate order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC., :
No. 3:10cv2486
Plaintiff
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
CHRIS KRAYNAK, and NAK’S BY
:
THE TRACKS d/b/a KNACK AT THE :
TRACKS a/k/a NAK’S BY THE
:
TRACKS,
:
Defendants
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 22nd day of January 2013, upon consideration
of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 26), it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as
follows:
1.
The motion is GRANTED with respect to Section 605(a) liability
against the corporation Nak’s by the Tracks. JUDGMENT is entered
in favor of J & J Sports Prods., Inc. and against Nak’s by the Tracks,
in the amount of $6,600.00 plus interest in accordance with 47
U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(c)( i)(II).
2.
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii), plaintiff shall have fourteen
(14) days from the date of this order to submit its litigation costs and
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an itemized list of attorney’s fees. Defendants shall then have
fourteen (14) days from the date of plaintiff’s cost and fee filing to file
objections.
3.
The motion is DENIED with respect to enhanced damages and
individual liability against Defendant Chris Kraynak.
4.
The motion of defendants’ counsel to withdraw as attorney (Doc. 35)
is DENIED.
5.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
BY THE COURT:
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court
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