Muniz v. Sullivan et al

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:1. Pltfs unsupported motions to compel (Docs. 36 , 38 ) these motions are deemed withdrawn pursuant to Local Rule 7.5, and are DENIED without prejudice. 2.With respect to Pltfs motion to compel Dft Berdanier to provide further responses to Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, and 20 (Doc. 39 ), the motion is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on December 13, 2011. (kjn )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGEL MUNIZ,
Plaintiff
v.
C.O. SULLIVAN, et al.,
Defendants

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Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-2635
(Judge Caputo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
In this civil action, plaintiff Angel Muniz, a former inmate incarcerated at the

Schuylkill County Prison, has sued a number of the prison’s correctional officers,
alleging that they used or facilitated the use of excessive force against him on May 28,
2010.1 Plaintiff has filed three separate motions seeking to compel Defendants to
produce discovery in this case. (Docs. 36, 38, and 39.)

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Defendants include Correctional Officers Eugene Berdanier, Tim Doyle,
Brian Gotshall, Frank Hannis, Michael Menne, David Wapinsky, Jack Yeager, and
Mark Sullivan. Counsel has entered an appearance on behalf of all defendants with
the exception of C.O. Mark Sullivan. With respect to this last defendant, counsel
has represented that at the time of service, Mark Sullivan was no longer employed
at the prison, and had enrolled on active duty with a branch of the United States
military, stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. It is unclear whether Plaintiff
has served Mr. Sullivan in a manner authorized under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. To date, no counsel for Mr. Sullivan has entered an appearance
in this action, and Mr. Sullivan has not responded to the complaint and allegations
against him.

The Court entered an order setting forth a briefing schedule with respect to each
of the motions. (Doc. 40.) Notwithstanding this order, Plaintiff has only filed one
brief that appears to be offered only in support of his motion to compel Defendant
Berdanier to respond more fully to Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, and 20 that were
propounded upon him. (Doc. 39, 45.) Defendants have filed a brief opposing this
particular motion (Doc. 50). On November 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed a reply brief in
further support of his motion to compel Defendant Berdanier’s responses to the
interrogatories. (Doc. 54.) The Court subsequently entered an order directing the
defendants to produce additional responsive documents for in camera review. (Doc.
55.)
Defendants complied with this order and submitted the documents for the
Court’s review. Following our review of these materials, we conclude that the
documents are not relevant to the claims that Muniz has brought in this action, as we
find that they are comprised of investigative documents relating to an incident that
occurred subsequent to the events alleged in the complaint, and the documents do not
otherwise appear reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of other admissible
evidence in this action.

Accordingly, we conclude that the information that

Defendants have furnished to Plaintiff with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, and
20 directed to Defendant Berdanier are sufficiently responsive to these discovery
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requests, and we will not compel a further response.
Turning to Plaintiff’s remaining motions to compel, we note that Plaintiff has
not filed a brief supporting either motion, notwithstanding having been directed to do
so. (Doc. 40.) Accordingly, we entered a subsequent order instructing Plaintiff to file
supporting briefs not later than November 30, 2011, or the motions would be deemed
withdrawn. (Doc. 55.) However, the Court has received notice that Plaintiff is no
longer housed at the Manhattan Correctional Center in New York, the last address that
the Court had on file with respect to Plaintiff’s custody. (Docs. 53, 56.) To date,
Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a current mailing address, and the Court is
thus unable to communicate its orders to Plaintiff. To the extent Plaintiff persists in
failing to notify the Court regarding his whereabouts, this action may ultimately be
subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute.

However, because Plaintiff had

previously demonstrated diligence in communicating with the Court, we do not find
that this action should be dismissed at this time. However, because Plaintiff has not
filed a brief in support of two of the motions to compel, and we find that these
motions have now been withdrawn, and they will be denied without prejudice.

II.

SUMMARY OF THE PENDING MOTION (Doc. 39)
As noted, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that the defendants subjected
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him to excessive force during an incident at the prison on May 28, 2010. Plaintiff has
also alleged that Defendant Mark Sullivan was later terminated for misconduct, and
Plaintiff has suggested that Defendant Sullivan had a history of using excessive force
against inmates at the prison. Accordingly, as part of his discovery requests, Plaintiff
propounded interrogatories on Defendant Berdanier specifically seeking information
about investigations into allegations against Mark Sullivan’s conduct while he was
employed at the prison, including the results of any formal investigation into
allegations that Mr. Sullivan had assaulted inmates.
Although Defendant Berdanier provided some information in response,
Defendants resisted responding fully to some of the requests, arguing either that the
discovery was irrelevant, sought information about an individual who has not properly
been made a party to this action, or otherwise sought evidence that would be
inadmissible at trial. (Doc. 50.)
In the pending motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to the
following interrogatories:
10.

In the reprimand/firing of Mark Sullivan what did your Investigation
reveal?

11.

Who were victim, witnesses, medical staff and Law enforcement
involved with the assault by Mark Sullivan on inmate in medical cell on
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June or July 2010?
20.

Did the victim of the assault by Sullivan when he was reprimanded/fired,
file criminal charges, grievances, lawsuit?

Defendants have objected to these interrogatories directed at Defendant
Berdanier
to the extent the discovery sought relates to parties who
have not been served with a complaint, individuals who are
not parties to this action or instances other than the May 28,
2010 incident which is the subject matter of this action on
the ground that discovery seeks information that is not
relevant to the subject matter of this action and is not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
(Doc. 50, at 2.) Notwithstanding this objection, Defendants responded to the
foregoing interrogatories as follows:
10.

Correctional Officer Mark Sullivan was subsequently terminated for
misconduct which did not involve the plaintiff, Angel Muniz.

11.

Investigation was conducted by an independent investigator. No
criminal charges were filed. The investigation concluded that the
charges of misconduct, unrelated to the plaintiff, Angel Muniz, were
founded. An incident occurred on June 10, 2010, involving Resident
Arndt. There were no known witnesses. Medical staff on duty on June
10 were medical staff employed by PrimeCare. There was no law
enforcement involvement.

20.

Objection on the ground that the information sought would not relate to
the incident involving the plaintiff, Angel Muniz and seeks information
which is not relevant to this action or likely to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
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(Doc. 50, at 3.) In essence, Defendants contend that these answers are sufficient, and
maintain that they should not be required to provide further responses, in particular
because the discovery sought relates to Mark Sullivan, who at this point has not
properly been made a party to this action. Additionally, Defendants assert that the
discovery sought is inappropriate because even if a subsequent incident occurred
involving another inmate and Mr. Sullivan, any evidence of such an incident would
be inadmissible under Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Additionally,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not filed a claim for municipal liability against the
county, or for supervisory liability against the warden or deputy warden at the prison,
and therefore discovery requests regarding other incidents of excessive force that
might show a pattern of misconduct is inappropriate and unwarranted.
Nevertheless, Defendants complied with this Court’s order directing them to
submit additional documents to the Court for in camera review. Following review of
those materials, we conclude that the documents are not properly discoverable in this
case as they are not relevant to the claims that Plaintiff has brought in this action, and
we do not find that they are reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of other
admissible evidence.

We further agree with Defendants that the information

contained in these materials would not properly be admissible under Rule 404 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
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III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Rule 26, the Legal Standard

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines both the scope
and limitations governing the use of discovery in a federal civil action:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court
order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense – including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Muniz’s motion, and the defendants’ response in opposition
to this motion, call upon the Court to exercise its authority under Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil procedure to regulate discovery in this case. Issues relating to
the scope of discovery permitted under the Rules rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). A
court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a
showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134
(3d Cir. 1983).
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This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense”. Therefore, valid claims of privilege still cabin and restrict the court’s
discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery permitted
by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which is defined in the
following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
Applying these benchmark standards, we now turn to the Mr. Muniz’s
interrogatories seeking information about any investigations that led to the termination
of Mr. Sullivan’s employment, including investigations into incidents involving Mr.
Sullivan arising one or two months after the alleged use of excessive force.
Additionally, Mr. Muniz requested information about whether any other victim of
assault by Mr. Sullivan pressed criminal charges, filed grievances, or commenced
legal proceedings as a result. Although Defendants provided some responsive
information to these interrogatories, they have declined to provide certain documents
relating to internal investigations that occurred at the prison subsequent to the events
alleged in the complaint.
In our prior order, we declined to find that Plaintiff was absolutely foreclosed
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from discovering this information, but we instead directed Defendants to submit
potentially responsive documents to the Court for in camera review so that we could
determine whether the documents were properly discoverable in accordance with Rule
26(b)(1), and to consider whether the investigative materials might ultimately be
admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 404(b) governs the admissibility of other acts evidence and provides as
follows: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident….”
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). With respect to the admissibility of Rule 404(b) other act
evidence:
While . . . Rule 404(b) is “construed as a rule of inclusion
rather than exclusion,” United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d
1015, 1019 (3d Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted), [the courts] have also cautioned that the . . .
reasons for introducing prior bad acts evidence may be a
combination of showing a “consequential fact as well as …
impugn [ing a party’s] character.” United States v. Jemal,
26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States
v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992)). Therefore,
“when evidence of prior bad acts is offered, the proponent
must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of
logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference
that the [party] has the propensity to commit the [act]
charged.” United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782
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(3d Cir. 1994) (citing Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272).
United States v. Lindsay 339 F. App'x 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, given the fact that Rule 404(b) is defined as a “rule of inclusion”,
we initially found that there might be information arising out of incidents involving
Mr. Sullivan and other inmates at the Schuylkill County Prison subsequent to May 28,
2010, which would be admissible under the Rule as proof of “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident….”
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). However, we observed that no judgment on the relevance and
admissibility of this evidence was possible in the abstract, as any assessment of these
issues involves a multi-faceted and fact-specific analysis of both the proffered
evidence and the party’s claims.
Recognizing that any responsive information that Defendants may provide
could arguably contain discoverable material, we noted that in the past courts have
reconciled the interests of inmate-plaintiffs and corrections officials by rejecting
broadly framed requests for access to prison records, see Paluch v. Dawson, No. 061751, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91191, 2007 WL 4375937, *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12,
2007), while conducting an in camera review of those records which may be relevant
to more narrowly tailored discovery demands. Paluch v. Dawson, No. 06-175, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54636, 2008 WL 2785638, *3 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2008); see also
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Whetstone v. Bohinski, No. 08-2306, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19346, *15-16 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 3, 2010).
We adopted that course in this case, and directed the defendants to provide to
the Court for its in camera inspection any further information that they may have with
respect to Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, and 20, other than the information provided in
the responses to date. Following our review of the materials that Defendants
furnished to the Court, we agree with Defendants that this information is not relevant
to Plaintiff’s claims in this case, and is not reasonably likely to lead to the discovery
of other admissible evidence. In this regard, we are now further satisfied that the
documents fall outside of Rule 404's ambit, and we conclude that requiring
Defendants to release some or all of this sensitive information would be improper and
unwarranted given the lack of relevance in this case and the sensitive nature of the
information itself.
IV.

ORDER
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

THAT:
1.

Plaintiff’s unsupported motions to compel (Docs. 36, 38) these motions
are deemed withdrawn pursuant to Local Rule 7.5, and are DENIED
without prejudice.
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2.

With respect to Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant Berdanier to
provide further responses to Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, and 20 (Doc. 39),
the motion is DENIED.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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