Bidlack et al v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 36 Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/21/15 (jam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDWIN BIDLACK, CANDY D. BIDLACK,
and JESSIE LEE NORTHRUP,
individually,
Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-0129
(JUDGE CAPUTO)

v.
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC,
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY
CORPORATION, and NOMAC
DRILLING, LLC,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before me is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) and Local Rule 83.3.1(a). (Doc. 36.) Plaintiffs commenced this action
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, Pennsylvania in December 2010, and
Defendants removed the action to this Court on January 19, 2011. (Doc. 1.) Shortly
thereafter, the parties agreed to stay the action pending arbitration. (Docs. 7; 8.) Plaintiffs
subsequently sought relief from the stay in February 2012, but that motion was denied on
May 11, 2012. (Docs 24; 25.) By Status Report submitted on June 17, 2013 (Doc. 30), the
parties indicated that they were working to resolve this matter.
Now, Defendants seek to have this matter dismissed for failure to prosecute.
According to Defendants, although they advised Plaintiffs in January 2014 that they wished
to move forward with arbitration, Plaintiff have not yet commenced arbitration proceedings.
(Doc. 36, ¶ 6.) As a result, Defendants contend that dismissal is warranted because: (1)
Plaintiffs abandoned their case; (2) the factors set forth by the Third Circuit in Poulis v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) favor dismissal; and (3)
Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Court’s February 23, 2011 Order by not commencing
arbitration. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
Plaintiffs dispute that they abandoned their case, and they contend that Defendants
fail to fully represent the events relevant to the history of this litigation. As set forth in the

Declaration submitted by William Dubanevich, counsel for Plaintiffs, the parties agreed in
June 2013 to defer arbitration and enter into settlement discussions. (Doc. 40, Dubanevich
Aff., ¶ 4.) Defendants, through prior counsel, submitted a settlement offer to Plaintiffs in
November 2013. (Id. at ¶ 6.) The offer was rejected by Plaintiffs. (Id.) In September 2014,
Plaintiffs were informed by attorney Jesse Pierce that Defendants’ prior counsel was no
longer involved in the case. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Pierce made another settlement offer on behalf of
Defendants around this time. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs continued to discuss settlement with
Pierce from October 2014 until February 2015. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
On May 1, 2015, Plaintiffs were contacted by attorney Michael Leahey, who has
since entered his appearance for Defendants in this case, seeking Plaintiffs’ concurrence
in the instant motion to dismiss. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The same day, Plaintiffs initiated a call with
Leahey and informed him of the ongoing settlement discussions they had been engaged
in with Pierce. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Leahey was not aware of those settlement discussions. (Id.)
On May 5, 2015, Leahey presented a “take it or leave it” settlement offer to Plaintiffs, and
he advised Plaintiffs that rejection of the offer would result in the filing of the motion to
dismiss. (Id. at ¶ 14.) The motion to dismiss was then filed on May 11, 2015. (Doc. 35.)
Defendants’ motion seeks dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) provides, in part: “Involuntary Dismissal;
Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a
defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Although the parties previously agreed to submit this dispute to arbitration, “an
agreement to arbitrate does not completely oust a district court of jurisdiction over the
claims subject to arbitration.” Windward Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reinsurance Co., 123
F. App’x 481, 483 (3d Cir. 2005). Courts have held that “a stay of proceedings pending
arbitration contemplates continuing supervision by a court to ensure that arbitration
proceedings are conducted within a reasonable amount of time, . . . and jurisdiction over
a Rule 41(b) motion properly serves this end.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, review of the
instant motion is appropriate.
2

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, however, will be denied without prejudice. First, the
evidence submitted by Plaintiffs confirms that they have not demonstrated a clear intent to
abandon the case, nor has their conduct made adjudication impossible in view of the
parties’ prior agreement to attempt to amicably resolve this case.
Second, dismissal is not warranted pursuant to the six factors set forth in Poulis v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).1 In balancing the Poulis
factors, no single factor is dispositive, and not all of the factors need be satisfied in order
to justify the dismissal of the action. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008).
Considering these factors in view of the evidence in the record, it does not appear
that Plaintiffs’ delay in commencing arbitration proceedings prejudiced Defendants in view
of the parties’ agreement to attempt to settle this case. Moreover, I do not agree with
Defendants that Plaintiffs have shown a history of dilatoriness, nor has there been any
evidence that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith. In these circumstances, the Poulis factors do not
weigh in favor of dismissal at present. However, if the parties cease settlement negotiations
and Plaintiffs still fail to commence arbitration proceedings, Defendants may renew their
request for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 36)
is DENIED without prejudice.
August 21, 2015
Date

1

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

The Poulis factors are:
(1) The extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the plaintiff's conduct; (3) the history of dilatoriness;
(4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad
faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails
an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
3