Amirnazmi v. Scism

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons. Amirnazmis motions for discovery and other relief (Docs. 16 , 18 , and 21 ) are DENIED.Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on May 6, 2011. (kjn )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALI AMIRNAZMI,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM SCISM,
Respondent.

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CIVIL NO. 3:11-CV- 273
(Judge Nealon)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THEE ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
On February, 8, 2011, the petitioner, Ali Amirnazmi filed, a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) In his petition, Amirnazmi: (1) challenges the results of the
prison disciplinary hearings which led to the forfeiture of good time for this federal
prisoner; (2) attacks the prison’s exercise under the Second Chance Act, with respect
to his placement in a Residential Re-entry Center; and (3) urges us to reassess the
fairness of a prison decision denying Amirnazmi an opportunity to participate in a
Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP).
Along with his petition, Amirnazmi filed a series of motions. (Docs. 16, 18 and
21.) In these motions Amirnazmi recited that he is now housed in the Special Housing
Unit at the prison. Amirnazmi then asked that this court enter orders: (1) directing
prison officials to allow him to keep stored legal materials in his Special Housing Unit
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cell; and (2) instructing prison officials to provide him access in discovery to prison
disciplinary materials relating to other inmates, information Amirnazmi sought as part
of a speculative fishing expedition in support of his habeas corpus petition.
On May 5, 2011, we filed a report and recommendation which recommended
that Amirnazmi’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied. (Doc. 23.) In light of
this recommendation, we will DENY this motions as moot, without prejudice to
Amirnazmi renewing the motions, should the district court determine that further
proceedings are appropriate on this petition.
In addition to denying these motions as moot, we note that, to the extent that
Amirnazmi seeks discovery regarding disciplinary decisions pertaining to other
inmates, his request fails on its merits. Habeas petitioners have no absolute right to
make discovery demands upon respondents. Rather, decisions on discovery requests
rest in the sound discretion of the court. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has noted:
Just as bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not afford a
sufficient ground for an evidentiary hearing, see Wacht v. Cardwell, 604
F.2d 1245, 1246 n. 2 (9th Cir.1979), neither do they provide a basis for
imposing upon the state the burden of responding in discovery to every
habeas petitioner who chooses to seek such discovery. Under Rule 6(a)
of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under § 2254 the district
court has discretion to decide the extent to which discovery is appropriate.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 6 makes clear that prior court

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approval is required to prevent abuse.
Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 185 (3d. Cir. 1987)
These discovery rules in § 2254 petitions apply with equal force to federal habeas
petitions under § 2241. See, e.g., Patton v. Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 156, 158-59 (M.D. Pa.
1979) (explaining that habeas rules are “applicable to Section 2241 petitions through
Rule 1(b)”).
In his habeas petition, Amirnazmi attacks the substance of various DHO
decisions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support any finding of
misconduct on his part. This substantive attack on the sufficiency of the evidence in
this disciplinary hearing must meet a demanding legal standard to succeed. A prison
disciplinary determination comports with due process if it is based on “some
evidence.” See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-56 (1985)
(“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board”). This standard is minimal
and does not require examination of the entire record, an independent assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, or even a weighing of the evidence. See id. at 455;
Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500, 501-02 (3d Cir. 1989). Therefore, is well settled
that the decision of the DHO is entitled to considerable deference by a reviewing court

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and must be upheld whenever there is "some evidence" to support the decision. Hill,
472 U.S. at 457; Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48 (3d Cir.1992); Thompson v. Owens, 889
F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1989); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1988); Freeman
v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 955 (2d Cir. 1986). In sum, in this setting the "function [of
the court] is to determine whether there is some evidence which supports the decision
of the [DHO]." Freeman, 808 F.2d at 954. As the Supreme Court has observed, the
“some evidence” standard is a highly deferential standard of review and:
Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support
the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.
Hill 472 U.S. at 455-456.
Applying this deferential standard, once the reviewing court determines there is “some
evidence” to support the finding of the DHO, the court must reject the evidentiary
challenge by the petitioner and uphold the finding of the DHO. Griffin v. Spratt, 969
F.2d 16, 22 (3d Cir. 1992); Thompson, 889 F.2d 501; Freeman, 826 F.2d at 954. In
practice, courts have rarely condemned correctional disciplinary decisions as being
wholly lacking in evidentiary support, and have frequently concluded that disciplinary
findings are supported by the requisite degree of proof . See e.g., Fiore v. Lindsay, 336
F.App’x 168 (3d Cir. 2009)(upholding disciplinary decision); Macia v. Williamson,
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219 F.App’x 229 (3d Cir. 2007)(same); Reynolds v. Williamson, 197 F.App’x 196 (3d
Cir. 2006)(same); Levi v. Holt, 193 F.App’x 172 (3d Cir. 2006)(same); Sinde v.
Gerlinski, 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (M.D.Pa. 2003)(same).
Given these governing standards which control resolution of habeas petitions
attacking prison disciplinary decisions, we will deny this particular discovery request,
finding that the request does not address the issue of the merits of these DHO
proceedings, and further finding that the release of other complaints in unrelated
matters would violate the privacy rights of the third parties named in those complaints.
See Mincy v. Chmielewski, No. 05-292, 2006 WL 3042968 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 25,
2006)(denying access to third-party complaints on privacy grounds). Moreover, we
find that Amirnazmi has not made the threshold showing of selective prosecution
which is a legal prerequisite to such a discovery. Such selective prosecution discovery
requests must meet a “rigorous standard.” and “the required threshold to obtain
discovery is ‘ “some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements
of the defense,” discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.’ ” United States. v.
Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 607 (3d Cir. 2004)(citations omitted). Amirnazmi has not
made this showing in his pleadings; therefore, his speculative discovery request should
be denied.

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Furthermore, as for Amirnazmi’s request that prison officials allow him to store
extra legal materials in his cell at the Special Housing Unit, we note that inmates have
in the past often invited federal courts to entertain orders directing their jailers to allow
them greater access to legal materials. Yet, these requests, while frequently made, have
rarely been embraced by the courts. See, e.g., Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, supra;
Edmonds v. Sobina, 296 F.App’x 214, 216 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2008); Barnes v. Quattlebaum,
No. 08-2197, 2009 WL 678165 (D.S.C. March 12, 2009); Clay v. Sobina, No. 06-861,
2007 WL 950384 (W.D.Pa. March 26, 2007); Wesley v. Vaughn, No. 99-1228, 2001
WL 1391254 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 7, 2001). Instead, these courts have repeatedly upheld as
reasonable prison policies concerning access to, and the storage of, legal materials that
are even more restrictive than those apparently at issue here, finding that these policies
do not unduly infringe upon inmates’ rights to petition the courts. See , e.g., Barnes
v. Quattlebaum, No. 08-2197, 2009 WL 678165 (D.S.C. March 12, 2009); Wesley v.
Vaughn, No. 99-1228, 2001 WL 1391254 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 7, 2001), (upholding a policy
limiting an inmate to storage of one box of legal materials in his cell per month.) In
light of this settled case-law, Amirnazmi’s complaints regarding the storage of some
of his legal materials while he is housed in the Special Housing Unit, do not raise
claims of a constitutional dimension.

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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons. Amirnazmi’s motions for discovery and
other relief (Docs. 16, 18, and 21) are DENIED.
So ordered this 6th day of May, 2011.

S/MARTIN C. CARLSON
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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