Medina v. Raiger et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion to Dismiss. It is ordered that:1.Defendants Motion to Dismiss (doc. 15) is granted in part and denied in part.2.Defendants Mease, Raiger, Christner and Hauck are dismissed from th is action due to Mr. Medinas failure to state a claim against them.3.Mr. Medinas failure to protect and retaliation claims are dismissed without prejudice.4.Mr. Medinas Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim will proceed against Hornberger, We nrich, Hartman, Gerstner Wentzel, Louden and Woody. 5.Mr. Medinas Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs will proceed against Hornberger, Wenrich, Hartman, Gerstner Wentzel, Louden, Woody and Nurse Carey.6.Defendants are granted twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order to file an Answer to the Complaint Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 3/7/12 (jam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARIO MEDINA,
Plaintiff
v.
WARDEN ROBERT L. RAIGER, et
al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 3:CV-11-0496
(Judge Caputo)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
On March 16, 2011, Plaintiff Mario Medina, a prisoner housed at SCI-Coal

Township, in Coal Township, Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to events that occurred while housed at the Lebanon
County Prison (LCP). Named as Defendants in the Complaint are: Warden Raiger;
Corrections Officer (CO) Hornberger; CO Wenrick; CO Hartman; CO Gerstner; CO
Wentzel; CO Woody; Cpl. Christner; Warden of Treatment Anthony Hauck; Nurse
Carey; CO Mease, CO Carpenter and CO Perry. Mr. Medina alleges that prison
officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to protect him from
assault; used excessive force against him; and denied him medical treatment for his
injuries. Doc. 1, Compl. He also claims these events were retaliatory in nature. Id.
Presently before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss and supporting
brief. Doc. 15, Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 16, Br. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss. Several

months have passed without Plaintiff filing any opposition to defendants’ motion, or
requesting an enlargement of time to do so. Thus, the motion ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted in part, and
denied in part. While a number of Mr. Medina’s claims for relief will be dismissed,
his Eighth Amendment claims of excessive use of force and denial of medical care
claims will proceed.

II.

Standard of Review
On a motion to dismiss, “[w]e ‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether,
under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to
relief.’” Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoted case omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege sufficient facts, if accepted
as true, state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949,

173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at

, 129 S.Ct. at

1949. The court is “ ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Twombly,

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550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965); see also PA Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d
215, 233 (3d Cir. 2010).
In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court’s
“inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim,
(2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at
the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the
elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.” Malleus v.
George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011)(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

,

129 S.Ct. at 1947-50). If a party opposing a motion to dismiss does not “nudge [his]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be
dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974.
Finally, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct.
2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.
2009). However, under no circumstance is a court required to accept bald
assertions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form
of factual allegations. See In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d
198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 n. 8
(3d Cir. 1997). Pro se litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended
complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher–Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007). However, a complaint

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that sets forth facts which affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right to
recover is properly dismissed without leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State
Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).

III.

Statement of Alleged Facts
On March 18, 2009, Mario Medina was escorted by Lebanon County Sheriffs

to the Lebanon County Courthouse for sentencing. Doc. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1.1 At his
sentencing hearing, Mr. Medina advised the sentencing judge that he “feared that
[his] life was in danger due to the victim of [his] case having relatives in said location
(Lebanon C.P.)”. Id. After approving Plaintiff’s plea, the judge “ordered sheriff’s
(sic) to house [him] at the Lancaster County Jail” until he was transferred to the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Id. However, the unidentified transporting
sheriffs delivered Mr. Medina to the LCP.
On March 20, 2009, Mr. Medina was housed with another inmate and also
placed in an exercise area with two other inmates in contradiction to Deputy of
Treatment Hauck’s administrative segregation order. Id. While in the exercise area,
Mr. Medina was “involved in a[n] altercation with these inmate”. Id. Officers
Hornberger, Wenrich, Hartman, Gerstner Wentzel, Louden and Woody then “arrived
and secured” the inmates with cuffs. Id. at CM/ECF pp. 1-2. While handcuffed
these officers yelled racial slurs at Mr. Medina, doused him with pepper spray, and

1

Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the record reflect the docket number and
page number assigned by the electronic case filing system (CM/ECF) rather than the page
numbers of the original documents.

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beat him unconscious. Id. at CM/ECF p. 2. During this ordeal, the officers stated
that Ms. Martinez, a co-worker and mother of the victim in Mr. Medina’s criminal
case, sends her regards. Id. Officer Wentzel is accused of striking Plaintiff with a
metal baton during the assault. Plaintiff was then removed from the recreation area
and “forced into a closet” were he was beaten, choked and “subjected to water hose
drowning tactics”. Id. When he was eventually “forced to the medical area,” Nurse
Carey refused to treat or document his injuries. Id. Officer Woody, the
Commanding Officer that day, refused to get Mr. Medina any medical assistance or
allow him access to water to minimize the effects of the pepper spray. Id. Cpl.
Christner was the officer “in charge of all officers” on March 20, 2009, and failed to
properly monitor, train and supervise the officers as did the Warden and unidentified
transporting sheriffs. Id.
Plaintiff claims defendants used excessive force against him in retaliation for
his criminal acts against their co-worker’s daughter; failed to protect him from harm;
and denied him medical care. Id. Mr. Medina alleges defendants tried to cover up
the incident by transferring him to the Lancaster County Jail. Id. However, that
facility would not accept him due to his apparent injuries, and as a result he was
transferred to SCI-Camp Hill. Upon his arrival there state prison officials
photographed his injuries and transported him to a local hospital for treatment. Id.
As relief, Mr. Medina seeks monetary damages. Id.

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IV.

Discussion
A.

Failure to State a Claim against Defendants Mease.

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to constitutional claims.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

U.S.

,

, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868

(2009)(“Government officials may not be held liable for unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”); see also Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)(claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior)(citing Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Rather, each defendant must be shown, via
the complaint’s allegations, to have been personally involved in the events
underlying a claim. Iqbal, supra,

U.S. at

, 129 S.Ct. at 1948 (“[A] plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see also Argueta v. United States ICE, 643
F.3d 60, 72 (3d Cir. 2011)(same). A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs, which may be shown through
allegations of actual involvement in, personal direction of, or knowledge of and
acquiescence to the asserted civil rights violations. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)(citations omitted). “Allegations of participation or actual
knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate
particularity.” Id. Alleging a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had
personal knowledge or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights is
insufficient to establish personal involvement. Id. at 1208. “In order to satisfy the

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‘personal involvement’ requirement, a complaint need only allege the conduct, time,
place and person responsible.” Solan v. Ranck, 326 F. App’x 97, 101 (3d Cir.
2009)(per curiam)(nonprecedential).
Aside from naming “Officer Mease” as a defendant in this action, Doc. 1 at
CM/ECF p. 1, Mr. Medina’s Complaint makes no allegations whatsoever concerning
Defendant Mease’s involvement in the underlying events that allegedly violated his
constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Complaint must be
dismissed as to Defendant Mease for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.

B.

Failure to Train/Supervise Claim Against Hauck, Raiger and
Christner.

Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018,
2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), “a local government may not be sued under §
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has held:
A government policy or custom can be established in two
ways. Policy is made when a decision maker possessing
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to
the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
A course of conduct is considered to be a custom when,
though not authorized by law, such practices of state
officials are so permanent and well settled as to virtually
constitute law.
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Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted). It is not enough “for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify
conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate
that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind
the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
405, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1389, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (emphasis in original); see also
Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 124-25 (3d Cir. 2003).
A municipality’s or supervisor’s failure to properly train its employees and
officers can create an actionable violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights under §
1983. Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412
(1989)).
Where the policy in question concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal
employees, liability under section 1983 requires that the omission amount to
“deliberate indifference” to a constitutional right. See Connick v. Thompson,
U.S.

,

, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359-60, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011); see also Doe v.

Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2011)(citing City of Canton, 489 U.S.
at 388, 109 S.Ct. at 1204). This standard is met when the need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the municipality can be reasonable
said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. Carter v. City of Phila., 181
F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1997). “In other words, a municipality can only be liable

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under § 1983 where the failure to train demonstrates a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’
choice by the municipality.” Doe, 660 F.3d at 179. A municipality’s “ ‘policy of
inaction’ in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the
functional equivalent of a decision by the [policymaker] itself to violate the
Constitution.” Connick,

U.S. at

, 131 S.Ct. at

(quoting Canton, 489 U.S.

at 395, 109 S.Ct. at 1208). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference
for purposes of failure to train.” See Connick,

U.S.

, 131 S.Ct. at 1360; see

also Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2010). “Without notice
that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can
hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause of
violation of constitutional rights.” Connick,

U.S.

, 131 S.Ct. at 1360. “A less

stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim would result in de facto
respondeat superior liability on municipalities”. Id. Nonetheless, a particular
“showing of ‘obviousness' can substitute for the pattern of violations ordinarily
necessary to establish municipal culpability.” Id. at .

, 131 S.Ct. at 1361; see also

Christopher v. Nestlerode, 240 F. App’x 481, 489-90 (3d Cir. 2007). The argument
that “a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to
fasten liability.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91, 109 S.Ct. at 1206. Finally, the
plaintiff must “prove that the deficiency in training actually caused [the constitutional
violation at issue].” Doe, 660 F.3d at 180 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391,
109 S.Ct. at 1206.)

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Defendants assert that Mr. Medina has failed to state a claim against Deputy
of Treatment Hauck, Warden Raiger and Cpl. Christner for which relief can be
granted. The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are indeed
sparse and based on their supervisory capacities. Mr. Medina does not aver that
Mr. Hauck, the Warden of Treatment, personally violated his civil rights, rather he
claims unknown individuals went against the “orders issued by Defendant Hauck
when they placed him in a double cell, and then placed him an exercise yard with
other inmates where he became embroiled in an altercation. Doc. 1 at CM/ECF p.
1. As previously noted, liability cannot be predicated solely on the doctrine of
respondeat superior. See Rode, supra. There are no other allegations involving
Defendant Hauck. Thus, he fails to state a claim against Defendant Hauck.
With respect to Warden Raiger and Officer Christner, Mr. Medina asserts
that:
Defendant Christner was in charge of all officers [on
March 20, 2009] and failed to properly monitor, train and
supervise the officers as did the Warden and Sheriff’s
(sic) who delivered me to this hostile prison with
indifference to the obvious danger to my safety and in
ignorance of the order of judge at sentencing.
Doc. 1 at CM/ECF p. 2. Although not purported to have been personally involved in
the alleged assault or the denial of medical care by the other defendants, Mr.
Medina seeks to hold Warden Raiger and Officer Christner responsible on theory
that they failed to properly “monitor, train and supervise” the actions of their
subordinates. Doc. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1. Based on the allegations of the Complaint
he cannot do so.
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While there is no requirement that Mr. Medina identify a specific policy in
order to survive a motion to dismiss, see Carter, 181 F.3d at 358, the court finds that
his Complaint is wholly lacking in any allegations supporting the existence of a
municipal policy or custom that caused his constitutional rights to be violated.
Generic allegations that the involved officers were improperly trained or supervised,
or that Mr. Medina would not have been injured on March 20, 2009, had the officers
received additional or better training or supervision, are insufficient to make out a
claim of deliberate indifference against Officer Christner or Warden Raiger. Mr.
Medina neither asserts that these defendants knew of the offending officers
propensity to retaliate against inmates by assaulting them or denying them medical
care, nor that the risk of harm posed by their subordinates was so obvious that their
interaction with Plaintiff needed to be more closely monitored. As such, Mr. Medina
fails to state a failure to train or failure to supervise claim against Warden Raiger or
Officer Christner.

C.

Retaliation

To prevail on a retaliation claim, a prisoner must show that: (1) he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered some “adverse action” by prison
officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
constitutional rights; and (3) that his protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor in the decision to discipline him. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330,
333 (3d Cir. 2001). Merely alleging the fact of retaliation is insufficient. “As a
threshold matter, a prisoner-plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that the conduct
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which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected.” Id. at 333.
Mr. Medina alleges that numerous defendants assaulted him “in retaliation”
for his criminal offenses against their co-worker’s daughter. See Doc. 1, Compl.
While Plaintiff believes defendants’ action were retaliatory in the definitional sense
of the word, he does not assert a legal claim of retaliation. Clearly, while Mr. Medina
suggests defendants sought to punish him for his victimization of their co-worker’s
daughter, it is implausible that his criminal activity for which he alleged triggered the
retaliation was a constitutionally protected activity. As such, he has failed to meet
the first prong of a retaliation claim. Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Medina fails to
state a retaliation claim because under any reasonable reading of the Complaint,
Mr. Medina fails to allege defendants actions were taken due to his participation in a
constitutionally protected activity.

D.

Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment imposes “a duty upon prison officials to take
reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). To establish a
failure to protect claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1) he is “incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2) the prison official
acted with “deliberate indifference” to his health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834-35, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Prison officials
exhibit deliberate indifference when they know of, and disregard, an excessive risk

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to the inmate's safety. Id.
Mr. Medina alleges that he advised his sentencing judge and the transporting
sheriffs that he “feared that [his] life was in danger due to the victim of [his] case
having relatives in said location (Lebanon C.P.)” Doc. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1. He,
however, makes no allegations that he alerted any LCP prison officials of his
concerns for his safety if housed at the facility, or that he had reason to fear any
inmate or staff at the institution. As such, there are no averments in the Complaint
to remotely suggest that any of the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a
known threat to Plaintiff’s safety and well being while housed at LCP.

E.

The Remainder of Plaintiff’s Claims are not Subject
to Dismissal.

Mr. Medina’s remaining claims are lodged against Officers Hornberger,
Wenrich, Hartman, Gerstner Wentzel, Louden, Woody and Nurse Carey and are not
subject to dismissal at this time. The following claims remain: (1) Eighth
Amendment excessive use of force stemming from the March 20, 2009, event
involving Officers Hornberger, Wenrich, Hartman, Gerstner Wentzel, Louden and
Woody2 and (2) Eighth Amendment claim that these offices and Nurse Carey were
2

In order for a prisoner to state an Eighth Amendment claim for the excessive use
of force by a prison official, he must establish that the force was not applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, but that it was maliciously and sadistically used to
cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156
(1992). Defendants assert they used only the force necessary to regain control over the
exercise yard after Mr. Medina was involved in an altercation with two other inmates. Mr.
Medina alleges he did not resist Defendants when then entered the recreation area and that
the force they used against him was excessive and the assault motivated by the fact that
the victim of his crime was the daughter or their co-worker. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth
(continued...)

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deliberately indifference to his serious medical needs following the March 20, 2009,
assault.3

V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 15) is

granted in part, and denied in part. The following claims and defendants are
dismissed: (1) all claims against defendants Mease, Raiger, Christner and Hauck;
(2) Mr. Medina’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against all defendants;
and (3) Mr. Medina’s claim of retaliation. However, with respect to Mr. Medina’s
Eighth Amendment claims of excessive use of force and denial of medical care, the
motion is denied.
An appropriate order will follow.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. RICHARD CAPUTO
United States District Judge
Date: March 7th

, 2012

2

(...continued)
Amendment excessive use of force claim involves disputes of fact and credibility
determinations that cannot be decided at the motion to dismiss level.
3

The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,
mandates that prison officials not act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious
medical needs by denying or delaying medical care. In order to establish that inadequate
medical care has risen to the level of a Constitutional deprivation, an inmate-plaintiff must
demonstrate that he had a “serious medical need” to which the defendants were
“deliberately indifferent.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50
L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Mr. Medina alleges that he suffered from various injuries which the
remaining defendants were aware of and refused to provide him treatment for non-medical
reasons. As such, he has asserted an claim of deliberate indifference against Hornberger,
Wenrich, Hartman, Gerstner, Wentzel, Louden, Woody and Nurse Carey.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARIO MEDINA,
Plaintiff
v.
WARDEN ROBERT L. RAIGER, et
al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 3:CV-11-0496
(Judge Caputo)

ORDER
AND NOW, this

7th

day of MARCH, 2012, it is ordered that:

1.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 15) is granted in
part and denied in part.

2.

Defendants Mease, Raiger, Christner and Hauck are
dismissed from this action due to Mr. Medina’s failure to
state a claim against them.

3.

Mr. Medina’s failure to protect and retaliation claims are
dismissed without prejudice.

4.

Mr. Medina’s Eighth Amendment excessive use of force
claim will proceed against Hornberger, Wenrich,
Hartman, Gerstner Wentzel, Louden and Woody.

5.

Mr. Medina’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs will proceed
against Hornberger, Wenrich, Hartman, Gerstner
Wentzel, Louden, Woody and Nurse Carey.

6.

Defendants are granted twenty-one (21) days from the
date of this Order to file an Answer to the Complaint.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. RICHARD CAPUTO
United States District Judge