Attanasio et al v. Community Health Systemsm, Inc. et al
Filing
23
ORDER granting 13 Defendants'Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Collective Action Complaint. Plaintiffs have 21 days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this case. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 10/20/11 (jam, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARMEN ATTANASIO, LYNN MARIE
POTOSKI, and DENISE GAITERI, on
their own behalf and for all others similarly
situated,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-582
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
Plaintiffs,
COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
WYOMING VALLEY HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM and WILKES-BARRE
HOSPITAL CO., LLC,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Collective Action
Complaint, (Doc. 13). In their Collective Action Complaint, Plaintiffs allege two categorical
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.
Defendants allege, in essence, that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains insufficient facts and
is therefore improperly pleaded. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees and will
dismiss the Complaint, providing the Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Carmen Attanasio, Lynn Marie Potoski, and Denise Gaiteri (“Plaintiffs”)
bring this action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§
201, et seq. They allege that Defendants Community Health Systems, Inc., Wyoming
Valley Health Care System, and Wilkes-Barre Hospital Co., LLC (“Defendants”), and all of
the Pennsylvania health care systems and hospitals under Defendants’ control, violated the
Act through failing to compensate their employees for the time they spent working during
meal breaks and on required maintenance of their uniforms. (Compl. ¶ 1, Doc. 1).
In regard to the named Plaintiffs, the Complaint merely alleges that, for the relevant
period, they were all non-exempt employees as defined by the FLSA, and that all were
“routinely damaged by Defendants’ failure to provide all proper compensation for time [they]
spent engaged in meal break work and uniform maintenance work.” (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7). Beyond
that, the Complaint does not elaborate as to the positions those Plaintiffs held, nor the exact
locations in which they worked.
As for the Defendants, the Complaint avers that Defendant Community Health
Systems, Inc. (“CHS”) was an employer as defined by the Act,1 and that “on its own or
through its affiliates, owns or operates more than 126 hospitals in 29 states, including the
Wyoming Valley Health Care System, its component entities and nine other healthcare
systems in Pennsylvania.” (Id. at ¶ 8). It further states that Defendant Wyoming Valley
Health Care System (“WVHCS”) is also an employer as envisioned by the Act. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Finally, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendant Wilkes-Barre Hospital Co., LLC
(“WBHC”) is “owned, operated and/or controlled by WVHCS and operates Wilkes-Barre
General Hospital” and that it too is an employer as defined by the Act. (Id. at ¶ 10). As
such, Plaintiffs claim that “Plaintiffs and the Class members, regardless of their job title or
location, had shared employers” and that the Defendants “jointly formulated, approved, and
controlled the improper practices described in [their] Complaint, and are jointly responsible
1
“‘Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer
in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization
(other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
2
for the improper practices described [in the Complaint].” (Id. at ¶¶ 17(c), 13). As such,
Plaintiffs bring two separate classes of claims against the collective Defendants.2
The first proposed class is the “meal break work sub-class.”3 There, the Plaintiffs
complain that they were wrongfully underpaid for their time spent working “during roughly
95% of their unpaid meal breaks each month.” (Id. at ¶ 28). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants faltered in their “obligat[ion] to ensure that Plaintiffs and the Class
members were completely relieved from all work-related duties during each of their unpaid
meal breaks.” (Id. at ¶ 26). As this time spent working apparently went unrecorded, and
that the Defendants allegedly knew as much, the Plaintiffs claim that this was a willing FLSA
violation. (Id. at ¶ 35).
The second class, styled as the "uniform maintenance work sub-class,"4 complains
that Plaintiffs were left uncompensated for roughly two to three “hours of unpaid uniform
2
The Act provides for such collective action: “An action to recover . . . may be maintained
against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29
U.S.C. § 216(b).
3
“[T]he ‘meal break work sub-class’ is defined to include all Pennsylvania residents
employed by Defendants, their subsidiaries, or their affiliated companies between March 28, 2008
and the present who were suffered or permitted to perform more than de minimis meal break work
for Defendants' benefit, but who were not properly compensated for this work.” (Compl. ¶ 1, Doc.
15). Such “more than de minimus meal break work” includes, but is not limited to, “responding to
emergency situations, responding to supervisors’ instructions, providing patient care, managing
hospital patients and visitors, performing lab work, performing maintenance work, performing
cleaning work and guarding or surveilling hospital facilities.” (Id. at ¶ 16).
4
“[T]he "uniform maintenance work sub-class" is defined to include all Pennsylvania
residents employed by Defendants, their subsidiaries, or their affiliated companies between March
28, 2008 and the present who were suffered or permitted to perform more than de minimis uniform
maintenance work for Defendants' benefit, but who were not properly compensated for this work.”
(Compl. ¶ 1, Doc. 15).
3
maintenance work each week separate and apart from their regular household laundry or
clothing maintenance chores.” (Id. at ¶ 40). This uncompensated time Plaintiffs allege was
a result of Defendants’ practices and policies, that the Defendants knew about the existence
of this extra labor since they “regularly encouraged, instructed, suffered and permitted
Plaintiffs and the Class members to perform this work and observed the results of this work
on a regular basis.” (Id. at ¶¶ 40-43). As such, Plaintiffs contend that this was also a willful
violation of the FLSA. (Id. at ¶ 47).
Plaintiffs are seeking a list of names of potential Class members and the
authorization to issue notice to those individuals. Moreover, in seeking judgement in their
favor, Plaintiffs request compensatory damages, pre-judgment interest, liquidated damages,
attorney’s fees and costs as well as equitable and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claim that all
named parties are members of both sub-classes, and that all Plaintiffs and class members
were subjected to the same meal break and uniform maintenance policies and systems.
Plaintiffs believe the Class of similarly-situated employees could potentially include several
hundred members.
Defendants collectively move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that it is
insufficiently pleaded, and in the alternative, that the requested relief is improper. (Mot.
Dismiss, Doc. 13). Specifically, Defendants allege that the named Plaintiffs have failed to
properly allege the existence of an employment relationship between any of the parties, and
that there are no specific allegations that any of the Plaintiffs ever worked more than forty
hours per week or approximate the amount of any unpaid overtime owed. The motion has
been fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the reasons explained below, the Court will
grant the Motion to Dismiss.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is
entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
236 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id.
A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a
claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The
statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Detailed factual allegations are not required.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, mere conclusory
statements will not do; “a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to
relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211. Instead, a complaint must “show”
this entitlement by alleging sufficient facts. Id. “While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
As such, the inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage is “normally broken into three
parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the
5
complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are
sufficiently alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the
complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), meaning enough factual
allegations “‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’” each
necessary element, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The
Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are
based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the
motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were
not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256,
263 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1998), or credit a complaint’s “‘bald assertions’” or “‘legal conclusions,’”
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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B. Plaintiffs’ Pleadings Under the FLSA
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint “plainly lacks the factual ‘heft’
necessary to show more than the mere possibility that Defendants violated the FLSA.” (Br.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6, Doc. 6). More specifically, they allege that the Complaint wholly fails
to meet the pleading standards set out above by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
The FLSA requires compensation for each hour worked based on the minimum
wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), and overtime compensation for each hour worked beyond the
forty-hour workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). To recover damages under the Act, and in
order to state a claim, the Act requires a Plaintiff to show that “(1) the defendant was
‘engaged in commerce’ as that phrase is defined by the FLSA; (2) he was an ‘employee’
as defined by the FLSA; and (3) he worked more than forty hours in a week but was not
paid overtime compensation for the hours worked in excess of forty.” Mell v. Gnc Corp.,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118938 at *15 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2010).
Additionally, “[i]Inclusion of class allegations does not relieve a plaintiff of alleging
that she has suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendants, that may be redressed by a decision in her favor.” Cavallaro v. UMass
Memorial Health Care Inc., No. 09-40152, 2011 WL 2295023 at *2 (D.Mass June 8,
2011)(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, (1992)). The standing
requirements are not relaxed merely because of the existence of a class action. Id. at *6.
1. Failure to Allege Employment
The Complaint alleges simply that each named Plaintiff is an employee as defined
by the Act, and conversely, that each Defendant is an employer as defined by the Act. In
7
as much, the Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed as it fails to
factually allege an employment relationship between any of the Plaintiffs and any of the
Defendants.
The Act defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and an “employee”
as “any individual employed by an employer,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The courts have
afforded these definitions a broad reading, in part to “further[] the remedial purposes of the
FLSA.” Cavallaro v. UMass Memorial Health Care Inc., No. 09-40152, 2011 WL 2295023
at *3 (D.Mass June 8, 2011) (citations omitted). The Third Circuit has promulgated a sixfactor balancing test to guide the district courts in weighing facts in order to determine
whether an employer-employee relationship exists:
(1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in which
the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit
or loss depending upon his managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee's
investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment
of helpers; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the
degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (6) whether the
service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.
Bamgbose v. Delta-T Group, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 660, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Martin
v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1991).
An employee may have multiple employers for the purposes of the FLSA, and
depending on the particular facts, those employers may be jointly responsible for
compliance with the Act’s provisions. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a); Davis v. Abington Memorial
Hosp., Nos. 09–5520, 09–5533, 09–5548, 09–5549, 09–5550, 09–5551, 2011 WL 4018106
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2011). Determining the existence of such a joint employment
relationship considers the “‘real economic relationship’ between the employee, employer,
8
and putative joint employer.” Lepkowski v. Telatron Mktg. Group, 766 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577
(W.D. Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). Similarly, individual companies can also be grouped
together as a single-employer for the purposes of the Act where they are “so interrelated
that they constitute a single employer.”
Davis, 2011 WL 4018106 at *3 (citing
Torres–Negron v. Merck & Co., Inc., 488 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.2007)).
Davis v. Abington Memorial Hospital presented a nearly analogous situation to the
instant case. 2011 WL 4018106 at *3. The alleged employers in the consolidated
complaints ranged from sixty-six (66) to two hundred and eighteen (218). Id.
The
Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, and that court agreed–noting that the “bounty of potential
employers notwithstanding, Plaintiffs somehow fail to allege facts establishing a single
employer-employee relationship.” Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs had neglected to mention
where exactly they reported to, who paid them, and who actually supervised them. Id.
Those plaintiffs, however, maintained that such specific details were immaterial as
to the named plaintiffs since each employer would be liable to a member of the collective
class. Id. That court disagreed, first ruling that the plaintiffs had “taken the concept of ‘joint
employer’ several steps too far.” Id. Specifically, it held that the plaintiffs failed to offer any
factual support for their conclusory pleading that they were “economically dependent” on
all eighty-six organizations without “alleging the basic terms of the primary employmentemployer relationship.” Id. As such, that court easily determined that the single-employer
theory of liability was also improperly plead. Id. at *4 (“Plaintiffs' failure to identify that any
single defendant as their employer is fatal.”). “In short, in order to proceed on their FLSA
claim, Plaintiffs must include basic information about the named Plaintiffs.” Id.
9
Across the federal courts, there is strong agreement as to this basic proposition.
Cavallaro v. UMass Memorial Health Care Inc. reached a very similar conclusion where
“[w]ith respect to defendants' employer status, the complaint contains at least four
conclusory legal assertions,” including the statement that “at all relevant times, plaintiffs
were employees under the FLSA.” 2011 WL 2295023 at *3 (D.Mass June 8, 2011). In
exactly the same fashion as Davis, the court in Cavallaro concluded there were insufficient
averments as to a joint-employer theory as the complaint did “not contain a single factual
allegation connecting plaintiffs with any of the corporate defendants.” Id. at *4. Specifically:
Nor have plaintiffs alleged when they began working, what position they hold,
or which defendants supervise their daily work schedules. Plaintiffs have
alleged no facts as to the location at which they work, what they do at work,
or what tasks they perform. They have not alleged that any of the corporate
entities make decisions regarding their compensation or method of
employment. And they have not alleged that their employment records are
maintained by any of the defendants. In light of their failure to allege any
specific facts in support of a theory of joint employment, there is no plausible
basis for an inference that all of the defendants caused the alleged FLSA
violations that plaintiffs suffered.
Id. That court also found the complaint lacking as to the single employer theory, finding that
the plaintiffs had failed to put forth “sufficient facts to suggest that even one of the
defendants is their employer.” Id. at *5.
Similarly, in Ping Chen v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., that court dismissed a complaint
where there was “nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of
action.” No. 09-107, 2009 WL 3379946 at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2009) (citing Twombly, 127
S.Ct. At 1964-65). That court found not a “single factual allegation indicating that Domino's
had any authority or control over their employment conditions.” Id. at *4. As such, it could
not find that an employment relationship had been pleaded, and it dismissed the complaint.
10
The Complaint in the instant case fails for the same reasons, as the Plaintiffs
similarly fail to plead “the basic terms of the primary employment-employer relationship.”
Davis, supra, 2011 WL 4018106 at *3. In fact, the Complaint merely alleges that, for the
relevant period, the named Plaintiffs were all non-exempt employees as defined by the
FLSA, and that all were "routinely damaged by Defendants' failure to provide all proper
compensation for time she spent engaged in meal break work and uniform maintenance
work." (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7, Doc. 1). The Plaintiffs wholly fail to plead where exactly they work,
what it is they do, how long they have done it for, and other basic facts that would add
credence to their bare legal recitations. Moreover, it merely avers, in a conclusory fashion,
that each Defendant is "an employer as defined in the Act." (Id. at ¶¶ 8-10). Such pleadings
constitute a mere "formulaic recitation of the elements of [the] cause of action” and are
insufficient to maintain a cause of action. Twombly, supra, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. Such
bare legal assertions, without more, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal,
supra, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
As in Ping Chen, since no Defendant is specifically implicated in the Complaint, it is
impossible for the Court to conclude that there are any proper claims leveled against any
of the listed Defendants. Of course, even though the Plaintiffs are pleading as a Collective
Class Action, this does not relieve them of their burden of making specific, factual
allegations. That the Defendants allegedly "operated all of the Pennsylvania health care
systems and hospitals under their ownership, management and control as part of an
integrated, comprehensive, consolidated health care delivery system," (Compl. ¶ 11, Doc.
1), does not alter this analysis, either. Plaintiffs must still plead their specific relationship
and grievances with the parties according to pleading standards. “Threadbare recitals of
11
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
In failing to articulate any the details of the arrangement between the Plaintiffs and
Defendants, the Court cannot resolve any quantum of plausibility from the Plaintiff’s claims.
Moreover, the Court notes that this is not only necessary as a legal matter, but as a
practical concern as well where the Plaintiffs are seeking to represent a broad class with
notice to be distributed. As such, the Complaint will be dismissed.
2. Failure to Allege the Existence of Unpaid Overtime
The Defendants further allege that the Plaintiffs have failed to include the essence
of their claim–the amount of overtime each Plaintiff is owed. In particular, Defendants point
to an absence of facts regarding when exactly such time was potentially accrued, and the
overall amount of the estimated overtime owed. (Doc. 15 at 19).
The instant Complaint asserts that the Plaintiffs “routinely worked more than 40 hours
per week and [were] routinely subjected to the scheduling, timekeeping and pay policies
and practices described herein.” (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7, Doc. 1). As such, Plaintiffs respond that
they have provided enough information to enable the Court to calculate the amount of
overtime owed. Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that from their estimations that Plaintiffs were
made to work 95% of their meal breaks, and two-to-three hours each week on uniform
maintenance, the Court could, assuming a standardized annual schedule, find that each
Plainitiff was entitled to a sum of 351 to 403 hours of uncompensated time per Plaintiff per
year. (Doc. 18 at 8).
The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, it is unclear whether each Plaintiff would
be entitled to such additional time at their standard or overtime pay rate. Moreover, it is not
12
clear from the Complaint as to the period in which each of the named Plaintiffs worked for
any of the Defendants and would be potentially entitled to such extra compensation.
Analogous to the above analysis, without knowing more about these named Plaintiffs’
express employment circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to compute the time
owed.
While highly specified figures need not be pleaded, Plaintiffs must be “able to
estimate the time periods in which they worked without proper overtime compensation.”
Mell v. GNC Corp., No. 10–945, 2010 WL 4668966, at * 8 (W.D.Pa. Nov.9, 2010). Precise
records as to days and hours owed are not necessary, but instead “a just and reasonable
inference that in their capacity as employees . . . they worked a concrete number of hours
for which they were improperly compensated.” Beaulieu v. Vermont, No. 2:10-cv-00032,
2010 WL 3632460 at *5 (D. Vt. Aug. 5, 2010) (finding individualized determinations as to
each Plaintiff based on a weekly estimate sufficient to meet the pleading standards). Of
course, “[t]he critical component of a complaint alleging violations of Section 207 is an
approximation of the number of unpaid weekly overtime hours worked over the employment
period.” Id. “At a minimum, it must set forth the approximate number of unpaid regular and
overtime hours allegedly worked.” Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare System,
Inc., Nos. 10 Civ. 2661(PAC), 10 Civ. 2662(PAC), 10 Civ. 2683(PAC), 10 Civ. 3247(PAC),
2011 WL 321186 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011).
As such, the Court finds this aspect of the Complaint similarly incomplete in pleading
facts sufficient to support a FLSA claim. The Court does not require exact determinations,
but the instant Pleadings are insufficient to determine what, if any, any of the named
Plaintiffs are potentially owed. For each of the three named Plaintiffs, the Complaint only
13
claims that each were harmed over the “relevant period.” (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7, Doc. 1). Even
assuming these parties did share the exact same “relevant period,” the Pleadings further
fail to indicate whether any one Plaintiff was harmed more than others. In other words, it
may be the case that one of more of the named Plaintiffs was compensated for at least
some of the extra time worked–it is impossible to tell.
A FLSA pleading requires some coherent approximation of the time owed. Though
the instant Pleadings do make globalized assertions as to the general loss suffered by the
Plaintiffs, the facts alleged do not even attempt to offer any sort of individualized amount.
Therefore, as the Complaint fails to include this necessary element of the Plaintiff’s claim,
the Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
C. Plaintiffs’ Requested Relief
Defendants alternatively claim that Plaintiffs are seeking improper relief in the form
of unspecified compensatory damages, concurrent pre-judgment interest and liquidated
damages, and injunctive relief. In their Prayer for Relief, Plaintiffs appear to simultaneously
request compensatory damages, pre-judgment interest, liquidated damages, reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs and equitable and injunctive relief. (Compl. at 14, Doc. 1). The
Act provides that “[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207
of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and
in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). While I will
dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint for the reasons stated above, I will briefly address the
Defendants’ specific argument below in regard to damages.
Defendants first argue that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs’ “unspecified
14
demand for compensatory damages to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking recovery of
compensatory damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress.” (Doc. 15 at 22).
However, the Court finds this issue is a non-starter as there is no indication that Plaintiffs
are seeking any compensatory damages other than those expressly provided by the Act.
The Act does not allow, however, for recovery for both liquidated damages and prejudgment interest. Gonzalez v. Bustleton Servs., No. 08-4703, 2010 WL 1813481 at *2
(E.D. Pa. May 5, 2010) (“It is well-settled in FLSA jurisprudence that a plaintiff cannot
recover both liquidated damages and prejudgment interest because both serve the same
purpose, namely to compensate employees for losses caused by delayed receipt of wages
they are due.” (citations omitted)). To the extent that Plaintiffs are pleading both forms of
damages, they argue that they are merely pleading in the alternative. (Doc. 18 at 10).
While not express on the face of the Complaint, the Court notes that such a pleading is
acceptable. Of course, Plaintiffs “may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has,
regardless of consistency.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3); see e.g. Flynn v. Stonegate Mortg.
Corp., No. 10-cv-2058-JAR-KSG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90878 at *17-18 (D. Kan. Aug. 30,
2010) (granting a motion to dismiss to the extent that the complaint sought both liquidated
damages and pre-judgment interest but sustaining the complaint to the extent it plead them
in the alternative). Therefore, to the extent that these two conflicting forms of relief are
requested, the Court notes that they are not fatal to Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
Finally, the Defendants take issue with the Plaintiffs seeking equitable and injunctive
relief and contend that such injunctive relief can only be obtained by the Secretary of Labor.
Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Only the Secretary of Labor
may initiate an action for injunctive relief under the FLSA.”); Flynn, supra, 2010 U.S. Dist.
15
LEXIS 90878 at *18 (“Although the Secretary of Labor is authorized to seek injunctive relief
under the FLSA for violations of its overtime and wage provisions, private parties are not
so authorized unless they are seeking injunctive relief under the anti-retaliation provision
of the FLSA.”). As the Plaintiffs are not seeking relief under the Act’s retaliatory provisions,
the Court notes that such injunctive relief is not appropriate.
For the reasons stated above the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Of course, “if a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit
a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) directs the Court to “freely give leave
when justice so requires.” While the Court acknowledges that the Plaintiffs have requested
leave to amend (Doc. 18 at 7 n.3), this principle applies even in situations where Plaintiffs
do not seek such a leave to amend, though a court may ultimately dismiss if the Plaintiff
does not ultimately submit such an amended pleading.
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245.
Therefore, the Court will afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their Complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Collective
Action Complaint (Doc. 1) will be granted. Plaintiff will be given twenty-one (21) days in
which to file an amended complaint. Failure to do so will result in a dismissal of this action.
An appropriate order follows.
October 20, 2011
Date
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge
16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARMEN ATTANASIO, LYNN MARIE
POTOSKI, and DENISE GAITERI, on
their own behalf and for all others
similarly situated,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-582
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
Plaintiffs,
COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
WYOMING VALLEY HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM and WILKES-BARRE
HOSPITAL CO., LLC,
Defendants.
ORDER
NOW, this 20th day of October, 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Collective Action Complaint (Doc. 13) is
GRANTED and the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED.
The Plaintiffs have twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order to file an
amended complaint. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this case.
/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge
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