Rausch Creek Land, L.P. v. Reliant Energy Mid-Atlantic Holdings, LLC et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Honorable A. Richard Caputo on 8/26/11. (jam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAUSCH CREEK LAND, L.P.,
Successor in interest to KOCHER
COAL COMPANY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-1039

Plaintiff,
(JUDGE CAPUTO)

RELIANT ENERGY MID-ATLANTIC
HOLDINGS, LLC; HEADWATERS INC.;
and KIMBERLY-CLARK, LLC,
Defendants,
MEMORANDUM
Defendants Reliant Energy Mid-Atlantic Holdings, LLC, Headwaters Inc., and
Kimberly-Clark, LLC (“Reliant”) move to dismiss plaintiff Rausch Creek Land, L.P.’s (“RCL”)
complaint. RCL seeks to hold Reliant liable for the violations of a Surface Mining Permit
(“SMP”) by Porter Associates, a third-party. Reliant argues that RCL did not comply with
the pertinent notice provisions and has failed to state a claim under either the Surface
Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”) or the Clean Streams Law (“CSL”).
The Court agrees and will dismiss the suit.
BACKGROUND
RCL’s complaint alleges as follows.
RCL is a limited partnership located in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. Reliant
Energy Mid-Atlantic Holdings, is a limited liability company located in Birdsboro,
Pennsylvania. Headwaters Inc. is a corporation located in South Jordan, Utah. KimberlyClark Pennsylvania is a limited liability company located in Roswell, Georgia. Porter
Associates is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Wilkes

Barre, Pennsylvania.
In January 1991, Porter Associates entered into a lease agreement with RCL’s
predecessor in interest, Kocher Coal Company, in which Porter leased land from Kocher
for ash reclamation. Under the lease, Porter agreed to assume and maintain various
mining permits issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection,
including Surface Mining Permit (“SMP”) 54890105. Porter subsequently violated the SMP
by placing over 400,000 yards of excess ash on RCL’s land. Each of the defendants
contracted with Porter to dispose of ash – ash that ended up on RCL’s land.
RCL filed its complaint against Reliant in state court after it had filed a separate
complaint against Porter. Reliant then removed the case, citing diversity jurisdiction, and
filed a motion to dismiss. In response, RCL filed an amended complaint in which it brought
one claim under the citizen suit provisions of the CSL and the SMCRA. Reliant then filed
a second motion to dismiss.

It claims RCL failed to adhere to the statutory notice

requirement of these Acts and failed to state a claim under either the CSL or the SMCRA
against the defendants. The motion has been briefed and is ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal
is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has
not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “‘to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’” each necessary element,

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Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring a
complaint to set forth information from which each element of a claim may be inferred). In
light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the statement need only “‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he factual
detail in a complaint [must not be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant
[with] the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232;
see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.
2007).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the allegations in the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The
Court may also consider “undisputedly authentic” documents when the plaintiff’s claims are
based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the
motion to dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume the plaintiff can prove facts that were
not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256,
263 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1998), or credit a complaint’s “‘bald assertions’” or “‘legal conclusions,’”
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

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When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining
if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff’s complaint
fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
I.

Notice Requirements under the SMCRA and the CSL

RCL has failed to comply with the notice requirements of the SMCRA and the CSL.
Both the SMCRA and the CSL require plaintiff to notify defendant sixty days before
filing suit. 52 P.S. § 1396.18c(c); 35 P.S. § 691.601(e). Interpreting similar provisions in
related environmental statutes, the Third Circuit has held: “the content of the notice must
be adequate for the recipients of the notice to identify the basis for the citizen's complaint.”
Public Interest Research Group of NJ v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239, 1249 (3d Cir. 1995)
(internal citation omitted).
Here, RCL sent each defendant a letter notifying them of RCL’s intent to sue.
Basically, these letters stated that Porter disposed of the defendant’s ash on RCL’s land in
violation of the law. But none of the letters provide the defendants with any legal basis for
their potential liability, rather than Porter’s. As such, these notices were inadequate.
II.

Failure to State a Claim

More fundamentally, RCL has failed to state a claim under either the CSL or the
SMCRA. In its complaint, RCL only cites the notice and citizen suit provisions of the CSL
and the SMCRA, not specific substantive provisions. While the pleading standard of Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 8(a) is liberal, to survive a motion to dismiss, RCL must make out a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.

RCL simply states in its amended complaint that the

defendants “generated” the ash and “allowed” Porter to put it on RCL’s land. But the
defendants are merely customers of Porter; there are no allegations that the defendants
had any say in how Porter disposed of the ash. RCL cites no statutory or case law to
support its view that a customer can be liable under the CSL or SMCRA simply for paying
for the disposal of material by a third-party. As a result, the Court finds RCL’s allegations
cannot survive a motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited above, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted. An
appropriate order follows.

8/26/11
Date

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAUSCH CREEK LAND, L.P.,
Successor in interest to KOCHER
COAL COMPANY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-1039

Plaintiff,
(JUDGE CAPUTO)

RELIANT ENERGY MID-ATLANTIC
HOLDINGS, LLC; HEADWATERS INC.;
and KIMBERLY-CLARK, LLC,
Defendants,
ORDER
NOW, this

26th

day of August, 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED
without prejudice.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo
A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge