Donnelly v. Peleak et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM (eo, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDWARD W. DONNELLY,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
MARK A. PELEAK and DEPT. OF :
LABOR AND INDUSTRY,
:
:
Defendants.
:

3:11-cv-1511
Hon. John E. Jones III
Hon. Malachy E. Mannion

MEMORANDUM
November 21, 2011
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion (Doc. 6), filed on October 31,
2011, which recommends that this action be dismissed. Plaintiff Edward W.
Donnelly (“Plaintiff” or “Donnelley”) filed objections to the R&R on November
14, 2011. (Doc. 7). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and this
action shall be dismissed.

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I.

BACKGROUND1
On August 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed the instant pro se action claiming, inter

alia, violations of his due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in relation to
workers’ compensation proceedings. Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2).
The facts giving rise to this matter are as follows. Plaintiff filed a workers’
compensation claim against his former employer, TRL, Inc., based on an alleged
work-related injury. A hearing was held on July 12, 2007 in front of Workers’
Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) Mark A. Peleak. WCJ Peleak issued a written
decision on July 20, 2007 which approved a settlement agreement between the
parties, pursuant to which, Plaintiff was to receive a lump sum payment of $12,500
less any payment of attorneys fees, plus payment of reasonable and necessary
medical expenses up to July 12, 2007. Thereafter, on August 20, 2007,
Compservices, Inc., the administrator of TRL’s workers’ compensation benefits,
issued two checks in full payment of Plaintiff’s claim. Donnelly claimed that the
checks were not issued within thirty days as required under Pennsylvania law, but
were issued a day late. As a result, he filed a petition seeking penalties, claiming
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Much of the factual background recited herein is extracted from a Memorandum and
Order issued by this Court in a previous action filed by Donnelly as well as an opinion issued by
in subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See Donnelly
v. TRL, Inc., 2010 WL 260664 (M.D. Pa.) and 420 Fed. Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2010).
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that TRL and Compservices had breached the settlement agreement. A hearing
was held on Donnelly’s petition, and the judge denied the said petition finding that
the payment was not untimely inasmuch as it was issued within thirty days of the
July 20, 2007 decision.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a civil rights action in this Court against TRL,
Compservices and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania claiming that his due
process rights were violated in relation to his penalty petition proceeding because
the judge accepted an “ex parte communication” from TRL in the form of a letter
outlining its response to the penalty petition and because TRL “illegally”
reproduced the July 12, 2007 hearing transcript. The docket number of that case
was 3:10-cv-665.
By Memorandum and Order dated June 25, 2010, we granted the
defendants’ individual motions to dismiss Donnelly’s action and dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim. In doing so, we determined that (1) the claims
against TRL were void ab initio in light of an automatic stay imposed by
bankruptcy proceedings in which TRL was involved; (2) the claims against the
Commonwealth were found to be barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) the
claims against Compservices failed because it was not a state actor. Finally, we
noted that any attempt to avoid the rulings of the WCJ would be barred by the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff appealed our dismissal of his action to the
Third Circuit. In affirming our decision on all grounds, the Third Circuit noted
that we had “properly rejected [the Plaintiff’s] attempt at venue shopping, which
appears to have been an effort to seek review of the WCJ’s judgment in federal
court rather than through the state appellate process.”
As noted above, on August 16, 2011, the Plaintiff filed the instant action, in
which he claims that, after he received the Third Circuit’s decision in the previous
action, he filed an appeal of the workers’ compensation matter with the
Commonwealth Court. The Plaintiff was thereafter notified that his appellate brief
did not comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Plaintiff
submitted another brief, which he characterizes as his “best effort to comply with
the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.” On April 27, 2011, the Plaintiff’s
appeal in the Commonwealth Court was dismissed for his failure to comply with
the court’s prior order. In this action, Plaintiff claims that the Commonwealth
Court thwarted his attempt to appeal the WCJ’s decision and that he is now barred
from obtaining due process in the state system. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to have
the court “uphold [his] right to Due Process” and “make void the Decisions of
Judge Peleak/Pennsylvania’s Appellate Courts and require the Commonwealth to
remand [his] Petition for Penalties to a Court in the Commonwealth with a Judge
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and Jury of peers to adjudicate [his] Petition for Penalties more in line with the
Constitution, common law and prevent the conflict of interest withe the
Department of Labor.” Plaintiff also states that since he “cannot get a second bite
at the apple,” he requests arbitration with Defendant Peleak “for damages caused
by his willful violation of [the Plaintiff’s] civil rights (due process) and criminal
actions that followed.”
On October 31, 2011, Magistrate Judge Mannion issued the instant R&R in
which he reviewed the Plaintiff’s complaint and determined that the Plaintiff was
simply attempting to re-litigate the claims which were previously found by this
Court and the Third Circuit to be barred. Magistrate Judge Mannion notes that, as
previously determined by this Court and the Third Circuit, Plaintiff’s attempts to
nullify any proceedings related to his workers’ compensation claim are nullified by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When objections are filed to the report of a magistrate judge, the district

court makes a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980). The court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s findings or
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recommendations. Id. Although the standard of review is de novo, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) permits whatever reliance the district court, in the exercise of sound
discretion, chooses to place on a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674-75; see also Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 275 (1976); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984).
III.

DISCUSSION
Within his objections to the R&R, the Plaintiff continues to assert that his

civil and due process rights have been violated. He further argues that the
undersigned, Magistrate Judge Mannion, and the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit must be “barred from involvement” with this case because of a “conflict of
interest.” Donnelly states that:
For the U.S. District Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to
actually believe the notion that the Commonwealth would allow me to
prove in a Court of Law that the corruption in Pennsylvania
Government is wide-spread and affects all the residents is insane. It
would cost Pennsylvania tens of millions of dollars just to review . . .
all the claims that were denied by the Department of Labor’s
Kangaroo Courts.
Plaintiff then requests a “change of venue” and warns that if this request is not
granted he will file “formal misconduct charges.” (Doc. 7, p. 4).

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While we recognize that Donnelly firmly believes his civil and due process
rights have been violated by the WCJ as well as the Commonwealth Court,
Plaintiff once again simply does not have a federal cause of action. As noted by
the Third Circuit, we lack jurisdiction “over cases brought by state-court losers
complaing of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Donnelly v. TRL, Inc., 420 Fed. Appx. at 129-30. That is
precisely the circumstance here, Plaintiff’s invective notwithstanding. As such,
any attack Plaintiff attempts to make on the state court worker’s compensation
proceedings are barred by Rooker-Feldman.
V.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the R&R shall be adopted in its

entirety and this matter shall be dismissed. An appropriate Order shall issue.

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