Robinson et al v. Wetzel et al
Filing
86
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re 81 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Mark Anthony Robinson. the plaintiffs motion to compel is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part, as follows: On or before October 14, 2013, we direct the defendants to pr ovide to the Court for its in camera inspection the voting slips and related documents regarding the decision to place Robinson in the SMU following his return to SCI Rockview. Armed with this information the Court can determine: (1) whether this inf ormation is relevant to the issues raised in this case; (2) whether it is subject to any valid claim of privilege recognized by the Federal Rules; and (3) to what extent, in what format, and under what conditions it may be released to the plaintiff. In all respects, the motion to compel, (Doc. 81.), is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 13, 2013. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARK A. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff
v.
JOHN WETZEL, et al.,
Defendants
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Civil No. 3:11-CV-2194
(Judge Mariani)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by Mark Robinson, a state inmate
who was confined at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Rockview. In his
amended complaint, filed on July 20, 2012, Robinson contends that his 2011
placement in the Special Management Unit at SCI Rockview was retaliatory, and
violated the plaintiff’s rights under the Eight Amendment. (Doc. 60.)
This case now comes before the Court for resolution of a discovery dispute.
Specifically, Robinson seeks disclosure of certain prison security policies, along with
voting slips and pre-decisional memoranda from prison staff who made the decision
to place Robinson in the Special Management Unit.
Robinson also requests
disclosure of documents that he describes as SMU placement hearing records. The
defendants have notified Robinson that hearing records do not exist, and have
provided him access to some prison policies, but object to a wholesale release of
prison policies and voting slips and pre-decisional memoranda from prison staff who
made the decision to place Robinson in the Special Management Unit on security
grounds. Robinson has, therefore, moved to compel this disclosure. (Doc. 81.) This
motion to compel has been fully briefed by the parties and is now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied, in part, and granted, in
part.
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
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The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
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disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
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the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573
(D.Kan. 2009).
Furthermore, in a prison setting, inmate requests for information relating to
security procedures can raise security concerns, and implicate a legitimate
governmental privilege, a governmental privilege which acknowledges a
governmental needs to confidentiality of certain data but recognizes that courts must
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balance the confidentiality of governmental files against the rights of a civil rights
litigant by considering:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by
discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the
impact upon persons who have given information of having their
identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental selfevaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or
evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an
actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending
or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the
investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available
through other discovery or from other sources; and (10) the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Finally, one other immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when ruling on
motions to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the production
of things that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of evidence by
parties who attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in
litigation. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. OrthoMcNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa.
Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.Pa. April
9, 2009).
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With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Smith’s
various discovery requests.
Turning first to Robinson’s request for SMU “hearing” records, the defendants
have already represented that no such hearing records or transcripts exist. This
response, denying the existence of certain requested materials, is sufficient, and
Robinson’s motion to compel further responses relating to things that do not exist will
be denied. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v.
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088
(E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251
(M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
As for Robinson’s requests for prison policy manuals, and pre-decisional
documents relating to inmate placement decisions, documents which provide candid
staff assessments of inmates, we note that the defendants have provided a declaration
detailing the substantial security concerns, and staff safety issues, which may arise
in this setting if these records were to be released. Given this showing by defendants,
like many other courts, we find this response persuasive and, therefore, will decline
to authorize wholesale disclosure of these prison manuals and pre-decisional
documents on the grounds that such disclosure may gravely impair institutional
security. See e.g., Banks v. Beard, 3:CV-10-1480, 2013 WL 3773837 (M.D. Pa. July
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17, 2013); Mearin v. Folino, CIV.A. 11-571, 2012 WL 4378184 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24,
2012).
We further note that Robinson’s showing of relevance in this case is obscure,
but apparently rests on his somewhat speculative hope that these voting slips and predecisional documents will, on their face, reveal some retaliatory motivation on the
part of correctional staff. To the extent that this is what Robinson seeks, consistent
with prior case law and acting out of an abundance of caution, we will direct a
narrowly tailored in camera review of certain records. See, Victor v. Lawler, 3:08CV-1374, 2011 WL 1884616 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2011) reconsideration denied, 3:08CV-1374, 2011 WL 3664741 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2011) and on reconsideration, 3:08CV-1374, 2011 WL 4753527 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2011). Specifically, the defendant
shall provide to the Court, for its in camera inspection, the voting slips and related
documents regarding the decision to place Robinson in the SMU following his return
to SCI Rockview, so the Court may determine whether these records, on their face,
contain evidence relevant to Robinson’s retaliation claim.
AND NOW, this 13th day of September 2013, the plaintiff’s motion to compel
is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part, as follows:
On or before October 14, 2013, we direct the defendants to provide to the
Court for its in camera inspection the voting slips and related documents regarding
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the decision to place Robinson in the SMU following his return to SCI Rockview.
Armed with this information the Court can determine: (1) whether this information
is relevant to the issues raised in this case; (2) whether it is subject to any valid claim
of privilege recognized by the Federal Rules; and (3) to what extent, in what format,
and under what conditions it may be released to the plaintiff.
In all respects, the motion to compel, (Doc. 81.), is DENIED.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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