Hammond v. Bledsoe et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM - Based on the foregoing, Hammond's Motion requesting preliminary injunctive relief will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 6/15/12. (jfg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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CIVIL NO. 3:CV·12·0242

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(Judge Mariani)

MICHAEL HAMMOND,

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Plaintiff,
v.
B.A. BLEDSOE, et aI.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM

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Background
Plaintiff Michael Hammond ("Plaintiff' or "Hammond"), an inmate presently confined at

the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg ("USP Lewisburg") in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania,
initiated the above action QIQ se by filing a civil rights Complaint under the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. 1.) Hammond raises allegations against various members of the USP
Lewisburg staff regarding his medical care, unsafe conditions, and the use of excessive force.
Hammond filed his Complaint on February 8,2012. By Order dated February 10, 2012, service
of the Complaint was directed. (Doc. 6.)
Presently before the Court is Hammond's Motion, filed on February 29,2012, in which
he requests that this Court issue a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. (Doc. 9.) Pursuant to our March 8, 2012 Order
directing service of the Motion on Defendants and directing the filing of a response within ten
(10) days, on March 15,2012, a brief in opposition to the Motion was filed on behalf of

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Defendants. (Doc. 14.) On March 20, 2012, Hammond filed a letter in which he responds to
the points raised in Defendants' opposition brief. (Doc. 15.) We therefore construe
Hammond's filing as his reply brief. Accordingly, the Motion is fully briefed and ripe for
disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be denied.

II.

Legal Standard
An injunction is an "extraordinary remedy" that is never awarded as of right. Winter v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has delineated four (4) factors that a district court must consider when
ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order: (1) whether the
movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant
will be irreparably injured if the court denies the requested relief; (3) whether granting the
requested relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether
granting the relief will be in the public interest. See Gerardi v. Pellulo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d
Cir. 1994); Hoxworth v. Blinder. Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1990). These
same factors are used in considering a motion for a temporary restraining order. See Ride the
Ducks, L.L.C. v. Duck Boat Tours. Inc., 2005 WL 670302, *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2005).
The moving party bears the burden of satisfying these factors. Adams v. Freedom Forge
Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 486 (3d Cir. 2000). While each factor need not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt, they must combine to show the immediate necessity of injunctive relief. Stilp

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v. Contino, 629 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297
F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2002)). Moreover, "[a]s these elements suggest, there must be a
'relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the
complaint.'" Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v.
Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8 th Cir. 1994)).
The risk of irreparable harm must not be speculative. See Adams, 204 F.3d at 488
(citing Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994)). Moreover, to establish a
reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient
evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action. See Punnett v.
Carter, 621 F.2d 578,582-83 (3d Cir. 1980). In deterrnining whether success is likely, the court
must look to legal principles controlling the claim and the potential defenses available to the
opposing party. See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp. 229 F.3d 254, 264 (3d
Cir.2000).
III.

Discussion

Hammond requests a temporary restraining order to protect him from all prison staff and
other inmates because of his sexual preference and his exercise of his constitutional rights.
(See Doc. 9 at 3.) In order to illustrate his need for protection, Hammond provides the details
of an incident that allegedly occurred on February 9,2012, one (1) day after this action was
initiated, during which he claims that he was verbally and physically assaulted by three (3)

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members of the USP Lewisburg staff who are not Defendants in this action, Rummel, Houser,
and Scampone. (See id. at 2-4.) Hammond alleges that these members of the correctional
staff attacked him after he reported that he was raped by his cellmate and then fabricated an
incident report against him to justify their actions. (See id.) Attached to his Motion are copies
of incident reports prepared by Scampone and Rummel charging Hammond with assault based
upon their allegations that, on February 9, Hammond became combative and kicked them while
they were transporting him from the law library to his cell. (See id. at 7.) Hammond alleges
that, because he has filed a complaint against Defendants, prison officials do not have a
problem with continuing to assault him and allowing other inmates to assault him as well. (See
id. at 4.)
We find that Hammond has failed to show a reasonable probability that he will succeed
on the merits or that he will suffer irreparable injury if his Motion is denied. Hammond seeks
relief based upon events that occurred after the initiation of this lawsuit and against individuals
who are not parties to this lawsuit. Where the events he describes in his Motion took place

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after he filed this lawsuit, he could not possibly have exhausted his administrative remedies as
to any claims arising from them. Moreover, as observed by Defendants, it appears upon review
of Hammond's Complaint and documents attached thereto that he did not fully exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to his claims asserted in this action. Defendants observe
that Hammond attaches to his Complaint a Response from the Regional Office of the Federal

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Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), dated January 5,2012, which responds to his grievance about
issues relating to his claims in this lawsuit, including the discontinuation of his medical care,
alleged threats to his safety, and medical care for his diabetes. (Doc. 1at 18.) The response
states that Hammond had thirty (30) days after that response to file an appeal, and the Office of
General Counsel would have forty (40) days to respond to that appeal (see 28 C.F.R.

§ 542.18), and thus, where Hammond initiated this action on February 8, 2012, it would appear
that he could not have exhausted his administrative remedies beforehand. 1 A preliminary
injunction grants "intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.»
De Beers Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). Because it is apparent that
Hammond raises new issues in his Motion that stem from events occurring after the initiation of

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this lawsuit and that do not involve Defendants to this action, and where, in any event, it appears
likely that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, it would be inappropriate to grant

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lin his reply brief, Hammond asserts that he has in fact exhausted his administrative
remedies and alleges that his attached exhibits are evidence of his exhaustion. (Doc. 15 at 1.)
However, Hammond attaches only one exhibit consisting of an undated informal resolution
attempt in which he complains about Unit Manager Brewer's handling of his legal mail. (kL at
3.) Notwithstanding the fact that a copy of an informal resolution attempt would not be proof of
the exhaustion of the entire administrative remedy process, it is unclear how agrievance
concerning the handling of mail relates to Hammond's claims in this lawsuit concerning the
discontinuation of his medication, his safety, and the treatment he receives for diabetes.
Hammond also asserts that his remedies should be deemed to be exhausted because
he did not receive a response to one of his remedies and therefore deemed it to be a denial.
(See id. at 1.) However, the remedy number he refers to, No. 66159-F1, does not correspond
to the number on the January 5, 2012 remedy raising the issues that relate to this case, and
therefore, does not demonstrate that he exhausted his claims.
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preliminary injunctive relief with respect to any of Hammond's claims. See id.; see also Ball,
supra, 396 Fed. Appx. at 837; BP Chems. Ltd .. supra, 229 F.3d at 264.
In addition, even if Hammond has exhausted the issues that form the basis for this
lawsuit, we find that he has failed to establish that he will suffer irreparable injury if the instant

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Motion is denied inasmuch as this lawsuit will provide him with an adequate remedy at law. To
the extent that Hammond wishes to pursue new claims against new individuals who are not

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parties to this action, he has a remedy available to him in the form of filing a new civil rights
lawsuit following his exhaustion of his administrative remedies.
Based on the foregoing, Hammond's Motion requesting preliminary injunctive relief will be
denied. An appropriate Order follows.

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Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge

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