Humphrey v. Merenda et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM. Since this Court has dismissed the federal claims against Defendants, jurisdiction will be declined with respect to any pendent state law claims that Plaintiff wishes to pursue. An appropriate Order will enter.(See Memorandum)Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 6/20/12. (cc, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOUGLAS E. HUMPHREY,
Plaintiff
v.
BASIL L. MERENDA, ET AL.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 3:CV-12-374
(Judge Conaboy)

_________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
Douglas E. Humphrey, an inmate presently confined at the
Fayette State Correctional Institution, LaBelle, Pennsylvania (SCIFayette), initiated this pro se civil action.

Doc. 1, p. 1.

Named

as Defendants are Secretary Basil L. Merenda and Assistant Counsel
Martha H. Brown of the Pennsylvania Department of State.

The

required filing fee has been paid.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff filed various
commercial documents including a security agreement on October 12,
2006 in Olympia, Washington, Albany, New York, and Washington D.C.
Humphrey next states that on or about April, 2009 bonds were issued
with respect to a criminal case in which he was a defendant.
Plaintiff notes that bonds were also issued in regards to an
unsuccessful habeas corpus action which he previously brought
before this Court.

See Doc. 1, ¶ 9.

After conducting an investigation into those purported
occurrences, Humphrey states that he “initiated a private
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independent administrative process ...

via certified mail sent to

an agent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” on October 30, 2009.
Id. at ¶ 11.

The agent allegedly failed to either rebut or agree

to the contents of said submission.
Plaintiff adds that on September 30, 2010 he filed a related
134 page “inter parties agreements” with the New York State
Department of State.

Id., ¶ 14.

According to the Complaint,

Humphrey filed a copy of that submission with Secretary Merenda on
November 3, 2010.

However, Humphrey’s filing was rejected one day

later on the basis that the filing office was unable to read or
decipher the information contained therein.

See id., ¶ 17.

On March 23, 2011, Plaintiff initiated an action with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court seeking mandamus type relief and
presumably alleging that Secretary Merenda acted in an
unconstitutional manner and failed to perform a non-discretionary
duty by rejecting his aforementioned filing.

Assistant Counsel

Brown successfully represented Secretary Merenda in that
proceeding.

See id. at ¶ 20.

Count I of the pending Complaint asserts that Defendant
Merenda violated Plaintiff’s civil rights under the Pennsylvania
Constitution by failing to fulfill his duty of protecting
Humphrey’s personal property by rejecting the inter parties
agreements.
Count II asserts civil rights claims under the United States
Constitution.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Secretary

Merenda’s conduct violated his constitutional rights in that the

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Defendant failed to give full faith and credit to his filing and
improperly retained the filing fee.
Count III raises civil rights claims against Secretary
Merenda and Attorney Brown pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

It is

alleged that Plaintiff was subjected to unfair business practices,
discrimination, and improperly deprived of his personal and private
property.

Count IV alleges that Humphrey was subjected to

discrimination and retaliation as the result of a conspiracy
between the Defendants as contemplated under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Count V raises state tort law claims against both Defendants.
As relief, Humphrey requests an award of compensatory and
punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, including a
permanent injunction directing that Defendants be compelled to
given full faith and credit to the submissions he filed with the
Pennsylvania Secretary of State.

Discussion
As previously noted, Plaintiff has paid the required filing
fee.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A

provides in pertinent part:

(a) Screening. -- The court shall review ... a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. -- On review, the court
shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
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A district court may rule that process should not be issued
if the complaint is malicious, presents an indisputably meritless
legal theory, or is predicated on clearly baseless factual
contentions.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989);

Douris v. Middleton Township, 293 Fed. Appx. 130, 132 (3d Cir.
2008).

Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which

either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks
an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are clearly
entitled to immunity from suit ... ."

Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d

192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277,
1278 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Mandamus releif
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
added that "the plain meaning of 'frivolous' authorizes the
dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that . . . are of little or
no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious
consideration, or trivial."
1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995).

Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
It also has been determined that "the

frivolousness determination is a discretionary one," and trial
courts "are in the best position" to determine when an indigent
litigant's complaint is appropriate for summary dismissal.

Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Mandamus Relief
In a prior, similar action filed by Humphrey with this Court
it was noted that he could not obtain mandamus type relief against
a Pennsylvania state official in federal court.

Consequently,

pursuant to reasons previously explained to the Plaintiff any
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pending request by him for mandamus type relief against the
Pennsylvania state officials named as defendants in this matter is
subject to dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
See Brown v. Beard, Civ. No. 4:CV-09-0136, 2009 WL 498630, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2009)(McClure, J.).
Emotional Injury
Plaintiff indicates that he is in part requesting an award
of monetary damages for mental distress.

See Doc. 1, p. 17, ¶ 4.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides that "[n]o federal civil action may
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury."

In

Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that where
a plaintiff fails to allege actual injury, Section 1997e(e) bars
recovery of compensatory damages.

However, the Court of Appeals

added that an inmate alleging a violation of his or her
constitutional rights may still pursue the action to recover
nominal and/or punitive damages even in the absence of compensable
harm.
Under the standards announced in Allah and Section 1997e(e),
since there has been no showing that Plaintiff suffered any
physical injury, Humphrey’s civil rights claims which assert
violation of his constitutional rights and seek in part an award of
compensatory damages can proceed only to the extent that they seek
non-compensatory damages.
614, 618 (M.D. Pa.

See Ostrander v. Horn, 145 F. Supp. 2d

2001).

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Full Faith and Credit/Unfair Business Practice
Plaintiff raises a vague claim that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights by not affording his 134 page “inter parties
agreements” full faith and credit.

Doc. 1, ¶ 14.

He similarly

contends that said conduct constituted an unfair business practice.
It is initially noted that a copy of said agreement has not been
submitted to this Court for consideration.
Second, based upon an application of the standards set forth
in Deutsch and Denton to a liberal reading of Humphrey’s Complaint
there are simply no facts set forth which could arguably support a
claim that the Defendants’ alleged rejection of Plaintiff’s
submission was unconstitutional.

This determination is bolstered

by the determination by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which
apparently upheld the legality of the rejection of Plaintiff’s
filing as well as the fact that portions of the pending Complaint
are set forth in an indiscernible manner.
Conspiracy
As previously noted Plaintiff claims that Defendants
engaged in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights.

In order to

set forth a cognizable conspiracy claim, a plaintiff cannot rely on
broad or conclusory allegations.

D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area

Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331,
366 (3d Cir. 1989); Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543, 545 (10th Cir.
1989).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has further noted that

"[a] conspiracy claim must . . . contain supportive factual
allegations."

Rose, 871 F.2d at 366.

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Moreover, "[t]o plead

conspiracy adequately, a plaintiff must set forth allegations that
address the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy,
and the certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to
achieve that purpose."

Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885

F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989).
The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement or concerted
action between individuals.
Durre, 869 F.2d at 545.

See D.R. by L.R., 972 F.2d at 1377;

Consequently, a plaintiff must allege with

particularity and present material facts which show that the
purported conspirators reached some understanding or agreement or
plotted, planned and conspired together to deprive plaintiff of a
protected federal right.

Id.; Rose, 871 F.2d at 366; Young, 926

F.2d at 1405 n.16; Chicarelli v. Plymouth Garden Apartments, 551 F.
Supp. 532, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

Where a civil rights conspiracy is

alleged, there must be some specific facts in the complaint which
tend to show a meeting of the minds and some type of concerted
activity.

Deck v. Leftridge, 771 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1985).

A plaintiff cannot rely on subjective suspicions and unsupported
speculation.

Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir.

1991).
Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, it is clear that he has failed to state a viable
conspiracy claim against Defendants.

There are simply no averments

of fact in the Complaint that reasonably suggest the presence of an
agreement or concerted activity between Defendants to violate
Plaintiff’s civil rights.

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Access to the Courts
Inmates have a constitutional right of meaningful access to
law libraries, legal materials or legal services.
430 U.S. 817, 821-25 (1977).

Bounds v. Smith,

The United States Supreme Court in

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-54 (1996), clarified that an
inmate plaintiff, in order to set forth a viable claim under
Bounds, must demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim being
pursued in the courts had been frustrated or was being impeded.

A

plaintiff must also allege an actual injury to his litigation
efforts.
Based upon a review of the Complaint, Plaintiff raises no
contention that his pursuit of a non-frivolous legal claim was
frustrated or impeded due to any conduct attributed to any of the
Defendants.

The claim that Attorney Brown successfully defended a

mandamus action filed by Humphrey in Pennsylvania state court does
not support a constitutional claim against said Defendant under the
criteria set forth in Lewis.

Likewise, frustrated

in light of the

determination by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that Merenda did
not err by rejecting Humphrey’s filing, any related access to the
court claims does not satisfy the non-frivolous legal claim
requirement of Lewis.

Accordingly, under the standards announced

in Lewis, the Complaint to the extent that it is seeking to assert
a denial of access to the courts claim is subject to dismissal.
Loss of Personal Property
Humphrey also asserts that he was subjected to an improper
loss or deprivation of personal property.

A civil rights claim

also cannot be brought to vindicate a prisoner’s right to property

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when the deprivation occurs as a result of a tortious and
unauthorized act where an adequate remedy exists to compensate
those who have suffered tortious loss at the hands of the state.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544 (1981).

The United States

Supreme Court has extended Parratt to include intentional
deprivations of property, holding that where a prisoner has an
adequate post-deprivation remedy under state law for any loss
suffered to his property, a civil rights claim is not available.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-533 (1984).

Consequently,

regardless of whether the deprivation of property was the result of
intentional or negligent conduct, a plaintiff may not obtain relief
via a civil rights complaint if he or she has adequate alternative
remedies.
Humphrey can assert a loss of property claim in Pennsylvania
state court.

Since Plaintiff has a state court remedy available to

him, his claim of improper deprivation of personal property will
not be entertained under § 1983.
Discrimination
Plaintiff also generally describes the actions of the
Defendants as being discriminatory.

A litigant seeking to

establish a viable equal protection claim must show an intentional
or purposeful discrimination. Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921,
929 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986).

However,

the Equal Protection Clause "does not deny to States the power to
treat different classes of persons in different ways."
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).

Reed v.

The Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has observed that the Equal Protection Clause "is not a

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command that all persons be treated alike but, rather, 'a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.'"
Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985)); see also Kuhar v. Greensburg-Salem Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d
676, 677 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980) ("An equal protection claim arises when
an individual contends that he or she is receiving different
treatment from that received by other individuals similarly
situated.").
Based upon a review of the Complaint there is no viable
assertion by Humphrey that he is being treated differently from
similarly situated individuals on the basis of his race, religious
beliefs, or some other impermissible reason.

There are simply no

factual averments alleged which could support a claim that the
Defendants engaged in actions which intentionally discriminated
against Humphrey.

Based on the standards announced in Wilson and

Artway, a viable equal protection claim is not set forth in the
Complaint.
Retaliation
Count IV of the Complaint asserts a vague allegation that
defendants subjected him to retaliation.
To establish a Section 1983 retaliation claim, a plaintiff
bears the burden of satisfying three (3) elements.

First, a

plaintiff must prove that he was engaged in a constitutionally
protected activity.
2001).

Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.

Second, a prisoner must demonstrate that he suffered some

“adverse action.”

(Id.)(quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,

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225 (3d Cir. 2000)).

This requirement is satisfied by showing

adverse action “sufficient ‘to deter a person of ordinary firmness’
from exercising his First Amendment rights.”

(Id.)(quoting Suppon

v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Third, a prisoner

must prove that “his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a
substantial or motivating factor’ in the adverse action.

Rauser,

241 F.3d at 333-34(quoting Mount Health Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).1
491, 498 (3d Cir.

See Lape v. Pennsylvania, 157 Fed. App’x.

2005).

Based upon a revierw of the Complaint there are simply no
facts which could support a claim that the rejection of Plaintiff’s
submission by the Defendants was undertaken in retaliation for
Humphrey’s prior engagement in a constitutionally protected
activity.
Pendent Jurisdiction
Finally, it is well settled that federal courts have
jurisdiction over state claims which are related to the federal
claims and result from a common nucleus of operative facts.

See

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9 (1976).

Supplemental jurisdiction may be

declined over a claim when the court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.
(1997).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

When rendering a determination regarding pendent

jurisdiction district courts should consider judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the litigants.

New Rock Asset

1.
Only where the facts of a particular case are “unusually
suggestive” of a retaliatory motive will temporal proximity,
standing alone, support an inference of causation. Krouse v.
American Sterlizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Partners v. Preferred Entity Advancements, 101 F.3d 1492, 1505 (3d
Cir. 1996)(citation omitted).
Once jurisdiction has been exercised over the state claim,
elimination of the federal claim does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to adjudicate the pendent claim.

Id. (citing Lentino

v. Fringe Emp. Plans, Inc., 611 F. 2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1979)).
However, if a federal claim is dismissed prior to trial, the
district court should decline to decide the pendent state claims,
“unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”
Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir.
1995).

Since this Court has dismissed the federal claims against

Defendants, jurisdiction will be declined with respect to any
pendent state law claims that Plaintiff wishes to pursue. An
appropriate Order will enter.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge

DATED: JUNE 20, 2012

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