Olarte v. Cywinski
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Dismiss - GRANTED re pltf's 14th amendment claim and DENIED in all other respects.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 8/28/12 (sm, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VANESSA OLARTE,
Plaintiff
:
No. 3:12cv632
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
RYAN CYWINSKI,
:
Defendant
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition is defendant’s motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11). The motion has been fully briefed and is
ripe for disposition.
Background
On or about November 18, 2011, Vanessa Olarte (hereinafter
“plaintiff”) was driving home from college on Middle Road, Hanover
Township, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 8 (hereinafter “Compl.”); Doc.
12, Def. Br. in Supp. at 2). Plaintiff noticed a police car behind her with its
lights on and immediately pulled over. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10). Defendant Ryan
Cywinski (hereinafter “defendant”), a Hanover Township Police Department
officer, approached plaintiff’s car and told her that he pulled her over for
speeding. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 11). Plaintiff provided defendant with her valid driver’s
license, insurance and registration and defendant went back to his police
vehicle. (Id. ¶ 13; Doc. 1, Exs. A, B, C). Approximately five minutes later,
defendant returned to plaintiff’s car and asked her if she had been to
Philadelphia. (Compl. ¶ 14). Plaintiff responded, “No.” (Id. ¶ 15).
Defendant told her that her car’s license plates1 were reported stolen in
The parties refer to license “plate” or “plates” throughout their
briefs. It is unclear whether plaintiff had one or two licenses plates on her
1
Philadelphia. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff stated that it was impossible because she
has never been there. (Id. ¶ 17).
Defendant went to his police car and minutes later another police car
arrived at the scene. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20). Shortly thereafter, a third police car
arrived. (Id. ¶ 21). Appropriately thirty minutes later, three officers
approached plaintiff and told her that they had to take her license plates
because they were reported stolen and her car would be towed because it
was illegal to drive the car without valid plates. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff asked
defendant how long her plates were reported stolen. (Id. ¶ 23). Defendant
told her “since 2007.” (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff also asked defendant why she
had never previously had a problem when she was pulled over or when
renewing her yearly registration. (Id. ¶ 25). The license plate numbers on
her car were the same as her registration. (Id. ¶ 18). Defendant refused to
answer any of plaintiff’s questions and told her to get out of her car. (Id. ¶
26).
Defendant gave plaintiff an “acknowledgment of seized driver’s
license/vehicle registration” form and noted that she refused to sign. (Id. ¶
27; Doc. 1, Ex. D). Plaintiff alleges that defendant never asked her to sign
the form. (Compl. ¶ 27). Defendant gave plaintiff a ticket for speeding.
(Id. ¶ 28; Doc. 1, Ex. E). He told her that she should be happy he was not
arresting her for driving with stolen plates. (Compl. ¶ 29). Plaintiff exited
her car and it was towed. (Id. ¶ 30). Defendant asked plaintiff if she
needed a ride and she responded that she did, however, the three officers
left plaintiff at the scene without providing her with any transportation. (Id.
¶ 31).
vehicle.
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Plaintiff immediately contacted her insurance agent. (Id. ¶ 32). The
agent then contacted PennDot to inquire whether the license plates were
reported stolen. (Id.) A PennDot representative stated that there were no
reported incidents regarding the plates and advised plaintiff to go to the
police station and ask for a police report and her license plates. (Id. ¶¶ 32,
33; see Doc. 1, Ex. F).
Later that day, plaintiff went to the police station to speak to
defendant. (Compl. ¶ 34). Defendant stated that a police report did not
exist. (Id.) A few minutes later, defendant said there was a report, but it
was “classified” and she could not have access to it without a lawyer. (Id.
¶ 35). Defendant told plaintiff that he had taken care of the stolen
registration status, but already sent her plates to PennDot, therefore she
would have to buy new license plates. (Id. ¶ 36).
Plaintiff claims that she incurred expenses to have her car towed and
secure new license plates. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38; see Doc. 1, Exs. G, H). Prior to
receiving the new plates, she was unable to drive her car, which left her
with no transportation to go to school or work. (Comp. ¶ 39). She was
also unable to transport her mother to work. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that she
lost income and incurred additional expenses for public transportation.
(Id.)
Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant on April 5,
2012. (Doc. 1). Counts I and II allege violations of plaintiff’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count III
asserts a Pennsylvania state law conversion claim. On June 6, 2012,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11). The parties have fully briefed
3
the motion, bringing the case to its present posture.
Jurisdiction
The court has federal question jurisdiction over this case brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “Section 1983") for violation of
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); 28 U.S.C. §§
1343(a)(3), (4) (granting district courts jurisdiction over civil actions brought
to redress deprivations of constitutional or statutory rights by way of
damages or equitable relief).
The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).
Legal Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of a complaint’s
allegations. Granting the motion is appropriate if, accepting as true all the
facts alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff has not pleaded “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” or put another way,
“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Third Circuit
interprets Twombly to require the plaintiff to describe “enough facts to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” each
necessary element of the claims alleged in the complaint. Phillips v. Cnty.
4
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). Moreover, the plaintiff must allege facts that “justify moving the
case beyond the pleadings to the next stage of litigation.” Id. at 234-35.
In relation to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the complaint
need only provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [cannot
be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice
of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232
(citation omitted). “Rule 8(a)(2) requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket
assertion of an entitlement to relief.” Id.
The issue is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true,
support a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a 12(b)(6)
motion, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and give the pleader the benefit of all reasonable inferences that
can fairly be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.
1997). However, “we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotations omitted).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, the court should identify
the allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. “When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
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Generally, a court should consider only the allegations in the complaint,
exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents
that form the basis of a claim. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Discussion
Defendant moves for the dismissal of plaintiff’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims and requests that we decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claim. As plaintiff brings
her federal law claims pursuant to Section 1983, we will briefly address the
law as it pertains to that statute.
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, rather it provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the
Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.
1996). In pertinent part, Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to establish a claim under Section 1983, two
criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of must have been
committed by a person acting under color of state law. Sameric Corp. of
Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). Second, the
conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution
or federal law. Id. The parties do not dispute whether defendant acted
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under color of state law, only whether plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated. We will address each of defendant’s arguments in support of his
motion to dismiss.
1. Standing
First, defendant challenges plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment standing.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST.
AMEND.
IV. A “seizure” of property “occurs when ‘there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’”
Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). A plaintiff has standing to assert a
Fourth Amendment violation when a seizure infringes upon an interest that
the amendment was designed to protect. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
140 (1978). “To have standing to state a claim for unlawful seizure under
the Fourth Amendment pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff [must] assert a
property or possessory interest in the seized property.” Cunningham v. N.
Versailles Twp., No. 09-1314, 2010 WL 391380, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27,
2010) (citing U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148).
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that she
had a property or possessory interest in the vehicle, therefore plaintiff does
not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. Defendant
claims that the vehicle plaintiff operated the day she was pulled over was
owned by her father, Herminio Olarte. He argues that the complaint does
not contain any allegations that the vehicle was given to her by her father
to use as her own property or any allegations that she had a possessory
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interest in the vehicle.
Plaintiff argues that she had a property and possessory interest in
the vehicle. She claims that she had exclusive control over the vehicle,
exercised reasonable care to protect it, maintained the car by ensuring it
operated properly and paid for necessary improvements and gasoline.
She contends that her father gave her the car and that she was the sole
operator. Plaintiff also relies on the legal principal of bailment for mutual
benefit in support of her interest in the car.
In accepting all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we find that she
sufficiently pled a possessory interest in the vehicle, and thus, has
standing to assert her Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiff possessed a
valid driver’s license, insurance and registration on the day she was pulled
over by defendant. It appears that plaintiff used the car on many
occasions. She drove the vehicle to school and work. She also used the
car to transport her mother to work. Plaintiff asserts that she did not have
a problem with the car when previously pulled over by police. The
allegations indicate that she had renewed the vehicle’s yearly registration.
Plaintiff had the vehicle towed to her residence. She ordered new license
plates and paid the costs of replacement. Plaintiff also incurred additional
expenses to use alternative means of transportation.
At this motion to dismiss stage, we find that the complaint contains
enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
plaintiff has a possessory interest in the vehicle.2 Defendant does not
Because we find that plaintiff sufficiently pled a possessory interest
in the vehicle, we will not address plaintiff’s argument regarding bailment
2
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contest plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim on any other grounds.
Accordingly, we will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process claim fails as a matter of law.3 The Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution provides, “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S.
CONST. AMEND. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment establishes both
procedural and substantive due process rights. It is well-established that
procedural due process protects possessory interests in property. Abbott
v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “At the
core of procedural due process jurisprudence is the right to advance notice
of significant deprivations of liberty or property and to a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.” Id. (citations omitted).
“To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due
process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an
individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to
him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455
for mutual benefit.
3
In addition to procedural due process rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees certain substantive rights. Defendant also argues
that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for a substantive due process
violation. However, as plaintiff indicates in her brief in opposition to the
motion to dismiss, she is only asserting a procedural due process claim in
her complaint. Therefore, the court will not address defendant’s
substantive due process argument.
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F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107,
116 (3d Cir. 2000). The United States Supreme Court has held that “an
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does
not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
533 (1984); see Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 421
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)) (“[W]here
the State must take quick action, or where it is impractical to provide
meaningful pre-deprivation process, due process will be satisfied by a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy.”); Harris v. Wooden, 808 F. Supp. 2d
736, 740 (D. Del. 2011) (quoting Abbott, 164 F.3d at 146-47) (“Advance
notice is the constitutional norm, but post-deprivation notice meets due
process standards if it ‘guarantee[s] protection against erroneous or
arbitrary seizures.’”).
A plaintiff cannot prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process claim if the state has an adequate post-deprivation procedure or
remedy available. See Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128,
139 (3d Cir. 2010). An adequate procedural due process remedy is when
a state provides a “reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local
administrative body.” Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x. 234, 237 (3d
Cir. 2011) (quoting DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for Twp. of West
Amwell, 53 F.3d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated in part on other
grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316
F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003)).
In the instant case, defendant cites Pennsylvania statutes in support
10
of his decision to tow the vehicle and to demonstrate that state law
provided plaintiff due process through a replevin action, which she chose
not to pursue. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3352, 6309.2; PA. R. CIV.
P. 1071-88. Defendant argues that due process only requires some postdeprivation remedy.
Plaintiff contends that there were no procedures available to her.
She asserts that when defendant towed her car and immediately sent her
license plate to PennDot, he deprived her of any opportunity for a postdeprivations remedies. She also asserts that the Pennsylvania statutes
defendant cites are inapplicable and replevin was an inadequate remedy.
We agree with defendant that Pennsylvania law provided plaintiff with
adequate post-deprivation remedies. Courts have found that Pennsylvania
law provides for such adequate remedies through replevin and conversion
claims. See Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding that a Pennsylvania state law conversion claim was a postdeprivation remedy); Lewis v. Heckler, Civil Action No. 11-6492, 2012 WL
1646862, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2012) (“In Pennsylvania, there are
postdeprivation remedies pertaining to seizures of property that have been
deemed meaningful for purpose of alleged violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Marsh v. Ladd, No. 03-5977, 2004 WL 2441088, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 27, 2004) (“Plaintiff has an adequate state post-deprivation
remedy in her state law claims for replevin and conversion.”).
We find that plaintiff acknowledges in her brief in opposition that a
replevin action was an available post-deprivation remedy, although she
argues that it was inadequate. She argues that the identity of the vehicle’s
true owner was clear, that the process would be expensive and time-
11
consuming, that she would have to pursue the action against the towing
company instead of the defendant and that replevin would deprive her of
the use of her car. These reasons do not support a finding that a replevin
action would have been unavailable, inadequate, or unreasonable remedy
to rectify the alleged error. See Perano, 423 F. App’x. at 237. We also
find that plaintiff could have pursued a conversion claim in state court.
Conversion is an available remedy, which is evidenced by plaintiff’s pursuit
of such a claim in Count III of the instant complaint.
Because replevin and conversion are available post-deprivation state
law remedies, we will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim for deprivation of property without due
process of law.
3. Conversion
Defendant argues that this court should not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law conversion claim because plaintiff did
not assert any claims that provide a basis for original jurisdiction. As we
found above, plaintiff sufficiently pled her Fourth Amendment violation
claim. Therefore, we have supplemental jurisdiction over this matter and
we will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss on those grounds. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a).
We also conclude that, in considering defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, plaintiff’s complaint provided sufficient allegations in support of her
conversion claim. Under Pennsylvania law, “[c]onversion has been defined
as the deprivation of another’s right of property in, or use or possession of,
a chattel without the owner’s consent and without lawful justification.”
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 813, 844 (E.D. Pa.
12
1993). “‘Where one lawfully comes into possession of a chattel, a
conversion occurs if a demand for the chattel is made by the rightful owner
and the other party refuses to deliver.’” Fenton v. Balick, 821 F. Supp. 2d
755, 760 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stella, 994
F. Supp. 318, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1998)).
We find that plaintiff alleged a plausible conversion claim. Plaintiff
avers that defendant deprived her of use and possession of her vehicle
without her consent or lawful justification. Defendant took her license
plates, claiming that they were reported as stolen. He towed her car
because it was illegal to drive a vehicle without valid license plates. A
PennDot representative told plaintiff’s insurance agent that there were no
reported incidents regarding plaintiff’s plates. Taking the allegations in the
complaint as true, we find that plaintiff sufficiently pled her claim.
Therefore, we will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s conversion
claim.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will grant in part and deny in part
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. We will grant
defendant’s motion as to plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. The
motion is denied in all other respects. An appropriate order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VANESSA OLARTE,
Plaintiff
:
No. 3:12cv632
:
:
(Judge Munley)
v.
:
:
RYAN CYWINSKI,
:
Defendant
:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 28th day of August 2012, upon consideration
of defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 11), it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The motion is GRANTED with respect to plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim (Count II). The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
BY THE COURT:
s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court
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