Luck et al v. Mount Airy # 1, LLC et al

Filing 99

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 88 89 MOTIONS for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 8/19/14. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PETER C. LUCK, and
KENNETH N. WYNDER, JR.
Plaintiffs
v.
MOUNT AIRY #1, LLC,
LIANNE R. ASBURY,
TREVOR TASETANO,
JOSEPH J. KULICK, JR. and
MARK A. KAYE
Defendants

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No. 3:12-cv-887
(Judge Munley)

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MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition are Defendants Mount Airy #1, LLC,
Lianne R. Asbury and Trevor Tasetano (hereinafter “Casino Defendants”)
and State Troopers Joseph J. Kulick, Jr. and Mark A. Kaye’s (hereinafter
“Commonwealth Defendants”) motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 88
& 89). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Background
The instant civil rights action arose from Plaintiffs Peter C. Luck and
Kenneth N. Wynder, Jr.’s (collectively “plaintiffs”) interactions with the
Casino and Commonwealth Defendants. On May 2, 2011, plaintiffs
entered Mount Airy Casino (hereinafter “Mt. Airy” or “the casino”) and

spoke with casino security guards concerning possible unionization. (Doc.
90, Commw. Defs.’ Statement of Material and Undisputed Facts
(hereinafter “Commw. Defs.’ SMF”) ¶¶ 18-19). Defendant Trevor
Tasetano (hereinafter “Tasetano”), a Mount Airy security supervisor,
approached plaintiffs and asked for identification. (Id. ¶¶ 21- 23). After
plaintiffs refused to furnish identification, Tasetano directed plaintiffs to
leave. (Id.) The parties dispute whether Tasetano also advised plaintiffs
that they could never return to the casino. (Commw. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 23;
Doc. 95-1, Pls.’ Resp. Statement. to Com. Defs.’ SMF (hereinafter “Pls.’
Resp. Stat.”) ¶ 23).
On May 14, 2011, plaintiffs returned to Mount Airy. (Commw. Defs.’
SMF ¶ 25). Defendant Tasetano and other security guards surrounded
plaintiffs on the gaming floor. (Id. ¶ 26; Doc. 88-2, Ex. N., Dep. of Wynder
(hereinafter “Wynder Dep.”) at 97-98). Tasetano reminded plaintiffs that
he told them on May 2, 2011 never to return to the casino. (Commw.
Defs.’ SMF ¶ 26).
Tasetano then contacted the Commonwealth Defendants. (Commw.
Defs.’ SMF ¶ 27). The Commonwealth Defendants met plaintiffs and
Tasetano on the gaming floor. (Id. ¶ 28). Commonwealth Defendants

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then escorted plaintiffs to an upstairs office and issued plaintiffs citations
for criminal trespass. (Id. ¶ 46). On June 7, 2011, following a criminal
summary trial on the trespass charges, plaintiffs were found not guilty.
(Id. ¶ 68).
In response, plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and §1988 against the Commonwealth and Casino
Defendants. After several motions and court orders, plaintiffs filed a
seven-count amended complaint on August 15, 2013. (Doc. 81). Count I
alleges false arrest and false imprisonment claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983 and 1988 against the individual Casino Defendants–Asbury and
Tasetano (hereinafter “individual Casino Defendants”). Count II alleges
sections 1983 and 1988 false arrest and false imprisonment claims
against the Commonwealth Defendants. In count III, plaintiffs assert a
civil conspiracy claim under sections 1983 and 1988 against the
Commonwealth Defendants and individual Casino Defendants. Counts IV
through VII aver several state law claims against the Casino Defendants:
Count IV, civil conspiracy; Count V, false arrest and false imprisonment;
Count VI, malicious prosecution and Count VII, intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

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At the conclusion of discovery the Casino and Commonwealth
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 88 & 89). The
parties then briefed the issues bringing the case to its present posture.
Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs bring this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“Section 1988”) for violation of plaintiffs’
constitutional rights. Thus, the court has federal question jurisdiction.
See U.S.C. § 1331. (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3), (4) (granting district courts
jurisdiction over civil actions brought to redress deprivations of
constitutional or statutory rights by way of damages or equitable relief).
The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Legal Standard
Granting summary judgment is proper “‘if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

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See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c)). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must
examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Int’l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949
(3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the
non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is material if it might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where the
non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for
summary judgment may meet its burden by establishing that the
evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would
be insufficient to carry the non-movant’s burden of proof at trial. Celotex
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its
burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must go beyond its

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pleadings, and designate specific facts with affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or answers to interrogatories demonstrating that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Discussion
In the present case, the defendants are separated into two groups:
(1) the Commonwealth Defendants—Pennsylvania State Troopers Mark
A. Kaye and Joseph J. Kulick, Jr.; and (2) Mt. Airy and the individual
Casino Defendants (collectively the “Casino Defendants”). Both the
Commonwealth Defendants and Casino Defendants have filed motions for
summary judgment. (Docs. 88 & 89). Collectively, they seek summary
judgment on all counts within plaintiffs’ amended complaint. The court will
address each motion separately.
Initially, the court notes that plaintiffs bring their federal law claims
against Commonwealth and Casino Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“Section 1983”). Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, create
substantive rights. Rather, it provides remedies for deprivations of rights
established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v.
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). Section 1983 states in
pertinent part:

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Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizens of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to establish a claim under Section 1983, two
criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of must have been
committed by a person acting under color of state law. Sameric Corp. of
Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). Second, the
conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution
or federal law. Id. Here, the Commonwealth and Casino Defendants only
contest whether their conduct deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional
rights. The court will, therefore, assume state action and only address the
alleged deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
I. Commonwealth Defendants
Plaintiffs allege three federal causes of action against the
Commonwealth Defendants pursuant to Section 1983: (1) false arrest; (2)
false imprisonment and (3) civil conspiracy. In response, the
Commonwealth Defendants assert qualified immunity precludes liability on
plaintiffs’ three federal claims.
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Qualified immunity insulates government officials who are
performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has
established a two-part analysis that governs whether an official is entitled
to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). We ask:
(1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the violation of a
constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id.; Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts may address the two
Saucier prongs in any order, at their discretion. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 232.
A right is clearly established if “it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Katz, 533
U.S. at 202). In cases of false arrest, qualified immunity shields state
actors from liability if “a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest]

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to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the
[arresting] officers possessed.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226
(1991) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). Law
enforcement officials who “reasonably but mistakenly conclude that
probable cause is present” are, therefore, entitled to immunity. Id.
The court will first address whether the facts establish a violation of
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The Commonwealth Defendants arrested
plaintiffs for criminal trespass. Under Pennsylvania’s criminal trespass
statute, “probable cause exists for an arrest for criminal trespass when the
facts and the circumstances are sufficient for a prudent person to believe
that the suspect: (1) entered or broke into a building or occupied structure,
(2) knowing that she or he had no license or privilege to do so.” Wright v.
City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3503(a)(2).
Commonwealth Defendants focus their qualified immunity argument
on the assertion that they had probable cause to issue citations to
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that defendants lacked probable cause. The
court agrees with the Commonwealth Defendants.
The Commonwealth Defendants had probable cause to arrest and

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issue plaintiffs criminal trespass citations. Although no precise definition
for probable cause exists, the Supreme Court has explained that police
officers possess sufficient probable cause when (1) there is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt determined from the totality of the circumstances,
and (2) the belief of guilt is particularized with respect to the individual
searched or seized. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); see
also Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding
probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within
the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
reasonable person to believe that the offense has been or is being
committed by the person to be arrested.).
Here, the Commonwealth Defendants’ comprehensive investigation
enhances their assertion that they had probable cause to issue criminal
trespass citations to plaintiffs. Specifically, the Commonwealth
Defendants spoke with Defendant Tasetano. Tasetano stated that
plaintiffs were at the casino on May 2, 2011, told to leave and directed
never to return. (Com. SMF ¶¶ 27, 30-31 & 58; Doc. 90-4, Dep. of Kaye
(hereinafter “Kaye Dep.” at 27)); Doc. 90-4, Kaye State Police
Investigation Report dated 8/16/11 at 1). The Commonwealth Defendants

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did not take Tasetano’s statements verbatim. Rather, they asked
Tasetano whether plaintiffs were issued trespass letters. (Kaye Dep. at
39-40). In response to the Commonwealth Defendants’ questioning,
Tasetano stated that plaintiffs would not produce identification on May
2nd. (Id.) As such, Tasetano failed to mail trespass letters because he
did not know plaintiffs’ identities or their mailing addresses. (Id.)
Additionally, the Commonwealth Defendants had no reason to
question Tasetano’s truthfulness because Tasetano had always given the
Commonwealth Defendants correct and accurate information. (Id. at 39,
44-45); see Karkut v. Target Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883-84 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (finding that the report of a trustworthy security guard establishes
probable cause for an arrest). In short, the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates that the Commonwealth Defendants did not deprive
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights because they had probable cause to
issue criminal trespass citations to the plaintiffs. As such, the
Commonwealth Defendants are entitled to assert qualified immunity,
which directs judgment as a matter of law in their favor on all of plaintiffs’
federal claims.

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II. Casino Defendants
Plaintiffs assert three federal claims against the individual Casino
Defendants: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment and (3) civil
conspiracy. Plaintiffs also state five state law causes of action against the
Casino Defendants: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) civil
conspiracy; (4) malicious prosecution and (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Casino Defendants contend that they are entitled
to summary judgment on all claims. The court will address plaintiffs’
federal and state law claims in seriatim.
A. False Arrest
Plaintiffs allege both sections 1983 and 1988 and state law false
arrest claims against the Casino Defendants. Under Pennsylvania state
tort law, a false arrest is “1) an arrest made without probable cause or 2)
an arrest made by a person without privilege to do so.” McGriff v.
Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997). “‘Arrest’ is defined
in § 112 of the Restatement [(second) of Torts] as ‘the taking of another
into the custody of the actor for the actual or purported purpose of bringing
the other before a court or of otherwise securing the administration of the
law.’” Gagliardi v. Lynn, 285 A.2d 109, 111 n.3 (Pa. 1971). Likewise,

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under federal civil rights law, a false arrest is an arrest made without
probable cause. Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.
1995). Such an arrest is a violation of the Constitution’s Fourth
Amendment. Id.
In the instant case, plaintiffs were arrested for criminal trespass
which, among other elements, requires that a person committing the
offense have prior notice that they are prohibited from entering a specific
place. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503(b)(1)(i). The plaintiffs and Casino
Defendants dispute whether Tasetano directed plaintiffs on May 2, 2011
not to return to the casino.
Plaintiffs aver that Tasetano failed to advise them on May 2, 2011
that they were never permitted to return. (Wynder Dep. at 97).
Additionally, plaintiffs contend that Mount Airy’s trespass policy requires
casino employees to identify individuals and mail corresponding trespass
letters. (Doc. 88-2, Ex. I., Dep. of Asbury (hereinafter “Asbury Dep.”) at
41). Plaintiffs, however, refused to provide identification on May 2, 2011,
and never received trespass letters. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that they
were ejected for the day only. (Wynder Dep. at 96-97).

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Casino Defendants contend that Tasetano informed plaintiffs that
they were trespassing on May 2, 2011 and directed them never to return.
(Doc. 88-2, Ex. J., Dep. Of Tasetano (hereinafter “Tasetano Dep.”) at 4758, 64). Furthermore, the Casino Defendants argue that Pennsylvania’s
trespass statute does not require written trespass letters. Rather,
Tasetano’s verbal directive never to return provided sufficient notice under
Pennsylvania’s trespass statute.
Here, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether
Tasetano directed plaintiffs never to return to the casino on May 2, 2011.
Because Pennsylvania’s criminal trespass statute requires an individual to
know that they have no right or privilege to enter a building, the issue of
what Tasetano said or did not say to plaintiffs on May 2, 2011 must be
decided by a jury. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude that Casino
Defendants may have lacked probable cause and falsely arrested plaintiffs
because Tasetano did not verbally advise plaintiffs on May 2, 2011 that
plaintiffs could never return. Thus, the Casino Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on this issue will be denied.

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B. False Imprisonment
Plaintiffs allege both sections 1983 and 1988 and state law false
imprisonment claims against Casino Defendants. To establish the tort of
false imprisonment under Pennsylvania state law, plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) he was detained; and (2) the detention was unlawful.
Gwynn v. City of Phila., 719 F.3d 295, 304 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Renk
v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289 (1994)). More specifically,
liability for false imprisonment attaches where: (a) one acts intending to
confine another within boundaries fixed by the actor, (b) his act results in
such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the
confinement or is harmed by it. Gagliardi, 285 A.2d at 111 n.2. Similarly,
an arrest made without probable cause may give rise to a civil rights claim
for false imprisonment under federal law. See James v. City of WilkesBarre, 700 F.3d 675, 683-84 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that a false
imprisonment claim under section 1983 “which is based on an arrest made
without probable cause . . . is grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable seizures.”).
In the instant case, the Casino Defendants’ false imprisonment
argument mirrors their false arrest argument–the Casino Defendants had

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probable cause to arrest plaintiffs. As previously stated, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Casino Defendants may have lacked probable cause and
falsely arrested plaintiffs. Ergo, the Casino Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs false imprisonment claims will be denied.
C. Civil Conspiracy
Plaintiffs allege both sections 1983 and 1988 and state law civil
conspiracy claims against Casino Defendants. To allege a civil conspiracy
claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish the elements of a state
law conspiracy claim. Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814 (3d
Cir. 1974). In Pennsylvania, those elements are: “(1) a combination of two
or more persons acting with a common purpose to do an unlawful act or to
do a lawful act by unlawful means or for an unlawful purpose; (2) an overt
act done in pursuance of the common purpose; and (3) actual legal
damage.” Phillips v. Selig, 959 A.2d 420, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
Additionally, proof of malice, or an intent to injure, is also an essential part
of a cause of action for conspiracy. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co.,
488 Pa. 198, 211 (Pa. 1979). “Bare conclusory allegations of ‘conspiracy’
or ‘concerted action’ will not suffice to allege a conspiracy. The plaintiff

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must allege an agreement or make averments of communication,
consultation, cooperation, or command from which such an agreement
can be inferred.” Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F. Supp. 922, 928 (M.D. Pa.
1992).
In support of their civil conspiracy claims, plaintiffs allege that the
Casino Defendants directed the Commonwealth Defendants to arrest
them. Plaintiffs also claim that the longstanding relationship between
State Trooper Kaye and Defendant Tasetano establishes that Kaye took
Tasetano’s version of events verbatim. (Kaye Dep. at 21-23). The Casino
Defendants contend that the undisputed facts fail to establish that the
Casino and Commonwealth Defendants acted with a common purpose to
unlawfully arrest plaintiffs. After careful review, the court agrees with the
Casino Defendants.
The Casino and Commonwealth Defendants did not act with a
common purpose to falsely arrest plaintiffs. As previously stated, the
Commonwealth Defendants conducted a comprehensive investigation
prior to issuing plaintiffs citations and did not simply take Tasetano’s
statements verbatim. Rather, they asked Tasetano whether plaintiffs were
issued trespass letters. (Kaye Dep. at 39-40). Tasetano replied that

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plaintiffs would not produce identification on May 2nd. (Id.) As such,
Tasetano had no idea who plaintiffs were and was unable to issue
trespass letters. (Id.)
Plaintiffs’ assertions do not extend beyond bare, conclusory
allegations and thus, do not permit a reasonable jury to reach the
conclusion that defendants conspired to arrest and imprison the plaintiffs.
Therefore, the court will grant the Casino Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on plaintiffs’ federal and state law civil conspiracy claims.
D. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiffs also allege a state law malicious prosecution claim against
the Casino Defendants. Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff asserting a
malicious prosecution claim must prove: (1) the institution of a proceeding
against plaintiff without probable case and with malice, and (2) the
proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s favor. Gilbert v. Feld, 842 F. Supp.
803, 814 (E.D. Pa 1993) (citing Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457,
463 (3d Cir. 1993); Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Local Union 249, 518 Pa.
517, 544 (1988)).
Plaintiffs allege that the Casino Defendants’ referral to the
Commonwealth Defendants instituted the criminal proceeding. Plaintiffs

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also argue that the Casino Defendants treated other solicitors differently,
which demonstrates malice. (Asbury Dep. at 58-65). Specifically, the
Casino Defendants wanted to make an example out of the plaintiffs that
the Casino Defendants would aggressively enforce their no solicitation
policy. (Id.) Finally, plaintiffs aver that the second element was met
because the criminal trespass proceedings terminated in their favor. (See
Doc. 81-1, Wydner docket 43402-NT-205-2011 at 1-2; Doc. 81-1, Luck
docket 430402-NT-206-2011 at 3-4).
Confronted with these facts, the Casino Defendants generally deny
that they “initiated the proceeding without probable cause or acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing plaintiffs to justice.” (Doc.
88, Commw. Br. in Support Mot. for Summ. J. at 20). The Casino
Defendants’ conclusory denial, however, does not satisfy their summary
judgment burden. Specifically, the Casino Defendants have failed to
establish that plaintiffs’ evidence would be insufficient to carry plaintiffs’
burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317 at 322. Thus, the court
rejects the Casino Defendants’ conclusory denial and will deny their
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s state law malicious prosecution
claim.

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E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, plaintiffs assert a state law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (hereinafter “IIED”). To prove an IIED claim under
Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
and that this conduct caused plaintiff severe emotional distress. Kazatsky
v. King David Memorial Park, 527 A.2d 988, 993 (Pa. 1987); Hoy v.
Angelone, 691 A.2d 476, 610 (Pa. Super. Ct.1996). “Extreme and
outrageous” conduct is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of human decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Strain v. Ferroni, 592 A.2d 698, 704 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate physical injury or harm.
Robinson v. May Department Stores Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (E.D.
Pa. 2003); see also Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 995 (requiring “at the very
least, [the] existence of the alleged emotional distress [to] be supported by
competent medical evidence”); Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass’n, 866
A.2d 1115, 1122-2323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (noting that “[i]n addition, a
plaintiff must suffer some type of resulting physical harm due to the

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defendant’s outrageous conduct.”).
Finally, at the summary judgment stage, the party alleging IIED must
present expert medical evidence of emotional distress. Robinson, 246 F.
Supp. 2d at 444 (granting summary judgment because plaintiff failed to
produce medical evidence of emotional distress); DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F.
Supp. 2d 255, 281 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that “[t]o recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must support the
claim of emotional distress with competent medical evidence, in the form
of expert medical evidence.”).
In the instant case, the court will deny plaintiffs’ IIED claim. Plaintiffs
allege emotional injury, but fail to provide copies of hospital records or
expert medical reports substantiating their emotional injury. Because
Pennsylvania law requires competent medical evidence to sustain a claim
for IIED, the Casino Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this
claim. See Hunger v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173, 178 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate
when a plaintiff fails to oppose a defendant’s summary judgment motion
with competent medical evidence supporting their claim).

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Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons stated above, the Commonwealth
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted, and the Casino
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and
denied in part. The Casino Defendants’ motion will be granted with
respect to plaintiffs’ section 1983 and state law civil conspiracy claims and
plaintiffs’ state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The
motion will be denied in all other respects.
Thus, the remaining claims are: Count One–section 1983 and 1988
false arrest and false imprisonment against the individual Casino
Defendants; Count Five–state law false arrest and false imprisonment
against Mt. Airy and the individual Casino Defendants and Count
Six–state law malicious prosecution against Mt. Airy and the individual
Casino Defendants. An appropriate order follows.

Date: 8/19/14

s/ James M. Munley
JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY
United States District Court

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