Njos v. Bureau of Prisons

Filing 221

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 147 MOTION Regarding The Suffieciency of an Answer and Objection filed by Scott Njos. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 2, 2015. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SCOTT NJOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant.

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CIVIL NO. 3:12-CV-1251
(Judge Kosik)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case

Scott Njos is a federal inmate housed at the United States Penitentiary,
Lewisburg, where he is currently serving an 188-month sentence following his
conviction on bank robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, escape, and assault on a federal
officer charges. While in federal custody, Njos has amassed an extensive disciplinary
history, having been cited on dozens of occasions with prison rules infractions, many
of which involved violent or disruptive behavior by Njos in an institutional setting.
This history of recidivism and on-going institutional misconduct led to the
reassignment of Njos to the Special Management Unit of the United States
Penitentiary, Lewisburg, where the plaintiff currently resides.

The parties are advised that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the district court
has orally referred the above-captioned case to the undersigned for pre-trial
management, resolution of non-dispositive motions, and preparation of reports and
recommendations on potentially dispositive matters.
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Njos is also a prolific litigator in federal court.2 Much of this litigation involves
Njos’ recurring complaint regarding the medical care and treatment which he receives
at the Lewisburg Penitentiary. The instant case is but one example of this growing
body of litigation brought by Njos. While this lawsuit has undergone several
transformations during the past three years that it has been pending before the court,
in its current form this case brings a single claim against a solitary defendant.
Presently, Njos is bringing a claim against the Federal Bureau of Prisons in this
case pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§504, 705, and 794(a). In essence,
Njos alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons is discriminating against him based
upon a disability which he suffers, in that federal prison official are excluding him
from prison programming based solely upon his disabilities. Njos describes these
disabilities as a history of bi-polar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, major
depressive disorder, and schizophrenia. (Doc. 83.)
Having framed his claim in this lawsuit in this fashion, Njos has now filed a
motion, described as a motion regarding sufficiency of answer and objection, (Doc.
147.), which takes issue with some of the responses which Njos has received to

See e.g., Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-243; Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-476;
Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2721; Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2816; Njos v. Thomas,
3:14-CV-766; Njos v. Bureau of Prisons, 3:12-CV-1251; Njos v. Kane, 3:12-CV1252; Njos v. Carney, 3:12-CV-1375; Njos v. United States, 3:15-CV-1960; Njos
v. Thomas, 3:14-CV-875.
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requests for admission from the defendant. Njos then demands that we direct a
criminal investigation and prosecution of those responsible for these responses under
18 U.S.C. §1001, a criminal statute which forbids false statements in matters within
the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States government.
Having considered this motion, for the reasons set forth below, the motion will
be denied.
II.

Discussion

In this motion, Njos appears to asks this Court to commence a criminal
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §1001. This he may not do. It is well established that
decisions regarding the filing of criminal charges are the prerogative of the executive
branch of government, are consigned to the sound discretion of prosecutors, and under
the separation of powers doctrine are not subject to judicial fiat. Indeed, it has long
been recognized that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a matter, “particularly
ill-suited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct.
1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). Recognizing this fact, courts have long held that a civil
rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing
the criminal prosecution of some third parties, finding that civil plaintiffs lack
standing to make such claims and concluding that such relief simply is unavailable in
a civil lawsuit. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Mehltretter, 20 Fed. Appx. 87, 90 (2d Cir.2001)

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(stating that “Ostrowski has no standing to sue for any of Mehltretter's actions. First
of all, he has not shown, injury-in-fact. The failure of Mehltretter to investigate or
prosecute Bybel did not injure him in any direct manner-he has no ‘personal stake in
the outcome’ of a perjury case brought against (or not brought against) another person
.”); See also Kim v. Romero, 877 F.2d 64, 1989 WL 67116 at *1 (9th Cir. June 14,
1989) (affirming the dismissal of a suit against various prosecuting authorities for their
failure to bring charges against a sheriff for alleged battery); McMinn v. Damiani, 765
F.2d 145, 1985 WL 13323 (6th Cir. May 3, 1985) (affirming the dismissal for lack of
standing a pro se civil rights case where plaintiff had sued state prosecuting authorities
for failing to investigate or prosecute claims against various state judges and lawyers);
Gessner v. Dep't of Corr., 3:14-CV-111, 2014 WL 972290 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2014);
Snyder v. Aaron, CIV.A. 05–1602, 2006 WL 544466 (W.D.Pa. Mar.6, 2006); Mover
v. Borough of North Wales, Civ. No. 00–1092, 2000 WL 1665132 at *2
(E.D.Pa.Nov.7, 2000) (stating that “Moyer has no judicially cognizable interest in
Timothy Conley's criminal prosecution. Accordingly, an agreement to refrain from
prosecuting Conley for sexual assault or to charge him with disorderly conduct or the
act thereof violates no constitutional right that Moyer has standing to assert.”); see
also Wise v. Augustine, Civ. No. 97–2651, 1997 WL 534695 at *2 (E.D.Pa. Aug.8,
1997) (stating that “[a] private citizen has no constitutional, statutory, or common law
right to require a public official to investigate or prosecute a crime.”); Dundore v.
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O'Donnell, Civ. No. 85–2907, 1985 WL 2681 at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept.17, 1985) (stating
that “Defendant O'Donnell is alleged to have refused to file the criminal charges
brought by plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs were no doubt aggrieved when O'Donnell
refused to file the charges, they have no constitutional right that I am aware of to have
criminal charges filed.”); Corbin v. Stevens, Civ. No. 91–1054, 1992 WL 96684 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. April 30, 1992) (stating that “[p]laintiff possesses no constitutional right to
have someone arrested....”).
III.

Order

For the foregoing reasons, Njos’ motion, described as a motion regarding
sufficiency of answer and objection, (Doc. 147.), which takes issue with some of the
responses which Njos has received to requests for admission from the defendant and
then demands that we direct a criminal investigation and prosecution of those
responsible for these responses under 18 U.S.C. §1001, a criminal statute which
forbids false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of agencies of the United
States government, is DENIED.
So ordered this 2d day of September 2015.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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