Njos v. Kane et al

Filing 110

MEMORANDUM ORDER - For the foregoing reasons, Njos motions which seek both additional discovery and an extension of the discovery deadlines in this three year old lawsuit. (Docs. 80 , 87 , and 97 .) are DENIED. Accordingly, the parties shall noti fy the Court by September 22, 2015, regarding: 1. The status of this case, including whether the parties consent to have this matter scheduled for trial by this Court, or referred to the District Court for the scheduling of any trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 8, 2015. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SCOTT NJOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant.

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CIVIL NO. 3:12-CV-1252
(Judge Kosik)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER1
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case.

Scott Njos is a federal inmate housed at the United States Penitentiary,
Lewisburg, where he is currently serving an 188-month sentence following his
conviction on bank robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, escape, and assault on a federal
officer charges. While in federal custody, Njos has amassed an extensive disciplinary
history, having been cited on dozens of occasions with prison rules infractions, many
of which involved violent or disruptive behavior by Njos in an institutional setting.
This history of recidivism and on-going institutional misconduct led to the

The parties are advised that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the district court
has orally referred the above-captioned case to the undersigned for pre-trial
management, resolution of non-dispositive motions, and preparation of reports and
recommendations on potentially dispositive matters.
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reassignment of Njos to the Special Management Unit of the United States
Penitentiary, Lewisburg, where the plaintiff currently resides.
Njos is also a prolific litigator in federal court.2 Much of this litigation involves
Njos’ recurring complaints regarding the conditions of his confinement at the
Lewisburg Penitentiary. The instant case is but one example of this growing body of
litigation brought by Njos. While this lawsuit has undergone several transformations
during the past three years that it has been pending before the court, in its current form
this case brings two torts claims against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1346, and 2671-2680.
Specifically, Njos alleges that the United States was negligent in the
maintenance of his cell after the cell walls were damaged during an earthquake which
struck the Eastern Seaboard in August of 2011. (Doc. 18.) According to Njos this
earthquake caused damage to his cell, which prison officials negligently failed to
repair despite Njos’ requests for repairs. This damage, in turn, created a dangerous
condition in the cell, a condition which resulted in injuries to Njos. In particular, Njos
alleges that he was standing on the toilet in his cell on August 28, 2011, cleaning the

See e.g., Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-243; Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-476;
Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2721; Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2816; Njos v. Thomas,
3:14-CV-766; Njos v. Bureau of Prisons, 3:12-CV-1251; Njos v. Kane, 3:12-CV1252; Njos v. Carney, 3:12-CV-1375; Njos v. United States, 3:15-CV-1960; Njos
v. Thomas, 3:14-CV-875.
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upper walls of the cell, all while resting his hand on the cell grate for support when the
“cell wall caved in were (sic) the earthquake had left cracks in the wall.” (Doc. 1, p.
2). Plaintiff states that the bricks surrounding the grate then suddenly caved in,
causing him to fall off of the toilet and injure his knee. (Doc. 18, ¶ 11.) Njos then
couples this negligence claim with a medical negligence claim relating to what he
alleges was a delay in treating his injured knee.
This case now comes before us for consideration of a brace of discovery
motions filed by Njos, motions which seek both additional discovery and an extension
of the discovery deadlines in this three year old lawsuit. (Docs. 80, 87, and 97.) The
government has responded to these motions, in part, by initially observing as follows:
Njos has served defendant with multiple discovery requests. On April
17, 2014, Defendant served on Njos responses to his 25 requests for
production of documents and interrogatories and responses to his 23
requests for admissions. On July 2, 2014, Defendant served on Njos
responses to his 20 requests for admissions and responses to his 10
requests for production of documents. On March 20, 2015, Defendant
received a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Fourth Request” which contains
numbered interrogatories for 6 individuals and the United States. The
interrogatories total 20. The same day Defendant received a second
document entitled “Plaintiff’s Third Request to Produce” which contains
8 numbered paragraphs requesting specific documents. These most
recent discovery requests were sent to the BOP attorney assigned to this
case with directions to forward the same to the individuals who are in a
position to best respond to the requests. Local Rule 33.3 provides that
requests for interrogatories are not to exceed 25 requests. Njos has
exceeded the limits provided by the local rules. Defendant has gone out
of its way to respond to Plaintiff’s requests despite the fact that Njos has
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exceeded number of requests allowable under the Local Rules. With that
said, the Defendant will continue to make a good faith effort to provide
complete and accurate responses to his most recent requests. As Njos has
exceeded the limit of discovery requests provided by the Local Rules,
and he is not entitled to initial disclosures, there is no reason to stay the
discovery deadline. Therefore, his motion should be denied.
(Doc. 82.)
Further, we note that at least one of these motions to compel, (Doc. 97.), was
filed a month after the discovery deadlines in this case had passed, and was, therefore,
untimely.
Having considered these motions, and the government’ response, for the reasons
set forth below, the motions will be denied and the parties will be directed to provide
a status report preparatory to scheduling the trial of this case.
II.

Discussion

Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a

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court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This
far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. One essential
attribute of the court’s discretion in this field is that the court may, and indeed must,
set schedules for the completion of discovery. When a party fails to abide by those

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schedules the court has the right, and the duty, to impose sanctions for that failure.
Those sanctions may, in the discretion of the court, include declining a party’s request
to compel compliance with untimely and improper discovery demands. Thus, where
a party has submitted an untimely discovery request, the court can, and in the exercise
of its discretion often should, refuse to compel compliance with that request. See, e.g.,
Maslanka v. Johnson & Johnson, 305 F.App’x 848 (3d Cir. 2008)(affirming denial of
pro se litigant motion to compel where discovery demands were untimely); Oriakhi
v. United States, 165 F.App’x 991 (3d Cir. 2006)(same); Bull v. United States, 143
F.App’x 468 (3d Cir. 2005)(same). As the court of appeals has noted in rebuffing a
similar effort by a tardy prisoner-litigant to compel responses to belated discovery:
[W]e discern no abuse of discretion with respect to [the inmateplaintiff’s] discovery and trial preparation issues. See Petrucelli v.
Bohringer and Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir.1995) (applying
“abuse of discretion standard when reviewing orders regarding the scope
and conduct of discovery”). [The inmate-plaintiff] filed a motion to
compel discovery after . . . after the expiration of the court-ordered
discovery period. The record confirms the District Court's conclusion
that [the inmate-plaintiff] failed to seek leave of court to extend the
discovery period. . . .”.
Oriakhi, 165 F.App’ x. at 994.
In this case, in the exercise of our discretion, we will deny these discovery
motions. Presently, this case involves a single simple claim of negligence relating to
the conditions of the plaintiff’s cell in August of 2011, when the plaintiff alleges that
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he suffered injuries. This simple and discrete claim has now been litigated for three
years, and as the government has detailed, has been the subject of extensive and
repetitive discovery demands.
The discovery deadline in this case lapsed in May of 2015, and the latest of
Njos’ discovery motions was filed after that deadline had passed. Given the relative
factual simplicity of this case, the extensive discovery conducted to date, and the
expiration of the existing discovery deadlines, we conclude that further discovery is
neither necessary, nor appropriate, in this case. Instead, this matter should be
scheduled for trial.
III.

Order

For the foregoing reasons, Njos’ motions which seek both additional discovery
and an extension of the discovery deadlines in this three year old lawsuit. (Docs. 80,
87, and 97.) are DENIED.
With the denial of these motions, the current status of this case that there are
no pre-trial motions pending, and discovery is now closed. At this stage of the
proceedings, the only remaining matters appear to relate to scheduling this case for
trial. The undersigned is unable to set a trial schedule for the district court, and it
would be imprudent for this Court to try set any further pre-trial schedule before the
undersigned unless the parties first consented to try this action before a magistrate
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judge. Accordingly, the parties shall notify the Court by September 22, 2015,
regarding:
1.

The status of this case, including whether the parties consent to have this
matter scheduled for trial by this Court, or referred to the District Court
for the scheduling of any trial.

So ordered this 8th day of September 2015.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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