Flynn v. Department of Corrections et al
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)As discussed earlier, under Woodford prisoners are required to comply with grievance system procedural rules when exhausting their administrative remedies. Since the undisputed record establishes t hat Flynn' s failure to do so resulted in the rejection of his complaints of retaliation, a finding of non-exhaustion and entry of summary judgment under the well settled Spruill and Woodford standards is appropriate. Rema i ning Defendants ' request for summary judgment will be granted. An appropriate Order will enter.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 3/4/16. (cc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONALD FLYNN,
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-12-1535
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ET AL.,
(Judge Conaboy)
Defendants
Donald Flynn, an
confined at the State
Correctional Institution, Coal Township, Penn
Twp.), initiated this pro se civil
U.S.C.
§
(SCI-Coal
ac
pursuant to 42
1983.
By Memorandum and Order
ed
t 26, 2013, Defendants'
motion seeking partial dismissal was
Specifically,
dismissal was granted in favor of De
s Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (DOC) and the
llowing DOC officials,
Secretary John Wetzel; Chief Grievance Off
Chief Hearing Examiner Robin Lewis.
Dorina Varner; and
Doc. 33, p. 18.
Dismissal
was also entered in favor of the following SCI-Coal TWp.
Defendants:
Hearing Examiner Kerns-Barrj Unit Manager Charles
Custer; Major Miller; Licensed Psychologist Manager (LPM) John
Sidler; Cam II Michael Corbacio; Correct
Deputy Superintendent Rhonda Ellet;
1
1
1
f
Richards; exMcCarty; Unit
Manager Williams; Correctional Officer Lahr; and C a i n
Scicchitano.
By Memorandum and Order dated February 3, 2015, Remaining
Defendants' motion for
su~oary
judgment was partially granted.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of Defendant Mail Room
Inspector Terese Jellen and favor of the Remaining Defendants with
respect to the POC conditions of confinement claims on the basis of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
Remaining Defendants are the following five SCI-Coal Twp.
offic
s:
Superintendent David Varano; Captain Charles Stetler;
Correctional Officer Nowell; as well as Lieutenants Shipe and R.E.
PI
iff's surviving claims contend
he was subjected
to retaliation by Defendants Stetler, Shipe, Long, and Varano
because he filed a grievance regarding JPay; and improper
confiscat
of legal materials by Defendants Nowell and Long.
Presently pending is Rema
Defendants' second motion
seeking entry of summary judgment.
Doc. 68.
The opposed
motion is ripe for consideration.
Discussion
Remaining Defendants contend that they are entit
of summary judgment on the grounds
d to entry
(I) Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation
related allegations; and (2) Flynn did not suffer any injury to a
non-frivolous legal effort
respect to his claim
Defendants Nowell and Long confiscated his legal material.
2
Standard of Review
is proper if "the pleadings, the discovery
SUITmary j
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to a j
P. 56(c); See also
Cir. 2001).
as a matter of law."
~~===-~-===~-=~~,
A factual
260 F.3d 228, 231 32 (3d
is "material" if it might a fect the
outcome of the suit under
applicable law.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
"genuine" only if there is a suffi
would allow a reasonable
t
A
factual dispute is
ent evidentiary basis
at
finder to return a verdict for
. at 248.
non-moving party.
. R. Civ.
The court must resolve all doubts
as to the existence of a
issue of material fact in favor of
the non-moving party.
, 260 F.3d at 232; see
Sybron Transition Corp., 142 F.R.D. 607, 609 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
Unsubstantiated arguments made in briefs are not considered
evidence of asserted facts.
F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d C
Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984
. 1993).
Once the moving
has shown that there is an absence of
of the non-moving party, t
evidence to support the c
moving party may not s
its complaint.
(1986) .
See
back and rest on the all
~~~~~~~~~~~~,
Instead, it must
affidavits, or by the depos
admissions on file,
s
non
477 U.S. 317, 324
beyond the pleadings and
ions, answers to interrogator
specific facts showing that
3
in
[its] own
s, and
is
a genuine issue for trial."
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see
also Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted).
Summary
judgment should be granted where a party "fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at
trial."
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
- regardless of whether it is
"'Such affirmative evi
nce
or circumstantial - must
amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the
evaluation
the court) than a preponderance.'"
Saldana, 260 F.3d
at 232 (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458,
460 61 (3d Cir. 1989».
Access to the Courts
Plaintiff claims that his cell was searched on August 12,
2010 by De
Nowell allegedly
filing of a grievance.
retaliation for Flynn's
Doc. 1, p. 3.
Flynn indicates that
although he was told that the search was investigative,
bel
f that the search was retaliatory.
is his
During this search Flynn
contends that 243 pages of his legal materials were confiscated by
Remaining Defendants Nowell and Long.
Remaining Defendants assert that to the extent that
Plaintiff is asserting a denial of access to the courts claim
against Remaining Defendants Nowell and Long, said allegation must
fail because Flynn "does not identify any nonfrivolous, meritorious
underlying cause of action as having been impeded by the
confiscation of alleged legal materials."
4
Doc. 69, p. 8.
brief vaguely asserts that the destruction of
Plaintiff's oppos
his
rsonal
rse ef
rs has had an
Post Conviction ReI
fAct (PCRA)" petition which
Philadelphia County Court of Common pleas.
Prisoners enjoy a constitutional ri
to the law libraries, legal
...':!....!--=~:..:.:.,
a
o~
Pen~sylvania's
filed in tne
Doc. 7 5, p. 1.
of meaningful access
als, or legal services.
430 U.S. 817, 821-25 (1977).
Bounds
Inmates have a right to
send and receive legal mail which is uncontroverted and implicates
both First and Sixth Amendment concerns, through the right to
petition the government and the right of access to the courts.
"when legal mail is read by prison employees, the risk is of a
'chill,' rendering the prisoner unwilling or unable to raise
substant
employees."
legal issues critical of
prison or prison
Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (E.D.
Pa. 1992).
The United States Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 351-54 (1996), clarified that an inmate plaintiff, in order to
set forth a viable claim under Bounds, must demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.
A
plaintiff must also allege an actual injury to his litigation
1.
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et ~ The PCRA "permits
motions for post-conviction collateral relief for allegations of
error, including ineffect
assistance of counsel, unlawfully
induced guil
pleas, improper obstruction of rights to appeal by
Commonwea h officials, and violation of constitutional
provisions." Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 251 (3d Cir.
1991).
5
efforts.
Under the standards mandated by
~~~,
in order for an
inmate to state a claim for interference with his legal work, he
must demonstrate that he has suffered actual injury.
See Oliver v.
Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that Lewis
effectively requires a showing of actual injury where interference
with legal mail is alleged).
Following a careful review of the Complaint, it is clear to
this Court that Flynn has failed to adequately demonstrate that he
suffered any injury to a non-frivolous
under
claim as required
In response to Plaintiff's opposing brief the
Remaining Defendants have provided a copy of the docket from
Flynn's Philadelphia County PCRA proceeding.
See Doc. 76.
Based
upon a review of that docket, there is no indication that the
alleged interference by Remaining Defendants Nowell and Long caused
Flynn to suffer any adverse determination with respect to his PCRA
action or any other matter
was pursuing in federal or state
court.
Accordingly, this Court agrees that entry of summary
judgment should be granted in favor of Nowell and Long with respect
to any denial of access to the court claim.
Administrative Exhaustion
Plaintiff asserts that he filed a grievance on August 8,
2010 regarding the implementation of "the J-Pay system and refusing
to accept money orders."
Doc. 1, p. 3, i
2.
It is alleged that
Defendants Stetler, Shipe, Long, and Varano retaliated against him
6
for filing that grievance by placing him in the prison's Restricted
Housing unit (RHU) and issuing him a
refused to withdraw the grievance.
sconduct charge when he
He also contends that an August
12, 2010 cell search was also retaliatory.
Remaining Defendants claim ent
lement to summary judgment
with respect to the claim that he was subjected to retaliation
initiating a grievance regarding JPay because Flynn failed to
properly exhaust his administrative remedies.
Pla
iff's oppos
brief asserts that
his argument is meritless
because he fully exhausted Grievance # 332131.
Section 1997e(a) of t
See Doc. 69, p. 2.
See Doc. 75, p. 1.
le 42 U.S.C. provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under Section 1979 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States
(42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other federal
law, by a
isoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.
Section 1997e(a) requires administrative exhaustion
"irrespect
of the forms of relief sought and offered through
administrative avenues.
u
~~~~~~~~~,
122 S.Ct. 983, 992
(2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 u.S. 731, 741 n. 6 (2001).
for monetary rel
requirement.
Claims
f are not excused from the exhaustion
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 74 (3d Cir. 2000).
Dismissal of an inmate's claim is appropriate when a prisoner has
f
led to exhaust his available administrative remedies before
bringing a c
1 rights action.
Ahmed v. Sromovski, 103 F. Supp.
7
2d 838, 843 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
"Elxhaustion must occur prior to
filing suit, not while the suit is pending."
Cir. 2000)(cit
F.3d 1152, 2000 WL 167468, *2
Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6
States, 165
Tribe v. Harvey, 248
C
Freeman v.
. 1999)); Oriakhi v. United
. Appx. 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006).
An inmate is not required to specifically plead or
demonstrate exhaustion in his or her complaint.
549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007);
Cir. 2002)(a
he has exhau
Jones v. Bock,
see also Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d
soner does not
administrat
to allege
remedies).
his complaint
, pursuant to
standards announced in Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d
Cir. 1997),
of non-exhaust
Supreme Court
568, 573 (3d
is the burden of a defendant asserting the defense
to plead and prove it. 2
The
States
Jones noted that the primary purpose of the
prison offic
exhaustion requirement is to al
Is to address
complaints before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to
the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving
litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a
useful record.
The administrative exhaustion mandate also implies a
procedural default component.
(3d Cir. 2004).
Appeals, a
Spruill v. Gillis 372 F.3d 218, 222
As explained by the Third Circuit Court of
default rule "prevents an end-run around the
2.
In Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d C . 2003), the
t similarly
United States Court of Appeals for the Third C
stated that "[flailure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense for the de
to plead."
8
exhaustion requirement."
. at 230.
It also ensures "prisoner
compliance with the specific requirements of the
evance system"
and encourages inmates to pursue their administrative grievances
"to the fullest."
Similarly, the Supreme Court has observed
that proper exhaustion of available administrative remedies is
mandatory, meaning that prisoners must comply with the grievance
system's procedural rules, incl
time limitations.
Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized
that "[t]here is no futil
requirement.
y
ion" to the exhaustion
Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citing Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 75.
A subsequent decision by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated its no futility exception by
rejecting an inmate's argument that exhaustion should be excused
because prisoner grievances were regularly rejected.
Smith, 186 Fed.
Appx. 271, 274 (3d Cir.
2006).
Hill v.
The Court of
Appeals has also rejected "sensitive' subject matter or 'fear of
retal
ion' as a basis for excusing a prisoner's failure to
exhaust."
Pena-Ruiz v. Solorzano, 281 Fed. Appx. 110, 113 (3d Cir.
2008).
A Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System has been
established by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC").3
Section V of DC-ADM 804 (effect
December 8, 2010) states that
"every individual committed to its custody shall have access to a
3. The DOC's grievance system has been pe
9
lly amended.
formal procedure through which to seek the resolution of problems
or other issues of concern arising during the course of
confinement."
See Doc. 29, p. 8.
It adds that the formal
procedure shall be known as the Inmate Grievance System and
provides a forum of review and two (2) avenues of appeal.
Section
VI ("Procedures") of DC-ADM 804 provides that, after attempted
informal resolution of the problem, a written grievance may be
submitted to the Facility Grievance Coordinator within fi
een (15)
working days after the events upon which the claims are based, but
allowances of extensions of time will be granted under certain
circumstances.
An appeal from the Grievance Coordinator's In
ial Review
decision may be made in writing within ten (10) working days to the
Facility Manager or Superintendent.
presented within fifteen
A final written appeal may be
(15) working days to the Secretary's
Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA).
A prisoner, in
seeking review through the DOC grievance system, may include
reasonable requests for compensation or other legal reI
available from a court.
f normally
However, an improperly submitted grievance
will not be reviewed.
A declaration under penalty of perjury submitted by SCI-Coal
Twp. Superintendent's Assistant/Grievance Coordinator Trisha Kelley
acknowledges that Plaintiff filed Grievance # 332131 regarding his
allegations of retaliation including his assertion of retaliatory
placement in administrative custody.
See Doc. 71-1.
However, his
grievance was rejected at all administrative levels because issues
10
relating to placement in administrative custody and disciplinary
custody cannot be addressed through the grievance process.
Doc. 71-2, p. 1.
See
Rather, any such administrative custody appeals
are to initiated through the DOC ' s Administrative Custody
Procedures .
Accompanying copies of the grievance and responses confirm
that Grievance # 332131 raised claims regarding retaliatory
mistreatment and was not addressed on its merits because it raised
an issue pertaining to placement in administrative custody.
Rather, the gri eva nce was rejected at all levels of the
administrative review process.
As discussed earlier, under Woodford prisoners are required
to comply with grievance system procedural rules when exhausting
their administrative remedies.
Since the undisputed record
establishes that Flynn ' s failure to do so resulted in the reje ction
of his complaints of retaliation, a finding of non-exhaustion and
entry of summary judgment under the well settled Spruill and
Woodford standards is appropriate .
Rema i ning Defendants '
for summary judgment will be granted.
requ est
An appropriate Order will
enter.
DATED: MARCH
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2016
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