Adderly v. Stofko et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Edwin M. Kosik on 8/11/2015. (emksec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NATHANIEL L. ADDERLY,

:
:
:
:
: CIVIL NO. 3:CV-12-1546
:
: (Judge Kosik)
:
:

Plaintiff
v.
C.O. STOFKO, et al.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Nathaniel L. Adderly, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. On February 3, 2015, the court addressed a motion to dismiss filed by
all fifteen (15) Defendants, fourteen of whom are former or current employees at the
Luzerne County Correctional Facility (“LCCF”), Pennsylvania. (Docs. 41, 42.) The
motion to dismiss was granted, but Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to submit an
amended complaint in this action. Instead of filing an amended pleading, Plaintiff
filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s decision. (Doc. 43.) For the
reasons that follow, the motion will be denied, and Plaintiff will be provided one final
opportunity to file an amended complaint.
I.

Background
The complaint filed by Plaintiff is 544 paragraphs in length, and with exhibits,

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numbers 85 pages. The pleading includes numerous allegations and spans the time
period from August of 2011, when Plaintiff entered LCCF, through August of 2012.
Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth a host of allegations including, but not limited to,
challenges to his placement, continued confinement and conditions in Protective
Custody (“PC”), being made to wear a “caution yellow uniform” which he claims is
stigmatizing, the physical and mental deterioration he is suffering, numerous
incidents of retaliation, the issuance of numerous false misconducts, incidents of
excessive force, the denial of due process, conspiracy, and deprivation of personal
and legal property. He seeks declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive
relief.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the
pleading should be stricken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and (d)(1), and that any
allegations related to Plaintiff’s placement in protective custody fails to allege
conduct violating the Constitution. (Doc. 35 at 3.) In considering Defendants’
motion, the court first found that the complaint failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a) and (d)(1). Specifically, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a claim for relief
contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) requires that each allegation be simple, concise and
direct. The court agreed with Defendants that Plaintiff’s submission is a running
narrative far from a brief, concise and direct pleading of the allegations and, at many

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points, filled with irrelevant information and general conclusions. Moreover,
Plaintiff asserted a conspiracy in an effort to tie together all of the allegations set
forth, but failed to offer any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy. As such,
without these necessary facts, a violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 was also apparent from
the face of the complaint.
The complaint clearly violated the spirit of Rule 8, in that it was anything but
short, simple, concise and direct. Second, while Plaintiff loosely weaves general
allegations of the existence of a retaliatory conspiracy intermittently through the
complaint, he does not offer any facts supporting the elements of a conspiracy.
Without such allegations, the complaint is in direct violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.
While agreeing with Defendants that the complaint, as submitted, failed to
satisfy the above-referenced Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that
leave should be granted to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to submit a proper amended
complaint. In the court’s Memorandum, Plaintiff was provided with the parameters
for submitting his amended complaint.
Defendants also moved to dismiss any challenge by Plaintiff to the fact that he
was placed in Protective Custody. While their argument was well-taken, the court
also afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to amend this claim in an effort to state a viable
claim. With respect to Plaintiff’s challenge to his custody classification in PC upon
his arrival at LCCF, the court found that it is well established that the United States

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Constitution does not confer any right upon an inmate to any particular custody or
security classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 (1976); Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Thus, inmates do not have a liberty interest in
retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status “[a]s long as the
[challenged] conditions or degree of confinement is within the sentence imposed ...
and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution.” Id. There is also no liberty
interest created directly by the Fourteenth Amendment that prevents an inmate from
being subjected to AC status. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Moreover, in this context, the Supreme Court has concluded that state-created liberty
interests could arise only when a prison’s action imposed an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin,
515 U.S. at 483.
To succeed on his claim, Plaintiff must allege that his status in PC subjected
him to atypical and significant hardship. The Third Circuit made clear in Griffin v.
Vaughn, 112 F.23d 703, 706 & n. 2 (3d Cir. 1997), which remains intact following
Shoats, that a prisoner placed in the conditions of AC for a period of 15 months does
not implicate a liberty interest.
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he did not allege that his classification had any effect
on the length of his overall criminal sentence. However, he did allude to other
conditions of his confinement which may amount to an atypical and significant

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hardship if properly pled. As such, the court found that in filing his amended
complaint, Plaintiff would be provided with the opportunity to set forth facts with
respect to any such claim of atypical and significant hardship.
Instead of submitting an amended complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that his complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. He contends that his complaint consists of two parts, the short, concise
and direct pleadings, and then a longer, more detailed discussion of the facts of his
claims. He argues that it is better for the court to have more information to enable it
to make an informed decision with respect to his claims. He further argues that the
documents he submits, when read together with the exhibits, clearly demonstrate
retaliation/conspiracy. In support of his claim, he pieces together various statements
in his complaint and then references different portions of exhibits as examples.
II.

Standard of review
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration “is to correct manifest errors of

law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Kabacinski v. Bostrom Seating,
Inc., 98 F. App’x 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d
906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)). Because “federal courts have a strong interest in the finality
of judgments,” United States v. Hoey, No. 09-200, 2011 WL 748152, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 15, 2011)(citation omitted), the standard that must be met to prevail on a motion
for reconsideration is high, see Berry v. Jacobs IMC, LLC, 99 F. App’x 405, 410 (3d

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Cir. 2004).
The court may grant a motion for reconsideration if the moving party shows:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence
which was not available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent a manifest injustice. United States v. Banks,
Crim. No. 03-245, 2008 WL 5429620, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2008)(citing Max’s
Seafood Café by Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Motions for reconsideration are not a tool to re-litigate and reargue issues which have
already been considered and disposed of by the court, see Hoey, 2011 WL 748152, at
*2 (citation omitted), or for addressing arguments that a party should have raised
earlier, see United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732-33 (3d Cir. 2010)(quotations
omitted). Rather, such a motion is appropriate only where the court misunderstood a
party or where there has been a significant change in law or facts since the court
originally ruled on that issue. Hoey, 2011 WL 748152, at *2. The mere
dissatisfaction with the court’s ruling is not a proper basis for reconsideration.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 73 F.Supp.2d 485, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
III.

Discussion
In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff mistakenly believes that the court

dismissed his complaint because he was overly inclusive with respect to the facts he
alleges. He misinterprets the underlying basis of the court’s Memorandum of

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February 3, 2015. The complaint was dismissed, with leave to amend, because
Plaintiff set forth 544 rambling paragraphs which was 85 pages in length, including
exhibits. His assertions contained many irrelevant details and spanned incidents
occurring over the period of one year. A rambling submission such as Plaintiff’s
made it very difficult for Defendants to determine what claims Plaintiff desired to
assert. As such, the impertinent and unnecessary material made framing an Answer
unnecessarily complicated. See Drysdale v. Woerth, Civ. No. 98-3090, 1998 WL
966020 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1998).
Moreover, because many of the incidents occurred at different times and
involved completely different defendants, Plaintiff’s conclusory statements
suggesting a “retaliatory conspiracy” without more, were clearly insufficient to set
forth entitlement to relief on said basis, as well as overcome an apparent Rule 20
violation. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). For these reasons, the court dismissed the
complaint and granted Plaintiff permission to cure these deficiencies. Accordingly,
the pending motion for reconsideration will be denied. An appropriate order follows.

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