Martinez v. Jones et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - the plaintiffs motions to compel(Docs. 40 and 42 .) are DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on May 29, 2015. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. JONES, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 3:12-CV-1547
(Judge Caputo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. This lawsuit began on August 8, 2012,
when the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants,
used excessive force during an unplanned use of force in which he claims to have
sustained injuries, and engaged in retaliatory treatment, cruel and unusual punishment
in the form of a denial of meals, and due process violations stemming from internal
misconduct actions. In the course of this litigation the district court issued a standard
case management order, directing that discovery be completed by October 14, 2014.
(Doc. 25.) That case management order then had to be modified after the plaintiff
refused to submit to a deposition by failing to appear after proper notice. (Doc. 27.)
The new discovery deadline was extended to December 29, 2014.
This case now comes before the court for resolution of a discovery dispute.
Specifically, in April of 2015, four months after the expiration of the discovery
deadline, Martinez has moved to compel the production of various investigative
records, staff personnel files, as well as video and audio tapes that may exist and
relate to these three year old incidents. (Docs. 40 and 42.) The defendants have
responded to this motion, (Doc. 48.), arguing that the discovery demands were first
made after the discovery deadline had expired, are untimely, and that much of what
Martinez seeks either does not exist or is not subject to disclosure. Accordingly, this
matter is now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the motions to compel will be denied.
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. . . .
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the
scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
– including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
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a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. One essential
attribute of the court’s discretion in this field is that the court may, and indeed must,
set schedules for the completion of discovery. When a party fails to abide by those
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schedules the court has the right, and the duty, to impose sanctions for that failure.
Those sanctions may, in the discretion of the court, include declining a party’s request
to compel compliance with untimely and improper discovery demands. Thus, where
a party has submitted an untimely discovery request, the court can, and in the exercise
of its discretion often should, refuse to compel compliance with that request. See,
e.g., Maslanka v. Johnson & Johnson, 305 F.App’x 848 (3d Cir. 2008)(affirming
denial of pro se litigant motion to compel where discovery demands were untimely);
Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F.App’x 991 (3d Cir. 2006)(same); Bull v. United
States, 143 F.App’x 468 (3d Cir. 2005)(same). As the court of appeals has noted in
rebuffing a similar effort by a tardy prisoner-litigant to compel responses to belated
discovery:
[W]e discern no abuse of discretion with respect to [the inmateplaintiff’s] discovery and trial preparation issues. See Petrucelli v.
Bohringer and Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir.1995) (applying
“abuse of discretion standard when reviewing orders regarding the scope
and conduct of discovery”). [The inmate-plaintiff] filed a motion to
compel discovery after . . . after the expiration of the court-ordered
discovery period. The record confirms the District Court's conclusion
that [the inmate-plaintiff] failed to seek leave of court to extend the
discovery period. . . .”.
Oriakhi, 165 F.App’ x. at 994.
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Beyond this requirement of timeliness, Rule 26's broad definition of that which
can be obtained through discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege
still cabin and restrict the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues.
Furthermore, the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant
information” a concept which is defined in the following terms:
“Relevant
information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573
(D.Kan. 2009).
Furthermore, in a prison setting, inmate requests for information relating to
security procedures can raise security concerns, and implicate a legitimate
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governmental privilege, a governmental privilege which acknowledges a
governmental needs to confidentiality of certain data but recognizes that courts must
balance the confidentiality of governmental files against the rights of a civil rights
litigant by considering:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by
discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the
impact upon persons who have given information of having their
identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental selfevaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or
evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an
actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending
or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the
investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available
through other discovery or from other sources; and (10) the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Moreover, to the extent that litigants seek personnel files in discovery, courts
have long recognized that:
Although personnel files are discoverable, they contain confidential
information and discovery of them should be limited. See, e.g., ReaganTouhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir.2008) (“Personnel
files often contain sensitive personal information ... and it is not
unreasonable to be cautious about ordering their entire contents
disclosed willy-nilly.... This is not to say personnel files are
categorically out-of-bounds.”); Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112,
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115 (E.D.Pa.1994) (“[P]ersonnel files are confidential and discovery
should be limited.”). The court must weigh the right to relevant
discovery against the privacy interest of non-parties. The court finds
that plaintiff is not entitled to the entire personnel records of all the
individuals without a more particularized showing of relevance.
Harris v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Operations, Inc, No. 09-1449, 2010 WL
4683776, *5 (M.D.Pa Nov. 10, 2010). Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115
(E.D. Pa. 1994)(“personnel files are confidential and discovery should be limited.”).
In addition, one other immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when ruling
on motions to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the
production of things that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of
evidence by parties who attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an
adversary in litigation. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare
Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL
5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL
975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Martinez’s
various discovery requests.
First, we note that these discovery demands, which were first propounded
months after the discovery deadline had elapsed and years after the events giving rise
to this lawsuit are untimely. Further, at least some of the items the plaintiff seeks
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reportedly do not exist since prison officials would not have been able to videotape
what was an unplanned use of force. When these discovery demands are untimely,
and for the most part seek material which does not exist, the proper exercise of our
discretion in this field calls for us to deny this motion to compel. See, e.g., Maslanka
v. Johnson & Johnson, 305 F.App’x 848 (3d Cir. 2008)(affirming denial of pro se
litigant motion to compel where discovery demands were untimely); Oriakhi v.
United States, 165 F.App’x 991 (3d Cir. 2006)(same); Bull v. United States, 143
F.App’x 468 (3d Cir. 2005)(same).
As for the belated requests for access to prison personnel files, disciplinary
records, prison investigative records, we note first that the request for disclosure of
this information may violate the privacy rights of third parties. See Mincy v.
Chmielewski, No. 05-292, 2006 WL 3042968 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 25, 2006)(denying
access to third-party complaints on privacy grounds). Likewise, we understand the
need to keep some prison investigative records confidential. We note that the
defendants have objected to the release of certain unidentified investigative records
citing the substantial security concerns, and staff safety issues, which may arise in this
setting if these records were to be released. We find this response persuasive and,
therefore, will decline to authorize the belated, and wholesale disclosure of these
documents on the grounds that such disclosure may gravely impair institutional
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security. See e.g., Banks v. Beard, 3:CV-10-1480, 2013 WL 3773837 (M.D. Pa. July
17, 2013); Mearin v. Folino, CIV.A. 11-571, 2012 WL 4378184 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24,
2012). We also conclude that Martinez has not made a sufficient showing at this late
date to gain access to otherwise confidential personnel files. Harris v. HarleyDavidson Motor Co. Operations, Inc, No. 09-1449, 2010 WL 4683776, *5 (M.D.Pa
Nov. 10, 2010).
Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D. Pa.
1994)(“personnel files are confidential and discovery should be limited.”).
An appropriate order follows.
III.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 29th day of May 2015, the plaintiff’s motions to compel
(Docs. 40 and 42.) are DENIED.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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