Matthews v. Cameron et al
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)However, in order to keep this matter moving forward, within thirty (30) days of the termination of Petitioners state court proceedings regarding any pending unexhausted federal claim, he will be r equired to file a written status report with the Court detailing the conclusion of his state court exhaustion efforts and including a copy of the relevant Superior and/or Supreme Courts dispositions. Failure to timely file the required written statu s report may be deemed a failure to prosecute. Upon demonstration by Petitioner that his state court proceedings have concluded with respect to his pending unexhausted claims, the stay issued in this matter will be lifted, until such time this matte r will be marked closed for administrative purposes. In the alternative, if Petitioner wishes to proceed solely with his exhausted claims and with the understanding that by doing so he may simply file an amended § 2254 petition within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Memorandum and Order containing those claims which have been exhausted in state court. Matthews is again warned that if he chooses to do so he risks being forever barred from presenting in federal court any claim not pr esented in his amended petition, Upon the timely filing of such an amended petition, this matter will be reopened. An appropriate Order will enter. re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Thomas Harvey Matthews Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 5/21/14. (cc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS HARVEY MATTHEWS,
:
:
Petitioner
:
:
v.
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-12-1759
:
WARDEN CAMERON,
:
(Judge Conaboy)
:
Respondent
:
_________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
This pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 was initiated by Thomas Harvey Matthews, an
inmate presently confined at the Benner State Correctional
Institution, Bellefonte, Pennsylvania (SCI-Benner). Service of
the Petition was previously ordered.
Matthews states that he was convicted of aggravated
assault, assault, corruption of minors, and indecent assault
following a 2006 jury trial in the Pike County, Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas.1
On November 2, 2006, Petitioner was
sentenced to an aggregate eleven and one half (11½) to twentyfour (24) year term of imprisonment.2
On direct appeal to the
1
Respondent clarifies that Matthews was convicted of 2
counts of aggravated indecent assault, 19 counts of indecent
assault; and 2 counts of corruption of minors. See Doc. 7, ¶ 1.
The charges stemmed from actions allegedly taken against two female
students by Petitioner while he was employed as an elementary
school teacher.
2
The Respondent adds that Matthews was also designated as
(continued...)
1
Pennsylvania Superior Court, Petitioner raised the following five
issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish indecent
assault against the two student victims; (2) the cases against
the two victims should have been severed; (3) the trial court
erred by not excluding the testimony of a third student; (4) the
trial court erred in concluding that Matthews was a sexually
violent predator; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing the statutory maximum sentence for each count.
See
Doc. 8-15, p. 6.
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on
January 4, 2008 by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
See
Commonwealth v. Matthews, 947 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 2008)(Table).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied Matthews’
petition for allowance of appeal by decision dated October 1,
2008.
See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa.
2008)(Table).
Thereafter, Matthews sought collateral relief via an
August 20, 2009 petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).3
He was represented by counsel
2
(...continued)
being a sexually violent predator pursuant to Pennsylvania’s
Megan’s Law.
3
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. One of the
avenues for relief in the Pennsylvania legal system is collateral
relief under the PCRA, "which permits motions for post-conviction
collateral relief for allegations of error, including ineffective
assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty pleas, improper
obstruction of rights to appeal by Commonwealth officials, and
violation of constitutional provisions." Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941
(continued...)
2
during this proceeding.
A hearing on the matter was conducted by
the Court of Common Pleas on February 19, 2010.
Petitioner’s
PCRA action which asserted claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel was denied on April 26, 2010.
Matthews appealed that decision to the Superior Court.
His PCRA appeal raised three issues: (1) trial counsel was
ineffective for not requesting a failure to promptly complain
about instructions; (20 the trial court erred in not providing
the failure to promptly complaint instruction; and (3) trial
counsel was deficient for introducing damaging evidence that was
previously ruled inadmissible.
See Doc. 8-22, Exhibit 18, p. 4.
The PCRA appeal was denied by the Superior Court on March 22,
2011.
See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 26 A.3d 1202 (Pa. Super.
2011)(Table).
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Superior Court on May 10, 2011.
See id.
By decision dated
January 30, 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Matthews’
petition for allowance of appeal.
38 A.3d 824 (Pa. 2012)(Table).
See Commonwealth v. Matthews,
This pro se petition, dated
August 27, 2012, was thereafter filed.
Respondent notes that following the initiation of this
matter, Matthews filed a second, pro se, PCRA petition on October
11, 2013 in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas.
18.
See Doc. 7, ¶
His second PCRA action was dismissed by the Court of Common
3
(...continued)
F.2d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 1991).
3
Pleas on November 13, 2012.4
It is unclear as to whether
Petitioner appealed the dismissal of that action.
Ground One of Matthews’ present petition claims
entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief on the basis that
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by allowing the
introduction of potentially damaging evidence which the trial
court had previously ruled was inadmissible.5
Petitioner
indicates that this argument was included in his initial PCRA
action.
He further contends that trial counsel failed to object
to improper cross examination and present witnesses that could
have created reasonable doubt.
See Doc. 1, ¶ 12.
Ground Two claims that the Commonwealth violated
Petitioner’s right to a fair trial by manipulating the meaning of
the memorandum (impeachment evidence) and tampering with the
victims’ testimony to establish a pattern.
Matthews concedes
that this argument was not previously presented to the
Pennsylvania state courts.
See Doc. 1, pp. 7-8.
Petitioner’s next argument (Ground Three) maintains that
the trial court violated due process by falsely stating that
counsel had requested a prompt complaint instruction and by
4
An addendum filed by Matthews generally asserts that his
second PCRA action has noting to do with his federal habeas corpus
petition. See Doc. 11, p. 1.
5
In a letter subsequently submitted to this Court
Petitioner explains that by having him testify his trial counsel
opened the door for introduction of a memorandum as impeachment
evidence that was previously ruled to be inadmissible. See Doc. 9,
p. 3. Matthews adds that his counsel could have diffused the
impeachment evidence by objecting to its introduction and/or by
introducing another memorandum but failed to do so.
4
imposing a sentence in excess of the applicable guidelines.
It
is also asserted that sequestered witnesses were allowed visitors
and that a transport order was not issued for him to attend an
appellate proceeding.
Matthews’ pending petition also indicates
that this argument was not presented before the Pennsylvania
state courts.
See id. at p. 8.
Respondent states that Petitioner’s pending claims
“may be subject to further state court legal analysis if the
Petitioner files additional actions in state court.”
23.
Doc. 7, ¶
The Respondent further contends that two of the three
grounds presently raised by Matthews (his challenges to actions
attributed to the Commonwealth and the trial court) “are
unexhausted as they are raised for the first time in this federal
action and have not been presented in the Pennsylvania state
courts.”
Id. at ¶ 27.
The response concludes that since the
matter before this court is a mixed petition it is subject to
dismissal as it contains unexhausted claims.
See id. at ¶ 29.
Discussion
The exhaustion requirement is not a mere formality.
It
serves the interests of comity between the federal and state
systems, by allowing the state an initial opportunity to
determine and correct any violations of a prisoner’s federal
rights.
Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2004).
The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[U]nder 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(c), such a petitioner ‘shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ...
5
if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented.”
Wenger v. Frank,
266 F.3d 218, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2001).
“A state prisoner is generally barred from obtaining
federal habeas relief unless the prisoner has properly presented
his or her claims through one ‘complete round of the State’s
established appellate review process.’”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (internal citations omitted); O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)(while exhaustion does not
require state prisoners to invoke extraordinary remedies, the
state courts must be afforded one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues via completion of the State's established
appellate review process). The Supreme Court in O’Sullivan
explained, that state prisoners must “file petitions for
discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary
appellate review procedure in the State.”
Id. at 847.
The
Supreme Court added that, in determining whether a state prisoner
has preserved an issue for presentation in a federal habeas
petition, it must be determined not only whether a prisoner has
exhausted his state remedies, but also whether he has properly
exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly presented
his claims to the state courts.
See id. at 848.
Fair presentation requires that the “substantial
equivalent” of both the legal theory and the facts supporting the
federal claim are submitted to the state courts, and the same
method of legal analysis applied in the federal courts must be
6
available to the state courts.
Evans v. Court of Common Pleas,
959 F. 2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134
F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997).
Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are made when:
(1) the state corrective process is so deficient as to render any
effort to obtain relief futile, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); (2) acts of
state officials have, in effect, made state remedies unavailable
to the petitioner, Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 184 (3d
Cir. 1987); or (3) "inordinate delay" in state proceedings has
rendered state remedies ineffective.
Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d
402, 405 (3d Cir. 1994); Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d
52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986).
Ground One claims entitlement to federal habeas corpus
relief on the basis that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by allowing the introduction of potentially damaging
evidence which the trial court had previously ruled was
inadmissible.
Petitioner further contends that trial counsel
failed to object to improper cross examination and present
witnesses that could have created reasonable doubt.
With respect
to the issue of exhaustion, Matthews asserts that Ground One was
included in his PCRA action and was therefore exhausted in state
court.
Based upon a review of the Superior court’s denial of
Matthews’ direct appeal it does not appear that any portion of
Ground One was raised in that proceeding.
Petitioner’s PCRA appeal to the Superior Court does appear
to have included the claim that trial counsel’s performance was
7
deficient for allowing the introduction of potentially damaging
evidence which the trial court had previously ruled was
inadmissible.
However, based upon a review of the Superior
Court’s decision, Matthews’s PCRA appeal did not include his
additional Ground One arguments that trial counsel failed to
object to improper cross examination and present witnesses that
could have created reasonable doubt. See Doc. 8-22, Exhibit 18,
p. 4.
With respect to Ground Two (the Commonwealth violated
Petitioner’s right to a fair trial by manipulating the meaning of
the memorandum and tampering with testimony), Matthews indicates
that said issue was not pursued on direct appeal because
appellate counsel was concentrating on ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.
See Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶ (b).
Petitioner further
admits that the argument was not included in his PCRA action.
See id. at ¶ (d).
Based upon Matthews’ own admission as well as
a review of the relevant state court decisions which have been
submitted by Respondent, this Court agrees with Respondent’s
contention that this claim is unexhausted.
In regards to Ground Three (the trial court violated due
process by lying about the prompt complaint instruction being
asked for and by imposing a sentence in excess of the applicable
guidelines), Petitioner indicates that said arguments were not
raised in either his direct appeal or his PCRA action.
p. 8. ¶¶ (c) & (d).
See id.,
However, based upon a review of the Superior
Court’s decision with respect to Matthews’ PCRA appeal, it is
8
apparent that the substance of the Ground Three prompt complaint
instruction claim was raised in that proceeding and therefore was
exhausted in Pennsylvania state court.
18, p. 4.
See Doc. 8-22, Exhibit
It also appears that the Ground Three excessive
sentence claim was arguably raised in Matthews’ direct appeal.
See Doc. 8-15, Exhibit 11, p. 6.
However, there is no
indication that the remaining arguments included in Ground Three,
that sequestered witnesses were allowed visitors and that a
transport order was not issued for him to attend an appellate
proceeding were previously raised in state court.
Although Petitioner has not set forth any argument which
would warrant a finding that exhaustion should be excused with
respect to his unexhausted pending claims, in both Rhines v.
Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) and Crews v. Horn, 360 F. 3d 146 (3d
Cir. 2004), a § 2254 petitioner filed a timely but mixed (one
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) federal habeas
corpus petition.
Both Rhines and Crews addressed arguments that
federal habeas petitions should be held in abeyance while
unexhausted claims were exhausted in state court because those
claims might be time barred upon returning to federal court due
to the time limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).6
The United States Supreme Court in Rhines, recognized that
under such “limited circumstances” district courts have
discretion to stay a mixed § 2254 federal habeas corpus petition
so that the petitioner can pursue review of his unexhausted
6
Matthews has also not provided any indication to this
Court that he only wishes to proceed with his exhausted claim.
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claims in state court.
Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277.
The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Crews similarly recognized that
in order to avoid an unfair result, “when an outright dismissal
could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack, a stay is
the only appropriate course of action.”
Crews, 360 F.3d at p.
154 (internal citations omitted).
As in Crews, Matthews should not face the prospect of
forfeiting federal court review of any pending unexhausted claim.
Given Petitioner’s pro se status and out of an abundance of
caution,
Crews counsels in favor of a stay of litigation in this
case while Matthews, if he so elects, can seeks state court
review of his multiple pending unexhausted federal claims.
However, in order to keep this matter moving forward,
within thirty (30) days of the termination of Petitioner’s state
court proceedings regarding any pending unexhausted federal
claim, he will be required to file a written status report with
the Court detailing the conclusion of his state court exhaustion
efforts and including a copy of the relevant Superior and/or
Supreme Court’s dispositions.
Failure to timely file the
required written status report may be deemed a failure to
prosecute.
Upon demonstration by Petitioner that his state court
proceedings have concluded with respect to his pending
unexhausted claims, the stay issued in this matter will be
lifted, until such time this matter will be marked closed for
administrative purposes.
In the alternative, if Petitioner wishes to proceed solely
with his exhausted claims and with the understanding that by
10
doing so he may simply file an amended § 2254 petition within
fourteen (14) days of the date of this Memorandum and Order
containing those claims which have been exhausted in state court.
Matthews is again warned that if he chooses to do so he risks
being forever barred from presenting in federal court any claim
not presented in his amended petition, Upon the timely filing of
such an amended petition, this matter will be reopened.
appropriate Order will enter.
S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED:
MAY 21, 2014
11
An
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