Matthews v. Cameron et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Pursuant to the above discussion, Petitioner has not established entitlement to equitable tolling and despite his entitlement to statutory tolling for the pendency of his initial PCRA action his &# 167; 2254 petition was clearly filed after the expiration of the § 2244(d) limitations period. Consequently, this matter is clearly time barred and is precluded from consideration. An appropriate Order will enter. Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 6/19/18. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS HARVEY MATTHEWS,

:
:
Petitioner
:
:
v.
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-12-1759
:
WARDEN CAMERON,
:
(Judge Conaboy)
:
Respondent
:
_________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
Thomas Harvey Matthews, an inmate presently confined at
the Benner State Correctional Institution, Bellefonte,
Pennsylvania (SCI-Benner) filed this pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Following the filing

of a response to the petition, this Court issued a Memorandum and
Order dated May 21, 2014 which determined that adjudication of
this habeas corpus action should be stayed.

See Doc. 15.

By Order dated January 6, 2016, Petitioner was granted
leave to file an amended petition containing only those pending
claims which he had exhausted in state court.

See Doc. 24.

An

amended petition (Doc. 26) and supporting memorandum (Doc. 25)
were thereafter filed by Matthews and this matter was reopened.
After being granted an extension of time, the Respondent filed a
response to the amended petition.

1

Matthews was convicted of two (2) counts of aggravated
indecent assault, nineteen (19) counts of indecent assault, and
two (2) counts of corruption of minors following a 2006 jury
trial in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas.

The charges

stemmed from the repeated molesting of two minor girls between
1997-1999 at the Shohola Elementary School in Pike County,
Pennsylvania.1

During the relevant time period, Matthew was

employed as the victims’ third grade teacher.2
Following a sentencing hearing, Matthews was designated as
a sexually violent sexual predator and sentenced to an aggregate
eleven and one half (11½) to twenty-four (24) year term of
imprisonment in November, 2006.
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on
January 4, 2008 following a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court.

See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 947 A.2d 828 (Pa.

Super. 2008)(Table).

On direct appeal to the Pennsylvania

Superior Court, Petitioner raised the following five issues: (1)
the evidence was insufficient to establish indecent assault
against the two student victims; (2) the cases against the two
victims should have been severed; (3) the trial court erred by
not excluding the testimony of a third student; (4) the trial

1

Neither victim reported the offenses to anyone until
years later.
2

The girls were not in the same class.
also testified against Matthews.
2

A third victim

court erred in concluding that Matthews was a sexually violent
predator; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the statutory maximum sentence for each count.

See Doc.

8-15, p. 6.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied
Matthews’ petition for allowance of appeal by decision dated
October 1, 2008.
(Pa. 2008)(Table).

See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 958 A.2d 1047
Matthews did not seek further review from the

United States Supreme Court.
On August 20, 2009, Matthews file an action pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).3

Following

appointment of counsel, submission of an amended PCRA petition,
and an evidentiary hearing, relief was denied on April 26, 2010.
Matthews filed a PCRA appeal to the Superior Court which raised
three issues: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not
requesting a failure to promptly complain instructions; (2) the
trial court erred in not providing the failure to promptly
complaint instruction; and (3) trial counsel was deficient for
introducing damaging evidence that was previously ruled
inadmissible.

See Doc. 8-22, Exhibit 18, p. 4.

3

The PCRA permits motions for post-conviction collateral
relief for allegations of error, including ineffective assistance
of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty pleas, improper obstruction
of rights to appeal by Commonwealth officials, and violation of
constitutional provisions." Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 251
(3d Cir. 1991).
3

The PCRA appeal was denied by the Superior Court on March
22, 2011.

See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 26 A.3d 1202 (Pa. Super.

2011)(Table).

A motion for reconsideration was denied by the

Superior Court on May 10, 2011.

See id.

By decision dated

January 30, 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Matthews’
petition for allowance of appeal.
38 A.3d 824 (Pa. 2012)(Table).

See Commonwealth v. Matthews,

This pro se petition was

thereafter filed on August 27, 2012.
After the initiation of this action, Petitioner filed a
second PCRA petition on October 11, 2012 which was subsequently
dismissed.
Ground One of Matthews’ pending Amended Petition claims
entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief on the basis that
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by allowing the
introduction of potentially damaging evidence which the trial
court had previously ruled was inadmissible.4

Petitioner further

contends that his trial counsel failed to object to improper
cross examination and present witnesses and documents that could
have created reasonable doubt.

See Doc. 26, ¶ 12.

Ground Two claims that trial counsel was also deficient
for not requesting that a prompt complaint instruction be given
to the jury.

See id.

In a subsequent addendum (Doc. 33),

4

Petitioner explains that by having him testify his trial
counsel opened the door for introduction of a memorandum as
impeachment evidence that was previously ruled to be inadmissible.
See Doc. 9, p. 3. Matthews adds that his counsel could have
diffused the impeachment evidence by objecting to its introduction
and/or by introducing another memorandum but failed to do so.
4

Matthews additionally maintains that the trial court acted
improperly by imposing a sentence in excess of the applicable
guidelines.
Respondent seeks dismissal of the amended petition on the
grounds that it is untimely, many of Petitioner’s claims were
procedurally defaulted, and trial counsel’s performance did not
constitute ineffective assistance was reasonable strategy.
Discussion
Timeliness
Respondent initially argues that Matthews’ action was not
timely filed and is therefore subject to dismissal.5
p. 21.

See Doc. 36,

Mathews has not opposed this argument.
It is initially noted that Petitioner’s original § 2254

petition is dated August 27, 2012,6 and will be deemed filed as of
that date.

See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)(a prisoner’s

action is deemed filed at the time it is given to prison
officials for mailing to the Court).
Section 2244(d) of Title 28 of the United States Code
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation
shall apply to an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run
from the latest of -

5

It is noted that the Respondent’s response to the
Original Petition did not raise the timeliness issue.
6

See Doc. 1, p.14.
5

(A) the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
for seeking such review . . .
(d)(2) The time during which a properly
filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review
with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under
this subsection.
See generally, Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d. 153, 157 (3d Cir.
1999).

Under the plain terms of § 2244(d)(1)(A), the period of

time for filing a habeas corpus petition begins to run when the
period for direct review expired.

See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209

F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000)(“upon conclusion of direct review of
a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to
file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running
of the period is suspended for the period when state postconviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”)(emphasis
in original).
The running of limitations period is suspended for the
period when properly-filed state post-conviction proceedings are
pending in any state court.

See

Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 243

(3d Cir. 2001)(an untimely PCRA petition does not toll the
statute of limitations for a federal habeas corpus petition);
Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 165-66 & n. 6 (3d Cir.
2003)(federal courts are bound by state court’s determination
that PCRA petition was untimely and thus not “properly filed”).
However, the period during which a Section 2254 applicant
could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the

6

United States Supreme Court from denial of an application for
state post conviction or other collateral relief does not defer
the commencement of the limitations period.

See Lawrence v.

Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333-36 (2007).
It is additionally noted that the

“one-year filing

requirement is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional
rule, and thus a habeas petition should not be dismissed as
untimely filed if the petitioner can establish an equitable basis
for tolling the limitations period.”

Jones, 195 F.3d at 159,

citing Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145
F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998).
Respondent’s pending untimeliness argument agrees that
Petitioner’s direct appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court on October 1, 2008 and that Matthews did not seek further
review.

As such, the Respondent correctly points out that under

the principles announced in § 2244(d)(1)(A) the limitations
period began to run ninety days later, as of December 30, 2008,
when the period for seeking review by the United States Supreme
Court expired.
Second, the Respondent also concedes that the running of
the limitations period was thereafter statutorily tolled during
the period when Petitioner’s initial PCRA action was pending
before the Pennsylvania state courts (August 20, 2009 - January
30, 2012).

While Matthews did file pursue a second PCRA action,

it was filed after the initiation of this action and therefore
not relevant to this timeliness discussion.

7

A review of the submitted record establishes that the one
year limitations period began to run as of December 30, 2008 and
continued to August 20, 2009, a total of 233 days.

The clock

restarted on January 30, 2012 and concluded on June 10, 2012, 132
days later.

This matter was not filed until August 27, 2012 (86

days late).
Based upon those unopposed determinations regarding
statutory tolling, Matthews’ pending federal petition was not
initiated within the § 2244(d) one year limitations period.
Petitioner makes no argument that he is entitled to
equitable tolling. “[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears
the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been
pursuing his claims diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way.”
408, 418 (2005).

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

A habeas petitioner may establish grounds for

equitable tolling by showing that (a) the government has actively
misled the petitioner; (b) the rights in question were timely
asserted, but in the wrong forum; or (c) the petitioner has in
some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights.”
Jones, 195 F.3d at 159.

“In non-capital cases, attorney error,

miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not
been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary’ circumstances for
equitable tolling.” Fahy , 240 F.3d at 244.
Nor does equitable tolling extend to claims of excusable
neglect.

Irwin, Dept. Of Veterans’ Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96

(1990).

In Johnson v. Hendricks, 314 F. 3d 159, 163 (3d Cir.

8

2002), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated that
attorney error was not a sufficient basis for equitable tolling.
Based upon an application of the standards announced in
Pace, Jones, and Fahy, there are no facts presented or apparent
from the record which could establish that Matthews’ failure to
timely pursue his pending federal claims was caused by being
misled by the Commonwealth, or that pursuit of those arguments
was otherwise prevented in some extraordinary fashion.

It is

also noted that this is not a case where the Commonwealth
allegedly failed to produce favorable evidence to a criminal
defendant.
Pursuant to the above discussion, Petitioner has not
established entitlement to equitable tolling and despite his
entitlement to statutory tolling for the pendency of his initial
PCRA action his § 2254 petition was clearly filed after the
expiration of the § 2244(d) limitations period.

Consequently,

this matter is clearly time barred and is precluded from
consideration.

An appropriate Order will enter.7

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge

DATED: JUNE 19, 2018

7

In light of this determination, discussion of the
Respondent’s remaining arguments is not required.
9